Gauhati High Court
Puni Ram Nath @ Koniram Nath vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 30 October, 2025
Author: Michael Zothankhuma
Bench: Michael Zothankhuma
Page No.# 1/20
GAHC010286922023
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./16/2024
PUNI RAM NATH @ KONIRAM NATH
SON OF LATE PANI RAM NATH, RESIDENT OF MIKIRBHETA, POLICE
STATION MIKIRBHETA, DISTRICT-MORIGOAN, ASSAM. PIN-782413
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REPRESENTED BY PP ASSAM.
2:BIPIN CHANDRA NATH
S/O LATE PEPALU NATH
R/O- PATKOMOI
P.S.-MORIGOAN
DISTRICT- MORIGOAN
ASSAM. PIN-782105
For the Appellant : Mr. D.K. Bhattacharyya, Adv.
For the Respondents: Ms. B. Bhuyan, APP, Assam.
-BEFORE-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
Date of hearing : 27/10/2025.
Date of Judgement : 30/10/2025
Page No.# 2/20
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER (CAV)
(Michael Zothankhuma, J)
1. Heard Mr. D. K. Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned senior counsel and Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, representing the State.
2. This appeal has been filed against the judgement dated 20/09/2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Morigaon, in Sessions case No. 57/2016, by which the appellant has been convicted under section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
3. The prosecution case in brief, is that an FIR dated 15/01/2016 was submitted by the Prosecution Witness- 2 (PW-2), who was the brother-in-law of the deceased. The FIR stated that around 4-30 p.m. on 14/01/2016, when PW-2's sister- in-law (deceased) asked her distant relative (nephew), i.e. the appellant to bring the cows from the grazing field, he hacked her to death with a dao suddenly and without uttering a word. The appellant was thereafter apprehended with the help of the local people and the Police were informed. Pursuant to the FIR dated 15/01/2016, Morigaon PS case No. 17/2016 under section 302 IPC was registered.
4. The Investigating Officer (IO) i.e. PW-7 started investigation and after completion of the investigation, the second I.O, i.e. PW-8, submitted a charge sheet, having found a prima facie case under section 302 IPC against the appellant.
5. The learned Trial Court thereafter framed a charge under section 302 IPC against the appellant for having killed the deceased with a dao, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The learned Trial Court examined 8(eight) prosecution witnesses and 2 (two) Page No.# 3/20 Court witnesses during trial. The appellant was thereafter examined under section 313 Cr.P.C, in which he gave a blanket denial of the evidence that had been adduced against him. The learned Trial Court thereafter came to a finding that the appellant had killed the deceased with a dao, that had been seized by the Police a day after the incident and convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no link between the dao that has been seized on 15/01/2016 with the death of the deceased on 14/01/2016, inasmuch as, the seized dao had not been sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for examination. In this respect, he has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Yusuf Vs. State of West Bengal [(2011) 11 SCC 754], wherein it has been held by the Supreme Court that in the case of circumstantial evidence, not sending the weapon used in the crime for chemical analysis is fatal, for the reason that the circumstantial evidence may not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime and none else, and that in the absence of any report of a Serologist as to the presence of human blood in the weapon may make the conviction of the accused unsustainable.
8. Further, the dao had not been shown to the Doctor who had conducted the Post-Mortem examination on the deceased, to prove that it was the seized dao that had been the cause of the injuries sustained by the deceased, which had led to her death. In this respect, he has relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Kartarey and others Vs. State of U.P [(1976) 1 SCC 172] , wherein the Supreme Court has held that it is the duty of the prosecution and no less of the Court, to see that the alleged weapon of the offence, if available, be shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as to whether all or any of the injuries on the victim could be caused with that weapon. Failure to do so may, sometimes, cause aberration in the course of justice.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the basis for the Page No.# 4/20 learned Trial Court coming to a finding that the appellant had killed the deceased with a dao was due to the Extra-Judicial Confession given to the witnesses. However, the learned Trial Court had not considered the fact that the appellant had given his Extra- Judicial Confession under coercion and it was not voluntary as he was tied up at the relevant point of time. He, accordingly submits that the above would go to show that the reasons for the learned Trial Court to come to a finding that the appellant was guilty of having killed the deceased was misplaced. He also submits that extra judicial confession being a weak piece of evidence, the same should be voluntary and should inspire confidence. In this respect, he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Subramanya Vs. State of Karnataka [2022 INSC 1083] . He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Moorthy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2023 INSC 739], where the Supreme Court has held that the veracity of a extra judicial confession is to be tested on the touchstone of the circumstances under which it was made. However, in the present case, the appellant having been tied up by the villagers, his extra judicial confession could be admissible in the trial, as the same was not voluntary.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that in terms of the medical report dated 23/08/2024 issued by the Mental Health Review Board, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati, who had examined the appellant, on the basis of the application made by the appellant i.e. IA(Crl) 341/2025 regarding the stand taken by the appellant that he had been suffering and undergoing treatment for Schizophrenia for a considerable length of time, the appellant was provisionally diagnosed as per ICD 10, a case of Paranoid Schizophrenia in remission (F20.05) on medication with, Mild Cognitive Disorder (F06.7) and hypertension, diabetes mellitus and hyperlipidaemia. The report dated 23/08/2024 also advised the appellant to continue regular medication and attend Psychiatry and Endocrinology set-up periodically for follow-up. He also submits that pursuant to the Mental Health Review Board Report date 23/08/2024, the District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup(M), Guwahati, has passed the order dated 22/10/2025 Page No.# 5/20 pursuant to the orders passed in IA(Crl) 341/2025, to the effect that the appellant was a person suffering from mental illness and in terms of section 103 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, he is to be admitted in any suitable Mental Health Establishment. As such, the learned District and Sessions Judge cum Chairman, Mental Health Review Board, Kamrup (M) was of the view that the appellant should be kept in a Mental Health Establishment as per the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, until further orders.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant thus submits that in view of the appellant now having been confirmed to be suffering from Schizophrenia, the appellant, even if found guilty in this appeal, would have to be kept in a Mental Health Establishment as per the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, or in the alternative, should be delivered to any relative or friend in case of acquittal under section 335 Cr.P.C.
12. Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned senior counsel and APP, Assam, on the other hand, submits that the Extra Judicial Confession made by the appellant to the prosecution witnesses clearly proved that the appellant had killed the deceased. Further, the appellant had run away with a dao and was eventually caught by the villagers. She also submits that the dagger that had been thrown away by the appellant while running away was recovered and seized the day after the incident. The learned APP submits that even though the dao may not have been sent to the FSL, the same was not the sole evidence to decide as to whether the appellant had killed the deceased. She also submits that the issue of unsoundness of mind/insanity of the appellant, would have to be decided with regard to whether the accused was of unsound mind/insane on the date the incident occurred. In the present case, when there has been no such stand taken by anybody during the trial proceedings before the learned trial Court, the issue of whether the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the incident, cannot be considered at this stage, as the finding of the Mental Health Review Board, which was made on 23/08/2024, cannot relate back to the date of the incident which happened in the year 2016. She submits that when there is nothing to Page No.# 6/20 show that the appellant was of unsound mind in the year 2016, the appeal would have to be decided, by considering the appellant of being of sound mind on the date when the incident occurred. She submits that when the evidence clearly shows the involvement of the appellant as the person who had killed the deceased, this Court should not interfere with the decision of the learned Trial Court and the impugned decision should accordingly be upheld.
13. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.
14. There are 2 (two) issues to be decided. Firstly, whether the conviction of the appellant by the learned Trial Court under section 302 IPC was correct and secondly, whether the appellant could be said to be of an unsound mind at the time of the incident, keeping in view the fact that the appellant had been diagnosed with Schizophrenia only on 23/08/2024, on the basis of the Mental Health Review Board report dated 23/08/2024.
15. The evidence of PW-1 is to the effect that the deceased was his wife and that he knew the appellant who was distantly related to them. At the time of the incident, the appellant was residing in their house and helped the deceased in her household works. The occurrence of the event took place on Uruka day of Magh Bihu. In the year 2016 at around 4-30 p.m. he received a call from his daughter-in-law stating that the appellant had hacked his wife with a dao. He hurried back to his village and on reaching his house, he found his wife, who was surrounded by villagers. He saw cut injury on the back of his wife's head. He also found the appellant being tied to the post of his house and on questioning him, the appellant told him that his wife had told him to tie the cows, while she would take the cut logs inside the house. The appellant protested stating that it was not the proper time to tie the cows. However, as PW-1's wife pestered him, the appellant got angry and dealt a blow on the head of PW-1's wife with a dao. The Police were thereafter informed. In his cross examination, PW-1 stated that the appellant had been staying in their house for 10-11 months, prior to Page No.# 7/20 the date of the incident.
16. The evidence of PW-2, who is the informant, is to the effect that the deceased was his sister-in-law. He also knew the appellant who was distantly related to them. At the time of the incident, the appellant was residing in the house of the deceased and he used to help the deceased in doing household works. The occurrence took place on Uruka day of Magh Bihu. At that time, he had gone to the Bazar. The husband of the deceased had also gone to the Bazar. After finishing his marketing, his wife had called him over phone and told him that the appellant had murdered his sister-in-law. On going back to his house, he saw the dead body of the deceased in the backyard of the house. The appellant was tied with a rope by villagers. On questioning him, the appellant told him that he had been irritated by the deceased pestering him to tie the cows. PW-2 denied the suggestion that he had falsely deposed with regard to the appellant's confession to him that he had murdered the deceased.
17. The evidence of PW-3, who is a neighbour of the deceased, is to the effect that on the day of the occurrence at about 4-30 p.m., some people had gathered in the house of the deceased. On hearing a hue & cry, he had immediately rushed to the place of occurrence, where he saw the appellant running with a dao in his hand. He saw the appellant behind the house of the deceased. The villagers were also running to catch the appellant. The villagers thereafter caught the appellant and the appellant thereafter immediately threw the dao. PW-3 further stated that the appellant admitted before all of them, that he was working in the house of the deceased and when the deceased asked him to work more, the appellant cut the deceased as he was agitated. PW-3 further stated that he saw the deceased lying in the back of her house, with a deep cut mark in the neck of the deceased and blood oozing out from it. The deceased died immediately and on arrival of the Police, they took the appellant. PW-3 denied the suggestion that the appellant did not confess his crime before the villagers.
18. The evidence of PW-4 is to the effect that he knew the deceased and the Page No.# 8/20 appellant, who was the nephew of the complainant. The appellant was also the nephew of the deceased. PW-4 stated that the appellant had been staying for about 11 months in the house of the deceased, prior to the occurrence of the incident. On the day of occurrence of the incident, the appellant was cutting wood on the back of the house of the deceased. On hearing a hue & cry, he went to the place of occurrence, where he saw that the deceased was lying on the ground with a deep cut injury on the neck. PW-4 further stated that the appellant was also present at the place of occurrence and he was carrying a dao with which he killed the deceased. On seeing them, the appellant ran away while still carrying the dao. The appellant thereafter threw away the dao in the field after a little distance. However, some people present in the field caught hold of the appellant and he was brought to the house of the deceased. Police were informed immediately and he was arrested. PW-4 further stated that he saw blood stains in the dao with which the deceased had been killed. Police also seized the blood stained clothes in his presence and he signed the seizure memo.
19. The evidence of PW-5, who is the Doctor who conducted the Post-mortem examination of the deceased, is to the effect that there was a deep lacerated injury in the left side of the neck of the deceased, extending upwards towards the cervical region with cutted great vessels. Another lacerated injury was seen on the left fronto- parietal region about 2.5 x 1 cm diameter. Internal hemorrhage was noted in the left frontal region. Fracture of the left side of the mandible in the region of the angle of the mandible was also seen. Lacerated injury was also seen in the left joint shoulder in upper part 1.5 inch x .5 inch. In the opinion of the PW-5, the cause of death of the deceased was due to hypovolaemic shock due to external hemorrhage and internal hemorrhage in the brain following cut injury, possibly by a sharp weapon.
20. The evidence of PW-6 is to the effect that on hearing a hue and cry at the house of the deceased, he came to know that the appellant, who was working as a labourer in the house of the deceased had killed her with a machete. He saw the dead Page No.# 9/20 body of the deceased and her neck was almost chopped off. There was profuse bleeding on the dead body and the appellant was running away from the house of the deceased. However, the villagers ran after the appellant and caught him. The appellant was thereafter brought to the house of the deceased and his hands were tied by a rope by the villagers. On informing the Police, the Police came and arrested the appellant. In his cross examination, PW-6 stated that though he did not see the weapon with which the deceased had been cut by the appellant. He came to know of the incident from the villagers when he went to the house of the deceased.
21. The evidence of PW-7 who was the first Investigating Officer (IO), is to the effect that he conducted the investigation and made the sketch map of the place of occurrence. He also found the appellant had been detained by the villagers and he was informed that the appellant had killed the deceased. The Executive Magistrate conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased. Further, the accused had run away towards the paddy field after the murder and the accused had thrown the dao. It was only in the morning of the next day that the said dao was recovered, which was stained with blood. In his cross examination, PW-7 stated that he did not find any eye witness, who actually saw the incident and the commission of the murder.
22. The evidence of PW-8 is to the effect that after collecting all the relevant documents like the Post-mortem report, seizure list etc. and after completion of the investigation by PW-7, he submitted the charge sheet against the appellant.
23. The evidence of Court Witness (CW)-1 & 2, is to the effect that they knew the deceased and that they had also seen the appellant in the house of the deceased. Further, the dao with which the appellant had killed the deceased was found in the paddy field, after a search had been made by the villagers. CW-1 & 2 stated that they were seizure witnesses to the dao being seized by the Police.
24. The examination of the appellant under section 313 Cr.P.C. shows that the appellant had given a blanket denial with regard to the evidence adduced against him Page No.# 10/20 before the learned Trial Court. Though the appellant in his explanation to question no.1, in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C, has taken a stand that he was not present at the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time, the same has been clearly proved otherwise by the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In the case of Vinay Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1997) 1 SCC 283, the Supreme Court has held that in a criminal case, where the burden on the prosecution is to prove that the accused was present at the scene and had participated in the crime, the plea of alibi could only be considered after the burden had been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence had been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the Court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that the accused was elsewhere when the occurrence occurred. However, if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the Court entertains some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court thus held that due to the above reason, strict proof was required for establishing the plea of alibi. As the appellant has failed to prove with evidence that he was in a different location at the time when the crime was committed, we do not find any reason to accept the alibi of the appellant, when the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the fact that he had been apprehended by the villagers and arrested by the Police, is proved.
25. The learned Trial Court on considering the evidence, had come to a finding that all the witnesses were found to be credible witnesses and that the testimonies were inter-linked and corroborated with each other. Further, the appellant had admitted to having killed the deceased before the villagers and the prosecution witnesses. Also, as the weapon had been recovered and seized, the evidence proved that the appellant was guilty of the murder of the deceased.
26. Though the appellant's counsel has taken a stand that the non-examination of Page No.# 11/20 the dao by the FSL showed that there could not be any link between the seized dao and the deceased, we are of the view that the appellant having made an extra judicial confession before the villagers and the prosecution witnesses, besides having run away from the scene of the crime with the dao, provides a complete circumstantial evidence pointing only to the guilt of the appellant, in the killing of the deceased.
27. No cross examination of the witnesses was done with regard to the appellant not being guilty of the crime of murder or that the dao which had been seized, not being the weapon used for killing the deceased. There was also no suggestion during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the appellant being of unsound mind at the time the incident occurred. No application had been made by anybody or a statement made, with regard to the appellant being of unsound mind in terms of Section 84 IPC at the time of the incident, which could have placed a reasonable doubt of the appellant being of sound mind at the time he committed the crime of murder.
28. There is also nothing in the evidence to show that the extra judicial confession given by the appellant was not truthful or voluntary. Though the dao had not been sent for examination to the FSL, to connect the weapon with the murder, the very fact that the appellant had been seen running away with the dao from the place of occurrence, gives rise to an inference that the appellant had killed the deceased with the dao. Further, the non-examination of the dao by the FSL, does not mean that there were no other circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the deceased. The other circumstantial evidence against the appellant was the fact that he started running away from the place of occurrence with the dao. Though the Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Yusuf (supra) held that not sending the weapon used in the crime for chemical analysis can be fatal, for the reason that the circumstantial evidence may not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime, we find that the non-sending of the dao to the FSL for analysis is not fatal in the facts of this case, inasmuch as, it is not in dispute that the Page No.# 12/20 weapon was used in the crime, as per the appellant's own extra-judicial confession, which we find trustworthy and voluntary. Even though the extra-judicial confession can be said to be a weak piece of evidence, the Supreme Court in Subramanya (supra) has held that if the same is voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, the same can be relied upon by the Court. On considering the facts of the present case, we find that the same has been made by the appellant voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. Further, there is nothing to show that the same is not true.
29. In the case of Thimma and Thimma Raju vs. State of Mysore [(1970) 2 SCC 105], the Supreme Court had held that there is no absolute rule that an extra- judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, though ordinarily an extra- judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material. In the case of Subramanya (supra), the Supreme Court further held that conviction can be based on a voluntary confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible it should be corroborated by independent evidence. This was also stated in the case of Madan Gopal Kakkad vs. Naval Dubey and Another [(1992) 3 SCC 204].
30. In the case of Moorthy vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2023 INSC 739], the Supreme Court referred to another of it's judgments in the case of Pawan Kumar Chourasia vs. State of Bihar 2023 SCC OnLine SC 259], wherein it was stated in paragraph-5 as follows :
"5. As far as extra-judicial confession is concerned, the law is well settled. Generally, it is a weak piece of evidence. However, a conviction can be sustained on the basis of extra- judicial confession provided that the confession is proved to be voluntary and truthful. It should be free of any inducement. The evidentiary value of such confession also depends on the person to whom it is made. Going by the natural course of human conduct, normally, a person would confide about a crime committed by him only with such a person in whom he has implicit faith. Normally, a person would not make a confession to someone who is totally a stranger to him. Moreover, the Court has to be satisfied with the reliability of the confession keeping in view the circumstances in which it is made. As a matter of rule, corroboration is not required. However, if an Page No.# 13/20 extra-judicial confession is corroborated by other evidence on record, it acquires more credibility."
(emphasis added)
31. In the case of Kartarey & Others vs. State of U.P. [(1976) 1 SCC 172], the Supreme Court held that where injuries were found to be forensically of the same species and the problem before the Court was whether all or any of those injuries could be caused with one or more weapons, it was the duty of the Prosecution and the Court to see that the alleged weapon of the offence was/were shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as to whether all or any of the injuries on the victim could be caused with that weapon. It also held that failure to do so may sometime, cause aberration in the course of justice. In the present case, though the dao was not shown to the Doctor, who conducted the Post-mortem Examination, there is nothing suggested to the said Doctor during his cross-examination that the dao could not have been the weapon that had caused the injuries on the deceased person.
32. On considering all the above decisions of the Supreme Court and the fact that the appellant who had been living for a number of months with the deceased had butchered the deceased and run away, we do not find any reason to doubt the Prosecution evidence, which is to the effect that the appellant had given extra-judicial confession to the witnesses. Further, the alibi of the appellant having been proved to be wrong, the same can be said to be an added link in the circumstantial evidence, proving the guilt of the appellant as the only perpetrator of the crime in question.
33. In the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116], the Supreme Court has laid down 5 golden principles which constitutes the basis for deciding a case on circumstantial evidence, wherein the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature, wherein they exclude every possible hypothesis except to the fact that the accused was guilty of the crime. In the present case, the circumstantial evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of Page No.# 14/20 the guilt of the appellant and excludes several other possible hypothesis that the appellant was not guilty of the crime. As such, we are of the view that the circumstantial evidence and his extra judicial confession which we find voluntary and trustworthy, all point to the guilt of the appellant.
34. In the case of Bapu vs. State of Rajashthan, reported in (2007) 8 SCC 66, the Supreme Court held that the onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused. However, when during investigation, previous history of insanity was revealed, it was the duty of the investigator to subject the accused to medical examination and place that evidence before the Court. It further held that mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under Section 84 IPC.
35. In the case of Ratan Lal vs. State of M.P , reported in (1970) 3 SCC 533, the Supreme Court has held that the crucial point of time at which unsoundness of mind should be established is the time when the crime is actually committed and the burden of proving this lies on the accused.
36. In the case of Vijayee Singh vs. State of U.P, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 190, the Supreme Court has held that if a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court with regard to the mental condition of an accused at the time of occurrence from the materials placed on record, the accused shall be entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.
37. In the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Manjuben, D/o Kasturbhai Nanjibhai, Criminal Appeal No.474/2019, the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that if a plea of insanity is raised by an accused, the accused should be subjected to a medical examination immediately.
38. In the case of Surendra Mishra vs. State of Jharkhand , reported in (2011) 11 SCC 495 , the Supreme Court has held that that an accused who seeks Page No.# 15/20 exoneration from the liability of an act under Section 84 of IPC has to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Medical insanity is a clinical diagnosis of a mental illness, while legal insanity is a legal determination of a person's mental state at the time of a crime, wherein a determination has to be made as to whether the accused was aware and understood that his actions were illegal. As such, the main difference between the legal insanity and medical insanity would basically refer to whether the accused knew the nature of his actions, vis-à-vis the accused mental state of health.
39. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ahmadullah , reported in AIR 1961 SC 998, the Supreme Court has held that that to establish insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the party is laboring under such defect of reason, as not to know the nature and quality of the act which he is committing. Thus, in terms of the judgments referred to above, the appellant would have to be subjected to a medical examination, if a plea of insanity had been raised by him or on his behalf in terms of Section 328 and 329 Cr.P.C.
40. In the present case, there is no whisper made by the appellant or his family members during the investigation and trial that the appellant was suffering from insanity/unsoundness of mind at the relevant point of time. As such, there is nothing to show that the appellant can take the aide of section 84 of the IPC, not to attract section 302 IPC, inasmuch as, the appellant has not been able to prove that he was suffering from unsoundness of mind at the time of the incident.
41. The blanket denial of the evidence recorded by the learned Trial Court by the appellant leads us to believe that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime of murder. In the case of Wajir Khan vs. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2023) 11 SCR 39, the Supreme Court has held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eyewitnesses were available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind, i.e. when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is Page No.# 16/20 found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances making it complete.
42. In the case of Abhishek Sharma Vs. State ((Govt. of NCT of Delhi ) reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1358, the Supreme Court has held that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either a partisan or interested or a close relative to the deceased, if otherwise he is found to be trustworthy and credible. It has further held that a dying declaration, if it is free of tutoring, prompting, etc. can form the sole basis of conviction.
43. On considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we do not find any ground to hold that their evidence were not trustworthy. On the other hand, we find that their evidence is reliable and is a truthful version of the cause of death of the deceased. We find no reason to disregard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as they all corroborate with each others testimonies.
44. In view of the reasons stated above, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgement and order passed by the learned Trial Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed on that score.
45. The above being said, we find that the plea of unsoundness of mind had been taken for the first time by the appellant only in this appeal and the appellant has apparently been found to be suffering from Schizophrenia on the basis of the Mental Health Review Board, Kamrup (M), Guwahati, report dated 23/08/2024 and the order dated 22/10/2025 passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup (M). Resultantly, the learned District & Sessions Judge cum Chairman, Mental Health Review Board, Kamrup (M) was of the view that the appellant should be kept in the Mental Health Establishment as per the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 until further orders.
46. Section 334 of the Cr.P.C. provides that whenever any person is acquitted on the ground that at the time in which he is alleged to have committed an offence, he was by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged Page No.# 17/20 as constituting the offence, or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not.
47. Section 335 of the Cr.P.C. provides that whenever a Magistrate or the Court finds that the accused person committed the act alleged, but for the incapacity found on the accused, it shall order such person safe custody or order such person to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person.
48. Section 335(2) provides that no order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made under Section 335 (1)(a) Cr.P.C otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the State Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912. It may be stated herein that the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 had been repealed by the Mental Health Act, 1987 and the Mental Health Act, 1987 was subsequently also repealed by the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017.
49. Section 335(3) Cr.P.C provides that no order for the delivery of the accused to a relative or friend shall be made under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1), except upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of the Magistrate or Court, that the person delivered shall be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person and he shall be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct.
Section 335(4) of the Cr.P.C. provides that the Magistrate or Court shall report to the State Government the action taken under Sub-Section (1).
50. Section 465(1) Cr.P.C provides that no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or proceedings under the Code, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in in fact been occasioned thereby.
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51. Section 465(2) of Cr.P.C. provides that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
52. The above being said, it is reiterated that as there is nothing to show that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the incident, there has been no failure of justice on account of the stand now being taken by the appellant that he was of unsound mind.
53. Section 102 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 ( herein after referred to as the 2017 Act) provides that when any person with mental illness is brought before a Magistrate, the Magistrate may, order in writing that the person conveyed to be public mental health establishment for assessment and treatment and to carry out an assessment of the person. Section 103 of the 2017 Act provides that a prisoner with mental illness should be admitted into any suitable mental health establishment and that the transfer of a prisoner with mental illness to the psychiatric ward in the medical wing of the prison shall be sufficient to meet the requirements under section
103. When there is no psychiatric ward in the medical wing of the prison, the prisoner may be transferred to a mental health establishment with prior permission of the Board. Section 103 of the 2017 act reads as follows :-
"103. Prisoners with mental illness.--(1) An order under section 30 of the Prisoners Act, 1900 (3 of 1900) or under section 144 of the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or under section 145 of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or under section 143 or section 144 of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957), or under section 330 or section 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), directing the admission of a prisoner with mental illness into any suitable mental health establishment, shall be sufficient authority for the admission of such person in such establishment to which such person may be lawfully transferred for care and treatment therein:
Provided that transfer of a prisoner with mental illness to the psychiatric ward in the medical wing of the prison shall be sufficient to meet the requirements under this section:
Page No.# 19/20 Provided further that where there is no provision for a psychiatric ward in the medical wing, the prisoner may be transferred to a mental health establishment with prior permission of the Board.
(2) The method, modalities and procedure by which the transfer of a prisoner under this section is to be effected shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The medical officer of a prison or jail shall send a quarterly report to the concerned Board certifying therein that there are no prisoners with mental illness in the prison or jail.
(4) The Board may visit the prison or jail and ask the medical officer as to why the prisoner with mental illness, if any, has been kept in the prison or jail and not transferred for treatment to a mental health establishment.
(5) The medical officer in-charge of a mental health establishment wherein any person referred to in sub-section (1) is detained, shall once in every six months, make a special report regarding the mental and physical condition of such person to the authority under whose order such person is detained.
(6) The appropriate Government shall setup mental health establishment in the medical wing of at least one prison in each State and Union territory and prisoners with mental illness may ordinarily be referred to and cared for in the said mental health establishment.
(7) The mental health establishment setup under sub-section (5) shall be registered under this Act with the Central or State Mental Health Authority, as the case may be, and shall conform to such standards and procedures as may be prescribed.
54. In view of the fact that we have upheld the impugned judgement passed by the learned Trial Court, section 103 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 requires the appellant to be put in the Psychiatric Ward of a Jail or in a Mental Health Hospital. As it has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the Tezpur Jail has a Psychiatric Ward in the Medical Wing for convicts who are having mental health problem/issues, we direct the respondents to transfer the appellant to the Psychiatric Page No.# 20/20 Ward of the Tezpur jail, to undergo the rest of his sentence as awarded by the learned Trial Court. If there is no Psychiatric Ward in Tezpur Jail, the appellant should be admitted into the Tezpur Mental Health Institute/Establishment. As and when the appellant's mental health improves, he may thereafter be transferred to the normal ward of the said jail to undergo the rest of the sentence awarded.
55. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
56. Send back the TCR.
JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant