Delhi High Court
State ( Nct Of Delhi) vs Sonu on 10 May, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 DEL 2375
Author: Sangita Dhingra Sehgal
Bench: Sangita Dhingra Sehgal
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.L.P. 688/2018
% Judgment reserved on: 4th April, 2019
Judgment pronounced on: 10th May, 2019
STATE ( NCT OF DELHI) ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Tarang Srivastava, APP for State with
SI Prakash, PS Sadar Bazar.
versus
SONU ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
1. By this petition under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter as 'Cr.P.C'), the appellant/State seeks
leave to appeal against the judgment dated 01.08.2018 passed by
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Fast Track Court-2,
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi whereby the
accused/respondent was acquitted of the charge under Sections
451/376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter as 'IPC') in FIR
No.1503/2015 registered at Police Station Burari.
2. Brief facts of the case, as noticed by the Learned Trial Court, are as
under:-
"In this case criminal law was set into motion on the
basis of statement of prosecutrix recorded by police
on 11.12.2015 and FIR No.1503/2015 u/s 376 IPC
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 1 of 21
was registered. In her statement prosecutrix had
narrated that on 11.12.2015 at about 5.00 a.m. while
she was present in her premises and her husband
had gone away for work then accused Sonu had
entered in her room after breaking the door and
committed sexual intercourse with her against her
wish and ran away. After the incident while she was
crying, the daughter-in-law of her landlord came
down and enquired for reason of weeping but she
did not tell anything regarding the incident being
fearful of her owner. Thereafter, her jethani also
came in her room to cook food then she narrated the
entire incident to her and when in the evening her
husband came home she narrated the entire incident
of rape to him who took her to police station and at
about 8:00 p.m. her statement was recorded by
police".
3. During the course of investigation, Inspector Mukesh Devi prepared
Rukka and got the case registered, she even got the prosecutrix
councelled. The I.O. sent the prosecutrix with SI Alma Minj to Aruna
Asaf Ali Hospital where she was medically examined and the
exhibits prepared by the doctors were preserved and seized by the
Investigating Officer. On 14.12.2015, statement of prosecutrix U/s
164 Cr.P.C. was recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate
wherein she had reiterated the same facts and circumstances against
the accused.
4. On the basis of material available on record, vide order dated
11.04.2016, charge was framed against the accused for the offences
punishable U/s 451/376 IPC to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has examined fourteen witnesses in all.
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 2 of 21
5. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C
wherein he reiterated his innocence and denied all the incriminating
evidence against him and claimed to be falsely implicated in this
case. According to him, PW9 (Pramod), husband of the prosecutrix
used to be his driver and he used to support the family of Pramod
financially and when he stopped extending financial support, PW9
(Pramod) in connivance with the prosecutrix got the present case
registered against him. Accused has examined one witness in his
defence.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State contended that the impugned
judgment dated 01.08.2018 is based on conjectures, surmises and the
learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the testimony of the
prosecutrix in its right perspective ignoring the well-settled
proposition of law that the sole testimony of the victim of sexual
offence is sufficient to base conviction of the accused; that the Trial
Court has erred by not appreciating the fact that the version of the
prosecutrix also corroborates with the FSL report whereby the DNA
profile generated from the clothes of the prosecutrix duly matched
with the DNA profile from blood gauze of the accused.
7. Learned counsel for the State further contended that the learned Trial
Court failed to consider the testimony of PW-2 (prosecutrix) in
correct perspective and based the acquittal of the accused, on minor
inconsistencies in the testimonies of PW-2 (prosecutrix); that the
learned trial court ignored the settled proposition of law that
conviction in rape case can be based on the sole testimony of the
victim which does not require any corroboration; that the testimony
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 3 of 21
of PW-2 (the prosecutrix) is fully corroborated with the testimony of
PW-9 (the husband) as well as MLC of the prosecution (Ex.PW-
2/A); that the Trial Court had failed to consider that the prosecutrix
had informed about the said incident to her husband and Jethani
(sister-in-law) and that the version of the prosecutrix has been
consistent throughout and corroborates with other material witnesses.
8. I have heard the learned counsel for the State and perused the
material available on record.
9. It is a settled principle of law that conviction in a rape case can be
based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without
corroboration from any other evidence. The statement of the victim is
more reliable than any other witness, where the testimony of victim
of sexual assault instills confidence in Court, the same can be relied
upon for conviction of the accused. It is also a well settled principle
of law that corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the
testimony of the victim is not a requirement of law but a guidance to
prudence under the given circumstances.
10. In State of Rajasthan vs. Babu Meena reported at (2013) 2 SCALE
479, the Apex Court held that:
"8. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting
the broad submission of Mr. Jain that the conviction
can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if
found to be worthy of credence and reliable and for that
no corroboration is required. It has often been said that
oral testimony can be classified into three categories,
namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and
(iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In
case of wholly reliable testimony of a single witness, the
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 4 of 21
conviction can be founded without corroboration. This
principle applies with greater vigour in case the nature
of offence is such that it is committed in seclusion. In
case prosecution is based on wholly unreliable
testimony of a single witness, the court has no option
than to acquit the accused.
9. In the background of the aforesaid legal position,
when we consider the case in hand we are of the
opinion that the statement of the prosecutrix is not at all
reliable or in other words wholly unreliable. No other
evidence has been led to support the allegation of rape.
Hence, it shall be unsafe to base the conviction on her
sole testimony. In her evidence she had stated that she
was subjected to rape at 12.00 noon when her sister
Jitendra, the wife of the accused had gone to purchase
milk. However, during the course of investigation she
alleged that she was subjected to rape at 06.30 A.M.
When confronted with the aforesaid contradiction in the
cross-examination, she could not explain the aforesaid
discrepancy. Her statement that she shouted for help
when she was subjected to rape also does not find
support from the evidence of Ramchandra Salvi (PW-
11), the owner of the house where the incident is
alleged to have taken place. Dr. Smt. Sushila (PW-12),
has also not supported the allegation of rape as also the
Forensic Science Laboratory Report. In the face of
what we have observed above, the evidence of the
prosecutrix cannot be said to be wholly reliable."
11. In Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130,
the Apex Court has held that:
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 5 of 21
"31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty
for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
evidence of prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same
inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely
trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling
quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the
prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, have already been
projected hereinabove, would go to show that her
evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be
relied upon to hold the Appellant guilty of the said
offences. Indeed there are several significant variations
in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section
161 statement (Code of Criminal Procedure), FIR and
deposition in Court."
12. In Vijay v. State of Madhya Pradesh: (2010) 8 SCC 191, the Apex
Court has observed that:
"Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect
that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be
worthy of credence and reliable, requires no
corroboration. The court may convict the accused on
the sole testimony of the prosecutrix."
13. It is vital to note that if the statement of the prosecutrix fails to
inspire confidence or is not worthy of credence then the same should
not be the basis for conviction. The same was reiterated in Sadashiv
Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra: (2006) 10 SCC 92,
wherein the Supreme Court held that:
9. It is true that in a rape case the Accused could be
convicted on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it
is capable of inspiring confidence in the mind of the
court. If the version given by the prosecutrix is
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 6 of 21
unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole
surrounding circumstances are highly improbable
and belie the case set up by the prosecutrix, the court
shall not act on the solitary evidence of the
prosecutrix. The courts shall be extremely careful in
accepting the sole testimony of the prosecutrix when
the entire case is improbable and unlikely to happen
14. As is also evident from the observations above, such reliance may be
placed only if the testimony of the prosecutrix appears to be worthy
of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant to note the observations
of the Apex Court in the case of Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh:
(2008) 15 SCC 133 which read thus:
10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic
principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix
should not be suspected and should be believed, more
so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with
that of an injured witness and if the evidence is
reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly,
the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest
weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the
same time they cannot be universally and
mechanically applied to the facts of every case of
sexual assault which comes before the court. 11. It
cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest
distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same
time a false allegation of rape can cause equal
distress, humiliation and damage to the Accused as
well. The Accused must also be protected against the
possibility of false implication, particularly where a
large number of Accused are involved. It must,
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 7 of 21
further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is
that an injured witness was present at the time when
the incident happened and that ordinarily such a
witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants,
but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming
that the statement of such a witness is always correct
or without any embellishment or exaggeration
Testimony of the prosecutrix
15. Returning to the facts of the present case, the primary issue for
consideration in the present leave petition is whether evidence
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of PW-2
(prosecutrix) and PW-9 (the husband) is trustworthy, credible and
worthy of reliance.
16. PW-2 (Prosecutrix) in her examination-in-chief deposed as under:
"On 11.12.2015 my husband had gone on his work
about 05.00 am and I along with my daughter aged
about 07 months was present in the house. I had
bolted the door of the room from inside. After half an
hour of leaving the house by my husband, accused
came there, broke opened the door by hitting the same
with his leg. The door was not properly bolted at that
time. Thereafter, he forcibly committed rape on me
after pinning me down on the bed. I was residing as a
tenant in a room on the ground floor at the address
given by me in my complaint. Accused was also
residing there in a room as a tenant on the same floor
opposite to my room. There was no other room on the
ground floor. After committing rape on me, accused
left the room with his "Champion" vehicle which he
used to drive. After the incident when I was weeping,
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 8 of 21
the daughter in law of our landlady heard the same,
came to me and asked me the reason why I was
weeping but I did not tell anything to her thinking that
I will tell the incident to my husband. After about 10
minutes my "Jethani" Smt.Asha came to my room to
cook food as her Gas Cylinder had got empty. At that
time I was still weeping. I told the entire incident to
Smt.Asha. She was also residing in the same street on
the opposite row. Thereafter, I also telephoned my
husband and narrated the entire incident to him.
After half and hour he also came up at the room and I
told the incident to him. Thereafter, I along with my
husband went to police station Burari and gave my
statement.
Cross examination of PW2 reads as under:-
Accused was known to me prior to the incident. My
husband was driving the vehicle of the accused and he
was getting Rs.8000/- per month as salary.
It is also correct that my differences with my husband
was sorted out with the intervention of the accused
and his Bua.
It is correct that I alongwith accused and his family
visited had gone to a place known as Chhota
Haridwar in Delhi. I alongwith my husband, accused
and his girlfriend had gone to a Dargah at
Wazirabad, Delhi.
The door of my room is a single door. The latches of
the door of my room were broken when accused
forcibly entered my room. When accused entered my
room, I asked him "kua hua", he sat beside me.
There is one wooden window in my room. Normally it
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 9 of 21
is remained closed. My one month old daughter was
asleep at the time of incident. There was a singly bed
in my room. My child was in my lap at that time. It is
correct that my wearing clothes were not torn. Again
said my shirt was torn from the neck. Accused was
wearing jeans and t-shirt at the time of incident. After
about half an hour accused left my room. I did not
raise alarm at that time (objected to by Ld.Addl. PP
for State). I had called my husband from my mobile
phone. My mobile phone number was 7503246431.
Presently it is closed. My husband reached the house
at about one hour or two hours. It is correct that I
was wearing the same clothes when my Jethani came
to my room.
I alongwith my husband reached police station
at 10.00 am. We stayed at police station for an hour.
I do not remember how many papers I had signed at
police station. I cannot tell the time of my medical
examination."
17. PW-9 (husband) during his examination-in-chief, deposed as under:
"I left my rented house in between 04.00 am to 05.00
am for the said work. At about 07.30 pm I received a
call from my wife/prosecutrix stating that accused
Sonu, present in the court (correctly identified) had
committed rape on her. Accused Sonu was known to
me as I had also worked with him as a driver and left
the job at about one and half months prior to the
present incident. Accused came into my contact
through the Bua of the accused, who had been residing
in Mandoli. My in-laws house was also in Mandoli.
The Bua of the accused had referred me to the accused
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 10 of 21
for the work of driving his car.After receiving the
aforesaid call, I reached my house at about 08.30 pm-
08.45 pm. My wife/prosecutrix narrated the entire
incident to me which had happened after a little while
of leaving my house. I immediately took my
wife/prosecutrix to police station, where she lodged
complaint already Ex.PW1/A.
Cross examination of PW-9 (the husband) reads as under:-
Prosecutrix had called me between 06:00-07:00 am I
was in the Phool Mandi, Gazipur at that time.
Prosecutrix had revealed me about the incident.
Except prosecutrix and my Bhabhi no one else was
present at my house when I reached there. It is correct
that after discussion with the prosecutrix for about one
hour, I along with her went to the police station.
"...It is correct that I had gone to visit Chhota
Haridwar and Mazar at Wazirabad with the accused in
the vehicle of the accused..."
18. From the perusal of the above statements it is evident that there are
various contradictions and inconsistencies in their deposition which
in furtherance creates a shadow of doubt upon the case of the
prosecution. In cross examination, PW2 (prosecutrix) deposed that
'The latches of the door of my room were broken when accused
forcibly entered my room' to the contrary PW11 (daughter-in-law of
land lady) had deposed in her cross examination that 'The door and
the latches of the room of the prosecutrix were not broken as
inspected by the police officials in my presence'. Another glaring
defect which is eminent is that PW-9 (husband) in his examination-
in-chief deposed that 'At about 07.30 pm I received a call from my
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 11 of 21
wife/prosecutrix stating that accused Sonu had committed rape on
her' to the contrary, PW-13 (Inspector Mukesh Devi) during her
cross-examination deposed that 'Prosecutrix along with her husband
came to police station at about 06:00 pm. It is highly improbable that
when PW-9 (husband of the prosecutrix) has received the
information only at 7.30 pm then has come he reached the police
station along with the prosecutrix at 6.00 pm. The conduct of the
prosecutrix is also unnatural as she neither raised any hue and cry at
the time of alleged incident nor reported the matter immediately after
the incident'. The time the police reached the spot of the incident is
also at dispute.
Medical Evidence
19. At this stage, it is pertinent to view the medical evidence adduced by
the prosecution. PW-5/Dr. Ruchita had examined the prosecutrix.
The MLC (Ex.PW-2/A) is reproduced below:
"No sign of fresh external injury seen at time of
Medical Examination.
Opinion can be formed after examination of collected
samples as female is sexually active and had
intercourse with her husband in less than 48 hours
before collection of samples"
20. Learned counsel for the State has strongly placed reliance on the FSL
result which reads as under:
CONCLUSION
1. The DNA profiling (STR analysis) performed on the
exhibits provided is sufficient to conclude that DNA
Profile generated from the source of exhibits '2a'
(underwear of victim) & '3a' (legging of victim) is
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 12 of 21
similar with the DNA Profile from the source of exhibit
"6' (blood gauze of accused Sonu).
2. The DNA profiling (STR analysis) performed on the
exhibits provided is sufficient to conclude that DNA
Profile generated from the source of exhibits '2a'
(underwear of victim) & '3a' (legging of victim) is
similar with the DNA Profile from the source of exhibit
"6' (b!ood gauze of accused Sonu)
21. The Apex Court in the case of Yogesh Singh vs. Mahabeer Singh
and Ors. reported at AIR 2016 SC5160, has held that the medical
evidence is only corroborative in nature and not conclusive. The
germane portion is extracted below:
"In any event, it has been consistently held by this Court
that the evidentiary value of medical evidence is only
corroborative and not conclusive and, hence, in case of a
conflict between oral evidence and medical evidence, the
former is to be preferred unless the medical evidence
completely Rules out the oral evidence. [See Solanki
Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 2 SCC
174; Mani Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1993 Supp (3) SCC
18; State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal and Anr., State of
Haryana v. Bhagirath MANU/SC/0362/1999 : (1999) 5
SCC 96; Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of
Gujarat (2003) 5 SCC 223; Thaman Kumar v. State of
U.T. of Chandigarh (2003) 6 SCC 380; Krishnan v. State
(2003) 7 SCC 56; Khambam Raja Reddy and Anr. v.
Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC
239; State of U.P. v. Dinesh MANU/SC/0282/2009 :
(2009) 11 SCC 566; State of U.P. v. Hari Chand (2009)
13 SCC 542; Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P.
MANU/SC/0702/2010 : (2010) 10 SCC 259 and Bhajan
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 13 of 21
Singh @ Harbhajan Singh and Ors. v. State (2011) 7
SCC 421]."
22. In a recent case, the Apex Court in Balvir Singh and Ors. vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported at 2019 (4) SCALE 631, has specified that
oral evidence always has supremacy over medical evidence as the
latter can only be considered as opinionative in nature. Relevant
portion is extracted below:
"26. It is well settled that the oral evidence has to get
primacy since medical evidence is basically opinionative.
In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha and Ors.:
(2003) 12 SCC 606, the Supreme Court held as under:
17. So far as the alleged variance between medical
evidence and ocular evidence is concerned, it is
trite law that oral evidence has to get primacy and
medical evidence is basically opinionative. It is
only when the medical evidence specifically Rules
out the injury as is claimed to have been inflicted
as per the oral testimony, then only in a given case
the court has to draw adverse inference. The same
principle was reiterated in State of U.P. v. Krishna
Gopal and Anr.: (1988) 4 SCC 302, where the
Supreme Court held "that eyewitnesses' account
would require a careful independent assessment
and evaluation for their credibility which should
not be adversely prejudged making any other
evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole
touchstone for the test of such credibility."
23. Returning to the facts of the present case the testimony of the
prosecutrix is inconsistent and in contradiction with the testimony of
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 14 of 21
her husband and other prosecution witnesses. The MLC of the
prosecutrix also does not support the case of the prosecution.
Thought in FSL report the semen detected from the clothes of the
prosecutrix matched with DNA profile of the accused but in the
present case conviction cannot be based only on the positive report of
the FSL as the statement of prosecutrix and MLC of the prosecutrix
does not support the case of the prosecution for punishment under
Section 376 IPC. The conduct of the prosecutrix also appears to be
unnatural hence the consensual relation among the accused and
prosecutrix cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, in the present case we
cannot place reliance on the report obtained from FSL.
False implication
24. The accused has produced one witness in his support, DW1/Smt.
Munni Kumari has deposed that the prosecutrix and the accused were
known to each other and that the accused used to pay the rent on
behalf of the prosecutrix, regarding which they used to have regular
quarrels. Relevant portion of her deposition is reproduced below:
"...Accused used to pay rent of complainant for
sometimes and sometimes husband of the complainant
used to pay the rent. They used to quarrel on the issue
of adjustment of rent amount.
Prosecutrix used to threat the accused that she would
implicate him in a case of rape if he would demand
his money from her or her husband..."
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 15 of 21
25. Attention of this court has been directed to the Cross examination of
PW11/Smt Karuna who is the daughter of the landlady. The same is
stated below:
"...It is further correct that police officials came to
our house at about 06:00pm-07:00pm on 11.12.2015.
it is further correct that prior to that no noise or hue
and cry was made by the prosecutrix or her husband
or any other relative of the prosecutrix. The door and
the latches of the room of the prosecutrix were not
broken as inspected by the police officials in my
presence..."
26. As per the case of the prosecution, the accused had forcibly entered
into the room of the prosecutrix and committed rape upon her.
However, from the perusal of the testimony of PW11 it becomes
established that the latch of the door to the room of the prosecutrix
was intact when the police had inspected the place. Even if the latch
was lightly bolted, there should have been some amount of damage to
the lock when the respondent forcibly entered into the room.
27. Another aspect which seems implausible is the fact that the
prosecutrix failed to raise any alarm to attract the attention of other
residents of the building or did not offer any resistance while having
been sexually assaulted by the respondent. Moreover, the prosecutrix
had, foremost, informed her jethani (Smt Asha) about the incident,
who could have been a vital witness to the case of the prosecution,
yet she was not examined by the prosecution.
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 16 of 21
Conclusion
28. From the above discussion, I am of the considered view that evidence
adduced by the prosecutrix has no ring of truth and does not find to
be of sterling character and is not sufficient to base the conviction of
the respondent. As far as medical evidence is concerned, it is settled
law that the same is corroborative in nature. Since, the ocular
testimony of the prosecutrix is inconsistent, it would be unsafe to
give weightage to the medical evidence.
29. On Scrutinizing the material available on record, as demonstrated
above, the same does not appear to be a case of sexual intercourse
against the will of the prosecutrix rather it appears that the
prosecutrix was a consenting party. The prosecution fails to prove its
case beyond any reasonable doubt as this Court finds that the
testimony of prosecutrix fails to inspire confidence and the same
cannot be relied for the conviction of the respondent.
30. The law with regard to grant of leave is well settled by a catena of
judgments. Leave to appeal can be granted only where it is shown
that the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court are perverse or there
is misapplication of law or any legal principle. The High Court
cannot entertain a petition merely because another view is possible or
that another view is more conceivable.
31. In Upendra Pradhan vs. State of Orissa reported at 2015 5 SCALE
634, the Apex Court has observed that:
"10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are
of the view that in case there are two views which can be
culled out from the perusal of evidence and application
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 17 of 21
of law, the view which favours the accused should be
taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this
Court. In Narendra Singh and Anr. v. State of M.P.
MANU/SC/0341/2004 : (2004) 10 SCC 699, this Court
has recognized presumption of innocence as a human
right and has gone on to say that:
30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt
belonged to the accused. It is further trite that
suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take
place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there
is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'.
31. It is also well known that even in a case where
a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof
remains on the prosecution. Presumption of
innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets
stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed.
This Court in a number of decisions has set out the
legal principle for reversing the judgment of
acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State
of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and
Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not
been adhered to by the High Court.
xxx
33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem
report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of
Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but
benefit thereof must go to the Appellants as in the
event of there being two possible views, the one
supporting the accused should be upheld.
11. The decision taken by this Court in the
aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 18 of 21
of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, wherein
this Court observed thus:
Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered
with because the presumption of innocence of the
accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden
thread which runs through the web of administration of
justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused should be
adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to
ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of
the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an
innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored,
a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate
the evidence in a case where the accused has been
acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether
any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see
Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be
followed by the appellate court considering the appeal
against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only
when there are compelling and substantial reasons for
doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly
unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference."
32. In Govindaraju @ Govinda vs State by Sriramapuram P.S. and
Anr. reported at AIR 2012 SC 1292 the Apex Court discussed the
law while dealing with appeals against acquittal in the following
words:
13.......The courts have held that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, then the
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 19 of 21
one favorable to the accused, may be adopted by the
court. However, this principle must be applied keeping in
view the facts and circumstances of a case and the thumb
rule is that whether the prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution has
succeeded in discharging its onus, and the error in
appreciation of evidence is apparent on the face of the
record then the court can interfere in the judgment of
acquittal to ensure that the ends of justice are met. This
is the linchpin around which the administration of
criminal justice revolves.
14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
the burden of proof lies on the prosecution and it has to
prove a charge beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial are
twin safeguards available to the accused under our
criminal justice system but once the prosecution has
proved its case and the evidence led by the prosecution,
in conjunction with the chain of events as are stated to
have occurred, if, points irresistibly to the conclusion
that the accused is guilty then the court can interfere
even with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of
acquittal might be based upon misappreciation of
evidence or apparent violation of settled canons of
criminal jurisprudence.
33. With the aforementioned reasons, I am of the opinion that the present
leave petition holds no merit and I see no compelling and substantial
reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Trial Court in
the present case and therefore, upon overall analysis, I am of the view
that the present leave petition preferred by the State being meritless
deserves to be dismissed.
CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 20 of 21
34. Accordingly, the present leave petition being devoid of merit is
dismissed.
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J.
MAY 10, 2019 gr CRL.L.P. 688/2018 Page 21 of 21