Central Administrative Tribunal - Ahmedabad
Rajnish Kumar Rai vs Home Affairs on 8 January, 2026
Central Administrative Tribunal
Ahmedabad Bench,
Ahmedabad
O.A. No.470 of 2025
Orders reserved on : 10.12.2025
Orders pronounced on : 08.01.2026
CORAM : Hon'ble Mr. Jayesh V. Bhairavia, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
Rajnish Kumar Rai,
Male, aged about 60 years,
Son of Mr. Shri Ram Rai,
Occupation: Assistant Professor, Indian School of
Management, Ahmedabad.
Residing at: MSH 302, New Campus,
IIM, Ahmedabad,Sargam Marg, Vastrapur,
Ahmedabad- 380015. ..........................................Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri Rahul Sharma)
VERSUS
Union of India,
(Notice to be served through
The Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India
North Block, New Delhi - 110 001. .......................Respondents
(By Advocates: Shri Devang Vyas, Senior Advocate
assisted by Shri H.D. Shukla)
ORDER
Per : Hon'ble Mr. Jayesh V. Bhairavia, Member (A)
By filing the instant OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
"A. This Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to quash and set asidethe impugned Order dated 23.07.2025 (at Annexure 'A1'), with the liberty that the Respondent may appointanother 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 2 OA No.470/2025 Inquiring Authority in accordance with theprovisions of the All India (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1969;
B. This Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to quash and set asidethe impugned Order dated 08.08.2025 (at Annexure 'A2');
C. This Hon'ble Tribunal may pass any other order in theinterest ofjustice. "
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. Facts in brief are that the applicant belongs to the 1992 Batch of the directly recruited IPS. During the period from 08.10.2014 to 18.04.2015, he was deputed to the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (in short 'UCIL') as its CVO and served as such during this period. Thereafter on 29.04.2015, the applicant joined the CRPF, on a lateral deputation, and later joined duties at Shillong, as IG, North-Eastern Sector, Shillong.
On 12.06.2017, the applicant was transferred and he joined duties at the CIAT, Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh.
On 25.08.2017, the respondent served a Charge Memorandum dated 25.08.2017 on the applicant, alleging certain procedural irregularities in conducting vigilance inquiries while he was posted as the CVO, UCIL.
2.1 In September 2017, the applicant being aggrieved with the said Charge Sheet dated 25.08.2017 had filed OA No.793/2017 before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal challenging the said charge-sheet on various grounds.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 3 OA No.470/2025 2.2 On 16.10.2017, Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal stayed further proceedings in the above-mentioned charge-sheet. 2.3 On 03.07.2025, Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vacated the stay granted earlier in favour of the applicant. 2.4 On 23.07.2025, the respondent vide the impugned Order (Annexure A/1), appointed Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retired), as the Inquiring Authority to conduct the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
2.5 On 08.08.2025, the applicant made a representation to the respondent/Disciplinary Authority against the appointment of Shri Kuldiep Singh as Inquiring Authority on the ground that the said Shri Kuldiep Singh was incompetent to conduct the proceedings in view of the provisions of Rule 8(2) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969.However, vide order dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure A-2), the Disciplinary Authority rejected the above- mentioned representation of the applicant. 2.6 In the meantime, on 04.09.2025, the applicant was compulsorily retired from service in connection with another and different matter.
2.7 On 25.10.2025, Preliminary Hearing was scheduled to be conducted via video conferencing.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 4 OA No.470/2025 2.8 Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his representation vide Order dated 21.08.2025, the applicant has filed this OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
3. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant. The applicant has also filed his rejoinder refuting the contents of the reply. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANTS 4.1 Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that Rule 8(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 provides that the Inquiring Authority shall be appointed as per the provisions of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, or the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950. This sub-rule does not provide for the appointment of a retired IPS officer as an Inquiring Authority. 4.2 Learned counsel also submitted that Rule 8(3) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, provides for the appointment of a Board as an Inquiring Authority, which is not applicable in the present case.
4.3 Learned counsel also submitted that contrasted with the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, one can find that Explanation (ii) to Rule 14(2) of the Rules ibid provides for the appointment of a retired officer as an Inquiring Authority, which is different from the provisions of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, where there is no 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 5 OA No.470/2025 provision for the appointment of a retired officer as Inquiring Authority.
4.4 Learned counsel also submitted that even in the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950, there is no provision for the appointment of a retired IPS officer as the Inquiring Authority. 4.5 Learned counsel argued that the respondent, while rejecting the aforesaid representation of the applicant vide order dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure A/2), has stated that there was no such condition in the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, which would preclude the appointment of Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retired), former DG, CRPF, as the Inquiring Authority.
According to the learned counsel Mr. Sharma, the respondent has misread the statutory rules.To sustain his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the judgement passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha & Anr. vs. Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye & Ors., reported in (2021) 17 SCC 90, wherein it has been held that a public authority can do only such acts as are permitted by the law and nothing more. It has no authority to act in a manner that does not strictly adhere to the procedure laid down in the statute.
4.6 Learned counsel by referring to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh & others, reported in (AIR) 1964 SC 358, submitted thatthe Hon'ble 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 6 OA No.470/2025 Supreme Courtalso lays stress on the scrupulous observance of prescribed procedures and permits no diversion from the same. 4.7 Learned counsel further submitted that the appointment of Shri Kuldiep Singh is also against the principles of natural justice and fair play. It raises a real apprehension of bias. As the said Shri Kuldiep Singh is presently serving as an Advisor (Security) to the Government of Manipur, which is no statutory or sanctioned post. No Conduct Rules or Discipline and Appeal Rules are applicable to him. His job is of a contractual nature, which is completely at the mercy of the respondent. Therefore, he would maintain neutrality, cannot be assured.
4.8 Learned counsel also submitted that the present application has arisen from a fresh cause of action, and the prayers made herein are different from the prayers made in OA 793/2017 preferred before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Devang Viwas by referring to the contents of the reply filed on behalf of the respondent submitted that the applicant herein has preferred the present Application to quash & set aside order dated 23.07.2025 vide which the Disciplinary Authority appointing Shri Kuldiep Singh as InquiringAuthority to inquire into the charges framed against the applicant as well as the order dated 21.08.2025 rejecting the representation of applicant preferred by him 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 7 OA No.470/2025 against the appointment of the said Shri Kuldiep Singh as Inquiring Authority.
5.1 Learned Senior Counsel raised the preliminary objection that this Tribunal has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain present application on the following reasons:
(i) The issue in question is arising pursuant to allegations against applicant while on deputation as CVO, UCIL, was issued a show cause notice by DAE on 20.03.2017 for serious procedural irregularities. The Ministry of Home Affairs, being the cadre controlling authority, issued Charge Memorandum dated 25.08.2017 under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline &Appeal) Rules, 1969 (herein after referred to as „AIS (D&A) Rules‟).
(ii) The applicant challenged the said Charge Memorandum before Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal by way of OA No.793/2017. Although, initially stay was granted by Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide interim Order dated 16.10.2017, however, the stay granted was vacated by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal on 03.07.2025. Thereafter, the respondent appointed Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retd.), as Inquiring Authority and Shri Abhilash Kidave as Presenting Officer by orders dated 23.07.2025.
(iii) Aggrieved by the appointment of the above-named as Inquiring Authority to conduct the inquiry proceedings 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 8 OA No.470/2025 initiated pursuant to issuance of the Charge Memorandum dated 20.03.2017, the applicant has approached this Bench of the Tribunal by way of the instant OA.
(iv) The proceedings in question are arising out of the proceedings before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal and, therefore, it is not open for applicant to approach the Ahmedabad Bench of this Tribunal to agitate the issue raised in this case.
5.2 Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) issued a Memorandum (Show Cause Notice) dated 20.03.2017 containing some allegations/misconducts committed by the applicant (compulsorily retired) while functioning as the Chief Vigilance Officer, Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL), Jaduguda. The applicant did not submit his reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by DAE. However, the applicant vide his letter dated 07.04.2017 requested for supply of additional documents for providing explanation. The applicant also sought additional information on the pretext that the matters are two years old and with the passage of time, his memory of precise facts and details of these matters has naturally faded and he does not recall the complete facts and circumstances of these matters.
5.3 Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the applicant neither accepted nor denied the charges and had been trying to delay the process. Further, as per the Charge Memorandum dated 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 9 OA No.470/2025 20.03.2017, the allegation for the alleged misconduct committed by the applicant were grave in nature and could not be forgotten by him within a span of two years. Hence, the reply/explanation given by the applicant was not accepted. Further, the alleged misconducts committed by the applicant, while he was on Central deputation (CVO, UCIL), the Central Govt. (Ministry of Home Affairs - being Cadre Controlling Authority of IPS) is the authority competent to institute proceedings and impose penalty upon the applicant as per Rule 7 of the AIS (D&A) Rules. The respondent vide Charge Memo dated 25.08.2017, after considering the letter dated 07.04.2017 of the applicant initiated disciplinary proceeding against him by framing following Articles of Charge:
"a. Shri Rajnish Kumar Rai, while working as CVO at UCIL, Jaduguda has enquired into alleged misconduct committed by CMD and Functional Director, UCIL without due approval of the Competent authority and submitted his investigation reports directly to CBI, Ranchi without consulting CVC/DAE in violation of CVC guidelines.
b. During the period from 11.01.2015 to 14.01.2015, Shri Rajnish Kumar Rai allegedly proceeded on tour despite denial of approval of Competent Authority and after tour also failed to submit inspection report ignoring CVC guidelines;
c. On relinquishment of charge as CVO, UCIL, Shri Rajnish Kumar Rai allegedly carried along with him confidential papers without approval of the Competent Authority; and d. Shri Rajnish Kumar Rai carried out investigation into allegation of various irregularities and corruption in UCIL which was based on complaints by unknown source (anonymous) in violation of CVC guidelines."
5.4 Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in response to the Charge Memorandum dated 20.08.2017, the applicant submitted a representation dated 30.08.2017, raising following three major issues:
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 10 OA No.470/2025 a. The applicant had sought documents listed in the Annexure-
III of the charge-sheet dated 25.08.2017;
b. The applicant had asked for the first stage advice of the CVC while issuing the charge-sheet;
c. The applicant had also mentioned that since the documents sought by him in response to the Show Cause Notice issued by the Deptt. of Atomic Energy were not provided and he had not submitted his reply, the Charge Memo may be withdrawn and also to grant him 30 days‟ time to submit reply to the DAE Memorandum from the date of receipt of the documents sought by him in response to the Show Cause Notice dated 20.03.2017.
5.5 Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that on considering, the respondent, inter alia, observed that the applicant was allowed more than four months‟ time since the DAE Memorandum was issued to him. However, he did not furnish his reply. Further, he was also given ample time for furnishing his reply. Accordingly, the respondent vide letter dated 17.10.2017 forwarded the copies of the documents mentioned in the Annexure-III of the Charge-Sheet dated 25.08.2017 and also conveyed the following:
a. In so far as obtaining the advice of the CVC is concerned, this is required if a vigilance angle is noticed;
b. He had already been given adequate opportunities to put forth his explanation to show-cause notice dated 20.03.2017.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 11 OA No.470/2025 5.6 Learned counsel submitted that thereafter, the applicant filed OA No.793/2017 before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal, seeking the following relief(s):-
"a. To call for records pertaining to the impugned Charge Memo dated 25.08.2017 issued by the Respondent No. 1;
b. To quash and set aside the impugned memo dated 25.08.2017 holding and declaring the same as unreasonable, illegal, arbitrary, biased, mala fide, for extraneous reasons, without any basis and need, also against public interest and good governance and unconstitutional;
c. To direct the respondents to consider and promote the applicant to the post of ADGP in Gujarat State Cadre with all consequential benefits with effect from the date on which the applicant became eligible for such promotions;
d. To grant any other and further reliefs, as the nature and circumstances of the present case may require and in the interest of justice."
In the said OA, the applicant also made prayer for grant of the following interim relief, till disposal of the said OA:-
"a. To direct the Respondents to stay all the ramifications, consequences, effects, implementation and operation of the impugned Charge Memo dated 25.08.2017 and its supporting documents listed in Annexure-III of the impugned Charge Memo dated 25.08.2017;
b. To direct the Respondents to consider the claim of the applicant for promotion to the rank of ADGP without reference to the impugned Charge Memo dated 25.08.2017;
c. To grant any other and further interim reliefs, as the nature and circumstances of the present case may require and as deemed fit in the interest of justice."
5.7 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the said OA No.793/2017 was listed on 16.10.2017 and the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal directed that there shall be stay of enquiry for a period of six weeks, which was extended from time to time. The respondent filed reply on behalf of UOI/Department to the said OA No. 793/2017 and while filing reply, a prayer for vacation of stay from the disciplinary 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 12 OA No.470/2025 proceeding was made. However, the said OA No. 793/2017 was not listed after 03.01.2019 due to non-availability of Division Bench as well as due to Pandemic COVID-2019. As such the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant were pending since long, therefore, Misc. Application No.369/2021 in OA No.793/2017 seeking vacation of stay from the disciplinary proceeding was filed by the respondent. During pendency of OA No. 793/2017 and MA No. 369/2021 before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal, the applicant filed Transfer Petition No.263/2021 before the Principal Bench of this Tribunal, seeking transfer of OA No. 793/2017 from Hyderabad Bench to Ahmedabad Bench, which was dismissed by the Principal Bench vide Order dated 04.02.2022.Being aggrieved with the Order dated 04.02.2022 passed by the Principal Bench of the Tribunal, the applicant filed SCA No. 6466/2022 before the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad, which was also dismissed vide Order dated 20.04.2022. Thereafter, aggrieved with the Order dated 20.04.2022 passed by the Hon‟ble Gujarat High Court, the applicant filed SLP No.20054/2023 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was also dismissed vide Judgment dated 06.09.2023.
5.8 Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that thereafter OA No.793/2017 along with MA No.369/2021 was listed on 09.11.2023 and after hearing the parties, the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide Order dated 09.11.2023 vacated the stay from the disciplinary proceedings by allowing MA No. 369/2021 and kept the order reserved on OA.Aggrieved with the Order dated 09.11.2023, the applicant filed 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 13 OA No.470/2025 WP No. 32213/2023 before the Hon'ble Telangana High Court, which was disposed of vide Order dated 28.11.2023. Thereafter, aggrieved with Order dated 28.11.2023, IA No.1/2024 in WP (C) No. 32213/2023 was filed by the respondent before the Hon‟ble Telangana High Court, which was dismissed vide Order dated 14.06.2024 with direction to the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal to dispose of OA No.793/2017 or the vacate stay application as expeditiously as possible. 5.9 Learned Senior counsel furthersubmitted that during pendency of OA No. 793/2017 and MA No. 369/2021, the applicant again filed Transfer Petition No.58/2025 before Principal Bench of this Tribunal seeking transfer of OA No. 793/2017 fromHyderabad Bench to Principal Bench of this Tribunal, which was also dismissed vide Order dated 22.08.2025.
5.10 Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the Hon'ble High Court of Telangana has specifically directed the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal to decide MA No. 369/2021 and OA No. 793/2017 on priority within three months; however, the same was pending since long. Therefore, UOI/MHA filed MA No.195/2025 before the Hyderabad Bench, requesting therein to hear the matter finally before the Hyderabad Bench itself, which was allowed vide Order dated 19.06.2025.Thereafter, OA No.793/2017 along with MA No. 369/2021 was listed before the Hyderabad Bench and Hyderabad Bench vide Order dated 03.07.2025 (Annexure-R1) again vacated the stay from the disciplinary proceedings. In the meantime, aggrieved with the Order dated 19.06.2025 passed by Hyderabad Bench, the applicant 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 14 OA No.470/2025 filed Writ Petition No.18849/2025 before the Hon‟ble High Court for the State of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi, which was dismissed as not pressed vide Order dated 07.10.2025 (Annexure-R2). 5.11 Learned Senior counsel also submitted that due to vacation of stay from the disciplinary proceeding passed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide Order dated 03.07.2025, the respondent resumed the disciplinary proceedings and with approval of the Disciplinary Authority appointed Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retired), Advisor (Security), Government of Manipur, as Inquiring Authority and Shri Abhilash Kidave, Under Secretary (NCPW), DAE as Presenting Officer vide Orders dated 23.07.2025.
Thereafter, the applicant submitted a representation dated 08.08.2025 to the respondent raising certain objections over appointment of Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retd.) as Inquiring Authority (IA) and requested to reconsider his appointment as Inquiring Authority in the matter and assign the inquiry to an officer who is independent, impartial and unconnected with either the previous proceedings against him or any current appointment made by the respondent. The said representation submitted by the applicant was considered by the respondent and it was noted that Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retired), former DG, CRPF, has been appointed as Inquiring Authority in the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings under Rule 8(2) of the AIS (D&A) Rules, with due approval of the Disciplinary Authority. Further, there is no such condition or provision under the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 which precludes the appointment of 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 15 OA No.470/2025 Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retired) as Inquiring Authority in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant. It was further observed that there was no such rule or instruction under the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 that an Inquiring Authority could not undertake more than one inquiry against the same officer or that a retired IPS officer posted by the Government to some post could not act as an Inquiring Authority. Accordingly, the aforesaid representation dated 08.08.2025 submitted by the applicant was found contrary to rules, without merit, and the same appeared to have been made with an objective to prolong the disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, keeping in view the aforesaid facts, rule position and all aspects of the case, the Disciplinary Authority rejected the representation dated 08.08.2025 vide Order dated 21.08.2025.
5.12 Learned Senior counsel also submitted that aggrieved by the rejection of his request for change of Inquiring Authority, the applicant has filed the instant OA before this Bench and requested the reliefs as quoted above.
5.13 Learned Senior counsel further submitted that the contentions of the applicant that he has compulsorily been retired vide Order dated 04.09.2025 and ordinarily residing in Ahmedabad are matter of record. However, the contention of the applicant that the subject matter of the order/action against which the applicant seeks redressal is within the jurisdiction of this Bench of the Tribunal is wrong and denied. In this regard, learned counsel submitted that the applicant has already filed OA No.793/2017 before the Hyderabad Bench of this 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 16 OA No.470/2025 Tribunal challenging the Charge Memorandum dated 25.08.2017 issued by the respondent. The said Charge Memorandum was stayed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide Order dated 16.10.2017 and the stay was vacated by Hyderabad Bench vide Order dated 03.07.2025. Accordingly, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant vide Charge Memorandum dated 25.08.2017 have been resumed and the respondent appointed Inquiring Authority and Presenting Officer vide Orders dated 23.07.2025. The appointment of Inquiring Authority and Presenting Officer is a consequential action to the Charge Sheet dated 25.08.2017. Accordingly, any grievance pertaining to conduct of enquiry, which resumed after vacation of stay by Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal may not be brought before this Bench of the Tribunal. It may be pertinent to note that earlier SCA No.6466/2022 before the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad was dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction itself which related to OA No. 793/2017 only and that OA No.793/2017 is still sub judice and due for final order by the Hyderabad Bench.
During the course of the arguments, it is brought to our notice that the said OA No.793/2017 has been dismissed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal.
5.14 Learned Senior counsel argued that as appointment of the Inquiring Authority and Presenting Officer to conduct the enquiry into charges framed against the applicant is a consequential action to the Charge Sheet dated 25.08.2017. The Charge Sheet dated 25.08.2017 has already been challenged by the applicant before the Hyderabad 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 17 OA No.470/2025 Bench of this Tribunal by filing OA No.793/2017, therefore, any related grievance in this regard may not be raised before this Bench of the Tribunal.
5.15 Learned Senior counsel also submitted that moreover, the applicant is governed by the provisions of All India Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, and provisions of Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 are not applicable in the case of the applicant being an All India Service Officer. Rule 8(2) of AIS (D&A) Rules provides that:-
"Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the Service, it may appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof."
Further, the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 has already been repealed and ceases to be in force, hence, Inquiring Authority could be appointed as per the provisions of AIS (D&A) Rules and the said Rule lays down that the Disciplinary Authority may appoint "an authority to enquire into the truth thereof". Thus, the Disciplinary Authority is fully competent to decide the authority who could be appointed to enquire into the charges. There is no bar whatsoever over appointment of a retired IPS officer as Inquiring Authority under AIS (D&A) Rules. Rather, appointment of a retired person as Inquiring Authority helps in completing the enquiry proceedings expeditiously.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 18 OA No.470/2025 5.16 Learned Senior counsel further argued that Rule 8(2) of the AIS (D&A) Rules, is about appointment of Inquiring Authority, whereas Rule 8(3) of the AIS (D&A) Rules envisages appointment of a Board as the Inquiring Authority, which is not applicable in the case of the applicant as admitted by the applicant himself.
In his case, Inquiring Authority has been appointed under Rule 8(2) of the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 and not under the CCS (CCA) Rules. Further, the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 is no longer in force having been repealed in 2018 itself.
5.17 Learned Senior counsel submitted that the representation of the applicant was rejected keeping in view the provisions of AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969.
5.18 Learned Senior counsel also submitted that the proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha & Anr. Vs. Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye & Ors.(supra), as relied upon by the applicant, has not been violated in any manner. Moreover, the Disciplinary Authority has acted in terms of applicable Rules only. 5.19 Learned counsel argued that the applicant has no case in hand at all over the issue raised by the applicant in the present OA. There is no violation of any Rule in the appointment of Inquiring Authority and it has been done under the competency of the Disciplinary Authority. The applicant has been making attempts to hold up the enquiry proceedings since more than last eight years. Innumerable litigations filed by him over the cause in various forums like various Benches of 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 19 OA No.470/2025 this Tribunal, Hon‟ble High Courts and Hon‟ble Supreme Court is testimony to his intentions. The present OA is also one such instance. The enquiry could be initiated after more than eight years since its inception and any hold at this juncture will only prolong it.
Moreover, conduct of enquiry is no conviction. Rather, it is the step through which the veracity of the allegation could be checked.
It also provides the charged officer opportunity to negate the charges and defend himself. Such defence could only be presented when enquiry is done, not otherwise. Thus, balance of convenience is only in favour of conducting the enquiry, not holding that. As it has been suitably stated that the appointment of Inquiring Authority has been done as per extant Rules and no violation of any rule or directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court or any other Hon‟ble Courts has been done, no stay in the matter is warranted.
5.20 Lastly, learned Senior counsel submitted thatthe applicant has no cause of action against the respondent and the present OA is nothing but abuse of process of law, and therefore, the same deserves to be dismissed by this Tribunal.
REJOINDER FILED BY THE APPLICANT TO THE REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS
6. By referring the averments made in the rejoinder, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the Respondent has sought to contest the maintainability of the present OA by placing reliance on:
(a) the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal, 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 20 OA No.470/2025 Hyderabad Bench, in OA No. 793/2017, filed by the applicant at the relevant point of time; and (b) the proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in W.P. No. 18849/2025.
In this regard, it is submitted that W.P. No. 18849/2025 was also in connection with OA No. 793/2017-HYD. As the W.P. No. 18849/2025 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the specific context as Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal proceeding to continue to hear OA No. 793/2017-HYD, despite the pendency of Transfer Petition No. PT 571/2017 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, praying for the transfer of OA No. 793/2017 to the Principal Bench, New Delhi. The said PT No. 571/2017 was itself filed by the applicant pursuant to and in compliance with the specific direction of the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide Order dated 30.12.2024 (Annexure A12) passed in OA No. 793/2017. However, the said PT No. 571/2017 was dismissed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal vide Order dated 22.08.2025. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the said Transfer Petition, W.P. No. 18849/2025 became purely academic and infructuous, as the very premise on which it was filed, namely the pendency of the Transfer Petition, had ceased to exist. The applicant, being desirous of having OA No. 793/2017-HYD expeditiously heard and disposed of on merits, withdrew W.P. No. 18849/2025. It is submitted that the withdrawal of W.P. No. 18849/2025 was solely on account of supervening events rendering it academic, and not due to any weakness or lack of merit. However, the Respondent has, by relying upon the proceedings in OA 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 21 OA No.470/2025 No. 793/2017-HYD, sought to portray that the applicant was responsible for delaying those proceedings. Therefore, this contention of the Respondent is factually incorrect and legally misconceived.
Learned counsel further submitted that on 30.12.2024, the learned Advocate for the applicant had travelled to Hyderabad specifically for final arguments in OA No. 793/2017. However, it was the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal, which directed the applicant to file a Transfer Petition before the Principal Bench, thereby halting the progress of the matter. The applicant merely complied with the Tribunal's direction. Any delay, if at all, was thus not attributable to the applicant but was a consequence of the judicial process and the Tribunal's own directions.
6.1 Learned counsel further submitted that OA No. 793/2017-HYD has since been dismissed by the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal vide order dated 12.11.2025, however, the formal written order is yet to be uploaded on the Tribunal's website. As such with the dismissal of OA No.793/2017-HYD, all averments made by the Respondent challenging the maintainability or jurisdiction of this Bench of the Tribunal on the basis of the pendency of OA No. 793/2017-HYD have become wholly academic, moot, and devoid of any legal consequence. The foundation upon which the Respondent's jurisdictional objection rested has ceased to exist. For this reason, it is stated that the applicant is not burdening this Tribunal by entering into the merits of the averments made in the reply in respect of the pendency of OA No. 793/2017-HYD, as they are now of no legal relevance.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 22 OA No.470/2025 6.2 Learned counsel also submitted that the following material facts bearing upon jurisdiction, i.e., the applicant was compulsorily retired from service vide Order dated 04.09.2025 of the Respondent. Had the order of compulsory retirement not been passed, the applicant would have, in the normal course, superannuated from service on 30.09.2025. Hence, Rule 6(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, will apply and confers jurisdiction upon this Bench of the Tribunal to entertain and adjudicate the present OA. 6.3 Learned counsel argued that even during the pendency of OA No. 793/2017-HYD, the applicant had three alternative legal remedies available to him for challenging the procedural illegality in the appointment of the Inquiring Authority by the Respondent. These options included: (a) Filing an MA in OA No. 793/2017-HYD seeking appropriate relief. However, such a course would inevitably have been met with objections from the Respondent alleging delay tactics or abuse of process; (b) Filing a separate OA before the Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench; and (c) Filing a separate OA before this Bench of the Tribunal, where the applicant ordinarily resides. All three remedies were legally available and permissible. The applicant's choice to pursue one remedy over another cannot be construed as an attempt to delay proceedings or as conferring any jurisdictional immunity upon the Respondent's illegal actions. Therefore, in view of applicant's compulsory retirement and the applicability of Rule 6(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, if the applicant possessed the legal right to file an OA before the Hyderabad Bench of 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 23 OA No.470/2025 this Tribunal (as is implicit in the Respondent's submissions), then the applicant possessed an equal right to file an OA before this Bench of the Tribunal also, since he ordinarily resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench. The choice of forum, where alternative fora are legally available, rests with the applicant and cannot be questioned by the respondent.
6.4 Learned counsel also argued that even assuming, without admitting, that any jurisdictional objection could have been raised prior to the disposal of OA No. 793/2017-HYD, with the dismissal of OA No. 793/2017-HYD on 12.11.2025, any such objection has become wholly untenable. There exists no impediment whatsoever to the operation of Rule 6(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, by virtue of which this Bench of the Tribunal possesses clear and unambiguous territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the present OA. The dismissal of OA No.793/2017-HYD has, in any event, removed any possible foundation for any jurisdictional challenge.
6.5 Learned counsel also argued that even if the applicant is perceived by the respondent to have delayed the conduct of the proceedings, the applicant has an absolute and non-derogable right to challenge the procedural violations in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings, particularly, when such violations prejudice his defence. The right to challenge jurisdictional errors and violations of mandatory procedural safeguards cannot be foreclosed on grounds of delay, as these protections are not matters of mere procedural convenience but 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 24 OA No.470/2025 are substantive statutory rights designed to ensure fairness and natural justice. Any prejudice to the defence resulting from such violations entitles the applicant to seek redress at any stage. The challenge to such a procedural violation, i.e., appointment of the Inquiring Authority in the instant case, must be raised at the earliest opportunity once the illegality comes to the notice of the applicant. It is for this reason that the applicant has filed this application at this point. 6.6 Learned counsel submitted that in respect of the merits of the present OA, the Respondent has failed to cite even a single provision of law or rules conferring upon the Disciplinary Authority the power to appoint a retired officer as the Inquiring Authority. The respondent's reply rests entirely on a bare assertion that it has the power/authority, without any statutory foundation.
6.7 Learned counsel also submitted that it is an admitted position, as acknowledged by the respondent, that the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, has been repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 2017. This repeal has fundamental implications for the interpretation and application of Rules 8(1) and 8(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, which explicitly reference the now-defunct 1850 Act.
In the backdrop of the repeal of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, the operative effect of Rule 8(1) and Rule 8(2) of the AIS (S&A) Rules, is required to be properly appreciated. The portions of these Rules that depend upon or reference the 1850 Act have become inoperative, leaving only the procedure prescribed under the AIS 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 25 OA No.470/2025 (S&A) Rules, as the sole applicable framework for conducting disciplinary inquiries against Members of the All India Services. The AIS (S&A) Rules 1969, provides that no order imposing any major penalties specified in Rule 6 shall be made except after an inquiry is held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and Rule 10 or provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, where such inquiry is held under that Act.
The use of the disjunctive 'or' and the qualifying phrase 'where such inquiry is held under that Act' makes it abundantly clear that the procedure under the 1850 Act was to be followed only where disciplinary inquiries were specifically instituted under that Act. With the repeal of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, this alternative procedural route has ceased to exist. Consequently, the sole and only procedure that can now be followed for disciplinary inquiries against Members of the All India Services is the procedure prescribed under the AIS (D&A) Rules. Rule 8(2) empowers the Disciplinary Authority to appoint an Inquiring Authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings against a Member of the All India Service. A careful reading of this provision shows that it offers two mutually exclusive alternatives, depending upon the statutory framework under which the disciplinary proceedings are instituted: (i) If disciplinary proceedings under Rule 8(1) have been instituted under the AIS (D&A) Rules, the Inquiring Authority must necessarily be appointed under the AIS (D&A) Rules. This would mean the appointment of a Board under Rule 8(3), because Rule 8(3) is the only provision in the All India Services (Discipline and 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 26 OA No.470/2025 Appeal) Rules, 1969, that specifies the constitution and composition of an "authority" for conducting disciplinary inquiries; and (ii) If disciplinary proceedings under Rule 8(1) have been instituted under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, the Inquiring Authority must necessarily be appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850.
However, with the repeal of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, this second alternative has ceased to exist and there can be no appointment of an Inquiring Authority under the repealed Act. The use of phrase "as the case may be" in Rule 8(2) is of critical legal significance. This phrase is not mere surplus age but clearly demonstrate that the mode of appointment of the Inquiring Authority is inextricably linked to and determined by the statutory framework under which disciplinary proceedings have been instituted. The phrase 'as the case may be' creates a statutory dichotomy: the power of appointment must be exercised under the same Act or Rules under which the proceedings themselves have been initiated. This interpretive principle flows from the elementary rule of statutory construction that every word in a statute must be given meaning and effect.
Since in the present case, disciplinary proceedings against the applicant have been instituted under Rule 8 of the AIS (D&A) Rules, consequently, in terms of Rule 8(2) itself, read with the phrase "as the case may be", the appointment of the Inquiring Authority can only be made under the AIS (D&A) Rules. The application of the Public 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 27 OA No.470/2025 Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, is completely ruled out as the Act has been repealed and the proceedings in the present case were never instituted under that Act. The Disciplinary Authority had no option but to appoint the Inquiring Authority strictly in accordance with Rule 8(3) of the AIS (D&A) Rules.
6.8 Learned counsel also submitted that moreover, it is important to appreciate that Rule 8(2) is an enabling provision that confers power upon the Disciplinary Authority to appoint 'an authority,' but this power is not plenary or unfettered. The Disciplinary Authority can only appoint that authority, which has been prescribed and whose composition has been specified under the AIS (D&A) Rules. Rule 8(2) does not confer upon the Disciplinary Authority any carte blanche discretion to create, devise, or constitute a new form of Inquiring Authority, which has not been expressly provided for under the AIS (D&A) Rules. The Disciplinary Authority cannot arrogate to itself power not conferred by the statutory rules. In catena of judgements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that disciplinary authorities must act strictly within the four comers of the Rules and cannot assume powers not granted by the Rules. Thus, the appointment of an Inquiring Authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings against a Member of the All India Service can only be under Rule 8(3), i.e. by a Board. The stringent safeguards prescribed in Rule 8(3) are not arbitrary or excessive but are deeply rooted in constitutional and administrative philosophy. Members of the All India Services occupy a unique and exalted position under Articles 312 and 313 of the Constitution of 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 28 OA No.470/2025 India. The All India Services constitute the 'steel frame' of India's administrative structure, serving as the backbone of impartial, competent, and professional governance in a federal polity.
Further learned counsel submitted that the framers of the Constitution and the rule-makers were acutely conscious that Members of these elite Services must be insulated and protected from arbitrary, mala fide, politically motivated, or frivolous disciplinary action, which could compromise their independence, objectivity, integrity, and fearless discharge of constitutional duties. It is for this compelling reason that Rule 8(3) mandates a multi-member Board comprising not less than two senior officers, with at least one from the same Service. This ensures: (a) collective wisdom and deliberation rather than individual caprice or bias; (b) peer review by officers of comparable seniority, experience, and understanding of Service conditions; (c) institutional protection against external pressure, vindictiveness, or arbitrariness through plurality of decision-makers; and (d) robust safeguards against frivolous, vexatious, or ill-founded disciplinary proceedings. The requirement of a Board is thus not a procedural technicality but a substantive constitutional and statutory safeguard integral to preserving the independence, integrity, and efficacy of the All India Services. To permit the appointment ofan individual officer, and particularly a retired officer who has no institutional accountability or stake in the Service, as the sole Inquiring Authority would be to wholly dilute, subvert, and defeat this fundamental protection. Such an appointment strikes at the very 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 29 OA No.470/2025 foundation of the carefully crafted procedural architecture designed to uphold the constitutional vision of an independent, professional, and fearless civil service. The legal meaning and import of the term 'authority' as used in Rule 8(2) must be properly appreciated.
Learned counsel for the applicant by referring the judgment passed by three Member Bench of the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in Satish Kumar Kulaeja Vs. Additional Secretary (HE), Ministry of HRD & Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors, reported in 2009 SCC Online CAT 1785 (Annexure A16), would submit it was held therein that the meaning of the word 'authority' is wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out Governmental or quasi-Governmental functions. The term 'authority' thus denotes an institutionalized body or entity established or recognized by statute, and not an individual officer appointed at the subjective discretion of the Disciplinary Authority. This interpretation is consistent with the authoritative pronouncement of a Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur Vs. Mohan Lal & Ors.,reported in 1967 SCC Online SC 18, wherein it has been observed that "This dictionary meaning of the word "authority" is clearly wide enough to include all bodies created by a statute on which powers are conferred to carry out governmental or quasi governmental functions." This binding precedent confirms that the term 'authority' in statutory provisions refers to bodies or institutions created or prescribed by statute to discharge governmental 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 30 OA No.470/2025 functions, and not to ad hoc appointments of individuals made at administrative discretion. In the context of the AIS (D&A) Rules, the only statutory 'authority' prescribed for conducting disciplinary inquiries is the Board contemplated under Rule 8(3). 6.9 Lastly, learned counsel submitted that in view of the above submissions, the legal position is beyond any reasonable doubt, as The Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, having been repealed, the sole and exclusive procedure applicable to disciplinary proceedings against Members of the All India Services is that prescribed under the AIS (D&A) Rules and under these Rules, the only provision prescribing the constitution, composition, and appointment of an Inquiring Authority is Rule 8(3), which mandates a Board consisting of not less than two senior officers, at least one of whom must be from the same Service as the delinquent officer. The term 'authority' in Rule 8(2) refers to this statutory Board contemplated under Rule 8(3), and to no other body or individual. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing excludes all others) applies. Since Rule 8(3) specifies the Board as the Inquiring Authority, all other forms of appointment are excluded. There exists no provision whatsoever in the AIS (D&A) Rules, that authorizes, permits, or sanctions the appointment of a retired officer, or even a serving individual officer, as the Inquiring Authority for conducting disciplinary proceedings against a Member of an All India Service. The appointment of a retired officer as the Inquiring Authority in the present case is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction, ultra virus the AIS (D&A) Rules, and void 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 31 OA No.470/2025 ab initio. Thus, the present OA is liable to be allowed in the interest of justice.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as judgments relied upon by the parties.
8. Having regard to the factual matrix of the case and contentions of the parties, as noted above, we are of the considered view that the following issues are to be delved into:
(i) Whether the present OA is maintainable before this Bench in view of the prior proceedings arising out of the same charge memorandum and the consequential nature of the impugned orders?
(ii) Whether the appointment of a retired IPS officer as Inquiring Authority under Rule 8(2) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 is without jurisdiction and ultra virus the Rules?
(iii) Whether the applicant has made out a case of violation of principles of natural justice or real likelihood of bias warranting interference at the interlocutory stage of disciplinary proceedings?
9. With regard to issue (i) as noted in para 8 above, i.e., whether the present OA is maintainable before this Bench in view of the prior proceedings arising out of the same charge memorandum and the consequential nature of the impugned orders, upon careful 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 32 OA No.470/2025 consideration of the factual matrix and the procedural history of the case, we are of the considered view that the present OA is maintainable before this Bench, reason being that the present OA does not challenge the Charge Memorandum dated 25.08.2017, which was the subject matter of OA No. 793/2017 before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal. The lis in the present OA is confined to the legality of the appointment of the Inquiring Authority vide order dated 23.07.2025 (Annexure A/1) and the rejection of the applicant‟s representation dated 21.08.2025 (Annexure A/2). These impugned orders came into existence much after the filing of OA No.793/2017 and arose only upon vacation of stay on 03.07.2025.
9.1 It is well settled that where a fresh administrative decision gives rise to a new grievance, such decision constitutes a fresh cause of action, even if it arises in the course of earlier proceedings. The present OA is, therefore, not a collateral challenge to the charge-sheet but a challenge to an allegedly illegal procedural step taken subsequently. Final Disposal of the said OA No. 793/2017 preferred by the applicant before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal, removes Jurisdictional Objection. As the respondent‟s principal objection to maintainability was founded on the pendency of the said OA No.793/2017 before the Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal. However, it is an admitted position that OA No. 793/2017 has since been dismissed on 12.11.2025. With the disposal of the said OA, the jurisdictional embargo, if any, has ceased to exist. Once the earlier OA has attained finality at the level of the Tribunal, there is no parallel or competing proceeding pending 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 33 OA No.470/2025 before any other Bench. Consequently, the objection that the applicant is attempting to invoke a parallel forum or re-agitate the same cause of action is rendered academic and unsustainable. 9.2 It is admitted fact that the applicant was compulsorily retired from service on 04.09.2025. Had such compulsory retirement not intervened, he would have superannuated on 30.09.2025. Therefore, at the time of filing of the present OA, the applicant was no longer in service and was ordinarily residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench, as it is not a disputed fact that the applicant is residing at Ahmedabad. Rule 6(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 expressly provides that where an applicant is no longer in service, an OA may be filed before the Bench within whose jurisdiction the applicant ordinarily resides. This provision is a special rule of territorial jurisdiction, intended to confer convenience and access to justice to retired or separated employees. 9.3 In the present case, the statutory condition under Rule 6(2) of the Rules ibid stands fully satisfied, and, hence, this Bench is vested with clear territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue raised in the present OA.
9.4 While it is true that the appointment of the Inquiring Authority follows the revival of disciplinary proceedings, not every consequential step is immune from judicial scrutiny. A consequential order, if allegedly ultra virus the statutory rules, furnishes an independent and justiciable cause of action. The applicant is not seeking to indirectly 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 34 OA No.470/2025 reopen the challenge to the charge memorandum; rather, he is questioning the competence and legality of the authority appointed to conduct the inquiry. Such a challenge goes to the root of jurisdiction and cannot be postponed to a later stage on the ground of being merely consequential.
9.5 The issue raised in the present OA, namely, the legality of appointing a retired IPS officer as Inquiring Authority was neither in existence nor adjudicated in OA No.793/2017. Hence, neither the doctrine of res judicata nor constructive res judicata is attracted. Service jurisprudence recognises that procedural violations in disciplinary proceedings may be challenged as and when they arise, particularly, when such violations are alleged to cause prejudice to the defence of the charged officer.
9.6 In view of the above, this Tribunal holds that the present OA arises from a fresh and distinct cause of action; the earlier proceedings before the Hyderabad Bench no longer operate as a bar; Territorial jurisdiction is clearly attracted under Rule 6(2) of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987; and the challenge to the appointment of the Inquiring Authority is legally maintainable and cannot be dismissed as a mere consequential or collateral challenge. Accordingly, the objection to maintainability raised by the respondent is rejected.
10. With regard to Issue (ii) as noted in para 8 above, i.e., whether the appointment of a retired IPS officer as the Inquiring Authority under Rule 8(2) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 35 OA No.470/2025 1969 is without jurisdiction and ultra vires the said Rules, it is pertinent to note that the Charge Memorandum issued to the applicant was admittedly under the provisions of the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969.Therefore, for a proper and effective adjudication of this issue, it becomes necessary to refer to and examine the relevant provisions of the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969, which have a direct bearing on the controversy in question. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
"8. Procedure for imposing major penalties.--
8(1) No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in rule 6 shall be made except after an inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner provided in this rule and rule 10 or provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act 1850 (37 of 1850) where such inquiry is held under that Act.
8(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the Service, it may appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act 185044, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof.
8(3) Where a Board is appointed as the inquiring authority it shall consist of not less than two senior officers provided that at least one member of such a Board shall be an officer of the Service to which the member of the Service belongs.
(emphasis supplied) 10.1 From the plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be seen that Rule 8(2) of the AIS (D&A) Rules empowers the Disciplinary Authority to appoint "an authority" to inquire into the truth of imputations of misconduct. The provision does not place any express restriction that such authority must be a serving officer or that it must invariably be a Board constituted under Rule 8(3).
It is apt to mention that Rule 8(3) is an enabling provision permitting appointment of a Board in appropriate cases; it does not 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 36 OA No.470/2025 mandate that every inquiry must be conducted only by such a Board.
The use of the word "may" in Rule 8(3) clearly indicates discretion and not compulsion. In our considered view, acceptance of the applicant‟s contention would amount to reading into the Rules a restriction, which the rule-making authority has consciously not provided. The expression "an authority" occurring in Rule 8(2) is of wide amplitude and cannot be artificially confined only to a multi-
member Board. The Rules deliberately leave the choice of the Inquiring Authority to the administrative wisdom of the Disciplinary Authority, depending upon the nature of charges and administrative exigencies. In the absence of any statutory bar, appointment of a retired IPS officer, particularly, one of very high rank and experience, cannot be held to be per se illegal.
10.2 The repeal of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 does not render Rule 8(2) otiose nor does it imply that only Rule 8(3) survives as the sole mode of inquiry. The reference to the 1850 Act in Rule 8(2) is merely an additional procedural option that existed earlier. Its repeal does not curtail the independent power conferred by Rule 8(2) itself. The phrase "as the case may be" only clarifies the applicable procedural route and does not restrict the scope of the authority that may be appointed. Accordingly, the appointment of Shri Kuldiep Singh, IPS (Retd.) as Inquiring Authority cannot be said to be ultra virus or without jurisdiction.
10.3 The aforesaid conclusion on this issue is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 37 OA No.470/2025 India and others vs. Alok Kumar, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 349, the relevant paras of the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced as under:-
"30. The Rules require the disciplinary authority to form an opinion that the grounds for inquiry into the truth of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour against the railway servant exists. Further, that they have enquired into the matter. Then, such inquiry may be conducted by the disciplinary authority itself or it may appoint under the Rules a Board of Inquiry or other authority to enquire into the truth thereof. Formation of such an opinion is a condition precedent for the disciplinary authority, whether it intends to conduct the inquiry under the Rules or under the Act as the case may be. The expression "as the case may be" clearly suggests that law which will control such departmental enquiry would depend upon the class of officers/officials whose misconduct or misbehaviour subject them to such inquiry. If the employee is covered under the Act, the disciplinary authority shall have to appoint an enquiry officer and proceed with the inquiry under the provisions of the Act, whereas if he is covered under the Rules, the procedure prescribed under the Rules will have to be followed.
31. Other important feature in the language of Rule 9 is appoint under this Rule a Board of Inquiry or other authority. What shall be the constitution of the Board of Inquiry and how the same would proceed further with the inquiry has been stated in sub-rules (3), (4) and (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules. The expression "other authority" has neither been explained nor defined under the Rules. In terms of Rules 2(1) & (2), the words which have not been defined under these Rules shall be deemed to have been assigned the same meaning as assigned under the Railways Act, 1890.
32. Even the Railways Act does not define the term "authority" though this expression has been used in conjunction with other words in the Rules as well as the Act. In the absence of any specific definition or meaning we have to rely upon understanding of this expression in common parlance. In common parlance, the word "authority" is understood to be, power to exercise and perform certain duties or functions in accordance with law. "Authority" may vest in an individual or a person by itself or even as a delegatee. It is the right to exercise power or permission to exercise power. Such permission or right could be vested in an individual or a body. It can also be in conferment of power by one person to another. This expression has been used differently in different statutes and can be given a different meaning or connotation depending upon the context in which it is used. The purpose and object of using such expression should be understood from the provisions of the relevant law and the purpose sought to be achieved.
33. The word "authority" is derived from the Latin word auctoritas, meaning intention, advice, opinion, influence or command which originate from an auctor, indicating that the authority originates from a master, leader or author, and essentially is imposed by a superior upon an inferior either by force of law (structural authority) or by force of argument (sapiential authority).
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 38 OA No.470/2025
34.Farlex Free Dictionary explains the word "authority" as follows:
"Authority n. permission, a right coupled with the power to do an act or order others to act. Often one person gives another authority to act, as an employer to an employee, a principal to an agent, a corporation to its officers, or governmental empowerment to perform certain functions. There are different types of authority including „apparent authority‟ when a principal gives an agent various signs of authority to make others believe he or she has authority, „express authority‟ or „limited authority‟ which spell out exactly what authority is granted (usually a written set of instructions), „implied authority‟ which flows from the position one holds, and „general authority‟ which is the broad power to act for another."
35.Oxford Dictionary explains the word as under:
"1. (a) The power to enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine, or judge.
(b) One that is invested with this power, especially a government or body of government officials : land titles issued by the civil authority.
2. Power assigned to another; authorisation: deputies were given authority to make arrests."
36.Merriam Webster's Law Dictionary, 1996 explains the word as under:
"Authority pl. -- ties
1. an official decision of a court used esp. as a precedent.
2. (a) a power to act est. over others that derives from status, position, or office. Example: the authority of the President.
(b) the power to act that is officially or formally granted (as by statute, corporate bye-law, or court order).
3.***
4. (a) a government agency or corporation that administers a revenue-producing public enterprise. Example: the transit authority.
(b) a government agency or public office responsible for an area of regulation. Example: should apply for a permit to the permitting authority."
37. In Law Lexicon, 2nd Edn., 1997, p. 171, the word "authority" has been explained and elucidated as follows:
"Authority.--*** A person or persons, or a body, exercising power of command; generally in the plural: as, the civil and military authorities. Power or admitted right to command or to act, whether original or delegated: as, the authority of a prince over subjects and of parents over children; the authority of an agent to act for his principal. An authority is general when it extends to all acts, or all connected with a particular employment, and special when confined to a single act.
„Authority, is nothing but a power to do something; it is sometimes given by word, and sometimes by writing: also it is by writ, warrant, commission, letter of attorney, & c. and sometimes by law. The authority that is given must be to do a thing lawful; for if it be 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 39 OA No.470/2025 for the doing anything against law, as to beat a man, take away his goods, or disseise him of his lands this will not be a good authority to justify him that doth it.‟ Authority (In contracts) the lawful delegation of power by one person to another.
Authority (In administrative law) is a body having jurisdiction in certain matters of a public nature.
Authority. Permission. Right to exercise powers; to implement and enforce laws; to exact obedience; to command; to judge. Control over; jurisdiction. Often synonymous with power;. The power delegated by a principal to his agent. The lawful delegation of power by one person to another. Power of agent to affect legal relations of principal by acts done in accordance with principal's manifestations of consent to agent."
38. It is clear from above that there is some unanimity as to what meaning can be given to the expression "authority". The authority, therefore, should be understood on its plain language and without necessarily curtailing its scope. It will be more appropriate to understand this expression and give it a meaning which should be in conformity with the context and purpose in which it has been used. The "other authority" appearing in Rule 9(2) is intended to cover a vast field and there is no indication of the mind of the framers that the expression must be given a restricted or a narrow meaning. It is possible that where the authority is vested in a person or a body as a result of delegation, then delegatee of such authority has to work strictly within the field delegated. If it works beyond the scope of delegation, in that event it will be beyond the authority and may even, in given circumstances, vitiate the action.
39. Now, we have to examine the argument of the respondents before the Court that the expression "other authority" shall have to be construed to cover only the persons who are in the service of the Railways. In other words, the contention is that the expression "person" used under Section 3 of the Act and expression "authority" used under Rule 9(2) contemplates the person to be in service and excludes appointment of an enquiry officer (authority) of a retired railway officer/official.
40. Heavy reliance was placed by the respondents upon the judgment of this Court in Ravi Malik v. National Film Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2004) 13 SCC 427 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 882] We have already discussed at some length the scheme of the Rules. As already noticed, we are not required to discuss in any further elaboration the inquiries taken under the Act, inasmuch as none of the respondents before us have been subject to public departmental enquiry under the provisions of the Act. Rule 9(2) requires the authority to form an opinion, whether it should hold the inquiry into the truth of imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against the railway servant itself or should it appoint some other authority to do the needful. Thus, there is an element of discretion vested in the competent authority to appoint "other authority" for the purposes of conducting a departmental enquiry.
41. It is a settled principle of interpretation that exclusion must either be specifically provided or the language of the rule should be such that it definitely follows by necessary implication. The words of the rule, 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 40 OA No.470/2025 therefore, should be explicit or the intent should be irresistibly expressed for exclusion. If it was so intended, the framers of the rule could simply use the expression like "public servant in office" or "an authority in office". Absence of such specific language exhibits the mind of the framers that they never intended to restrict the scope of "other authority" by limiting it to the serving officers/officials. The principle of necessary implication further requires that the exclusion should be an irresistible conclusion and should also be in conformity with the purpose and object of the rule.
42. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents wanted us to accept the argument that the provisions of Rule 9(2) have an implicit exclusion in its language and exclusion is absolute. That is to say, the framers have excluded appointment of former employees of the Railway Department as other authority (enquiry officer) under these provisions. We find no merit in this contention as well.
43. An exclusion clause should be reflected in clear, unambiguous, explicit and specific terms or language, as in the clauses excluding the jurisdiction of the court the framers of the law apply specific language. In some cases, as it may be, such exclusion could be read with reference to irresistible implicit exclusion. In our opinion the language of Rule 9(2) does not support the submission of the respondents. Application of principle of exclusion can hardly be inferred in the absence of specific language. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of this Court in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2004) 4 SCC 677 : AIR 2004 SC 2154]
44. In the present case, neither of these ingredients appear to be satisfied. Ultimately, what is the purpose of a departmental enquiry? It is, to put to the delinquent officer/official the charges or article of charges and imputation and seek his reply in the event of there being no substance to hold an inquiry in accordance with the rules and principles of natural justice. The enquiry officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a delegatee and has to work within the limited authority so delegated to him. The charges and article of charges and imputations are served by the disciplinary/competent authority. The inquiry report is submitted again to the competent authority which is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and then decide whether any punishment should be imposed upon the delinquent officer or not. Thus, all substantive functions are performed by the disciplinary or the specified authority itself. It is only an interregnum inquiry. It is conducted by the delegatee of the said authority. That being the purpose and specially keeping in mind the language of Rule 9(2), we are unable to accept the contention that "other authority" has to be a person in service alone. Thus, it is not only the persons in service who could be appointed as enquiry officers (other authority) within the meaning of Rule 9(2).
47. Thus, a person who is engaged by a competent authority to work on a fee or a fixed remuneration can be a public servant. We fail to understand then how a person engaged for the purposes of performing a delegated function in accordance with law would not be "other authority" within the meaning of Rule 9(2). The Rule has not specified any qualifications or prerequisites which need to be satisfied before a person can be appointed as an enquiry officer. It has been left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Unless such exclusion of a former employee of the Government was spelt out specifically in the 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 41 OA No.470/2025 Rule, it will be difficult for the Court to introduce that element and the principle of implication simpliciter.
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50. Firstly, we are unable to see any conflict, much less the contradiction between the language of Rule 9(2) and the Circular of 1998 issued by the appellants. Under Rule 9(2), the disciplinary authority has the discretion to appoint a "Board of Inquiry" or "other authority" to conduct inquiry against the delinquent officer/official. The circular only aids it further while saying that in the interest of the administration and in consonance with the Rules, the former/retired officers of the Railway Department who satisfy the eligibility criteria can be appointed as enquiry officers and submit their report to the disciplinary authority in accordance with law. It is clear that the circular issued is only supplementing Rule 9(2) and is in no way in conflict with the language or spirit of Rule 9(2).
51. The argument advanced on behalf of the respondents is that in the event of clear conflict between circulars and the statutory rules, the circular cannot be permitted to prevail. This argument would be worth consideration only if the respondents are able to demonstrate before the Court without ambiguity that it is a case of conflict and the circular issued is in terms contrary to the language of the statute." 10.4 It is also profitable to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Jagdish Chandra Sethy (Civil Appeal No.6061/2011 decided on 18.07.2023),reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1932, in which also a similar issue as involved in the instant case was adjudicated and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court by placing reliance on the judgment in Union of Indian and others vs. P.C. Ramakrishnayya, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 644, and Alok Kumar (supra) ruled that :
"5. The legal position is not res integra, as "Union of India & Ors. v. P.C. Ramakrishnayya"(2010) 8 SCC 644, referring to the earlier decision in "Union of India v. Alok Kumar" (2010) 5 SCC 349, has interpreted Rule 14(2) and thereupon held:
"16. In Alok Kumar this Court considered in great detail, the meaning of the word "authority" occurring in Rule 9(3) and came to find and hold that a retired officer could also be vested with the delegated authority of the disciplinary authority (see paras 26-
62) to hold the inquiry. It may also be noted that in Alok Kumar, this Court also considered the decision in Ravi Malik v. National Film Development Corp. Ltd6.
2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 42 OA No.470/2025 and distinguished it by pointing out that it was in the context of Rule 23(b) of the Service Rules and Regulations, 1982 of National Film Development Corporation. In SCC para 45 of the judgment, the Court observed as follows: (Alok Kumar case, SCC p.
367).:
"45. Reliance placed by the respondents upon the judgment of this Court in Ravi Malik7 is hardly of any assistance to them. Firstly, the facts and the rules falling for consideration before this Court in that case were entirely different. Secondly, the Court was concerned with the expression „public servant‟ appearing in Rule 23(b) of the Service Rules and Regulations, 1982 of the Film Development Corporation. The Court expressed the view that „public servant‟ should be understood in its common parlance and a retired officer would not fall within the meaning of 'public servant‟, as by virtue of his retirement he loses the characteristics of being a public servant. That is not the expression with which we are concerned in the present case. Rule 9(2) as well as Section 3 of the Act have used a very different expression i.e. 'other authority' and „person/persons‟. In other words, the absence of the words „public servant‟ of the Government are conspicuous by their very absence. Thus, both these expressions, even as per the dictum of the Court should be interpreted as understood in the common parlance."
6.In view of the legal position, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - Jagdish Chandra Sethy has urged that in the present case, the disciplinary authority had not recorded specific reasons why a retired government servant was appointed to act as an inquiry officer. We are not impressed with this argument and reject the same, as a belated afterthought. This submission should not be entertained before this Court, post the inquiry etc.
7.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 07.01.2010 rejecting the challenge to the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack dated 08.02.2008 in O.A. No.828 of 2005 is set aside. Consequently, O.A. No.828 of 2005 would be treated as dismissed.
8. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."
(emphasis supplied) 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 43 OA No.470/2025 10.5 In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Alok Kumar (supra) and Jagdish Chandra Sethy (supra), we find no merit in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant seeking to draw a distinction between the provisions governing the appointment of the Inquiring Authority under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969. The legal principles enunciated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as noted herein above clearly negate the contention of the applicant that only a serving officer/Board of not less than two senior officers could be appointed as Inquiring Authority. Consequently, the contention raised on this score is rejected, and issue no.(ii) stands answered accordingly.
11. With regard to issue (iii)as noted in para 8 above, i.e., whether the applicant has made out a case of violation of principles of natural justice or real likelihood of bias warranting interference at the interlocutory stage of disciplinary proceedings, we observe that the plea of bias raised by the applicant is speculative and based on surmises. Merely because the Inquiring Authority is a retired officer or is holding an advisory assignment or earlier had conducted a departmental inquiry against the applicant does not establish any real likelihood of bias. No material has been placed on record to show personal animosity, prior involvement, or vested interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
11.1 It is well settled that disciplinary proceedings should not be interdicted at an interlocutory stage unless there is patent lack of jurisdiction or demonstrable mala fides. Appointment of an Inquiring 2026.01.08 KHAMBHATI 14:56:46 NILESH KANTILAL +05'30' 44 OA No.470/2025 Authority, by itself, causes no prejudice. The applicant will have full opportunity to defend himself during the inquiry and to challenge the findings, if adverse, at an appropriate stage, if so advised. Interference at this stage would only prolong proceedings which have already remained pending for several years, largely on account of repeated litigations. Thus, the issue no.(iii) is answered accordingly.
12. As such we hold that the appointment of a retired IPS officer as Inquiring Authority under Rule 8(2) of the AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 is neither prohibited nor ultra virus the Rules. Rule 8(3) of the Rules ibid does not mandate compulsory appointment of a Board in every case. No case of real bias, violation of natural justice, or jurisdictional error is made out at this stage. Thus, the present OA is premature, misconceived, and amounts to unwarranted interference with ongoing disciplinary proceedings.
13. In the result, for the forgoing discussion, we do not find any merit in the present OA and the same is accordingly dismissed.
14. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Jayesh V. Bhairavia)
Member (A) Member (J)
2026.01.08
KHAMBHATI
14:56:46
NILESH KANTILAL
+05'30'