Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Ashok Kumar Jain vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 19 January, 2011
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH OA No. 1568/2010 New Delhi this the 19th day of January, 2011 Honble Mr. Justice V.K.Bali, Chairman Honble Mr. L.K.Joshi, Vice Chairman (A) Shri Ashok Kumar Jain, S/o Late Sh.M.S. Jain, R/o D-105, Narwana Apartments, I.P.Extension, Patparganj, Near Madhu Vihar Market, Delhi-110092 (retired as Controller of Accounts, Directorate of Audit, 4th Level, C-Wing, Delhi Sachivalaya, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Players Building, New Delhi-110002. Applicant (By Advocate Shri R.V.Sinha j VERSUS 1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Players Building, Delhi Sachivalaya, New Delhi-110002 (Through : The Chief Secretary ) 2. The Lt. Governor of Delhi, Raj Niwas, Delhi-110054 3. The Principal Secretary (Finance), Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 4th Level, A-Wing, Players Building, Delhi Sachivalaya, New Delhi-110002 4. Department of Health, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 9th Level, A-Wing, Players Building, Delhi Sachivalaya, New Delhi-110002 (Through: its Principal Secretary) Respondents (By Advocate Shri H.K.Gangwani) O R D E R Mr. L.K. Joshi, Vice Chairman (A):
The Applicant is challenging the Memorandum of Charge dated 30.04.2010 for major penalty proceedings for an incident of the year 2002. He has prayed for quashing and setting aside of the said Memorandum and payment of post-retirement dues with interest.
2. The facts of the case are narrated hereafter. The Applicant was working as Deputy Controller of Accounts in the year 2002 in the Government of NCT of Delhi, the first Respondent herein. The alleged misconduct relates to the award of tender for purchase of C T Scanner for Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Hospital under the Government of NCT of Delhi. The following charge was levelled against the Applicant:
That the said Shri A.K.Jain while functioning as Dy. Controller of Accounts, Govt. of NCT of Delhi during the year 2002 committed gross misconduct in as much as he, being a member of the purchase committee, participated in the meeting of the Purchase Committee on 21.06.2002 to consider the award of Tender for purchase of a C.T. Scanner in Deen Dayal Upadhayay Hospital. Sh. A.K.Jain being an experienced and senior accounts functionary was aware that a Tender could be awarded only to the lowest bidder (L1) but for obvious reasons he did not point out this gross impropriety of awarding the Tender to M/s Wipro GE (L2), the second lowest bidder instead of to M/s Picker India Ltd, the lowest bidder as per the original specifications.
Shri A.K.Jain was also aware that a decision of award of Tender could not be made on the basis of the altered terms & conditions of the original tender. The tender process in this case got vitiated due to charge of scope of work after opening of technical bids as also due to calling of revised price bid after opening of the original price bids.
Thus Sh. A.K.Jain has failed to maintain absolute integrity and exhibited conduct unbecoming of a Govt. Servant thereby violating the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964. The statement of imputation of misconduct, as communicated by the impugned Memorandum has also been quoted below in full:
On the directions of Honble High Court of Delhi in CWP No. 6857/99 a process to purchase a C.T.Scanner for Deen Dayal Hospital, Delhi was initiated by the Health & Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi in the year 2001.
During the tender process 6 firms had submitted their technical bids and finally following three firms were short-listed as technically qualified. The financial bids of the qualified three bidders were opened on 17.8.2001:-
1. M/s. Wipro GE Medical Systems Ltd
2. M/s Picker India Ltd.
3. M/s Phillips Medical Systems After opening of price bids, M/s Picker India was found to be the lowest as per the original specifications, terms & conditions of the tender for the purchase of C.T.Scanner. However, the purchase committee instead of considering L1 for award of the tender asked all the three firms to submit comprehensive contract for the first five years including the replacement of X-ray tube. These conditions were not included in the original tender. By including the new set of conditions, the scope of work changed and the original tender got vitiated due to this impropriety. The purchase committee thus negotiated with the three technically qualified bidders and awarded the tender to M/s Wipro GE inspite of its being the second lowest in the original tender.
In the meeting of the purchase committee held on 21.6.2002 Shri A.K.Jain, the then Dy.Controller of Accounts participated in the deliberations and also signed the minutes of the meetings. Being a senior and experienced accounts officer, he had a caste upon duty to point out the impropriety of awarding a tender to L2 bidder and he was also duty bound to point out that the changed conditions of the original tenders would vitiate the original tender and the scope of work covered therein. Sh. A.K. Jain was supposed to be aware of the relevant rules (GFR) and being a senior accounts functionary should have impressed upon the committee members for awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, but he deliberately avoided to point out this grossimpropriety.
The decision made in the meeting held on 21.6.2002 was also in violation of the directions dated 3.4.2002 of Chief Secretary, Delhi wherein it was observed that it is equally necessary to go by the fundamental principles of acceptance of bids and opening of tenders. Whatever specifications were given at the time when the tenders were called should be frozen and no changes howsoever necessary, introduced without giving due opportunity to the again parties. Obviously, one has to go by the lowest technical bids within those who qualified as per the original specifications. If that is done we are unable to get the advantage of five years of AMC etc. One would just have to explain that in the larger interests of not delaying the purchase of CT scanner this had to be done. The above act on the part of Sh.A.K.Jain clearly manifests that with ulterior motive and malafide intention he kept a strategic silence during the meeting of the purchase committee and did not point out the aforesaid impropriety in the matter.
Thus Sh.A.K.Jain has failed to maintain absolute integrity and exhibited conduct unbecoming of a Govt. Servant thereby violating the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964. The Applicant was served a Memorandum dated 20.08.2009, seven years after the incident, stating therein that M/S Picker India Limited, one of the companies who tendered for the CT Scan equipment had made a complaint dated 07.08.2002 in the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) about irregularities in the purchase of the above mentioned CT Scan. It was stated that an enquiry had been made in the matter, which revealed that though M/S Picker India Limited was L-1 as per the original specifications, yet the same was ignored on technical grounds and tender was allotted in favour of L-2, M/S Wipro GE. It was further stated in the said Memorandum that the Applicant was a member of the purchase committee, which awarded the tender to L-2. The Applicant was asked to explain his position as to why disciplinary proceedings should not be started against him. The Applicant gave his reply on 28.08.2009, wherein he stated that the tender of M/S Picker India Limited was ignored on the grounds which were recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the members of the committee collectively. He also stated that there was no violation of norms and procedures. Thereafter, the Memorandum of Charge dated 30.04.2010 was served on the Applicant, on the date he retired from service on superannuation.
3. The learned counsel for the Applicant pointed out that there were following ten members of the purchase committee:
1. Sh. S P Agarwal, Principal Secretary (Health);
2. Dr. T B Buxi, Expert, TAC;
3. Dr. R K Navalakha, Medical Superintendent, LN Hospital;
4. Dr. D K Srivastava, Medical Superintendent, GTB Hospital;
5. Dr. K N Srivastava, Medical Superintendent, DDU Hospital;
6. Dr. A K Sethi, Professor, GTB Hospital;
7. Dr. Rajeev Ranjan, Specialist (Radiology), DDU Hospital;
8. Dr. Pooja Gupta, Deputy Secretary (Finance);
9. Sh. A K Jain, Deputy Controller of Accounts, GBPH;
10. Dr. B S Bannerjee, Additional Secretary, Health.
It is stated that no other member of the above mentioned committee has been issued a charge sheet and only the Applicant has been singled out for initiating departmental inquiry. The Memorandum of Charge was served on the Applicant after he had already handed over the charge of his office on his superannuation on 30.04.2010. It was vehemently contended that the Respondents had no explanation whatsoever for delaying the issuance of Memorandum of Charge, which has been served after eight years of the alleged misconduct, thereby causing serious prejudice to the Applicant in his defence. The learned counsel has placed reliance on several judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court, to which we shall advert in the following paragraphs, contending that in case of such long unexplained delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in serving the Memorandum of Charge, where the charged officer is in no way responsible for the delay, the Memorandum of Charge cannot be maintained. In this context advertence has been made to the counter affidavit of the Respondents to paragraph 1 (ii), in which the reasons for delay had been given. It is stated therein that the complaint dated 07.08.2002 was received by the CVC from M/S Picker India Limited about serious irregularities in the purchase of CT Scanner for DDU Hospital by the Health and Family Welfare Department of the Government of NCT of Delhi in the year 2001-02. The complaint was referred to the Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare by letter dated 05.12.2002 for enquiry and report. It is further stated that no report was received from the Principal Secretary of the Department of Health and Family Welfare, in spite of a number of reminders and demi-official letters. The matter was taken up with the Government of NCT of Delhi by the CVC by its letter dated 09.06.2006. CVC, it is stated, advised, by its communication dated 05.09.2006, that explanation of all the officers should be taken and the matter referred back to the CVC. The matter was referred to the CVC for reconsideration and closure by the then Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi by letter dated 29.11.2007. The CVC, however, by its communication dated 10.03.2008 directed that action should be taken as per its earlier advice. The Health and Family Welfare Department referred the matter to the Directorate of Vigilance after obtaining the version of all concerned. The matter was referred to the CVC by letter dated 29.04.2010. The CVC by its Memorandum dated 30.04.2010 advised initiation of major penalty proceedings against the Applicant. The Respondents have averred that action was being taken on the matter throughout from 2002 to 2010 and after due investigation only the Applicant was held responsible for the misconduct.
4. The Honourable Supreme Court has considered the issue regarding the implications of unconscionable delayed Memorandum of Charge in several cases. The matter came up before the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Bani Singh and another, (1991) 16 ATC 514, in which it was held that delay of 12 years in initiating disciplinary proceedings was too long and it would be unfair to permit the departmental proceedings to be initiated so late in the day. It was observed thus:
4. The appeal against the order dt. 16-12-1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1997 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunals orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. (emphasis added) In State of Andhra Pradesh V. N Radhakrishnan, JT 1998 (3) SC 123, in another case of undue delay in initiating the departmental inquiry, it was observed thus by the Honourable Supreme Court:
19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It can also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employees. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is responsible for delay or when there is proper explanation for delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. (emphasis supplied).
In yet another case, State of Punjab and others V. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570, the Honourable Supreme Court severely indicted delay in initiating departmental inquiry. It was observed that a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges can be a ground for quashing the charge sheet. It was observed that:
"10.. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after a lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charge difficult and is thus also not in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges." (Emphasis added) A similar case came up before the Supreme Court in P V Mahadevan V. M D , T N Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636. A memorandum of charge was issued to the appellant before the Honourable Supreme Court on 8.06.2000 for some irregularity in issuing a sale deed in 1990 to an employee of the Housing Board, who was to superannuate shortly. It was submitted by the counsel for the appellant that though the records were available with the Housing Board, no action was taken against the appellant for 10 years. It was also urged that no action whatsoever was offered by the Housing Board for the inordinate delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against him. The Honourable Supreme Court placed reliance on its judgements in Bani Singh (supra) and N. Radhkrishnan (supra) and, noting the explanation for delay by the respondent, observed thus:
8. Our attention was also drawn to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Board in this appeal. Though some explanation was given, the explanation offered is not at all convincing. It is stated in the counter-affidavit for the first time that the irregularity during the year 1990, for which disciplinary action had been initiated against the appellant in the year 2000, came to light in the audit report for the second half of 1994-95.
9. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 reads thus:
118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year.
119. The accounts of the Board shall be examined and audited once in every year by such auditor as the Government may appoint in this behalf. 10. Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of accounts at the end of every year and section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in 1994-95. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961. It is now stated that the appellant has now retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter-affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay.
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of government employee... As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer. (emphasis added) The Honourable Kerala High Court in Meera Rawther V. State of Kerala, 2001 (1) SLR 518, laid down the following ratio:
13. The Court also held that wherever delay is put forward as a ground for quashing the charges, the Court has to weigh all the factors, both for and against the delinquent officer and come to a conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances. In this connection we also refer to the decision of Gujarat High Court in Mohanbhai Dungarbhai Parmar Vs. Y.B. Zala and others, 1980 (1) SLR 324 wherein the Court held that delay in initiating proceedings must be held to constitute a denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himself for one cannot reasonably expect an employee to have a computer like memory or to maintain a day-to-day diary in which every small matter is meticulously recorded in anticipation of future eventualities of which he cannot have a pre-vision. Nor can he be expected to adduce evidence to establish his innocence for after inordinate delay he would not recall identity of witness who could support him. Delay by itself, therefore, will constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to show cause and that would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. (emphasis added)
5. The explanation put forward by the Respondents for delay is really an apology for delay. The complaint was received by the CVC in the year 2002 and it was referred to the Department of Health and Family Welfare, Government of NCT of Delhi in the same year. No action was taken for next four years. It was only in June 2006, after an unexplained delay of four years, that CVC again picked up the threads. Even then it took two years to issue the Memorandum of Charge to the Applicant, which was done with an unseemly hurry considering that the CVC sent its advice on 30.04.2010 to the Chief Secretary of Government of NCT of Delhi and on the same day it was communicated to the Applicant on the very last day of his official career. Apart from saying that the matter was under active consideration all through from 2002 to 2010, the Respondents have miserably failed to explain the delay. Before we may expatiate on this aspect of delay further, it may be instructive to consider the minutes of the meeting, which was attended by 10 participants, including the Principal Secretary to the Government of NCT of Delhi. The minutes have been reproduced below:
4. Purchase of CT Scan for DDU Hospital:
The Committee was informed that the Hospital requested for the purchase of the CT Scan as per directions of the Honble High Court in the case of Gurmeet Singh Vs. GNCTD and others and the purchase process was initiated. The same was also being monitored by the Court. In the meanwhile, after the shortlisting of firms, M/s Erbis Engineering Co., also challenged the procedure in the High Court and the same was closed with the direction to examine their case on technical grounds. The eminent experts in the filed met and decided that the firm M/s Erbis Engineering Co., is not technically qualified.
The Committee was informed that while preparing the specifications high level Committee consisting of renowned radiologists and took due care in preparing the same. In order to ensure that the machine does not go out of order, the following clause was added:
5 years guarantee of the total system. Subsequently annual maintenance contract to be quoted for the next 5 years in the form of comprehensive labour plus spares and labour only. All software upgradation should be provided free of cost within the guarantee period. In case any parts/accessories, a back-to-back guarantee for the same.
Tube guarantee for 1,50,000 slices on pro rata basis. One spare tube same guarantee as the original tube. Prices should be quoted separately.
Subsequently, the experts felt that the tube guarantee upto 1.5 lacs slice have been asked, which will exhaust in about 2 years time. Hence, the short listed and technically qualified firms were asked to confirm 5 years comprehensive guarantee including the tube on 22.8.2001 in sealed envelops. After considering the revised prices, the position in respect of three short listed firms, M/s Philips, M/s Pickers and M/s Wipro GE is as per Annex.1. The calculation of M/s Pickers is conditional, viz., 3.0 lac slices and then Rs.16/- per slice and that the pries of CMC are in US. Hence comparison not possible. Hence L-1 is M/s Wipro GE.
Both M/s Picker and M/s Wipro GE are claiming to be the L-1. If the original tender condition is taken care of, then the position is different.
M/s Philips M/s Pickers M/s Wipro GE
Unit Price Rs.3,73,00,000 US$ 535,000 US$ 515.000=INR
256,72,750
Spare X Ray
Tube 19,50,000 52,000= 5,87,000
Software 31,00,000 INR= 2,92,61,950 INR 9,25,000
Turn Key 18,98,000 INR= 16,50,000 INR 14,80,000
Total 4,42,48,000 3,09,11,950 INR 2,80,77,750
Comprehensive
Maintenance
Cost 65,75,000 USD 1,29, 854 INR 94,00,000
INR 64,73, 221
Total 5,08,23,000 INR 3,73,85,171* INR 3,74,77,750
The price of USD = 49.85
The prices after 5 years cannot be calculated at this stage.
The current value had been taken.
The Committee observed that equal opportunity was given to all the bidders by the medical Superintendent, DDUH on 18.8.2001 to provide a full comprehensive warranty and all bidders have attended the meeting as per attendance sheet. The offer submitted by M/s Picker had been conditional and as such no comparison can be made as they mentioned the tube has a warranty of 3.00 lac slices and thereafter Rs.16.00 per slice would be charged.
The Committee further desired that normally CMC/AMC is quoted in Indian Rupees and in this case M/s Picker has quoted in U.S. Dollars, which is again not comparable as the value after 5 years cannot be ascertained now. Even during last 6 months it made a difference of Rs. 3.00 lacs.
Thus, the Committee concluded that the rates quoted by M/s Philips & M/s Wipro GE is acceptable and that M/s Wipro GE is the lowest tenderer. It will be noticed that the change in the specifications had been introduced in an earlier meeting of experts on the directions of the Honourable Delhi High Court. The committee comprised renowned radiologists. There is discussion in the minutes about which of the two firms M/S Picker India Limited and M/S Wipro GE is L-1. It is stated that both of these firms are claiming to be L-1. After due deliberations the committee has come to the conclusion that M/S Picker India Limited had given a conditional tender and had quoted for CMC/AMC in US dollars instead of in Indian rupees. After these deliberations the committee has collectively decided to conclude that M/S Wipro GE is L-1. This is the decision of the committee and all members are equally responsible for the same. It would, therefore, be clearly an act of hostile discrimination only to proceed against the Applicant. All other participants in the meeting, in which the decision was taken, have been allowed to go scot-free. There is another aspect to this case. The issue would be whether the charge against the Applicant could at all be called 'misconduct'. Misconduct has been defined as follows in Black's Law Dictionary:
"A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, its synonyms are misdemeanour, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness."
In P. Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, at page 3027, the term `misconduct has been defined as under:
The term `misconduct implies, a wrongful intention, and not involving error of judgment.
Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude.
The word `misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. The Honourable Apex Court had also considered the issue in Union of India and others V. J Ahmad, (1979) 2 SCC 286 and held that there had to be an element of deliberate mischief or wilfulness in the action of a person for it to be labelled 'misconduct'. An innocent mistake or omission, where no deliberate intent to defraud or cheat is involved, cannot be termed as 'misconduct'. In the instant case decision has been taken after due deliberations by a committee. By no stretch of the imagination could it be said that the so-called 'strategic silence' of the Applicant was a result of mischievous intent on his part. Considered in this light, it would seem that the action initiated after eight years against only the Applicant is against the principles of natural justice. Moreover, it would not be possible after a lapse of such a long time for the Applicant to effectively defend himself against the charge. Most of the members of the committee, which took the decision, have retired and may not be available as witnesses. They may not remember the details of what transpired in the meeting. Very serious prejudice has been caused to the Applicant by the act of the Respondents in initiating the departmental proceedings after a lapse of eight years, only against the Applicant, without taking any action against any other member of the committee, when the decision was a collective one. Considering all aspects of the case, the balance is clearly in favour of the Applicant and against the Government.
6. On the basis of the above discussion the OA is allowed and the impugned Memorandum of Charge dated 30.04.2010 is quashed and set aside. The Respondents are directed to pay the post- retirement dues to the Applicant within four weeks of the receipt of a certified copy of this order with 8% simple interest on the dues. Since the Respondents have caused unnecessary harassment to the Applicant, a cost of Rs.20,000 is directed to be given to him.
( L.K.Joshi ) ( V.K.Bali) Vice Chairman (A) Chairman /dkm/