Karnataka High Court
Haleshappa S/O Rudrappa Pujar, vs The State Of Karnataka on 10 September, 2018
Bench: B.Veerappa, H.T.Narendra Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 10 T H DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2018
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD
WRIT APPEAL Nos.100192-200/2017 [GM-RES]
BETWEEN:
1. HALESHAPPA S/O RUDRAPPA PUJAR,
AGED ABOUT: 73 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O. PURADAGERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
2. MANJAPPA S/O VEERAPPA BULLANNAVAR
AGED ABOUT: 41 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAKERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
3. ALLABHAX HUSSAISAB BULLAPUR,
AGED ABOUT: 40 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O KIRGERI,
TUMMINKATTI POST,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
4. NAGENDRAPPA S/O RUDRAPPA PUJAR,
AGED ABOUT: 57 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAKERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
5. SMT.SHANTAMMA
W/O MAHESHWARAPPA PUJAR,
AGED ABOUT: 53 YEARS,
:2:
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAKERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
6. HANUMANTAPPA S/O HALLURAPPA OLEKAR
@ TALAWAR, AGED ABOUT: 68 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAKERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
7. SMT.SUMA W/O ANANDAPPA PUJAR,
AGED ABOUT: 48 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAGERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
8. SMT.SAVITRAMMA W/O SHEKRAPPA PUJAR,
AGED ABOUT: 48 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O PURADAGERI,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
9. HARAGNAL RANGAVVA W/O NINGAPPA
AGED ABOUT: 73 YEARS,
OCC: COOLIE, R/O KIRGERI VILLAGE,
HIREKERUR TALUK,
HAVERI DISTRICT.
... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. S. G. KADADAKATTI, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF COMOMERCE &
INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE-01.
2. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, 2ND FLOOR,
RASTROTHAN PARISATH BUILDING,
NRUPATUNGA ROAD,
:3:
BANGALORE-01.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
HAVERI DISTRICT, HAVERI.
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
ZONAL OFFICE, LAKAMNALLI INDUSTRIAL AREA,
PUNA BANGALORE ROAD,
DHARWAD.
5. THE MANAGE CANE,
M/S GM SUGAR AND ENERGY LIMITED,
NO.22, PAMADI TOWER,
2ND FLOOR, I MAIN,
GANDHI NAGAR,
BENGALURU-09.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RAVI V. HOSAMANI, AGA FOR R1, R3 & R4)
THESE WRIT APPEALS ARE FILED UNDER SECTION
4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING
TO SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 7.3.2017 PASSED BY
THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP NO.101936/2017
AND 102209-16/2017 BY ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEALS,
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
THESE WRIT APPEALS COMING ON
FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY,
B.VEERAPPA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
These writ appeals are filed against the order dated 7.3.2017 made in WP Nos.101936/2017 (GM-RES) & WP Nos.102209-16/2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court disposing of the writ petitions on the ground that once the lands acquired, :4: vests with the Government, cannot be returned back to the land owners.
2. The appellants, who claim to be the owners of various lands situated at Chatnalli Village, Hirekerur Taluk, Haveri District, had filed WP Nos.108171- 179/2015 (LA-KIADB) against the Endorsement dated 18.09.2012 issued by respondent No.3-SLAO, KIADB, Zonal Office, Dharwad. After hearing the both parties, the learned Single Judge of this Court by the order dated 31.10.2015 disposed of the writ petitions observing that the legal position of law has not been placed before the Court as to the consequence of non- utilization of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired. The Government can use the acquired land for any other purpose other than the purpose for which the acquisition was made, and it has to take its decision, permitting the present petitioners to file a detailed representation to the Government, and directed the State Government to consider the said representation and pass appropriate orders within six weeks from the date of :5: lreceipt of a copy of the said order. Even before consideration of the said representation, the present appellants have filed second writ petition before this Court in WP No.101936/2017 and connected writ petitions for writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to consider the request of the petitioners pursuant to the directions of this Court dated 31.10.2015 made in WP No.108171-179/2015 and the representation dated 7.12.2015. This Court after hearing the both parties, by the impugned order dated 7.3.2017 disposed of the writ petitions holding that once the lands acquired for public purpose, it cannot be returned back to the land owners. Hence, these appeals are filed.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
4. Sri. S. G. Kadadakatti, the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge :6: disposing of the writ petitions without examining the material on record on the ground that once the lands acquired, vests with the government, cannot be returned back to the land owners, is erroneous and contrary to the material on record. He would further contend that though the respondent-KIADB acquired the lands for the benefit of respondent No.5 for establishment of Basaveshwara Sugar Factory, the same has not been utilized. The learned Single Judge ought to have directed the respondents to consider the representation dated 7.12.2015 in pursuance of the directions issued by the learned Single Judge of this Court made in WP Nos.108171-179/2015, the same has not been done. He would further contend that though the lands acquired for the public purpose by KIADB, they are not using the same for the said purpose. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ appeals.
5. Per contra, Sri. Ravi V Hosamani, the learned AGA on taking notice to respondent Nos.1, 3 :7: and 4 sought to justify the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and contended that once the lands acquired for the public purpose, vests with the government, there is no question of return back to the lands owners, who have already taken compensation in respect of the said lands and admittedly, the present appellants have already filed applications under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in LAC Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2016 for enhancement of compensation and the same are pending before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hirekerur for adjudication. In view of the above, the very writ petitions filed before the learned Single Judge was not maintainable. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the writ appeals.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the material on record clearly depicts that the lands of the petitioners and others were acquired by the State Government under the provisions of Section 28(1) of the KIADB Act by issuing preliminary notification :8: dated 28.05.2001 and notification dated 26.03.2002 issued under Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board Act, 1966 and the possession was taken from the petitioners, subsequently, an award came to be passed by the SLAO granting compensation of Rs.31,000/- per acre. When the possession was taken and after receipt of the compensation amount, the petitioners filed erstwhile writ petitions before this Court in WP No.108171-179/2015 seeking to quash the endorsement dated 18.09.2012 issued by the SLAO. The learned Single Judge of this Court by the order dated 31.10.2015 disposed of the said writ petitions permitting the petitioners to file a representation before the State Government, with a direction to the State Government to pass appropriate orders within a period of six weeks, after holding that once the lands acquired, the government can use same for any other purpose other than the purpose for which the acquisition was made. Even before consideration of the said representation, the petitioners again filed second writ :9: petition in the month of February, 2017 seeking writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent to consider the request of the petitioners pursuant to the directions issued by this Court and to consider the representation dated 7.12.2015.
7. In the entire pleadings of the writ petitions, the petitioners have not disclosed about reference petitions filed before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hirekerur in LAC Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 2016 under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for enhancement of compensation. Once the land losers filed an application under Section 18(1) of the Act for enhancement of compensation before the learned Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, writ petitions are not maintainable. The same is suppressed and filed writ petitions. It is also not in dispute that the possession of the lands was taken by the respondents-Authority and award came to be passed on 7.2.2004, subsequently, the petitioners after receiving the award amount filed an : 10 : application under Section 18(1) of the Act for reference. When the matters are pending for adjudication, the writ petitions filed are not maintainable. The learned Single Judge considering the rival contentions, by the impugned order disposed of the writ petitions holding that once the lands acquired, vests with the Government, it can utilize the said lands for any other purpose. The said settled position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants.
8. It is well settled law that the lands acquired for public purpose-unutilised land-reassignment or reconveyance of, to erstwhile owner- is not permissible. Our view is fortified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of AP and Another Vs. Syed Akbar, reported in (2005)1 SCC 558, wherein paras 10 to 14 held thus:
"10. It is neither debated nor disputed as regards the valid acquisition of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the possession of the land had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land has vested absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.: 11 :
Under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, Government could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In the instant case, even under Section 48, the Government could not withdraw from acquisition or to re-convey the said land to the respondent as the possession of the land had already been taken. The position of law is well settled. In State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, para 4 of the said judgment reads: (SCC P 433) "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value."
11. In that case, an extent of 1.94 acres of land was acquired in 1952 for construction of National Highway and the construction was completed in 1955 in 80 cents of land and the balance of land remained unused. The remaining land was sought to be sold to the land owner at the same rate at which the compensation was awarded under Section 11. This again was challenged in the writ petitions. : 12 : The Government tried to sustain the action on the basis of the executive order issued by the Government for permission for alienation of the land. On these facts, the position of law was made clear in para 4 extracted above. Thus, it is clear that under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land should vest in the State free from all encumbrances and that any executive order inconsistent with the provisions of Land Acquisition Act was invalid. Further that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In our view, this decision supports the case of the appellants fully.
12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p.406) "2........ We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilized for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilized, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions."
13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil (supra) and other cases held that: (SCC p.340, para 12) "12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to : 13 : the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land". Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340) "10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilized was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification.
11. Yet again in C.Padma Vs. Dy. Secy. To the Govt. of T.N., it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose."
14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilized for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be re-assigned or re-conveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order."
9. In view of the above, the appellants have not made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge exercising the power under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961.
: 14 :
10. Accordingly, the writ appeals are dismissed. However, it is needless to observe that it is open for the appellants to pursue their LAC proceedings pending before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Hirekerur, in accordance with law.
Since the main appeals are dismissed, IA No.1/2017 for direction does not survive for consideration, accordingly, IA stands disposed of.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE JTR