Jharkhand High Court
Junul Topno vs Phibi Franciska Kongari Daughter Of ... on 5 January, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No. 172 of 2025
With
I.A No.12917 of 2025
Junul Topno, aged about 66 years, son of Late Ashiyan Topno, resident of
village-Maindan Toli Khunti, P.O & P.S-Khunti, District-Khunti
(Jharkhand)
.........Plaintiff/ Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Phibi Franciska Kongari daughter of Late Mangaldan Kongari, resident of
Village-Ukauli, PO-Bano, PS-Bano, District-Gumla, at present residing at
Village-Serendih, Chaibasa Road, Khunti, P.O & PS-Khunti, District-
Khunti
.... ..... Defendant/Respondent/Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Pankaj Kumar Dubey, Advocate
For the Respondent : ...............
Order No.03/Dated:5th January, 2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 17.12.2024 and the decree dated 04.01.2025 passed in Matrimonial Case No.09 of 2023 by the learned Principal District Judge, Khunti whereby and whereunder the petition filed under sections 10(1), (i) and 10(1) (ix) of Divorce Act, 1869 by the appellant-husband against the respondent-wife has been dismissed on contest.
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the plaint having been recorded by the learned Principal District Judge, needs to be referred herein reads under as:
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(i) The case of the petitioner as per plaint in brief is that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the respondent on 18.07.1985 as per Christian rites and rituals at G.E.L. Church Beralonger, P.S-Bano, District-Gumla under G.E.L. Church Lotakel Paris.
(ii) It is further stated that after solemnization of marriage both the parties started peaceful conjugal life with each other at the house of the petitioner at village- Maidan Toli, Khunti for about one and half years.
(iii) It is further case of the petitioner that after some time difference arose between the spouse. The petitioner with his moral obligation always tried to maintain happy conjugal life with the opposite party with hope that gradually everything will be normal.
(iv) It is stated that on 15.12.1986 the mother-in-law of the petitioner came to his house at Khunti and took away the Opposite Party/wife by giving assurance that she will be back after celebration of Christian festival. After passing of Christmas the petitioner went to his matrimonial home to bring back his wife but she was not ready to come back and directly refused to lead her conjugal life with the petitioner.
(v) However, the petitioner tried his level best to convince her but she was adamant with her previous attitude and she neither came to the matrimonial house nor did she had any physical relation at any time since then.
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(vi) It is stated that the petitioner and his family members tried to sort out the difference arose between them but all went in vain and the last attempt to restitute the conjugal life was also futile when the petitioner and his family members approached the respondent to lead a peaceful life on 18.07.2019.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect as narrated hereinabove that the marriage in between the appellant and the respondent, the wife and the husband, respectively was solemnized on 18.07.1985 as per Christian rites and rituals. After marriage both the spouse leading a happy marital life but soon thereafter there were some altercations arose between them and they started living separately and finally a suit under sections 10(1) of Divorce Act, 1869 has been filed by the husband for dissolution of their marriage.
4. In the divorce suit, the respondent-wife had appeared and filed her written statement denying all the allegations levelled against her by her husband. The factum of marriage has been admitted but it is denied that she had withdrawn herself from the life of the petitioner and deserted him. It has been alleged that the petitioner did not like company of the wife and he used to continuously give her ill-treatment. The petitioner always misbehaved with her but she ignored the same hoping that the matter would be resolved in future. It is alleged that the petitioner used to misbehave with his son, namely, Anup Topno and never paid any expenses to his son. It has been alleged that the petitioner always quarreled with her as he kept another lady, namely, Manju Tirkey with him and due to that reason dispute arose between them. The petitioner is leading an adulterous life with the said Manju Tirkey and his behaviour 3 2026:JHHC:19-DB with the respondent was very inhuman. On the aforesaid ground, she has prayed that the suit for divorce may be dismissed.
5. Two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the appellant- husband. The husband himself has been examined as PW1 and marriage certificate has been exhibited on behalf of the appellant-husband as Ext.1.
6. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent-wife four witnesses have been examined including the respondent-wife herself as OPW1.
7. The learned Principal District Judge, Khunti has formulated five issues, one of the issues is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of divorce u/s 10(1) (i) and section 10(i)(ix) of Divorce Act 1869 on the ground of adultery and desertion against defendant/opposite party? The issues have been answered in favour of the respondent-wife and, accordingly, the learned Principal District Judge, Khunti has dismissed the suit for divorce on contest.
8. The said judgment has been challenged by the appellant-husband by filing the instant appeal.
Submission on behalf of the appellant-husband:
9. In support of his contention, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Dubey, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
(i) It has been contended that the present appeal has been filed after delay of 224 days and for condonation of such delay, an interlocutory application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 being I.A No.12917 of 2025 has been filed by the petitioner-
husband (appellant herein).
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(ii) It has been contended by referring to paragraph nos.4 to 11 of the application for condonation of delay that due to the reason mentioned in those paragraphs, the delay has been caused and, as such, a prayer has been made to condone the delay so as to hear the matter on merit.
(iii) There is an error in the impugned judgment, since, each and every aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration based upon the documentary evidences as well as ocular evidences.
(iv) The element of desertion has been found to be there if the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband will be taken into consideration but without appreciating the same properly the learned Family Judge has come to the finding by holding that no element of desertion is there and, as such, the impugned judgment suffers from an error.
(v) It has been contended that the appellant has been meted out with cruelty as also respondent-wife is living separately and, as such, both the grounds are available as would be evident from the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant-husband, but the same has not been taken into consideration.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband, based upon the aforesaid ground, initially, has contested the case by showing the error in the impugned order and has submitted that the impugned judgment needs interference said to be perverse.
11. It needs to mention herein that vide order dated 14.11.2025 notices were issued to the respondent-wife by both process on the main 5 2026:JHHC:19-DB application as well as on the limitation matter, but the respondent-wife did not chose to appear in the present appeal.
Analysis:
12. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant- husband and gone through the application for condonation of delay and the findings recorded by the learned Principal District Judge, Khunti.
13. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 224 days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application being I.A No. 12917 of 2025 on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be sufficient.
15. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the instant appeal as has been mentioned in the said interlocutory application, the relevant at paragraph nos. 4 to 11, are being referred herein as under:
"4. That it is stated that the counsel of the appellant informed him after singing of the decree i.e. 04.01.2025 thereafter the plaintiff concerned through Advocate and took advised thereafter applied Certified Copy on 12.08.2025 same was received on 21.08.2025 of Matrimonial Case No. 09 of 2023.
5. That it is stated that the appellant came to Khunti and after collecting the same requested him to get it filed through a good lawyer in the Hon'ble High Court.
6. That it is stated that the appellant entrusted the file to his counsel at Khunti and requested him to inform regarding filing of the appeal.
7. That it is stated that the appellant is a rustic villager and he is not acquainted with the procedural law.6
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8. That there is no deliberate latches or negligence on the part of the appellant.
9. That the appellant has strong prima facie case and there is every chance of his success in the above appeal.
10. That the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and injury if the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned.
11. 11. That the petition of the appellant is bonafide and in the interest of justice."
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay condonation application and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition as has been propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
17. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
18. It requires to refer herein that the Law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC
351.
19. The Privy Council in "General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim", (1939-40) 67 IA 7 2026:JHHC:19-DB 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
"A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law."
20. In "P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala", (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."
21. While considering the similar issue, this Court in "Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy", (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:
"21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be 8 2026:JHHC:19-DB exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
22. It is settled position of law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while considering the question of condonation of delay.
23. In the case of "Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr.", [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the 9 2026:JHHC:19-DB delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
24. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in "State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade", [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr." (supra,) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder:
"1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of 10 2026:JHHC:19-DB M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 :
(2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only "certificate cases" to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue.
The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this 11 2026:JHHC:19-DB Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up."
25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in "Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.", (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph- 12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be 12 2026:JHHC:19-DB exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground."
26. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
27. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made in "Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer", [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged 13 2026:JHHC:19-DB that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause"
and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The 14 2026:JHHC:19-DB statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or 15 2026:JHHC:19-DB for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
28. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
29. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in "Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.", AIR 1964 SC 1336; "Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan", (1969) 2 SCC 770; "Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti", (2011) 3 SCC 545 and "Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai", (2012) 5 SCC 157.
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30. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against 17 2026:JHHC:19-DB whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."
31. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
32. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the inordinate delay of 224 days, is proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for condoning the delay.
33. This Court from the aforesaid judicial pronouncements has found that the delay can be condoned irrespective of period of delay but the said consideration must be passed upon the explanation if found to be sufficiently explained.
34. It has been mentioned in the delay condonation application that after the impugned decree has been signed on 04.01.2025, appellant being aggrieved with impugned judgment and decree, decided to file an appeal. The plaintiff concerned through Advocate and took advised thereafter applied Certified Copy on 12.08.2025 same was received on 21.08.2025 of Matrimonial Case No. 09 of 2023. It is stated that the appellant came to Khunti and after collecting the same requested him to get it filed through a good lawyer in the Hon'ble High Court. It is stated that the 18 2026:JHHC:19-DB appellant entrusted the file to his counsel at Khunti and requested him to inform regarding filing of the appeal. It is stated that the appellant is a rustic villager and he is not acquainted with the procedural law. Thereafter, the appellant after arranging the money approached his counsel and, accordingly, filed the present appeal which caused the delay of 224 days.
35. No other ground has been given by the appellant in the delay condonation application which may said to be sufficient to condone the huge delay of 224 days in filing the present appeal.
36. The law is well settled that if any litigation has been filed beyond the period of limitation, then the entire period from the date of judgment is to be explained showing the sufficient cause.
37. This Court fails to understand that though the relief as sought for by the appellant-petitioner was that he is a rustic villager and to get the advice from his counsel there was inordinate delay to file the present lis, but it is pertinent to mention here that as per submission of the learned counsel for the applicant at bar, the appellant-petitioner is a rustic villager having no knowledge of the procedural law, but it has come on record that the appellant-petitioner has always remained in contact with his counsel and took advice for filing of the present appeal and, as such, it is very difficult to believe that he has no knowledge of any procedural law.
38. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such circumstances as per the reference made hereinabove about the conduct of the appellant- husband, the same cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 224 days.
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2026:JHHC:19-DB
39. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove as also the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application, is of the view that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 224 days in filing the appeal.
40. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 12917 of 2025 is hereby dismissed.
41. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal being F.A No.172 of 2025 also stands dismissed.
42. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Sudhir Dated:05.01.2025 Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR 20