Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Praveen Kumar vs Gnctd on 17 December, 2025
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O.A. No. 1358/2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 1358/2024
Reserved on: 13.10.2025
Pronounced on:17.12.2025
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Praveen Kumar (Superintendent)
S/o Late Sh K Rama
R/o House No. 7371/19 1st floor, Gali No. 1
Prem Nagar, Beside Punjab Shoes Company,
Shakti Nagar, (North Delhi),
PO : Malka Ganj,
District : North Delhi - 110007.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Ms. Alankriti Dwivedi)
VERSUS
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through Chief Secretary
Delhi Secretariat, I.P. Estate, New Delhi - 110002.
2. Department of Women and Child Development
Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through Secretary
1st Floor, Maharana Pratap ISBT Complex,
Kashmere Gate, New Delhi - 110006.
3. Department of Social Welfare
Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through Secretary, 7th Floor, MSO Building, ITO, I.P
Estate, New Delhi-110002.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Girish C. Jha)
2026.01.07
ANJALI
17:40:16+05'30'
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O.A. No. 1358/2024
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. B.Anand, Member (A):
By way of filing of this Original Application (O.A.) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant seeks the following relief(s):-
"8.1. Direct Respondents to consider counting the service of the Applicant for the post of Superintendent from the year 2003 and pay all the necessary arrears and consequential benefits arising from 2003 alongwith interest; 8.2. Direct Respondents to provide financial upgradation consequential arising due to not counting of past service alongwith arrears and other consequential benefits;
8.3. Pass any other order/s in favour of Applicant and against the Respondents as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. However, during the course of the arguments, the applicant stated that he has since retired on 30.04.2024 and hence, he is seeking to modify the relief by restricting his prayer in the present O.A. to the extent that the applicant be considered for all the benefits, which include, financial upgradation, pension and other retiral benefits counting the service of the post of 'Superintendent' with effect from 13.12.2010, the date from which the applicant was promoted on ad hoc basis pursuant to the directions of this Tribunal.
2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 3 O.A. No. 1358/2024
3. The brief factual matrix of the case is that the applicant was initially recruited on 18.01.1998 as 'Welfare Officer Grade-II' in the department of Social Welfare in the pay scale of Rs. 5500-175-9000/- making him eligible for next promotion for the post of CDPO/Superintendent in the pay scale of Rs.9300-34800 plus Rs. 4600/ Grade Pay.
4. Meanwhile, consequent to the recommendations of the 5th Central Pay Commission (CPC), the post of 'Welfare Officer Grade-II' and the post of 'Deputy Superintendent/ACDPO' both came to carry the equal scale of pay i.e. Rs.5500-175-9000/-. The respondents recognizing that an anomaly has arisen consequent to the recommendations of the 5th CPC decided to merge both the posts of 'Welfare Officer Grade-II' (the post held by the applicant at that time) and 'Deputy Superintendent/ACDPO' vide their orders dated 19.10.2006. As a consequence of which 30 sanctioned posts of 'Deputy Superintendent' was ordered to be merged with the existing sanctioned strength of 'Welfare Officers' and an additional 05 sanctioned posts of 'Assistant Child Development Project Officers (ACDPO) were ordered to be merged with existing sanctioned strength of 'Supervisor (Women) Grade-I'. The net result of this exercise is that the 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 4 O.A. No. 1358/2024 immediate promotional post for the applicant holding the post of 'Welfare Officer Grade-II/ACDPO' became 'CDPO/Superintendent' in the pay scale of Rs. 9300- 34800/- plus Rs. 4600/- GP. The applicant claims that he was eligible to be promoted as 'CDPO/Superintendent' with effect from 08.01.2003 in as much as the amended Recruitment Rules dated28.11.2011 stipulated only five years service in the grade rendered after his initial appointment as 'Welfare Officer Grade-II' on regular basis. The applicant's grievance is that the respondents failed to conduct a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) for the first 16 years of the applicant service thereby hampering his career progression despite his being eligible to be promoted way back in 2003 as per the then RRs of 1989 which was subsequently amended in the year 2011 stipulating only 5 years service as 'Welfare Officer Grade-II'. He states that only pursuant to the directions of the Tribunal dated 26.05.2011 in O.A. No. 1907/2011 titled NamrataBiruly vs. GNCT of Delhi & Others, the applicant was promoted purely on ad hoc basis notionally with effect from 13.12.2010 to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' in the pay scale of Rs. 9300-34800/- + Rs. 4600/- Grade Pay.This ad hoc appointment was later regularised by 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 5 O.A. No. 1358/2024 posting him as a regular 'Superintendent/CDPO' w.e.f. 30.07.2014, after the much-delayed conduct of the DPC meeting. Thus, the grievance of the applicant is that he is being penalised and his career progression has been unduly delayed due to the inaction on the part of the respondents in not conducting the DPC during the first 16 years of his career. Even after they conducted such a DPC meeting and promoted him to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO', they did not accord him the benefits of the Assured Career Progression (ACP) Scheme, which was meant to alleviate the stagnation experienced by the applicant in his service career. As he has received only one promotion to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO', his remuneration was enhanced from Rs. 9300-34,900/- plus Rs. 4200/- Grade Pay (under the 6th CPC) to Rs. 9300- 34,900/- plus Rs. 4600/- Grade Pay.
5. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that it is a settled position of law that an employee cannot be made to suffer for the failure of the administration to hold DPCs in a timely and regular manner. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Madhavan v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 566, wherein it was held that if a DPC is arbitrarily or mala 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 6 O.A. No. 1358/2024 fide cancelled, or not convened without reasonable justification, resulting in prejudice to an employee, the Government is empowered, in an appropriate case, to grant promotion with retrospective effect so as to restore the employee to the position he would have occupied but for such arbitrary action.
6. The learned counsel further submits that the aforesaid legal principle has been consistently reiterated by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. Reference is made to the judgment in Union of India v. K.L. Taneja, W.P.(C) No. 8102/2012, wherein the Court held that where delay in promotion is attributable to mala fide or deliberate administrative inaction, including intentional delay in holding DPCs, the affected employee is entitled to be considered for promotion from a retrospective date so that he is not placed in a disadvantageous position.
7. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in S.K. Murti v. Union of India & Others, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4779, directed grant of promotional benefits from the date the petitioner therein became eligible, holding that the petitioner could not be penalized for the delay in holding the DPC when no fault was attributable to him. The said decision was upheld by the 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 7 O.A. No. 1358/2024 Hon'ble Supreme Court, thereby lending finality to the principle that administrative delay cannot operate to the detriment of an employee.
8. Learned counsel points out that the ratio laid down in S.K. Murti (supra) was subsequently followed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Union of India & Others v. Vinay Kumar, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3861, and was also affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it was categorically held that the interest of an employee cannot be prejudiced merely because the assessment committee or DPC was not constituted within the prescribed time.
9. To buttress his contention further, the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and Ors. Etc. Etc. vs Aghore Nath Dey and Ors. Etc. Etc., reported in (1993) 3 SCC 371, and Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (1990) 2 SCC 715, to contend that DPCs are required to be convened regularly and that an employee ought not to suffer on account of inaction or lapses on the part of the respondents. The relevant observations contained in paragraph 25 of State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) and paragraph 47 of Direct 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 8 O.A. No. 1358/2024 Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra) read as under:-
State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra) "25. In our opinion, the conclusion (B) was added to cover a different kind of situation, wherein the appointments are otherwise regular, except for the deficiency of certain procedural requirements laid down by the rules. This is clear from the opening words of the conclusion (B), namely, "if the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules" and the latter expression "till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules". We read conclusion (B), and it must be so read to reconcile it with conclusion (A), to cover the cases where the initial appointment is made against an existing vacancy, not limited to a fixed period of time or purpose by the appointment order itself, and is made subject to the deficiency in the procedural requirements prescribed by the rules for adjudging suitability of the appointee for the post being cured at the time of regularisation, the appointee being eligible and qualified in every manner for a regular appointment on the date of initial appointment in such cases. Decision about the nature of the appointment, for determining whether it falls in this category, has to be made on the basis of the terms of the initial appointment itself and the provisions in the rules. In such cases, the deficiency in the procedural requirements laid down by the rules has to be cured at the first available opportunity, without any default of the employee, and the appointee must continue in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service, in accordance with the rules. In such cases, the appointee is not to blame for the deficiency in the procedural requirements under the rules at the time of the initial appointment, and the appointment not being limited to a fixed period of time is intended to be a regular appointment, subject to the remaining procedural requirements of the rules being fulfilled at the earliest. In such cases also, if there be any delay in curing the defects on account of any fault of the appointee, the appointee would not get the full benefit of the earlier period on account of his default, the 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 9 O.A. No. 1358/2024 benefit being confined only to the period for which he is not to blame. This category of cases is different from those covered by the corollary in conclusion (A).
And Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association (supra) "47. To sum up, we hold that:
(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.
The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.
(D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down.
(E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date.
2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 10 O.A. No. 1358/2024 (F) Where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule.
(G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject. (H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative. (I) The posts held by the permanent Deputy Engineers as well as the officiating Deputy Engineers under the State of Maharashtra belonged to the single cadre of Deputy Engineers.
(J) The decision dealing with important questions concerning a particular service given after careful consideration should be respected rather than scrutinised for finding out any possible error. It is not in the interest of Service to unsettle a settled position.
With respect to Writ Petition No. 1327 of 1982, we further hold:
(K) That a dispute raised by an application under Article 32 of the Constitution must be held to be barred by principles of res judicata including the rule of constructive res judicata if the same has been earlier decided by a competent court by a judgment which became final.
In view of the above and the other findings recorded earlier, we do not find any merit in any of the civil appeals, writ petitions and special leave petitions which are accordingly dismissed. There will be, however, no order as to costs."
2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 11 O.A. No. 1358/2024
10. On the strength of the aforesaid judgments, the learned counsel for the applicant submits that the delay in granting promotion to the applicant is wholly attributable to the respondents and, therefore, the applicant is entitled to consideration for promotion from the date it became due, along with all consequential benefits.
11. A related grievance to the main grievance of the applicant is that the respondents issued a seniority list in the year 2018, which impeded the applicant's chances of further promotion. The said seniority list for the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' was assailed, as the applicant's name as well as those of his colleagues were shown below their juniors who had joined the service much later than them. The said seniority list was not satisfactory to the applicant as well as to one of his colleagues, who made various representations to the respondents between 2018 and 2019.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the contentions raised by the applicant and submits that the applicant, upon joining service on 08.01.1998, was appointed in the Department of Social Welfare. Subsequently, the said Department was bifurcated into the Department of Social Welfare and the Department 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 12 O.A. No. 1358/2024 of Women and Child Development (DWCD) vide order dated 14.11.2007. However, DWCD became the Cadre Controlling Authority for the applicant only on 24.07.2020. It is contended that the promotion of the applicant to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' could be considered only in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, 1989, as amended in 2011, and subject to the availability of vacancies in the said post.
13. It is further submitted that after the implementation of the 5th Central Pay Commission recommendations, certain anomalies were noticed, particularly that the posts of 'Deputy Superintendent/ACDPO' and 'Welfare Officer Grade-II' were carrying the same pay scale, and therefore, both the posts were merged. Thereafter, the process for amendment of the Recruitment Rules of 1989 was initiated, and the applicant entered the feeder cadre as 'Deputy Superintendent/ACDPO' only after the amendment of the Recruitment Rules in 2011. The amended Recruitment Rules of 2011, according to the respondents, do not contain any provision for granting retrospective promotion from the year 2003 as claimed by the applicant. It is also pointed out that the applicant has not stated whether any post of 'Superintendent /CDPO' was vacant in the year 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 13 O.A. No. 1358/2024 2003 when he claims to have become eligible. It is reiterated that mere eligibility only entitles a person to be considered for promotion and that actual promotion can be granted only against an available vacancy.
14. The respondents further refute the contention of the applicant that he had stagnated in the post of 'Welfare Officer' for a period of 16 years without being granted financial benefits under the ACP Scheme. It is stated that the ACP Scheme stood replaced by the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme with effect from 01.09.2008, providing for financial upgradations at intervals of 10, 20 and 30 years of continuous service. The applicant, according to the respondents, has already been granted two financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme-the first on 08.01.2008 and the second on 08.01.2018.
15. With regard to the applicant's contention that the seniority list issued in 2018 contained errors, the respondents fairly admit the same and submit that, due to reconciliation of objections received from various stakeholders including the applicant, the tentative seniority list for the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' could be published only on 08.02.2024.
2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 14 O.A. No. 1358/2024
16. In response to the applicant's reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.K. Murti (supra), the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the facts of the said case are clearly distinguishable from those of the present matter. It is contended that in S.K. Murti (supra), the delay in promotion was attributable to administrative reasons and the promotion therein was governed by the Modified Flexible Complementing Scheme (MFCS), which is applicable to regular Scientists working under various Ministries and Departments of the Government of India.
17. It is further submitted that, in the present case, the applicant is governed only by the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme and not by the MFCS. The learned counsel emphasizes that the applicant has already been granted the benefit of two financial upgradations under the MACP Scheme, besides being accorded regular promotion in the year 2014. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in Ajay Kumar Shukla & Ors. vs. Arvind Rai & Ors., reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1195, wherein it has been held that "there is no fundamental right to promotion and that 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 15 O.A. No. 1358/2024 an employee has only the right to be considered for promotion, as and when it arises, in accordance with the relevant rules".
18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and, with their assistance, have also carefully gone through the pleadings available on record.
19. The main grievance of the applicant is that, even under the latest Recruitment Rules of 2011 issued for filling up the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO', only five years of regular service as 'Welfare Officer' in the Grade Pay of Rs. 4200/- is required for such promotion and, therefore, the applicant ought to have been promoted to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' on 08.01.2003. However, due to the inaction of the respondents in not convening the DPC for all these 16 years, he could be regularly promoted as 'Superintendent/CDPO' only on 30.07.2014.
20. The DoPT OMs dated 10.04.1989 and 03.04.2013, relied upon by both the respondents and the applicant, deal with the manner of conducting DPC meeting(s) and the advance action required to be taken for convening such meeting(s). However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there is no purpose in convening a DPC when no 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 16 O.A. No. 1358/2024 promotional posts are available. Nowhere in the present O.A. has it been demonstrated as to how many posts of 'Superintendent/CDPO' were vacant during the period from 2003 to 2014, when the applicant claims regular entitlement to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO'. For each of these years between 2003 and 2014, the Recruitment Rules of 1989 and 2011 were admittedly in existence, prescribing the manner of promotion to the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO'. However, the mere existence of these two sets of Recruitment Rules did not, in reality, confer any indefeasible right upon the applicant.
21. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the respondents in the case of Ajay Kumar Shukla (supra) squarely covers the present case, as there is an indefeasible right to be considered for promotion, but no one can claim promotion as a matter of right. In the instant case, when the post of 'Superintendent/CDPO' itself was not available, or at least have not been satisfactorily brought to our notice, there is no question of promoting the applicant and posting him against a post which has not been shown to be vacant during the relevant period to which the applicant was eligible to be considered, but only 2026.01.07 ANJALI 17:40:16+05'30' 17 O.A. No. 1358/2024 for want of conducting DPC in a timely manner, the applicant has to suffer.
22. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we find no merit in the present O.A. and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
(B. Anand) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) (Member (J)
/anjali/
2026.01.07
ANJALI
17:40:16+05'30'