Delhi District Court
Siddharth Chand Jain vs North Delhi Municipal Corporation on 16 December, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE (CENTRAL )
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
PPA No.4/2021
CNR No. DLCT01-011664-2021
Siddharth Chand Jain
S/o late Sh. Subhash Chand Jain
Karta of Subhash Chand Jain (HUF)
1629, Ground Floor, S.P. Mukherjee Marg,
Delhi-110006. ...........Appellant
Versus
1. North Delhi Municipal Corporation
Land & Estate Department
7th Floor, Civic Centre, Minto Road,
New Delhi-110002 ........... Respondent no.1
2. Smt. Manju Jain
W/o Late Sh. Subhash Chand Jain
R/o C-780, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
(Proforma party) ........... Respondent no.2
3. Smt. Nidhi Jain
D/o Late Sh. Subhash Chand Jain
R/o C-780, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
(Proforma party) ........... Respondent no.3
4. Smt. Shivani Jain
D/o Late Sh. Subhash Chand Jain
R/o C-780, New Friends Colony,
New Delhi-110025.
(Proforma party) ........... Respondent no.4
Digitally signed
by VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 1 of 20 KUMAR
BANSAL
BANSAL
Date:
2025.12.16
16:41:23
+0530
Date of filing of appeal : 13.09.2021
Date of arguments : 15.11.2025
Date of Judgment : 16.12.2025
JUDGMENT:
1. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short PPA) challenging the order dated 03.09.2021 whereby the Ld. Estate officer passed the eviction order against the appellant herein with respect to property/shop no.1629, ground floor, Queen Road, S.P. Mukherjee Marg, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred as property in dispute) and also permitted the authorities to recover the damages.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a petition dated 21.06.2016 was moved by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, L&E Department, North DMC for eviction of Subhash Chand Jain, now represented by his Legal heirs from the property in dispute and for recovery of damages. It is alleged that the premises is owned by North DMC. There is shop on the ground floor and flat on the first floor. The ground floor was initially auctioned vide Corporation's Resolution No. 19 dated 04.12.1941. First floor was unauthorizedly occupied by Suresh Chand Gupta, which was vacated on 15.03.2013. Ground floor was initially allotted to the predecessor of the respondent on monthly license fee in auction held on 16.12.1941 and allotted to Sh. Pratap Singh, which was extended for 11 months and thereafter, there was no formal extension of license. Sh. Pratap Digitally signed by VIRENDER PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 2 of 20 VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 16:41:29 +0530 Singh continued to occupy the premises unauthorizedly. Sh. Pratap Singh died on 08.11.1965. The respondents and their predecessor in interest have paid license fee upto 31.03.2012.
3. A civil litigation was also filed where it was held that the license has not been determined and it stands transferred in the name of Sh. Ramesh Chand Jain. On the death of Sh. Ramesh Chand Jain, Subhash Chand Jain came in possession of the premises. Subhash Chand Jain also expired on 27.10.2011, who is now represented by the LRs. It is alleged that a requisition dated 02.09.2015 was received from the office of Dy.
Commissioner, RP Cell, North DMC asking for the termination of the license of the premises in dispute and eviction thereof for re-development of adjoining Novelty Cinema complex. In pursuance to that, the first floor was got vacated as the ground floor was also required, therefore, show cause notice dated 28.10.2015 was issued to the respondents, which has been duly replied by them and accordingly eviction letter dated 18.02.2016 was issued to hand over the vacant physical possession of the premises.
4. The order dated 18.02.2016 was assailed in the Writ Petition 4122 of 2016 which was disposed of vide order dated 10.05.2016 with the direction to consider initiating proceedings under the PP Act, 1971 in view of the fact that premises on the first floor in the same building was evicted by resorting to PP Act.
5. Notice of the petition was sent to the respondents/appellant. They filed the reply dated 08.09.2016.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date: PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 3 of 20 BANSAL 2025.12.16 16:41:36 +0530
They did not dispute the facts, but it is alleged that after the demise of Sh. Subhash Chand Jain recorded licensee, the respondents herein have deposited the license fee alongwith house tax for the year 2012-2013. The petitioner/MCD has refused to accept the same for the year 2013-2014.
6. It is alleged that the part of the public premises in occupation of the respondent is not connected with the re- development of Novelty Cinema. The order dated 18.02.2016 directing the respondent to hand over the vacant physical possession of public premises is without any authority and is illegal. The requisition from RP Cell is not a bonafide requirement.
7. The petitioner/MCD filed rejoinder denying the averments made in the reply by the respondents and re-asserted the facts mentioned in the petition.
8. After completion of pleadings, the case was fixed for evidence.
9. Sh. Vijender Kumar, Section Officer, Land & Estate Department, North DMC was examined as PW-1. He has proved the contents of the petition and also proved the documents. The witness was also put to cross examine. He specifically denied the suggestion that the competent authority has not considered the documents on record prior to issuance of the show cause notice and the termination letter.
10. Sh. Parmanand was examined as PW-2. He also filed his affidavit in evidence dated 06.03.2017. He proved the documents with respect to the re-development plan. The documents are Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 4 of 20 16:41:42 +0530 proved as Ex.PW2/1 to Ex.PW2/9.
11. Respondent/appellant Sidharth Jain himself appeared in the witness box as RW-1 and he filed his affidavit in evidence Ex.RW1/X and also relied upon the documents Ex.RW1/1 to Ex.RW1/20. Thereafter, the evidence was closed.
12. Ld. Estate Officer after hearing the arguments passed the order which is under challenge in the present appeal.
13. Notice of the appeal was sent to the respondents. Record of Estate Officer was requisitioned.
14. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Counsel for the respondent and perused the record.
15. Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that Ld. Estate officer has not considered all the facts, acted with a pre- determined mind and passed the eviction order without considering the facts and law on the point. Ld. Counsel submitted that as per the record, premises in dispute was given on license in 1941, much prior to the Public Premises Act coming into force, as the same came into force in 1971. The fact that the appellant herein is a tenant has been decided in the civil suit filed by the LRs of Sh. Pratap Singh Jain against Municipal Corporation of Delhi & ors. That suit was decreed vide judgment dated 14.11.1970 holding that the tenancy in favour of Late Sh. Pratap Singh continued to be contractual and is heritable. It does not come to the end with the death of Pratap Singh and therefore the same devolved upon his LRs. The LRs continued to pay the rent/license fee as well as the house tax. The fact that they are paying the rent is evident from the receipts which they have Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 5 of 20 2025.12.16 16:41:48 +0530 placed on record. The tenancy was duly mutated in the name of Subhash Chand Jain, S/o Late Sh. Pratap Singh. Sh. Subhash Chand Jain also expired on 27.10.2011 leaving behind the appellant herein as one of the legal heir. The other legal heirs have already issued the NOC in favour of the appellant herein. The appellant is in lawful possession of the premises in dispute being the tenant. Ld. Counsel submitted that it was the respondent only who refused to receive the rent and therefore, the appellant was also compelled to file the civil suit. He also filed the suit seeking mandatory injunction that the MCD shall not interfere with the rights of the appellant herein. That suit was withdrawn on 14.12.2016, after the proceedings before the Ld. Estate Officer commenced.
16. Ld. Counsel further submitted that these facts clearly show that appellant herein is in possession of the premises being the tenant as he succeeded to the rights of Sh. Subhash Chand Jain.
He has replied the show cause notice dated 28.10.2015 claiming that he is a tenant and his tenancy cannot be terminated as he has not violated any terms and conditions of the tenancy and is also paying the rent. Ld. Counsel submitted that MCD without considering all these facts, issued the letter asking him to deliver the possession. Ld. Counsel submitted that the order dated 18.02.2016 was passed without any authority. Writ Petition No.4122/2016 was filed challenging the illegal action and the order of eviction dated 18.02.2016. The Writ Petition was disposed of directing to conduct the proceedings in accordance with provisions of PP Act. Ld. Counsel submitted that all these Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 6 of 20 2025.12.16 16:41:54 +0530 facts clearly show that appellant herein is in possession as a tenant and it is settled law as held in the case of Suhas H. Pophale Vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.: (2014) 4 SCC 657, wherein it was held that PP Act would not apply to the premises which was allotted prior to the commencement of the Act. The Court held as follows-
30. As far as the present matter is concerned it is required to be noted that the Principal Agencies floated by the promoters of the erstwhile private Insurance Companies were controlling their business. In the 'History of Insurance of India' published by Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority' (IRDA) on its official website on 12.07.2007 under Ref: IRDA/GEN/06/2007 it is stated as follows:
"The Insurance Amendment Act of 1950 abolished Principal Agencies. However, there were a large number or insurance companies and the level of competition was high. There were also allegations of unfair trade practices. The Government of India, therefore, decided to nationalize insurance business."
Thus, as far as the erstwhile Insurance Company in the present case is concerned, as an initial step, its management was taken over by the Central Government w.e.f. 13.5.1971, and it was entrusted with the custodian appointed by the Central Government. It would definitely entail a right in the custodian to take necessary steps to safeguard the property of the erstwhile insurance company. But it was a transitory arrangement. The properties of the erstwhile insurance companies did not belong to the Government Companies or the Government at that stage. The Public Premises Act, undoubtedly provides a speedy remedy to recover the premises from the unauthorised occupants. At the same time, we have also to note that in the instant case the occupant is claiming a substantive right under a welfare provision of the State Rent Control Act, which gave him a protected status in view of the amendment to that Act. The question is whether this authority of management bestowed on the Government Company can take in its sweep the right to proceed against such protected tenants under the Public Premises Act, by contending that the premises belonged to the Government Company at that stage itself, and that the State Rent Control Act no longer protected them.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 7 of 20 BANSAL KUMAR Date: BANSAL 2025.12.16 16:42:00 +0530
Considering that the Rent Control Act is a welfare enactment, and a further protective provision has been made therein, can it be permitted to be rendered otiose and made inapplicable to premises specifically sought to be covered thereunder, and defeated by resorting to the provisions of the Public Premises Act? In the present case, it must also be noted that the appellant is seeking a protection under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, which has a non-obstante clause. The respondent No. 1 is undoubtedly not without a remedy, and it can proceed to evict an unauthorised occupant under the Rent Control Act, if an occasion arises. It can certainly resort thereto until the managerial right fructifies into a right of ownership. However by enforcing a speedier remedy, a welfare provision cannot be rendered nugatory. The provisions of the two enactments will have to be read harmoniously to permit the operation and co-existence of both of them to the extent it can be done. Therefore, the term 'belonging to' as occurring in the definition of Public Premises in Section 2(e) will have to be interpreted meaningfully to imply only the premises owned by or taken on lease by the Government Company at the relevant time. In the facts of this case what we find is that the appellant had the status of a deemed tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, prior to the concerned premises 'belonging to a Government Company' and becoming public premises. If at all he had to be evicted, it was necessary to follow the due process of law which would mean the process as available under the Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, and not the one which is provided under the provisions of the Public Premises Act.
41. It is relevant to note that there has been a criticism of the use of the powers under the Public Premises Act, and the manner in which they are used in an arbitrary way to evict the genuine tenants from the public premises causing serious hardships to them. The Central Government itself has therefore, issued the guidelines to prevent such arbitrary use of these powers. These guidelines were issued vide Resolution No. 21012/1/2000-Pol.1, dated 30th May, 2002, published in the Gazette of India, Part I, Sec.1 dated 8th June, 2002. They read as follows:-
"GUIDELINES TO PREVENT ARBITRARY USE OF POWERS TO EVICT GENUINE TENANTS FROM PUBLIC PREMISES UNDER THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS / FINANCIAL Digitally signed INSTITUTIONS by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 8 of 20 16:42:05 +0530
1. The question of notification of guidelines to prevent arbitrary use of powers to evict genuine tenants from public premises under the control of Public Sector Undertakings/financial institutions has been under consideration of the Government for some time past.
2. To prevent arbitrary use of powers to evict genuine tenants from public premises and to limit the use of powers by the Estate Officers appointed under section 3 of the PP(E) Act, 1971, it has been decided by Government to lay down the following guidelines:
(i) The provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 [(P.P.(E) Act, 1971] should be used primarily to evict totally unauthorised occupants of the premises of public authorities or subletees, or employees who have ceased to be in their service and thus ineligible for occupation of the premises.
(ii) The provisions of the P.P. (E) Act, 1971 should not be resorted to either with a commercial motive or to secure vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate their own employees, where the premises were in occupation of the original tenants to whom the premises were let either by the public authorities or the persons from whom the premises were acquired.
(iii) A person in occupation of any premises should not be treated or declared to be an unauthorised occupant merely on service of notice of termination of tenancy, but the fact of unauthorized occupation shall be decided by following the due procedure of law. Further, the contractual agreement shall not be wound up by taking advantage of the provisions of the P.P.(E) Act, 1971. At the same time, it will be open to the public authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provisions of the Rent Control Act in each State or to move under genuine grounds under the Rent Control Act for resuming possession. In other words, the public authorities would have rights similar to private landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with genuine legal tenants.
(iv) It is necessary to give no room for allegations that evictions were selectively resorted to for the purpose of securing an unwarranted increase in rent, or that a change in tenancy was permitted in order to benefit particular individuals or institutions. In order to avoid such imputations or abuse of discretionary powers, the release of premises or change of tenancy should be decided at the level of Board of Directors of Public Sector Undertakings.
(v) All the public Undertakings should immediately review all pending cases before the Estate Officer or Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 9 of 20 BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 16:42:11 +0530 Courts with reference to these guidelines, and withdraw eviction proceedings against genuine tenants on grounds otherwise than as provided under these guidelines. The provisions under the P.P. (E) Act, 1971 should be used henceforth only in accordance with these guidelines.
3. These orders take immediate effect."
42.Thus as can be seen from these guidelines, it is emphasized in Clause 2(i) thereof, that the Act was meant to evict (a) totally unauthorised occupants of the public premises or subletees, or (b) employees who have ceased to be in their service, and were ineligible to occupy the premises. In Clause 2(ii), it is emphasized that the provisions should not be resorted to (a) either with a commercial motive, or (b) to secure vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate their own employees, where the premises were in occupation of the original tenants to whom the premises were let out (i) either by the public authorities, or (ii) by persons from whom the premises were acquired, indicating thereby the predecessors of the public authorities. Clause 2 (iii) of these guidelines is very important. It states on the one hand that it will be open for the public authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provision of the Rent Control Act in each state, and to move under genuine grounds under the Rent control Act for resuming possession. This Clause on the other hand states that the public authorities would have rights similar to private landlords under the Rent Control Act in dealing with genuine legal tenants. This clause in a way indicates that for resuming possession in certain situations, where the tenants are protected under the State Rent Control Act prior to the Public Premises Act becoming applicable, the public authorities will have to move under the Rent Control Acts on the grounds which are available to the private landlords. Clause 2(iv) seeks to prevent imputations or abuse of discretionary powers in this behalf by stating that there should be no room for allegation that evictions were selectively resorted for the purpose of securing an unwarranted increase in rent or change in tenancy to benefit particular individuals or institutions. It, therefore, states that the release of premises or change of tenancy should be decided at the level of Board of Directors of Public Sector Undertakings. Clause 2(v) goes further ahead and instructs all public undertakings that they should review all pending cases before the Estate Officer or Courts with reference to these guidelines, and withdraw the proceedings against genuine tenants on Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 10 of 20 BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 16:42:19 +0530 grounds otherwise than as provided under the guidelines.
17. Ld. Counsel submitted that this judgment was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Band Box Private Limited Vs Estate Officer, Punjab and Sind Bank and Ors. :
(2014) 16 SC 1602, wherein it was held as follows-
"10. As seen from paragraph 40, quoted above, the judgment clearly says that the Bombay Rent Act would not prevail qua the repugnancy between it and the Public Premises Eviction Act. That aspect has not been contradicted in Dr. Suhas H. Pophale's case (supra). It also relies upon the judgment in Ashoka Marketing Limited (supra) which says that the Public Premises Act as well as the State Rent Control Laws are both referable to entries in concurrent list and they operate in their own field. It is only in the area of its own that the State Rent Control Act applies and in its own time frame. The judgment in Dr. Suhas Pophale's case accepts that the Public Premises Act will prevail over the Bombay Rent Act to the extent of repugnancy i.e. for eviction of unauthorised tenants and for collection of arrear of rent, but, not prior to 16.09.1958 when the Public Premises Act became applicable.
Paragraphs 42 and 65 which are relied upon also do not deal with the aspect of retrospectivity and being protected under the welfare legislation. That being so, it is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Vikas Singh.
18. Ld. Counsel further submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India Vs N.R.C Ltd. : (2014) 13 SCC 291 has also upheld the same proposition and held as follows-
4. Mr. T.R. Andhiyarujina, learned senior counsel, appeared for the respondent-N.R.C. Ltd. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Sushil Kumar vs. Gobind Ram reported in 1990 (1) SCC 193 to submit that the Estate Officer was coram non judice, since according to him he did not have jurisdiction to pass the order of eviction. He referred to the judgment of this Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana reported in 2013 (10) SCC 136 to Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 11 of 20 2025.12.16 16:42:25 +0530 submit that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. He has drawn our attention to the judgment rendered by this Court in C.A.No.1970 of 2014 on 11th February, 2014 in the case of Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Its Estate Officer to which one of us (H.L. Gokhale,J.) was a party. Mr. Andhiyarujina has submitted that this judgment clearly lays down that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 will not apply prior to the Act coming into force, that is prior to 16th September, 1958. He has drawn our attention to various paragraphs of this judgment and submitted that though this judgment has been rendered subsequent to the dismissal of the present special leave petition, inasmuch as the law is now clarified, the respondent-N.R.C. Ltd. cannot be said to be an unauthorized occupant, nor can the action under the Public Premises Act be said to be valid. He pointed out that the N.R.C. Ltd. has been a tenant of this property since about 1946. Subsequently, the building wherein its premises are situated, was taken over by the Life Insurance Corporation, and thereafter by the Central Bank of India. In view of this judgment, the relationship between the Central Bank of India and the N.R.C. Ltd. as landlord and tenant will continue to be governed under the Bombay Rent Act and now under The Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
5. Inasmuch as this submission has been raised by Mr. Andhiyarujina, learned senior counsel, we would like to point out that this judgment in Dr. Pophale's case clarifies the legal position as laid down by this Court earlier in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Anr. vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. reported in 1990 (4) SCC 406. That judgment has held that the Public Premises Act and the State Rent Control Acts were both referable to the concurrent list, and would be valid in their spheres, but Public Premises Act will prevail to the extent of any repugnancy. Therefore, this Court held earlier in the case of Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. reported in 2011 (13) SCC 446 that to the extent the Public Premises Act covers the relationship between the landlord and the tenant, namely, for eviction of unauthorized occupants and for recovery of arrears of rent, the Public Premises Act will apply and not in other aspects of their relationship. This is why in Banatwala's case (supra) it was held that the application for the maintenance of the premises would lie to the Court of Small Causes in Mumbai, and it will not be hit by the provisions of the Public Premises Act. The issue in Dr. Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 12 of 20 BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 16:42:31 +0530 Suhas H. Pophale's case was as to when the Public Premises Act will apply, and it was laid down that the Act will not apply prior to the Act coming into force, and until the premises concerned belonged to the concerned public corporation, whichever is the later date. This was on the footing that if there are any welfare provisions in the statutes, the legislature cannot be intended to have taken them away if there is no repugnancy."
19. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay also in the case of Anita Bharat Singh Vs United India Insurance Company Limited & ors:
MANU/MHOR/28100/2025 has held as under-
15. The endeavour of Mr. Sanglikar to urge that since the judgment of Suhas Pophale (supra) has been referred to a larger bench by the Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Vita Private Limited and Anr., the precedential value of the judgment in the case of Suhas Pophale (supra) is diluted, does not merit countenance. It is well recognized that the reference of a judgment to a larger bench does not dilute the precedential value of the referred judgment and it continues to be a good law in the interregnum.
20. Ld. Counsel submitted that in view of these judgments, the proceedings under the PP Act are not maintainable as admittedly the premises was leased out in the year 1941 and at that time the Public Premises Act even did not come into existence. The premises was governed initially by Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and then by Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which came into force in February, 1959. Ld. Counsel submitted that admittedly, PP Act came into force in 1971, therefore, in view of these judgment, the property does not fall within the purview of PP Act and consequently, the proceedings under the PP Act itself are not maintainable in view of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 13 of 20 2025.12.16 16:42:38 +0530 Court. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the judgment of Ashok Kumar Shaw & ors. Vs Kolkata Municipal Corporation & ors.: 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 7011 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the tenancy was created in 1941 and at that time it was not even the 'Public Premises' as PP Act was not in force. It is prayed that order of Ld. Estate Officer be set aside and appeal be allowed.
21. Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) followed in Band Box Private Limited (supra) and the other judgments is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Ld. Counsel submitted that in those cases, the premises which were rented out are not of government or government owned companies. The private land was rented out which subsequently vested with the government.
In the present case, when the tenancy was created, at that time itself it was a government land and hence a public premises which was created much prior to 16.09.1958 and hence governed by PP Act and not by Rent Control Act. Ld. Counsel in this regard also placed reliance on the judgment of Sunil Kumar & Anr. Vs DDA: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6929. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon judgment titled M/s B.C. Shaw & sons Vs The Union of India & Ors decided by Hon'ble Calcutta High Court on 16.09.2014 in W.P. 15067 (W) of 2014, wherein it was held that DRC Act does not apply to the tenancies created in respect of public premises or the premises belonging to the Central Government which came into existence prior to Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 16:42:44 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 14 of 20 +0530 16.09.1958. It was held as under-
"17. I have not been able to locate any law laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) tot he extent that the 1971 Act would have no application in cases where the tenancy/lease in respect of 'public premises' belonging to the Central Government came into existence prior to September 16, 1958. That was really not an issue there and it is axiomatic that the fact situation did not warrant such a finding being returned in that regard.
18. Now, adverting attention to paragraph 64 of the decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), it is noticed that the two categories of occupants for whom exclusion of coverage of the 1971 Act has been adumbrated therein are the "occupants of (sic premises of) these public corporations", and not the occupants of premises belonging to the Central Government. It is settled by a catena of judicial pronouncements that a line here or there in a judgment of a superior court need not be read as a statute. In fact in the said decision the learned Judge referred to the oft-quoted saying that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The Supreme Court carved out exceptions applicable to public premises belonging to public corporations, which cannot be extended to public premises belonging to the Central Government. The decision in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is clearly distinguishable and does not, therefore, aid the petitioner."
22. It was followed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of Sunil Kumar (supra). Ld. Counsel submitted that under the circumstances as it was the government property when it was leased out, this fact is also admitted by the appellant himself, as per law, DRC Act is not applicable to the premises owned by the Central Government as held in the case of B.C.Shaw (supra) and that it being the 'public premises' from the very beginning and as in the case of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) that later on it vested in the government, therefore, those judgments are not applicable at all. Ld. Counsel further submitted that in the present Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 15 of 20 KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 16:42:50 +0530 case, the tenancy has been terminated. Now, the appellant is in unauthorized occupancy, therefore, Estate Officer has rightly passed the eviction order. There is no merit in the appeal. Same be dismissed.
23. After hearing the arguments and going through the record, I found that in the present case, admittedly, the tenancy was created in 1941, much prior to 16.09.1958. The law is very clear that the DRC Act does not apply to the tenancy of the premises belonging to the Central Government. In the present case, as the premises belong to the Central Government at the time of leasing out itself and it is not the case where the premises was earlier rented out and it vested in the government subsequently i.e. subsequent to the enactment of the PPA. In the present case, the property was owned by the government when leased out and continued to be so. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment titled as "Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. Vs VITA" decided on 11.12.2025 in Civil Appeal No(s). 2638 of 2023 has held that where the premises is a 'public premises' then PP Act will prevail and not the Rent Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the judgment of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) and other judgments. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as follows-
"12. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons and analysis, the following positions of law emerges,
(a) In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing3 and the three-Judge Bench decision in Jain Ink7, the view taken in Suhas H. Pophale2 which is a two-Judge Bench decision, is palpably incorrect and unjustified. Suhas H. Pophale2 cannot and does not Digitally signed by VIRENDER hold the field. VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 16:42:56 +0530 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 16 of 20
(b) Since, the propositions laid down in Suhas H. Pophale2 runs contrary to the decisions laid down by the Benches of larger strength in Ashoka Marketing3 and Jain Ink7, the same is bad in law.
(c) The ratio decidendi by the Bench of larger strength is binding on the Bench of the smaller strength, irrespective of the fact whether the judgment by the Bench of the larger strength is apriori or posterior, in point of time.
(d) A Bench of the smaller strength cannot mark a departure from the decision of the Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the ratio of the Bench of larger strength, in guise of explaining the decision of the larger Bench.
(e) It was not permissible for the two-Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale2 to interpret the statutes and lay down propositions in conflict with what was laid down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing3 and by a three-
Judge Bench in Jain Ink7, when the set of material facts in the background of the controversy dealt with, were similar.
(f) In laying down the propositions incongruent to and contrary to the law laid down in Ashoka Marketing3, the Bench in Suhas H. Pophale2 disregarded the principle of stare decisis and violated the well settled law of precedent. Answers
13. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the propositions of law laid in Ashoka Marketing3
(i) Both categories of statutes namely, the PP Act 1971 on one hand, and the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and similar Rent Control Legislations, on the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in order to determine as to which Act will apply in case of conflict, reference has to be made to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. Keeping in view the object and purpose underlying both the enactments, that is, the PP Act 1971 and the Rent Control Acts, the provisions of the PP Act 1971 shall Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 17 of 20 16:43:02 +0530 override the provisions in the Rent Control Legislations.
(ii) The PP Act 1971 and the State Rent Control Acts are special enactments in themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non derogant will not apply. Having regard to the purpose, policy and legislative intent of the PP Act 1971, the same would prevail over the State Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction of 'unauthorised occupants' of 'public premises' as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act.
(iii) The provisions of PP Act 1971, to the extent they cover the premises falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the provisions of the Rent Control Act.
(iv) A person in unauthorised occupation of 'Public Premises' under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act.
(v) In cases where the tenanted premises are claimed to be governed by the State Rent Control Act and the same have also become 'Public Premises' within the meaning in Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971, for their unauthorised occupation, the PP Act 1971 will have the application.
(vi) The statutory machinery envisaged under the PP Act 1971, could be activated for recovery of possession of public premises by any Government or public entity mentioned in the definition.
(vii) The PP Act 1971 will apply to the tenancies which may have been created and in existence either before coming into force of the Act or which may have been created subsequent to coming into the force of the Act.
(viii) Two conditions must be satisfied for the applicability as above. Firstly, the tenanted premises must fall within the purview of definition under Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971. Secondly, the premises should have been in unauthorised occupation.
(ix) Termination of tenancy of 'Pubic Premises' by issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of the modes which would render the occupation of the tenant unauthorised, post the date specified in such notice. This would hold true in respect of tenancies created before or after coming into force of the PP Act 1971.
(x) Invocation and applicability of the provisions of the PP Act 1971 is not dependent upon the aspect of Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.12.16 PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 18 of 20 16:43:09 +0530 possession. What is material is the occupation of the premises which has become unauthorised occupation. The occupation is a continuous concept.
(xi) The propositions enunciated in Suhas H. Pophale2, as noticed in paragraph 3.3.6 of this judgment, do not, in our considered view, state the correct position of law. The observations made therein, with great respect, are not in consonance with the settled legal principles and runs contrary to the principle of stare decisis and stand overruled to that extent."
24. In view of this judgment and also the fact that in the present case the land was already vesting in the government when it was leased out to the predecessor in interest of appellant herein and continued to be so, therefore, he cannot get the benefit of Suhas H. Pophale. Secondly, in view of the recent judgment titled Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs VITA (supra) of Hon'ble Supreme Court of three Judges Bench, it is now settled law that the PP Act will prevail and not the DRC Act, therefore, on this count no relief can be given to the appellant herein.
25. The other contention of Ld. Counsel is that the premises is not required for the development of the area adjoining to the Novelty Cinema. In my opinion that can be of no aid to the appellant herein to retain the public premises. Even the pendency of the civil suit will not help him. There is clear admission that property is a public premises, termination order has already been issued, hence he is in unauthorized occupation of the public premises and is liable to be evicted. The Ld. Estate officer has rightly passed the eviction order. There is no merit in the appeal to that extent.
26. So far as the recovery of damages is considered, the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 19 of 20 BANSAL Date:
2025.12.16 16:43:17 +0530 respondent may proceed against appellant in accordance with law for recovery of damages as per the directions issued by Ld. Estate officer.
27. There is no merit in the appeal. Same is dismissed.
28. Record of Estate officer be sent back with copy of the order.
29. Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Digitally signedVIRENDER by VIRENDER Announced in open Court KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL Date: 2025.12.16 BANSAL on 16th Day of December, 2025 16:43:23 +0530 (Virender Kumar Bansal) Principal District & Sessions Judge(Central) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi PPA No. 4/2021 Siddharth Chand Jain Vs NDMC & ors. Page 20 of 20