Karnataka High Court
Smt Gouramma Alias Gangamma W/O ... vs The Deputy Commissioner Haveri on 29 July, 2024
Author: Krishna S.Dixit
Bench: Krishna S.Dixit
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB
WA No.100101 of 2024
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 2024
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT APPEAL NO.100101 OF 2024 (KLR-RES)
BETWEEN:
SMT. GOURAMMA @ GANGAMMA
W/O. TIPPERUDRAPPA MEDLERI
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. JALINAGAR, NEAR PARK,
DAVANAGERE, DIST. DAVANAGERE.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. LAXMAN T. MANTAGANI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
by JAGADISH T
R HAVERI,
Location: High DISTRICT. HAVERI 581110.
Court of
Karnataka
Dharwad Bench
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
HAVERI SUB DIVISION 581110,
DISTRICT. HAVERI.
3. SHIVAJEPPA
S/O PAMPANNA BHOSLE
AGE. 75 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
4. CHANDRAPPA
S/O PAMPANNA BHOSLE
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB
WA No.100101 of 2024
AGE. 77 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
5. SAHADEVAPPA
S/O SHIDLINGAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 68 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
6. RAMAPPA
S/O SHIDLINGAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 63 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
7. HANUMANTAPPA
S/O MAHADEVAPPA TOTAD
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. CHALAGERI-581145,
TQ. RANEBENNUR,
DIST. HAVERI.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. V.S. KALASURMATH, HCGP FOR R1 & R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S.4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO, SET-ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED
BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DTD.23/01/2024 IN
W.P.NO.67352/2011 (KLR-RES) IN ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION
BY UPHOLDING THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER DTD.22/11/2004 VIDE ANNEXURE-L TO THE WRIT
PETITION AND ORDER PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
DTD.17/03/2011 VIDE ANNEXURE-M TO THE WRIT PETITION.
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB
WA No.100101 of 2024
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, KRISHNA S.DIXIT, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA S.DIXIT
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE KRISHNA S.DIXIT) This intra-court appeal seeks to call in question a learned Single Judge's order dated 23.01.2024 whereby private respondents' W.P. No.67352/2011 (KLR-RES) having been favoured, the orders of Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for resumption of land under the provisions of Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short, 'the 1978 Act'), have been quashed and, as a consequence, appellant's application filed for resumption has been dismissed.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant- grantee vehemently argues that the rejection of the earlier applications for resumption having not been made on merits -4- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 do not come in the way of making a fresh claim for resumption, as observed by the Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner in their resumption orders; learned Single Judge in holding to the contra has grossly erred in law; the question of dealing in making resumption application would pale into insignificance in view of Karnataka Act No.30 of 2023 whereby the 1978 Act has been amended, to the effect that there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of the 1978 Act. Counsel submits that, this aspect having been lost sight of, there is error apparent on the face of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. Learned Government Advocate also maintained the same stand.
3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
(a) The subject land does not answer the definition of 'granted land' in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was -5- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958.
The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003.
(b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application -6- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a "hereditary land" falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirty- two years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of Karnataka1, that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning 1 (2020) 14 SCC 232 -7- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered.
(c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of "limitation and delay"
has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under:
"(c) notwithstanding anything conained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act.
(d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section."
It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for -8- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated.
(d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity.
(e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of "limitation period"
at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of -9- NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view:
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ....."
(Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least.
(f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate.
(g) There is a marked difference between 'delay & laches' that operate in equity and 'limitation & delay' that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan2 make out this point:
"Delay, laches and acquiescence
20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not 2 (2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.... The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches.
21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024
(h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond.
(i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify.
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NC: 2024:KHC-D:10666-DB WA No.100101 of 2024 In the above circumstances, this appeal is liable to be and accordingly, dismissed, costs having been made easy.
The Registry to send a copy of this judgment to Respondent Nos.3 to 7 by speed post immediately.
Sd/-
(KRISHNA S.DIXIT) JUDGE Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL) JUDGE KMS, CT:VP LIST NO.: 1 SL NO.: 19