Delhi District Court
Vandana Sharma vs Hunyla Malik on 9 March, 2026
CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
IN THE COURT OF SH. YASHDEEP CHAHAL,
CIVIL JUDGE-02, SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURT,
DELHI
Case No. : CS SCJ 626/2022
CNR No. : DLST03-001041-2022
IN THE MATTER OF :
VANDANA SHARMA
D/o Dr. Ashok Kumar Sharma
R/o Flat No.3, Third Floor, (Plot No. 10638)
Silver Oakwood Apartment-2,
Ward No.8, Mehrauli, South Delhi.
............Plaintiff
Versus
HUNYLA MALIK
D/o Abdul Hamid
R/o B-74, First Floor, DDA Flats Pocket-11,
Jasola, New Delhi,
Ph-8882874190,
WhatsApp No. 885084484, 8882874910.
..........Defendant
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SUIT FOR DEFAMATION AND COMPENSATION ON
ACCOUNT OF HARASSMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT
MRS. HUNYLA MALIK
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Date of Institution of suit : 07.06.2022
Date of Reserving of Judgment : 20.02.2026
Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 09.03.2026
(Yashdeep Chahal),
Civil Judge-02 (South)
Saket Courts, New Delhi
09.03.2026 (Page 1 of 26)
CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
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JUDGMENT
1. That the legal profession, especially the practice of law, is filled with volatile sentiments and temperamental human frailties is not unknown to those who are a part of it. Often, in the course of trials and judicial proceedings, we encounter the worst manifestations of human emotions and one, at times, fails to realise when such emotions cross the lines of legality in the eyes of law. The present one is a case wherein a litigant/defendant felt dissatisfaction against her Counsel/plaintiff, who was handling her matrimonial proceedings, and expressed that dissatisfaction to various authorities by alleging professional misconduct and extortion. Eventually, the complaints were withdrawn, with an admission that they were false, and in this backdrop, the plaintiff has approached this Court for the vindication of her right of reputation. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose of the present suit filed by the plaintiff seeking compensation for defamation and harassment from the defendant, namely, Mrs. Hunyla Malik.
PLAINT
2. Briefly put, the case of the plaintiff is that she is a practicing advocate at Saket District Courts, New Delhi and the defendant has defamed her by getting false complaints registered against her before District Legal Services Authority, (South- East), New Delhi ("DLSA") and Police station, Saket. It is (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 2 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik averred that later, the complaints were withdrawn by the defendant and she admitted they were false. It is averred that the said complaint(s) were registered just to defame the plaintiff and to force her to withdraw her complaint against Mr. Manish Upadhyaya, a friend of the defendant. It is averred that the plaintiff had lodged a complaint against Manish Upadhyaya alleging sexual harassment on 01.07.2019 vide DD. No. 54B at Police Station Naib Sarai. Later, an FIR bearing no. 251/19 (PS:
Naib Sarai) was registered on her complaint under Sections 354/354-A IPC on 18.07.2019.
3. It is further averred that the defendant exerted pressure on the plaintiff after 01.07.2019 to withdraw her complaint against Mr. Manish Upadhyaya. However, as the plaintiff refused to withdraw her complaint against the said person, the defendant filed false complaints against the plaintiff before DLSA (South-
East) and Police Station Saket on 12.07.2019. It is further averred that on 27.07.2019, when the anticipatory bail (Bail Application No. 1396/19) of accused Manish Upadhyay was being heard by the concerned Court, the defendant was present and levelled verbal allegations and passed defamatory remarks in open Court against the plaintiff (complainant/victim in the criminal case) regarding corruption committed by her as DLSA Counsel for the defendant, as mentioned by her in the complaints filled before DLSA and Police Station: Saket. It is further averred that the alleged acts were committed by the defendant with the intention (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 3 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik to diminish the reputation of the plaintiff in the society and profession.
4. It is further averred in the plaint that the Plaintiff was engaged as an advocate by the defendant and was managing her legal affairs. The plaintiff met the defendant when DLSA, South East authorized her to file and pursue the defendant's case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in January 2018. The same was filed by the plaintiff in March 2018 and later, the plaintiff also got to know that the defendant was assigned another advocate from DLSA, Mr. Puneet Dhawan, for filing her Domestic Violence Act (DV) case and she was not satisfied with him. Accordingly, the defendant expressed her grievances against him before the plaintiff and narrated her miserable condition in life. It is averred that in this manner, the defendant gained the sympathy of the plaintiff. It is further averred that later, the defendant also filed a complaint against Mr. Puneet Dhawan before DLSA and decided not to engage any legal aid lawyer for her domestic violence case. One fine day, the defendant came to the chamber of plaintiff and wept a lot to file her case of domestic violence and she persisted the plaintiff to do so. At the same time, the defendant also expressed her incapacity to pay the fee for such litigation. It is averred that the plaintiff agreed upon her terms and she promised to pay fee incurred in case after procuring maintenance/money from her husband/father and she also expressed her inability to pay paper expense i.e. typing, (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 4 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik photocopy, attestation, electronic documents etc. It is averred that the defendant promised to pay Rs.50,000/- for the services within some months as and when her father would support her. Accordingly, the plaintiff believed the defendant and took her DV case pro bono as a private counsel. Accordingly, she drafted the petition under Section 12 DV Act and such drafting was also done by the plaintiff by going to defendant's place, as she was unable to sit for long in chamber to assist in drafting due to her illness and small child.
5. Thereafter, the plaintiff filled her DV case in June 2018 and the defendant went to her hometown Kashmir. She continuously called the plaintiff from there and invited to visit Kashmir and enjoy the weather. In some chats, the defendant said that she generally brings many things/dry fruits/saffron/clothes for her friends, neighbors and if the plaintiff wanted the same, she could get for the plaintiff as well. The defendant brought saffron, kahwa tea and dry fruits for the plaintiff and the plaintiff paid for the same to her in June, 2018. As time passed on, the plaintiff became good friends with the defendant and gave her Rs. 1,05,000/- (Rs. One Lakhs Five Thousands only) but later, the defendant cheated the plaintiff and refused to return her amount, and filed false complaints against plaintiff by taking advantage of the incident involving her friend Mr. Manish Upadhyaya.
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 5 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
6. Thereafter, the plaintiff performed pro bono legal work for the defendant. The plaintiff also gave free legal advice to her landlord's son Shanky and her friend Manish Upadhyaya from time to time and on 12.07.2019, the defendant put great pressure upon the plaintiff to withdraw her complaint against Mr. Manish Upadhyaya by hook or crook, and when the plaintiff refused, she offered money. After refusal, the defendant filed false complaints against plaintiff before concerned authorities and later, withdrew them by stating that they were false.
7. It is averred that as a result of the false complaints filed by defendant, Ld. Secretary of DLSA got suspicious about the honesty of plaintiff and called her reply in writing, which was filled by plaintiff. Due to such action, the plaintiff felt degraded in her reputation among her known persons i.e. head of DLSA, Staff of DLSA, Colleges and lawyers. Further, the IO of the complaint filed by the defendant before PS Saket, namely Rajender Singh (Sub-Inspector), also called the plaintiff for investigation in police station and behaved like she was a culprit. He also threatened to take action against her. In this way, the plaintiff was traumatized, humiliated, harassed and defamed. It is further averred that on 27.07.2019, the defendant came to the Court of Shri Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Ld. ASJ Saket District Courts (South), and in open Court, she uttered indecent and false statements about the character of plaintiff and reiterated false facts, which she had mentioned in her complaint(s) filed before (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 6 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik Police Station Saket and DLSA (South-East). In this manner, she lowered the plaintiff's reputation among the legal fraternity/ lawyers. Later, the plaintiff met her colleagues who had seen the incident and felt shame upon herself and also faced certain rumours and taunts. In this manner, the reputation of plaintiff was lowered in the eyes of the society.
8. It is further averred that when the plaintiff filed a reply before DLSA and Police Station and before the police could take a final decision over her complaints, the defendant withdrew her complaints from DLSA and Police Station: Saket on 13.08.2019 and 12.08.2019 by asserting that they were false.
9. As regards delay, it is averred that the delay occurred in filling of present complaint was caused due to the pandemic period of Covid-19. It is further submitted that the period of delay is exempted by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, the present suit.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
10. After institution of the suit, summons was issued to the defendant. The defendant appeared before the Court and filed her written statement.
11. In her written statement, the defendant has taken several preliminary objections. It is contented that the present suit filed (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 7 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik by the plaintiff is totally vague, misconceived, false, frivolous and lacks in material particulars and is liable to be dismissed. It is further mentioned in the WS that the plaintiff started pressurizing the defendant to withdraw her complaints against the plaintiff. Mr. Manish Upadhyay also consoled the defendant that it would be better if things are settled, as defendant herself was suffering in life due to her family dispute and it was better not to go further with other disputes, to which the defendant agreed. Remaining averments have been denied by the defendants.
ISSUES
12. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed vide order dated 02.03.2024:
i. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of compensation as prayed for? OPP ii. Relief.
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE
13. Plaintiff, in support of her case, has placed on record her affidavit vide Ex. PW1/A and relied upon the following documents:
Sl. Exhibits/Mark Details of Documents
No.
1. Ex. PW1/1 Screenshots of Whatsapp chats
(Colly.) alongwith Certificate under
(Objected to Section 65B of Indian Evidence by Counsel for Act.
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 8 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik defendant as to mode of proof)
2. Mark B Copy of complaint filed against defendant DD No. 55B, PS Saket dated 25.07.2019.
3. Mark C Copy of complaints filed by (Colly.) defendant before DLSA (South-
East) and SHO, PS Saket.
4. Mark D Copy of withdrawal receipts filed (Colly.) by defendant before DLSA (South-East) and SHO, PS Saket.
5. Ex. PW1/2 Certified copy of order dated (Colly.) 27.07.2019 in FIR No. 251/19 PS Neb Sarai alongwith bail application.
6. Ex.PW1/3 Appointment letter issued by DLSA.
14. PW1 was cross-examined by Ld. Counsel for defendant at length. In her cross-examination, she deposed that she was appointed as her Legal Aid Counsel by DLSA (South-East). She admitted that she has not filed any proof pertaining to her assertion in para no. 2 of evidence by way of affidavit that defendant had pressurized her to withdraw her complaint against Mr. Manish Upadhyaya. She further admitted that she had filed settlement agreement i.e. MoU before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for quashing of FIR after apology and had not taken any amount/compensation from Mr. Manish Upadhyay.
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 9 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
15. Thereafter, plaintiff summoned and examined Ms. Sania, Dealing Official, Record Room as PW-2. This witness brought the document i.e. record of FIR bearing No. 251/2019, PS Neb Sarai, copy of bail application no. 1396/2019 filed by Sh. Manish Upadhyaya and complaints which were exhibited as Ex.PW2/A (OSR) (Colly.).
16. Plaintiff also summoned Sh. Mohan Singh, UDC, DLSA, South-East, Saket and examined as PW-3. This witness brought the document i.e. complete record of proceedings upon the complaint filed against the plaintiff, copy of application form, copy of complaint dated 13.07.2019 with supporting documents, copy of withdrawal letter dated 13.08.2019, copy of letter dated 21.08.2019 issued by ACP, South District, copy of application for addition to previous complaint alongwith documents and reply of complaint filed by the plaintiff dated 27.07.2019 alongwith supporting documents, which were exhibited as Ex.PW3/A (Colly.) (OSR).
17. Thereafter, Plaintiff summoned her last witness form UDC, DLSA South-East, Saket who was examined as PW-4. This witness brought the summoned document i.e. complete record of proceedings upon the complaint filed by the defendant against the LAC namely Sh. Puneet Dhawan. Copy of complaint filed by the defendant dated 19.03.2018 was exhibited as Ex.PW4/A (Colly.) (OSR).
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 10 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
18. Thereafter, evidence on behalf of plaintiff was closed on 19.01.2026.
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE
19. Defendant did not examine any witness in support of her case despite opportunity and the evidence on behalf of defendant was closed vide order dated 11.02.2026.
FINAL ARGUMENTS
20. I have gone through the arguments filed on behalf of plaintiff in the form of written submissions. The written submissions are part of the record and the arguments are not being reproduced for the sake of brevity. Final arguments were not advanced on behalf of defendant as none appeared on behalf of defendant, despite opportunity.
ANALYSIS & DECISION Judicial Understanding of Civil Defamation
21. Defamation, in India, entails both civil and criminal consequences. Whereas, criminal defamation is codified in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (earlier Indian Penal Code, 1860); civil defamation is purely a common law concept and is often addressed as the tort of defamation. What we are dealing with in the present case is the tort of defamation. Irrespective of (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 11 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik the nature of defamation, the underlying essence of every defamation case is loss of reputation, which is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 ("the Constitution"), being an inherent part of the broader right to life and dignity. Having said that, what makes a claim of defamation truly interesting is the fact that it pitches one fundamental right against the other. For, every defamation essentially involves an exercise of free speech in the eyes of the defendant and an action against any speech on the ground of defamation tests the limits of free speech, as understood in light of Article 19 of the Constitution. The onerous duty of testing speech on the anvil of defamation falls upon the Court, as it falls in the present case.
22. From a theoretical perspective, defamation is an act of false exercise of speech in a manner that it infringes the other's right to enjoy reputation. Constitutionally speaking, freedom of speech is envisaged in Article 19(1) and defamation is mentioned in Article 19(2) as a reasonable restriction on free speech, provided the reasonable restriction on free speech is backed by a law made by the State. Therefore, what Article 19(2) implies is that free speech cannot be curtailed on the ground of defamation unless there is a law which provides for such curtailment. Understood in this manner, the offence of criminal defamation could be said to be a manifestation of reasonable restriction under Article 19(2) as it is supported by "law" i.e. BNS/IPC. Although, strictly speaking, the tort of defamation is not based on (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 12 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik any 'law' made by the Parliament and is purely based on common law. However, civil defamation is a common law tort which is applicable in India and the word "defamation" in Article 19 is understood to cover both civil and criminal defamation. When the concept is narrowed down and examined through the lens of common law, we find that the tort of defamation is an act of making false speech which is defamatory and which has the tendency of lowering the reputation of the targeted person in the eyes of right thinking members of the society. The essential ingredients of the tort of defamation have been summarized by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abhijit Mishra v. Wipro Limited, (2025) DHC 5678 as follows:
"(i) a false statement, whether written (libel) or spoken (slander); and defamatory in nature i.e., it must have the effect of lowering the reputation in the eyes of others (right-thinking members of the society);
(ii) publication of such statement to at least one person other than the plaintiff; and
(iii) identifiability, i.e., the statement must refer to the plaintiff either expressly or by implication
(iv) Absence of a valid defence such as justification, truth, or privilege."
23. It is fairly understood that written defamation is referred as libel and oral defamation is referred as slander. What we are dealing with here is libel, as defamation has been alleged to have been committed in writing. The first ingredient refers to the statement being defamatory in nature i.e. it must lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of others. The 'others' are often considered to be the right-thinking members of the society (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 13 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik and for all practical purposes, it is the Court that assumes the role of the right-thinking members of the society and examines the speech from that standard. However, it is not a matter of rule. For instance, if the plaintiff approaches the Court by specifying the person in whose eyes his reputation has been lowered, the plaintiff must show that he actually had a reputation in the eyes of such specified persons and such persons must appear before the Court as witnesses to say so, if required. However, there may be cases in which the plaintiff does not specify any specific person or class of persons, but states that his reputation has been lowered in the eyes of the society at large. In such cases, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he enjoyed some reputation in the eyes of the society at large and once it is so averred, it is for the Court to examine whether the plaintiff did enjoy such reputation and whether the reputation stood lowered in the eyes of the society at large depending on the nature of statement. In the latter category of cases, the examination is essentially based on the social outlook of the Judge and his own sense of perception of the society at large. Therefore, it is not always necessary for the reasonable members of the society to step into the witness box to state that the plaintiff has been defamed in their eyes.
24. The second ingredient is of publication i.e. communication of the defamatory writing to some person other than the plaintiff. The second ingredient is closely linked to the first ingredient as it (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 14 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik reinforces the principle that defamation is actually loss of reputation in the eyes of third persons (often referred as reasonable man, right thinking members of the society etc.) and not in the own eyes of the plaintiff. Therefore, unless the plaintiff is able to show that his reputation has been lowered in the perception of others, he cannot succeed in an action of defamation even if his reputation stands tarnished in his own eyes. After all, the concept of reputation itself refers to the perception or image that a person enjoys in the estimation of others. The concept of publication gets quite interesting when it is broken down and understood in a practical sense. Understandably, a claim of loss of reputation would only stand if the defamatory writing has actually been read or heard by the third person. What if it's a letter which was never taken out of the post box or an email which was never checked by the receiver or a Facebook post which was never read by any user? Could a plaintiff, in such circumstances, claim that the defamatory writing has been actually communicated to the third persons and reputation has been lowered in their eyes? The question also arises because, stricto sensu, there is no presumption of law or fact that communication of a defamatory writing to a third person itself confirms that the writing has actually been read by such third person. Reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Escorts Limited v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7607.
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 15 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
25. The concept of 'inference' is used to resolve this issue in most cases. It suggests that, depending upon the nature of content, mode of communication and ordinary course of events, the Court may draw an inference that the defamatory writing has been duly communicated to the third persons and publication is deemed as complete in view of such successful communication. Ordinarily, the burden to prove publication is a positive burden which falls upon the plaintiff, however, in some cases, the burden can be discharged by drawing an inference on the basis of a bundle of facts, as stated above. In Sameer Dnyandev Wankhede v. Red Chillies Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., (2026) DHC 701, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi succinctly summarized the position of law as:
"26. On a careful reading of the proposition discussed above, it could be observed that ordinarily, when loss of reputation and standing in the eyes of others is claimed, the defamatory imputation must be published to persons, before whom the plaintiff enjoys a reputation. However, in cases where libel is claimed, in grounds that the nature and seriousness of the impugned content would cause the plaintiff to be shunned, avoided, or excluded from society, the requirement to identify third party before whom the plaintiff has a reputation as such may not be as relevant. Notwithstanding the same, the bare minimum which must necessarily be satisfied, even in such cases is, that the third parties to whom the defamatory content is published, must know of the plaintiff. They cannot be individuals who have not heard of the plaintiff. Naturally, the wrong of defamation cannot be done, at a place where the claimant does not enjoy a reputation or otherwise is not known. Else, it would just be a case of loss of self-esteem in the own eyes of the claimant, and not of reputational loss in the eyes of others."
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 16 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
26. In arriving at this finding, the Court relied upon a crucial extract on 'inferences' from Gatley on Libel and Slander, 10th Ed., 2003, Para. 32.6, which clarifies the proposition thus:
"Inferences It is not necessary in all cases to prove that the libellous matter was actually seen and read by some identified third party. If it is a matter of reasonable inference that this happened, a prima facie case of publication will be established. Thus, proof that a libellous letter was sent through the post is prima facie evidence of publication to the person to whom it was addressed. The same must surely be true where it is proved that an email was sent to stated addressees. The sending of a libellous postcard has been held to be prima facie evidence of publication to the persons who handled the postcard. There is no presumption that a letter in an unsealed envelope will be read by anyone other than the addressee."
27. Therefore, a careful reading of the position of law discussed above suggests that the appreciation of the ingredient of publication is based on practical human experiences. Quite naturally, it is so because an aggrieved plaintiff may be able to show that a defamatory writing has been sent to a third person or has been made available for reading, but it could be practically difficult for him to show that it has actually been read by such third person. To overcome this practical difficulty, it is permissible for the Court to indulge in an inferential exercise on the basis of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Importantly, this approach is not alien to the law of evidence, as codified in Bharatiya Sakshya Sanhita, 2023 ("BSA"). For, the law of evidence in India provides for presumptions. Section 119 of BSA (earlier Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872) (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 17 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik empowers the Court to presume the existence of certain facts, based on the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business. Therefore, the ingredient of publication is proved not only on the basis of proof of communication shown by the plaintiff but also on the basis of inferences or presumptions drawn keeping in mind the ordinary course of events.
28. It is equally essential that the defamatory statement is identifiable with the plaintiff and there can be no ambiguity about it. If the plaintiff is not identifiable from the statement, it cannot be said with certainty that the plaintiff has been defamed. Fourthly, it is very important to sustain an action for civil defamation that there is no valid defence. Whereas, criminal defamation has multiple statutory exceptions, civil defamation majorly has three exceptions - truth, justification and privilege. The concepts of truth and justification are well understood in law; however, the concept of privilege requires a brief elaboration.
29. Generally understood, privileges fall into two categories- absolute privilege and qualified privilege. The former applies to such communications wherein the need for a free communication trumps the concern of reputational harm that such communication may cause. It applies to judicial proceedings, parliamentary proceedings, communications made to public (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 18 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik offices in public interest etc. Understandably, in such communications, free speech takes precedence. Qualified privilege kicks in when the defendant pleads that he had a duty to speak and he performed it without any malice or mala fide intent, even though the statement may be untrue.
Factual Analysis & Appreciation
30. Having discussed the law on civil defamation, the Court may now come to the facts of the case. In the present case, the principal issue is whether the defendant defamed the plaintiff by writing the complaint dated 12.07.2019 to PS Saket and District Legal Services Authority, South East District, New Delhi ("DLSA"). The basis of pleading defamation is that the complaints were made falsefully and deliberately, and the defendant herself admitted the false nature of her complaints while withdrawing the same later on. At the outset, be it noted that both the complaints were eventually and admittedly withdrawn by the defendant, however, the letters of withdrawal were different. The letter sent to PS Saket dated 11.08.2019 intimates simpliciter withdrawal, without stating that the complaint was false. However, the letter sent to DLSA, South East dated 13.08.2019 not only sought permission to withdraw the complaint but also recorded the admission of the defendant that the allegations in the complaint were not true.
(Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 19 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik
31. The allegations recorded by the defendant against the plaintiff herein pertained to extortion of money by the defendant while serving as her counsel and inducement to fulfil her demands by bringing various products from Kashmir. There is no question that the statements have the tendency of lowering the reputation of the plaintiff in her professional circle. In response to the complaints made by the defendant, the plaintiff was called upon to furnish explanations and was called to DLSA as well as Saket Police Station. Therefore, the publication as well as communication of the defamatory material to third persons are made out. Now, it needs to be seen whether the defendant has succeeded in proving any defence.
32. With respect to the withdrawal letter, the only defence taken by the defendant is that the withdrawal letter was signed by her under influence. Thus, the authenticity of the letter is not in doubt as the signatures actually belonged to the defendant. However, the defendant has attempted to wriggle out of the controversy by alleging undue influence. The said statement has been advanced as a bare statement and no defence evidence has been led to prove the manner of undue influence under which she was constrained to sign the withdrawal letter. It is trite law that the burden of proving an assertion falls upon the party which asserts it. There is absolutely no evidence of undue influence as per the record and even from an examination of the circumstances, no such inference could be drawn. For, if the (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 20 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik withdrawal was made under influence, the defendant could have taken steps to intimate the same to DLSA or concerned PS, and to seek reopening of the inquiry against the plaintiff. No such action was taken. Furthermore, no subsequent complaint or action was initiated to make it clear that she had not consciously signed the withdrawal letter. It assumes significance because the defendant is not an illiterate person who could not file complaints or write letters to the authorities. The fact that she was forthcoming in filing two separate complaints against both her legal aid counsels, is indicative of the fact that she was quite enthusiastic and vocal about her concerns. The submission of undue influence came only after the defendant was called to file her WS in the present case and to somehow escape any liability. Clearly, it is an afterthought.
33. Be it noted that the defendant has not even attempted to prove that her allegations were truthful or justified in any manner. Even otherwise, there is no justification or truth in the allegations as it appears from the record. It is the admitted position that the plaintiff was engaged by the defendant in two different capacities - as a legal aid counsel for the case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and as a private counsel for the case under DV Act. Even if the plaintiff demanded reasonable expenses from the defendant from time to time, she was entitled to do so as she was incurring expenses in handling the defendant's private case. There was absolutely no basis for the defendant to label it (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 21 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik as extortion. Moreover, she admitted the fact that the plaintiff had taken up her case pro bono and that the plaintiff was helping her in her private matters. Despite such helpful conduct, the defendant went on to tarnish the professional reputation of the plaintiff over a demand of nominal expenses. Evidently, the defendant took advantage of the professional constraints of the plaintiff and wrote the letters to the authorities in a 'shoot and go' manner. The timelines also indicate that the complaints were filed for an ulterior objective.
34. The plaintiff filed the complaint for sexual harassment against defendant's friend Manish Upadhyaya on 01.07.2019 before the concerned PS. The same was later converted into FIR on 18.07.2019. The defendant immediately swung into action and filed the complaints against plaintiff before DLSA and PS Saket on 12.07.2019 i.e. 11 days after the complaint made by the plaintiff against Manish Upadhyaya. Thereafter, during the anticipatory bail hearing on 27.07.2019, the defendant was present before the concerned Court for reasons best known to her. Her presence is marked in the relevant order. The plaintiff's case is that she appeared to level allegations against the plaintiff in order to tarnish her credibility and to save her friend. It is denied by the defendant on the ground that the defendant's submissions are not recorded in the said order. Be that as it may, the defendant has stated in her WS that she was informed by the plaintiff that she was going to file complaint against Manish and thereafter, (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 22 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik she did not interfere between the plaintiff and Manish as it was their private matter. Despite so, the defendant was present in the Court, without any locus, during the hearing of the anticipatory bail application of Manish. The defendant's conduct is inexplicable.
35. In light of the above discussion, I have no doubt in observing that the defendant has defamed the plaintiff by making a false complaint dated 12.07.2019 to DLSA, South East and has committed the tort of defamation. Evidently, the plaintiff had to explain her professional conduct before the authorities and the complaints had the effect of putting a black spot on the integrity and professional ethics of the plaintiff. Although, the only issue framed in the matter is of compensation, however, the grant of compensation is based on the finding of defamation and harassment. Accordingly, I have rendered the findings above.
Issue No. 1:
36. Grant of compensation for the violation of legal rights and tort of defamation is a legally permissible remedy in common law. I shall now determine the compensation payable to the plaintiff in view of the infringement of her rights.
37. In India, the law regarding grant of compensation in private wrongs is on a slightly different footing as compared to other jurisdictions. Whereas, in other jurisdictions, both general (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 23 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik and exemplary damages are permissible so as to serve the twin interests of compensation and deterrence; in India, we largely limit ourselves to general damages. As observed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abhijit Mishra (supra), exemplary damages have been awarded by the Indian Courts in constitutional violations by public authorities, however, a similar approach is missing in private wrongs. Be that as it may, exemplary damages are not even prayed in the instant matter and therefore, the standard approach to award general compensatory damages is the way to go in the present case. For the clarity of reasoning, I feel it appropriate to reproduce the following para from Abhijit Mishra, which succinctly captures the legal position:
98. The law, ordinarily speaking, does not favour punitive or exemplary damages in routine defamation claims, and instead focuses on providing reasonable compensation for the loss of reputation, mental anguish, and emotional suffering. However, the absence of a defined formula for quantifying injury to honour or repute renders such awards inherently discretionary based on the facts and gravity of the defamation, in each and every case. The very idea of quantification of reputational loss in terms of money makes the task of judicial determination challenging. It is also attributable to the fact that there is no real equivalence between the loss of reputation and monetary loss, except in cases wherein reputational loss has been suffered by a corporate entity leading to actual loss of income/business, or in cases where monetary loss could be linked directly to the loss of repute. However, such cases are not common, especially where an individual suffers the injury. Across common law jurisdictions, it has been acknowledged that damages for libel or slander are to be quantified "at large" i.e., without reference to any particular loss or damage. The calculation of compensation on this principle takes into account a myriad set of (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 24 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik circumstances, including, but not limited to, the conduct of the parties, circumstances of the case, gravity of the libel, extent of publication, whether to a few or to public at large, refusal to accept mistake or apology, effect of the libel on personal integrity, professional honour, honesty and loyalty of the defamed person etc. In addition, the Court may also keep in mind the consequential effect of the loss of reputation on future prospects and social standing, to the extent it could be considered objectively and reasonably. Having said that, the Court must be mindful that the award of damages or compensation on account of reputational loss is not a means to unjustly enrich a plaintiff and thus, the computation must restrict itself to the overall impact of the reputational harm on the mind and life of the defamed person, insofar as it could be inferred from the circumstances on record."
38. Thus, the quantification in the instant case is to be carried out "at large" i.e. without reference to any particular head of loss or damage, and by keeping into view the general factors such as conduct of parties, extent of reputational harm, gravity of libel, extent of publication etc. Keeping in view the above discussion regarding loss of professional integrity of the plaintiff in the eyes of authorities; harassment in the form of filing explanations before various authorities; the fact that the act was committed to deter the plaintiff who was herself a victim of sexual harassment;
the fact that the plaintiff had to suffer despite offering pro bono services to the defendant and keeping in view the fact that the defendant had levelled similar allegations against her previous counsel as well, I am of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper to award general compensatory damages to the (Yashdeep Chahal), Civil Judge-02 (South) Saket Courts, New Delhi 09.03.2026 (Page 25 of 26) CS SCJ 626/22 Vandana Sharma Vs. Hunyla Malik tune of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the plaintiff to redress reputational harm, harassment and loss of professional credibility.
RELIEF
39. In view of findings above, the suit is decreed and the defendant is directed to compensate the plaintiff by making payment of Rs. 2,00,000/- as compensation, along with the costs of the suit.
40. Decree sheet be prepared in terms of this judgment on payment of deficient court-fee, if any.
41. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by YASHDEEP YASHDEEP CHAHAL
CHAHAL Date: 2026.03.09
16:36:29 +0530
Announced in the open court (Yashdeep Chahal)
on 09.03.2026 Civil Judge-02(South)
(This judgment contains 26 pages Saket Courts, New Delhi
and each page has been signed by me.) 09.03.2026
(Yashdeep Chahal),
Civil Judge-02 (South)
Saket Courts, New Delhi
09.03.2026 (Page 26 of 26)