Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Jodhpur Deve. Authority, Jodhpur vs State & Ors on 7 September, 2016
Bench: Navin Sinha, Pankaj Bhandari
1/7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
--------------------------------------------------------
D.B. CIVIL SPECIAL APPEAL (WRIT) NO.574/2016
APPELLANT:
Jodhpur Development Authority, Jodhpur through
Dy.Commissioner, Jodhpur Development Authority,
Jodhpur.
Versus
RESPONDENTS:
1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Revenue
Department, Govt. of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer.
3. Authorized Officer, Sub Divisional Officer (Land
Conversion-II), Jodhpur.
4. Tehsildar (Revenue), Jodhpur.
5. Smt.Pushpa Gehlot w/o Rajendra Gehlot r/o Near
Krishi Mandi Circle, Mandore Road, Jodhpur.
6. Hem Singh s/o Shri Gordhan Kachhawaha,
resident of Subhash Chowk, Soorsagar, Jodhpur.
Date of Order : 07.09.2016
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. NAVIN SINHA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ BHANDARI
Mr.D.S.Rajvi for the Appellant.
ORDER
------------
1. The present appeal arises from order dated 04.09.2015 dismissing S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.2124/2012. The learned Single Judge set aside the order passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer dated 16.10.2008 in a proceeding under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter 2/7 referred to as 'the Act') preferred by the State of Rajasthan against order dated 04.02.1988 allowing conversion of the lands by Respondent no.5.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it was the successor body of the Trust under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 in view of Section 96 of the Jodhpur Development Authority Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Authority'). The responsibility for urban development now vested with the Authority. It is therefore vitally concerned with any permission granted by the Trust for conversion of lands contrary to the Master Plan under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the U.I.T.'). Respondent no.5 did not appear before the Board of Revenue despite paper publication and therefore an ex-parte order was justifiably passed. An order passed in 2008 was challenged as late as 2012 by Respondent no.6 who claims to be a purchaser from the former. The latter had no locus standi if the claim in its origin through Respondent no.5 was itself defective and he was not a party respondent before the Board of Revenue.
3. We have heard counsel for the Appellant. 3/7
4. One Rameshwar Lal was the khatedar of khasra No.828/751, Tehsil and Village, Jodhpur measuring 25 bighas. He sold it after sub-plotting to 94 different persons by sale deed dated 31.12.1987. Respondent No.5 was one of the purchasers consequent to which mutation was also done. It was converted for residential use by the Sub Divisional Officer (Land Conversion II), Jodhpur by order dated 04.02.1988. The patta was granted in her favour on 11.02.1988 assigning plot No.107. The conversion order was assailed by the State government before the Revenue Appellate Authority-II through the Tehsildar (Land Conversion). The appeal of the State Government was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority on 07.06.1990. The order attained finality as it was never challenged by the State Government in a second appeal under Section 76 of the Act. Respondent No.5 transferred the plot to Respondent No.6.
5. In the year 1997, the State Government filed an application under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 before the Board of Revenue questioning the conversion order of khasra No.828/751 dated 04.02.1988 on the ground that it had already been transferred and handed over to the Urban Improvement Trust. The Board of Revenue allowed the 4/7 application and quashed the conversion order dated 04.02.1988.
6. Section 9 of the Act in Chapter 2 reads as follows:-
"9. General superintendence of subordinate Revenue Courts.- Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the general Superintendence and control over all Revenue Courts and over all Revenue Officers shall be vested in, and all such Courts and officers shall be subordinate to the Board."
It vests general powers of superintendence and control in the Board over all revenue courts and its officers as being subordinate to the Board. Chapter 4 deals with procedure of revenue courts and officers. Chapter 5 deals with appeal, reference, revision and review. Section 76 of the Act provides for a second appeal to the Board in specified circumstances. Section 84 vests power in the Board to call for the records of any case of a judicial nature in which no appeal lies to the Board if jurisdiction had been exercised illegally or with material irregularity and to pass appropriate orders. Section 86 provides for review by the Board on its own motion or on an application preferred. It is therefore apparent that the Board has appellate powers, suo moto powers and powers of review. A person aggrieved by an order is therefore not remediless for invocation of the general 5/7 powers of superintendence and control over subordinate revenue courts by the Board. There is a specific remedy for an appeal, revision and review. Section 78 provides a limitation of 90 days for preferring the second appeal.
7. Despite availability of the remedy for second appeal, revision and review, the State Government did not challenge the order of the first Appellate Authority dated 07.06.1990 and belatedly filed an application under Section 9 of the Act invoking the general powers of superintendence only to cover its own lapses and limitation in not having availed appellate remedies and which had become time barred. Even before the learned Single Judge the State Government did not file a reply. The learned Single Judge therefore committed no error by holding that the order dated 07.06.1990 of the first Appellate Authority had attained finality with regard to the legality of the conversion of the plot ordered on 04.02.1988.
8. In Karan Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan [R.R.D. 1962 141] the Court was dealing under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.
9. A similar question fell for consideration that in absence of appeal under Section 225 of the Act of 1955 or revision under Section 230 the Board of Revenue 6/7 could not while hearing the revision petition set aside the order of the Sub Divisional Officer and the Revenue Appellate Authority in exercise of the powers under Section 221 of the Act. Interpreting Section 9 it was observed in Surendra Pal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue for Rajasthan and ors. [1993 Supp (3) SCC 229] as follows:-
"10. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the section confers executive powers of superintendence and control on the Board and it does not vest any power of superintendence on the Board on judicial side. For this purpose he relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court reported as: Karan Singh v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan 1962 RLW 178. The Division Bench in that case was concerned with the interpretation of Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act. Section 9 whereof provides as under:-
"9 Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the general superintendence and control over all revenue courts and over all revenue officers shall be vested in, and all such courts and officers shall be subordinate to, the Board."
11. In that case also the High Court took the view that it is not correct to say that Section 9 is limited to the executive control and superintendence of the Board over subordinate revenue courts and it does not apply to judicial proceedings. The contention on behalf of the appellant to that effect was negatived but on merits the High Court held that it was not appropriate for the Board to exercise the powers conferred by Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act in view of the fact that the Board had appellate jurisdiction and it could not, therefore, make use of its powers of superintendence and control and 7/7 the order of the Board could not be held proper with reference to Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act.....".
10. The Authority was not even in existence when the conversion was allowed on 04.02.1988. Under Section 104A of the U.I.T., the State Government had the general power of control over the Trust and was possessed of such powers to give directions as necessary in its opinion or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The pursuit before the first Appellate Authority by the State Government to assail the order of conversion culminating in the order dated 07.06.1990 originated in this context. The Authority being a body successor to the UIT under Section 96 is bound by the decisions which have attained finality earlier and it is not open for it to question the orders indirectly especially when the State Government has pursued matters unsuccessfully.
11. The delay is condoned and the appeal is dismissed.
(PANKAJ BHANDARI),J. (NAVIN SINHA ),C.J. Skant/-