Gujarat High Court
Koteshvaram Aadimulam Modaliyar vs State Of Gujarat on 9 October, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025
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Reserved On : 24/09/2025
Pronounced On : 09/10/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 1815 of 2014
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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KOTESHVARAM AADIMULAM MODALIYAR & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR RS SANJANWALA, SR. ADVOCATE with ROHAN LAVKUMAR(9248) for
the Petitioners
MR CHINTAN DAVE, APP for the Respondent No. 1
SERVED BY PUBLICATION IN NEWS for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
CAV JUDGMENT
1. The petitioners have filed the petition invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India r/w section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "the Code") claiming following relief:-
"A) YOUR LORDSHIPS, in the exercise of powers under Article 226 Of the Constitution of India read with Section 492 Of the Cr.P.C, be pleased to quash and set aside the charge sheet dated 7.12.2009 filed against the accused and all further proceedings arising out of the Criminal Case No. 1113 of 2009;Page 1 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined (B) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to stay further proceedings arising out of Criminal case No 1113 of 2009, in the interest of justice; (C) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to grant any other and further relief/s, as may be deemed fit, in the interest of justice."
2. Brief facts of the case are as under:-
2.1 The Volvo prime mover (in short "the truck") bearing registration No.KA 01 D 4095 attached with trailers of 138 wheels bearing registration Nos. GJ 12 Z 4075, GJ 12 Z 4074 and GJ 12 Z 4078 was carrying turbine engine on 30 th July 2009 and started its journey from Mundra. and was to be offloaded at GSPC, Pipavav at Amreli. The accused No. 5 was riding the truck; the accused Nos. 3 and 4 carried out the work of loading of turbine engine into trailers and accused Nos.1 and 2 were under obligation to supervise entire transportation. The distance between Mundra and Pipavav being 450 km was to be completed within 10 or odd days covering 40 km per day. The truck travelled for nine days covering distance of around 340 km and when it reached on 3rd sagment of the bridge constructed over Shetrunji river, the bridge was suddenly collapsed. The truck, which was carrying turbine engine, fell in the river taking loss of five employees of M/s JM Baxi and company, which was primarily responsible for transportation. The FIR therefore was registered by the Deputy Executive Engineer, NHAI against the accused for the offences punishable under sections 279, 304(A), 337, 338 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 117, 184 of the Page 2 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined Motor Vehicles Act and Section 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, which was registered as CR No.1 I of 98 of 2009 with Talaja Police Station, Bhavnagar.
The police has taken up the investigation of the offence and at the end of investigation, the police found sufficient evidence to file charge sheet. The charge sheet came to be filed before the learned JMFC, Talaja for the aforestated offences, which was registered as Criminal Case No.1113 of 2009. Thereafter, process was issued to the petitioners. In turn, the petitioners filed an application Exh.6 under section 239 of the Code to discharge the accused on the ground that no criminal rashness or negligence of any of the manner is marked in the charge sheet. By detailed and comprehensive order, the learned trial court rejected the application and directed the petitioners to remain present for framing of the charge on 27th September 2013.
2.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned JMFC for refusing to discharge the petitioners, Criminal Revision Application No.1 of 2014 has been filed before the learned Single Judge under section 397 of the Code.
2.3 By judgment and order dated 25 th April 2014, the learned 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar camp at Mohuva, dismissed the revision application.
2.4 Hence this petition.
3. The petitioners have essentially invoked the jurisdiction Page 3 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined under section 226 of the Constitution of India r/w section 482 of the Code, however, the law is settled on the issue that trial courts' order is not amenable to the jurisdiction under section 226 of the Constitution of India. [See Neeta Singh and Ors Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others rendered in Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No.13578 of 2024]. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala appearing for the petitioners, therefore submitted that the petition may be treated as filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India r/w section 482 of the Code, as it challenges the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned courts below declining to discharge the petitioners.
4. In background of the above factual aspect, learned Senior counsel Mr. Sanjanwala assisted by learned advocate Mr. Rohan Lavkumar for the petitioners would submit that the learned Courts below grossly erred in not discharging the petitioners from the charges levelled in charge sheet, as the learned courts below have been carried away by death of five persons in the road accident. He would further submit that plain reading of the charge sheet papers disclose a road accident and resulted into death of 5 persons, except that no whisper of words like criminal rashness or negligence is envision in the matter. He would further submit that the truck loaded with turbine engine in trailers of 138 wheels driven by one of the petitioners has travelled substantial part of total journey from Mundra to Shetrunji River without any untoward incident, however, unfortunately, when the truck was reached on the bridge over the Shetrunji River and was Page 4 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined trying to pass 3rd segment of the bridge, the bridge collapsed and due to which, the truck along with the trailers fell in the river resulted into death of five persons.
5. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that scene of this road accident does not attract rash act, which can be said to be an over hasty act of the petitioners or even deliberate act. He would further submit that due to the reason beyond the control of the petitioners, the bridge over the Shetrunji river collapsed, resulting into the accident taking life of 5 persons. He would further submit that the incident is heart wrenching, as it has taken life of five persons, but it lacks the applicable rashness or negligence on the part of the petitioners. Referring to judgment in case of Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam Vs. State of A.P., (2000) 7 SCC 72, learned Senior counsel would submit that if the prosecution fails to prove rash act or applicable rashness or criminal negligence at the first impression, the petitioners may not be sent for a trial. In case on hand, it is submitted that charge sheet papers, as are failed to espy even remotely any criminal rashness or negligence, they are insufficient to frame charge against the petitioners. The learned courts below have committed serious error in dismissing the discharge application ignoring all these aspects.
5.1 Learned Senior counsel would further submit that the FIR was registered by Deputy Executive Engineer, NHAI, however, he referred to Annexure B to submit that by letter dated 1st December 2009, the Deputy Executive Engineer, Page 5 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined NHAI, Mahuva wrote a letter to the learned JMFC, Talaja to drop the complaint proceedings against the petitioners on the ground that M/s JM Baxi and company, which is owner of the truck, agreed to pay expenses for reconstruction or repairing of segment 3 of the bridge on Shetrunji river and therefore, the Deputy Executive Engineer has no objection and they did not want to proceed further with the FIR. This indicates that substantial part of the FIR against the petitioners has been resolved. He would further submit that essentially, the FIR was registered as 3rd segment of the bridge on Shetrunji river was collapsed and due to which, the NHAI has suffered a huge loss, but since it has been paid by M/s JM Baxi and company, now the offence does not survive.
5.2 Referring to charge sheet counter, learned Senior counsel would submit that according to the investigating officer, the truck was plying on the public road without obtaining any permission from the appropriate officer. He would further submit that the charge sheet counter is silent on the issue that permission from which authorized officer has not been obtained. He would further submit that it is omnibus and general allegation without specifying authority from which permission required. He would further submit that in fact, the truck started its journey from Mundra, which was intercepted by the RTO and penalty of Rs.1,40,000/- was levied. Further, the motor vehicle inspector had levied penalty of Rs.40,000/- considering the fact that the vehicle is oversize and overweight, but thereafter, they have permitted the truck to move further to complete its transportation, Page 6 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined which indicates that at no point of time, the authorized government officer either requirement of any permission or criminal rashness or negligence or any deliberate act on the part of the petitioners, which attracts the offences punishable u/s 279 and 304A of the IPC being core to the accusation made against the accused.
5.3 Referring to role of each accused, learned Senior counsel would submit that accused Nos.1 and 2 were responsible to supervise the entire journey; accused Nos.3 and 4 were given task to load and offload the turbine engine and accused No.5 was plying the truck with turbine. Looking to the aspect, he would submit that the learned Courts below have committed serious error. The concurrent findings arrived by the learned Courts below are wholly unsustainable and deserve to be set aside by allowing this petition.
5.4 Upon above such submissions, learned Senior counsel Mr. Sanjanwala requests to allow the petition by quashing and setting aside the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned Courts below and to discharge the petitioners.
6. Per contra, learned APP Mr. Chintan Dave would submit that the petition is essentially filed under the supervisory jurisdiction defined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that challenge is made to the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned Courts below, though in the relief, it is prayed to quash the charge sheet, but it cannot be done since the petitioners exhausted remedy available u/s 239 of the Code. He would further submit that at Page 7 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined the most, this Court can examine the correctness of the orders passed by the learned Courts below under supervisory jurisdiction. He would further submit that to make out a case for relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have to establish that non-intervention of the High Court under supervisory jurisdiction would cause miscarriage of justice. It is further submitted that to arrive at such findings, the petitioners are required to establish that the orders called in question are so arbitrary that no prudent man can ordinarily come to such decision.
6.1 Learned APP took this Court through the order passed by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the learned Sessions Court in revisional jurisdiction and stressed that the learned Courts below found sufficient evidence to put the petitioners to trial. He would further submit that the findings of the learned trial Court indicates that prima facie case is made out against the petitioners on bare perusal of the charge sheet papers. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has recorded subjective satisfaction on existence of sufficient material to proceed with trial against the petitioners.
6.2 It is also submitted by learned APP that at the time of deciding discharge application, the learned trial Court is not required to sift and weigh the evidence as it is appreciated during trial. The learned trial Court was required to assess the charge sheet material in the limited space to see that whether sufficient material exists to put the accused to trial. If it is established on record that sufficient material is Page 8 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined available to put the accused to trial, the Court ordinarily should decline to discharge the accused. He would also submit that prima facie presumption of correctness of charge sheet papers is available. Thus, learned APP submitted that the learned Courts below since have not committed any error much less error of law leading to miscarriage of justice, the petition is arid of merit.
6.3 With above submissions, learned APP prays to dismiss the petition.
7. Though served, none appears for the private respondent.
8. At the outset, it is to be noticed that the petitioners invoked powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India r/w section 482 of the Code, but in petition, the petitioners challenged orders passed by the learned Courts below declining to discharge the petitioners. Therefore, essentially, the petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Nomenclature of the petition suggests so. I may therefore analyze the supervisory power of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It provides superintendence over all the courts and Tribunal within the State or within the jurisdiction of the High Court except those Tribunal, which are dealing in cases of armed forces. The High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can interfere with the order of subordinate Court or Court below within their bounds. It can correct jurisdictional error, procedural irregularities or violation of natural justice. Prevention of miscarriage of Page 9 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined justice and maintaining judicial discipline is the main plank under judicial superintendence of the High Court. However, Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not permit High Court to assume jurisdiction of appellate Court or revisional Court. Every error of facts or law may not be corrected in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, except those leading to miscarriage of justice. This being a discretionary jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only when occasion arise to keep subordinate courts or Tribunal within the bounds of their authority.
9. The constitutional bench of Hon'ble Apex Court was called to examine the superintending power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India way back in the year 1954 in case of Waryam Singh Versus Amarnath, 1954 AIR SC 215. In para 13, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-
"13. This power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C. J., in 'Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V/s. Sukumar Mukherjee', to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower Courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower Courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by Sec. 13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on which in an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 we should interfere. The appeal, therefore, Page 10 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined must stand dismissed with costs."
9.1 In Mani Nariman Daruwala Versus Phiroz N.Bhatena with Meharji K.Kajrkaria Versus Phiroz N.Bhatena, 1991 (3) SCC 141, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can set aside or or ignore the findings of fact of an inferior Court or tribunal if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. The Hon'ble Apex Court made it clear that except aforesaid permissible limited intervention, High Court has no jurisdiction to intervene or interfere with the findings of fact.
9.2 In Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Versus Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi Deceased Through His Heirs And Legal, 1995 (6) SCC 576, the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly expounded that the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. In recent past, the Hon'ble Apex Court examined the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
9.3 In case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Versus Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 62 held as under:-
Page 11 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.Page 12 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and
(f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised Page 13 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined suo motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality."
9.4 Again the nature of scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was examined in case of Sameer Suresh Gupta Through Pa Holder Versus Rahul Kumar Agarwal, 2013 (9) SCC 374, which reads as under:-
Page 14 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined "6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai.
After considering various facets of the issue, the two- Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 694-96, para 38) "(1)Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has Page 15 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.
(6) A patent error is an error which is self- evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.
(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings.
Page 16 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.
(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case."
9.5 With profit, let refer judgment in case of Garment Crafts Vs. Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 15 and 16 enlightening the nature of scope of the supervisory Page 17 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as under:-
"15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal [Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 217]. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional1 jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed:-
"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the Page 18 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to."
10. Keeping in mind the limited space available to this court for interference under Article 227 of the constitution of India, examination of the order passed by the learned trial court indicates reason that the truck along with trailers loaded with turbine engine, totally weighing more than 250 ton, started its journey from Mundra to Pipavav. At no point of time, the petitioners put any government authority to the notice of plying such vehicle or has received any permission from any of the government department permitting to ply such heavy vehicles. Twice, the truck along with the trailers were intercepted by the RTO officers on the ground of not carrying any permission and mischief of it being oversized and overloaded. At both the times, the vehicle was fined with Rs.1,40,000/- and Rs.40,000/- respectively; yet, the petitioners did not stop its vehicle, but continue its plying that too Page 19 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined without obtaining any requisite permission. This prima facie indicates that throughout, the transportation of the vehicle was without any permission from the competent authority. The learned trial court examined statement of witness Hiralal and considered the fact that vehicle started its journey from Mundra to Pipavav without taking any permission, which prima facie established that offence is made out. The argument of learned Senior Advocate that the vehicle travelled almost 2/3 of the total length of journey without any hindrance and thus, no culpable negligence can be attributed would not sustain. The gravity of the offence is that 5 persons have lost their life. The vehicle being a very big and oversized vehicle without taking any precaution and without examining the weight loading capacity entered into the territory of bridge of Shetrunji river. The bridge could not bear and sustain the load and collapsed and slumped at third segment. Apt to note that it is not transportation of ordinary vehicle. It is a very heavy vehicle being a truck attached with trailers having 138 wheels loaded with turbine engine and the weight of which was more than 250 to 285 ton at the relevant time decided to transport around more than 400 km without any authority/permission received from the government officials or from the RTO officer. Had the appropriate authority been informed about travelling of this vehicle with specific route, the appropriate authority would not have permitted the truck to travel from a particular road or on particular bridge.
11. Learned Senior Advocate, though argued vehemently to find fault with the orders of the learned courts below, failed to Page 20 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined point out or notice a single document in the charge sheet, which favours the case of the petitioners to discharge them. Argument that no culpable rashness or overhasty act is attracted, could be a good defence, but at this stage of deciding discharge application is insufficient of merit or rather is based upon speculation.
12. Another argument was canvassed that on the bridge of the Shetrunji river, no signboard was kept that the bridge is dangerous and no oversize vehicles are permitted to ply. This could also be a good defence and could be argued after evidence is led, but it cannot be a reason to discharge the petitioners.
13. The learned trial court, refers to the judgment in case of Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja and others, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Shoraj Singh Ahlawat and others Vs. State of UP, AIR 2013 SC 52, and since found sufficient material to put the petitioners to trial, declined to discharge petitioners. Perusal of the order passed by the learned JMFC, it appears that the learned JMFC has rightly assessed all the material, sift and weight it from the view point of the discharge and believed that sufficient material is available to put the petitioners to trial. Thus the petitioners failed to yield any result in favour of them. The concurrent findings of learned Courts below are just, proper and in line of legal provision. No arbitrariness or capricious is found in the impugned orders.
14. As far as the judgment relied upon by the petitioners in Page 21 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined case of Mohd Aynuddin (supra), it was a case where passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus. The Hon'ble Apex Court in this case, in factual background, held that no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. The Hon'ble Apex Court explained what is the rash act and what is the culpable rashness. Para 9 reads as under:-
"9. A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court after explaining criminal rash and negligence, observed that driver has to come out with the possible explanation that he was unaware of even possibility of accident, which happened. In the present case, the driver and other persons who are charged with the offence does not come with any possible explanation even at the stage of discharge application. Apt to note that learned Senior counsel failed to put the case that the petitioners have taken sufficient care before plying oversized and overloaded truck or have taken all the precautions guarding against injury to public generally or to any individual in particular. Moreover, to be noted that the Court is legally prevented from examining any Page 22 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined evidence at the stage of discharge to believe that petitioners have taken due care and proper precaution.
16. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v/s. R. Soundirarasu [(2023) 6 SCC 768], the Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to sections 227,228,239,240 and 245 of Cr.P.C., in para 53 to 70 has held as under :-
"53. The aforestated Sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the accused if "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction".
54. Sections 227 and 239 respectively provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including the documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the other hand, the stage for discharge under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken.
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55. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied -- if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.
56. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:-
"11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."Page 24 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025
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57. Then again in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra), a three- Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32).
"32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."
58. In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."
59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the Page 25 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge.
60. In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so.
61. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has committed Page 26 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See :V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC
962).
62. Section 239 of the CrPC lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word 'groundless', in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word 'groundless' used in Section 239 of the CrPC means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused.
63. The learned author Shri Sarkar in his Criminal P.C., 5th Edition, on page 427, has opined as:-
"The provision is the same as in S. 227, the only difference being that the Magistrate may examine the accused, if necessary, of also S. 245. The Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in S. 173; (ii) examining the accused, if necessary and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all."
64. In short, it means that if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out, it Page 27 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined would amount to a charge being groundless.
65. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545, this Court has stated about the ambit of Section 251(A)(2) of the CrPC 1898, which is in pari materia with the wordings used in Section 239 of the CrPC as follows:-
"It cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charge has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in S. 173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution."
66. In para 16, this Court has stated as:-
"16.... Under sub-sec. (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in S. 173, Criminal P.C. and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with sub- sec. (3), according to which, if after hearing the arguments and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chap. XXI of the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish Page 28 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two sub-sections together, it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges."
(Emphasis supplied)
67. Thus the word 'groundless', as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.
68. This Court has again dealt with this aspect of the matter in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC
52. This Court has stated in the said case as:-
"At this stage, even a very strong suspicion found upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."
69. The suspicion referred to by this Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words "a very strong suspicion" used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged.
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70. Section 239 has to be read along with Section 240 of the CrPC. If the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charge (allegations), he may frame charge in accordance with Section 240 of the CrPC. But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused does not make out a prima facie case and does not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused."
17. In the case of State by Inspector of Police, Chennai v/s. S. Selvi [AIR 2018 SC 81], the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the Court must proceed with presumption that material brought on record by prosecution are true and must evaluate such material with view to find out whether facts disclose existence of ingredients of offence.
18. In recent judgment in case of State Of Orissa Versus Pratima Behera, AIR 2025 SC 218, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that at the stage of consideration of discharge what is to be considered whether there is a prima facie case. The Court should not endeavour to find whether clinching materials are there or not. The material collected by the prosecution since are not matured into evidence, it is beyond the question of existence or otherwise of prima facie case based on material. The Hon'ble Apex Court again explained the scope of discharge in para 9 and 10, which reads as under:-
"9. Before considering the rival contentions on merits in order to consider the sustainability or otherwise of the impugned judgment, we think it only appropriate to consider certain relevant position of law in relation to certain aspects involved in the case on hand. We will firstly consider the scope of Section 239, Cr. P.C. Page 30 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined In the decision in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay & Anr., 2 (1986) 2 SCC 716; 1986 INSC 86 this Court held that the obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises only when the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. In the decisions in State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 239; 2000 INSC 491 this Court held thus: -
7. In the backdrop of the factual position discussed above, the question formulated earlier arises for our consideration. The legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the Trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. It is also well settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them the court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the Trial Court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans exceptional Page 31 of 32 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Oct 09 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Oct 10 02:24:00 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1815/2014 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/10/2025 undefined cases.
10. We may hasten to state at this juncture that though at the stage of framing of issue what is to be seen is only whether there is a prima facie case to make the accused to stand the trial at the trial, certainly, the presumption of innocence should be in favour of the accused."
19. In view of above, scope of consideration at the stage of discharge application, this Court finds that the learned Courts below have not committed any error. The petitioners remained high and dry in establishing that charges against them are groundless. Simultaneously, the petitioners could not develop fault in concurrent findings of the learned Courts below. In this context, the Court under the supervisory jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned orders.
20. Resultantly, the petition fails and stands dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) SHEKHAR P. BARVE FURTHER ORDER After pronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate Mr. Aditya Dave for the petitioners seeks relief to extend the interim relief in favour of the petitioners for further period of 04 weeks so as to approach higher forum. The request is rejected for the aforesaid reasons.
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