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[Cites 42, Cited by 0]

Telangana High Court

D.Shiva Kumar vs The State Of Telangana, on 29 August, 2024

        THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
                           AND
         THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE J.SREENIVAS RAO

     WRIT PETITION Nos. 22362 and 20565 of 2016, 11079 of
                   2017 and 8722 of 2019

COMMON ORDER:

(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice J.Sreenivas Rao) In all these Writ Petitions, petitioners have mainly questioned G.O.Ms.No.113, Revenue (Land Matters) Department, dated 01.06.2016 issued by the respondent No.1-State Government, exercising the powers conferred under Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (Central Act No.6 of 2014) repealing the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 as illegal and violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and without jurisdiction.

2. Heard Sri Anand Kapur, learned counsel, representing Sri M.Satish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.11079 of 2017, Sri Velagapudi Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. No.8722 of 2019, Sri Pottigari Sridhar Reddy, learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of learned Advocate General for official respondents. No representation on behalf of the petitioner/s in W.P.No.22362 of 2016 and W.P.No.20565 of 2016 and no 2 representation on behalf of the unofficial respondents in all the Writ Petitions.

Brief facts of the case:

3. For the facility of reference, the facts in W.P. No.11079 of 2017 are being referred.

3.1 Petitioner filed L.G.O.P. No.753 of 2003 on the file of XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar against respondent Nos.3 and 4 invoking the provisions of Section 7(A) of A.P. Land Grabbing Act, 1982 (hereinafter called for brevity as 'the Act, 1982') to declare the petitioner as owner of the premises bearing H.No.8-8-364/1 of Plot No.A-88 in Survey Nos.250 to 260 and 263 to 304 consisting of 300 square yards situated at Ward No.8, Block No.8, Green Park Colony, Karmanghat Village and to declare that respondent Nos.3 and 4 are land grabbers and to evict them from the above premises and to deliver the vacant possession of the property and also to direct them to pay damages for illegal occupation of the schedule property from 02.11.2003. Learned XIV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record dismissed the above L.G.O.P.No.753 of 2003 by its judgment and 3 decree dated 17.10.2016. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed the Writ Petition stating that the respondent No.1-State Government is not having authority or jurisdiction by way of repealing the Act, 1982 to issue the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016.

4. Respondent No.2 in W.P. No.8722 of 2019 filed common counter affidavit on behalf of official respondents denying the allegations made by the petitioners inter alia contending that respondent No.1-State Government, after following the due procedure as contemplated under law issued the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016 after obtaining necessary orders as per the business rules and also approval from Cabinet, exercising the powers under Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, (herein after called brevity Act, 2014) and repealed the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 by assigning the reasons and transferred the pending cases from the Special Tribunal to the respective Courts and the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are not maintainable under law.

5. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners:

5.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.11079 of 2017 contended that the respondent No.1-State Government through 4 impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016 repealed the entire provisions of the Act, 1982 and the same is contrary to law and without jurisdiction. He further contended that respondent No.1-

State Government is not having authority or jurisdiction to repeal the Act, 1982 by way of G.O. in the absence of any legislation, by simply invoking the powers under the provisions of Section 101 of Act, 2014.

5.2 He further contended that under the constitutional scheme, Legislature is competent to legislate within its domain of competence, subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India, but the Legislature is not entitled to either create a new body/legislature to discharge its functions nor it can delegate its function without laying down parameters for the delegate to perform that function and the impugned G.O. is in gross violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

5.3 He also contended that the executive by itself cannot legislate unless the Legislature empowers it for that purpose and to that extent within the permissible contours of Constitution of India. He further contended that the Legislature has to discharge its essential function of Legislation and cannot delegate its power of repeal or saving or empower an authority to modify the 5 essential features of an enactment. Respondent No.1-State Government without meeting the parameters of condition precedent invoked the powers under Section 101 of the Act, 2014 and issued impugned G.O. which is exfacie illegal.

5.4 He further contended that by virtue of the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016, the entire Act, 1982 has been repealed. By virtue of repealing the Act, petitioner has foregone the right of filing statutory appeal against the judgment and decree passed in L.G.O.P. No.753 of 2003. Hence the impugned G.O. issued by the respondent No.1-State Government is illegal, contrary to law and without jurisdiction.

In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court:

5.5. In Lachmi Narain and others vs. Union of India and others 1, it was held as follows:
"45. In Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1915 this Court inter alia examined the constitutional validity of s. 2 of the Laws Act in the light of general principles relating to the nature, scope and limits of delegated legislation.
46. Section 2 as it then stood, was as follows:
"The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, extend to any Part State (other than 1 (1976) 2 SCC 953 6 Coorg and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands) or to any part of such State with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendments of any corresponding law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State."

47. The Court by a majority held that the first part of this section which empowers the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to any part of such State with such modifications and restrictions as it thinks fit any enactment which is in force in a Part A State, is intra vires, and that the latter part of this section which empowers the Central Government to make provision in any enactment extended to a Part C State, for repeal or amendment of any law (other than a Central Act) which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State, is ultra vires. Consequent upon this opinion, the latter part of the section was deleted by s. 3 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 195 (Act XLVIlI of 1952) with effect from 2-8-1951.

60. The power given by Section 2 exhausts itself on extension of the enactment; it cannot be exercised repeatedly or subsequently to such extension. It can be exercised only once, simultaneously with the extension of the enactment. This is one dimension of the statutory limits which circumscribe the power. The second is that the power cannot be used for a purpose other than that of extension. In the exercise of this power, only such "restrictions and modifications" can be validly engrafted in the enactment sought to be extended, which are necessary to bring it into operation and effect in the Union Territory. "Modifications" which are not necessary for, or ancillary and subservient to the purpose of extension, are not permissible. And, only such "modifications" can be legitimately necessary for such purpose as are required to adjust, adapt and make the enactment suitable to the peculiar local conditions of the Union Territory for carrying it into operation and effect. In the context of the section, the words "restrictions and modifications" do not cover such alterations as involve a change in any essential feature, of the enactment or the legislative policy built into it.

7

This is the third dimension of the limits that circumscribe the power.

It is true that the word "such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit", if construed literally and in isolation, appear to give unfettered power of amending and modifying the enactment sought to be extended. Such a wide construction must be eschewed lest the very validity of the section becomes vulnerable on account of the vice of excessive delegation. Moreover, such a construction would be repugnant to the context and the content of the section, read as a whole, and the statutory limits and conditions attaching to the exercise of the power. We must, therefore, confine the scope of the words "restrictions and modifications"

to alterations of such a character which keep the inbuilt policy, essence and substance of the enactment sought to be extended, intact, and introduce only such peripheral or insubstantial changes which are appropriate and necessary to adapt and adjust it to the local conditions of the Union Territory."

5.6 In Straw Products Limited Vs. Income-tax Officer, 'A' Ward, Bhopal and others 2, it was held as follows:

"14. But the impugned Order seeks to alter the connotation of that expression. The assessee contends that no difficulty arose or could arise in giving effect to the provisions relating to the allowance of depreciation under the Indian Income-tax Act to the merged States after the promulgation of the Taxation Laws (Merged States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1949, and the Central Government assumed, in issuing the impugned Order under s. 6 of Act 67 of 1949, powers which were not invested by the Act, and on that account the Order is invalid. The Union of India resists that plea. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that the Central Government having issued the 1962 Order, it must be deemed to be held that difficulties had arisen in giving effect to the provisions of Act 67 of 1949 and the opinion of the Central Government in that behalf was conclusive. The Court observed:
2
AIR 1968 SC 579 8 "The language of the section clearly shows that it is for the Central Government to decide, as a pure act of administration, whether an obstacle or impediment exists in giving effect to the provisions of the Act, Rule or Order referred to in s. 6 which calls for an order for surmounting the obstacle or removing the impediment. No doubt s. 6 does not expressly say that the Central Government should be satisfied as to the "existence of any "difficulty" for tile removal of which the making of an Order is necessary. But it is implicit in the language of s. 6 that the Central Government should be satisfied that a difficulty exists in giving effect to, the provisions of any Act, Rule or Order extended by s. 3 to the Merged States. If the existence of any "difficulty" depends on the satisfaction of the Central Government, then it follows that the condition about the existence of any difficulty, for the removal of which the Central Government is empowered to make in Order, is a subjective condition incapable of being determined by anyone other than the Central Government which has to take, action in the matter."

In so observing, in our judgment, the High Court plainly erred. Exercise of the power to make provisions or to issue directions as may appear necessary to the Central Government is conditioned by the existence of a difficulty arising in giving effect to the provisions of any Act, rule or order. The Section does not make the arising of the difficulty a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government: it is a condition precedent to the exercise of power and existence of the condition if challenged must be established as an objective fact."

5.7 In Vasu Dev Singh and others vs. Union of India and others 3, it was held as follows:

"A statute can be amended, partially repealed or wholly repealed by the legislature only. The philosophy underlying a statute or the legislative policy, with the passage of time, may be altered but therefor only the legislature has the requisite power and not the 3 (2006) 12 SCC 753 9 executive. The delegated legislation must be exercised, it is trite, within the parameters of essential legislative policy. The question must be considered from another angle. Delegation of essential legislative function is impermissible. It is essential for the legislature to declare its legislative policy which can be gathered from the express words used in the statute or by necessary implication, having regard to the attending circumstances. It is impermissible for the legislature to abdicate its essential legislative functions. The legislature cannot delegate its power to repeal the law or modify its essential features."

5.8 In State of Tamil Nadu and others vs. K.Shyam Sunder and others 4, it was held as follows:

"44. As the legislature cannot carry out each and every function by itself, it may be necessary to delegate its power for certain limited purposes in favour of the executive. Delegating such powers itself is a legislative function. Such delegation of power, however, cannot be wide, uncanalised or unguided. The legislature while delegating such power is required to lay down the criteria or standard so as to enable the delegate to act within the framework of the statute. The principle on which the power of the legislature is to be exercised is required to be disclosed. It is also trite that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. Delegation cannot be extended to "repealing or altering in essential particulars of laws which are already in force in the area in question". (Vide: re: Article 143 of the Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., AIR 1951 SC
332)."

6. It is relevant to mention here that learned counsel for the petitioner has forwarded his arguments to the extent of issuance of impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016, repealing the 4 (2011) 8 SCC 737 10 Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 as without jurisdiction.

7. Sri Velagapudi Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in W.P.No.8722 of 2019 submits that he adopted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.11079 of 2017.

Submissions of the learned Special Government Pleader:

8. Learned Special Government Pleader contended that respondent No.1-State Government is having power to repeal or modify the law exercising the powers conferred under the provisions of Section 101 of the Act, 2014. Accordingly respondent No.1-State Government after following the due procedure under law and after obtaining orders as per the business rules and also after obtaining approval from Cabinet issued the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016 and repealed the Act, 1982 by giving reasons and the same is in accordance with law.

9. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. 11 Lafarge Dealers Association and others 5, contending that the provisions of Sections 78 and 79 of the Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act are similar to Sections 100 and 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, wherein it was held as follows:

"10. Before interpreting Sections 78 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act which are in pari materia to Sections 84 and 85 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000, we would like to reproduce paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of The Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Ranchi & another Vs M/s Swarn Rekha Cokes & Coals Private Limited and others ((2004) 5 SCC 618) which read as under:

"26. The question then arises, as to what is the true meaning and import of Sections 84 and 85 of the Act?
27. We have earlier reproduced Sections 84 and 85 of the Act. As earlier noticed, Sections 3 to 6 which form part of Part II of the Act provide for the formation of new States to be known as the State of Jharkhand and the State of Bihar. The territories specified in Section 3 constitute the new State of Jharkhand and the remaining territories fall within the territory of the State of Bihar. However, Section 84 in express terms, provides that the provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extended or applied and the territorial references in any such law to the State of Bihar shall, until otherwise provided by a competent legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within the existing State of Bihar before the appointed day. Section

85 provides that for the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the State of Bihar or Jharkhand of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors. Page 11 of be 5 (2019) 7 SCC 584 12 necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. The language in these sections is clear and unambiguous. These sections provide that the laws which were applicable to the undivided State of Bihar would continue to apply to the new States created by the Act. The laws that operated continue to operate notwithstanding the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bihar and creation of the new State of Jharkhand. They continue in force until and unless altered, repealed or amended. It is not disputed before us and indeed it cannot be disputed in view of the wide definition given to "law" in Section 2(f) of the Act that the notification issued under Section 7(3)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 is law within the meaning of Sections 84 and 85 of the Act. Thus, the notification published in the Bihar Gazette on 22-12-1995 bearing SO No. 478 continues to operate in the State of Jharkhand till such time as it is altered, repealed or amended. By virtue of Section 84, the territorial references in any such law (which includes the notification in question), to the State of Bihar shall be construed as meaning the territories within the existing State of Bihar before the appointed day, until otherwise provided by a competent legislature or other competent authority. A conjoint reading of both these provisions makes it abundantly clear that the territorial references in any law in force immediately before the appointed day must be construed as meaning the territories within the existing State of Bihar before the appointed day. To facilitate their application in respect of the State of Bihar or Jharkhand, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of the law as it may consider necessary or expedient by way of repeal or amendment. Till such law is so repealed or amended in accordance with law, it shall have effect.

After their amendment or alteration, they shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications made. We, therefore, find no difficulty in holding that the notification of the Government of Bihar issued under Section 7(3)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and published in the gazette on 22-12-1995 being SO No. 478 is law as defined by Section 2(f) of the Act. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors.Page 12 of The said notification holds the field and applies to all the territories which comprised the undivided State of 13 Bihar. The States of Bihar and Jharkhand have been vested with power to make such adaptations and modifications of the law as they may consider necessary or expedient. This they can do by issuance of order before the expiration of two years from the appointed day. After the adaptations and modifications of the law, the law shall have effect as so modified or adapted till such time as a competent legislature or other competent authority further alters, repeals or amends such law.

14. Having considered the contention of the parties and in the context of Sections 78, 79, 80, 85 and 86 of the Reorganisation Act, we feel that the stand taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the 1960 (11) STC 456 Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors.Page 20 of State of Chhattisgarh is correct and merits acceptance. We have already reproduced the aforesaid provisions and partly interpreted them in paragraphs 9 and 10 and would now proceed to interpret Sections 78 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act. Section 78 of the Reorganisation Act consist of two parts. The first part states that the provisions of the Reorganisation Act shall not be deemed to have affected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed date extends or applies. In other words, the law in force before the appointed date, which in the present case is 1st November, 2000, would continue to apply to the successor or reorganised State of Madhya Pradesh as it existed before bifurcation. This is natural and normal as the laws enacted by the legislature and the executive of the State of Madhya Pradesh would obviously apply to the territories forming part of it after its reorganisation/division. As a result of bifurcation some areas that were earlier part of the State of Madhya Pradesh would now form part of the new State of Chhattisgarh, albeit this would not matter and affect application of the laws as they applied prior to the appointed date to the territories that required a part of the reorganised State of Madhya Pradesh. Section 78, no doubt uses the word 'deemed' but in fact, the first part does not incorporate/create any deeming fiction and rather postulates and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors.Page 21 of states the obvious. However, the second part of Section 78 incorporates a deeming fiction when it states that territorial references to such law in the State of Madhya Pradesh, i.e. the laws 14 enacted by the legislature and executive of the State of Madhya Pradesh before bifurcation, shall until otherwise provided by the competent legislature or other competent authority be construed as meaning the territories within the existing state of Madhya Pradesh before the appointed day. The effect, thereof, is that the laws enacted by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the reorganisation would continue to apply to the areas forming part of the new State of Chhattisgarh and also the reorganised State of Madhya Pradesh, but within their territorial confines. The enactments or the laws in force in the unified State of Madhya Pradesh would continue to apply to the two states, not as one or the same enactment or law, but as two separate enactments or laws as applicable to two different states.

23. While interpreting Section 84 and 85 of the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000 analogous to Section 78 and 79 of the Reorganisation Act, this Court in Ranjan Sinha Vs. Ajay Kumar Vishwakarma had dealt with and affirmed the underlined theory of continuity of laws in the new state after or post the reorganisation observing that the principle of "clean state", as it exists in the international law in relation to the state succession, which means that the successor state generally does not inherit the prior treaty obligations or rights of a predecessor state, is different from the adjustment of territories which the Parliament undertakes and enforces under Article 3. The reorganised states do not usually start as tabula rasa, rather they are successors of the pre-existing erstwhile Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors.Page 30 of States. Disorderly and chaotic situation would erupt if the new state was to be created without any laws as on the date of its creation.

To overcome this interregnum and vacuum, the Reorganisation Act(s) uniformly contain provisions which create a legal fiction to the extent that the reorganisation of the State would not affect the applicability of laws to all the territories included within it before and even after the reorganisation. However, this is subject to another dictum/rule that the existing laws as earlier applicable to the territories would be applicable to the new state until the new state provides for adaptation or modification of the law by way of repeal or amendment. The time period provided for such adaptations and modifications is generally two years from the appointed day, i.e. the day by which the Central 15 Government in the Official Gazette provides for the creation of the two states by transfer of territories from one state to another.

24. The Constitutional Bench judgment in M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (1958 AIR 468), had examined and rejected several contentions of the dealers carrying on business in the city of Madras for restraining the State of Andhra from imposing sales tax on sales effected in favour of merchants carrying on business in the State of Andhra. One of the AIR 1958 SC 468 Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23592 of 2014 & Ors.Page 31 of contentions raised related to the true interpretation of Section 53 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, the argument being that though for political purposes the State of Andhra was a separate State, but for enforcement of laws as they stood on the date of division/bifurcation, the State of Andhra was deemed to be a part of the State of Madras. This contention was rejected holding that the States of Andhra and Madras were two separate States and were governed by two separate though identical Acts. Accordingly, when the sales tax enactment as applicable had provided for single levy on successive sales of yarn, it would have application to sales in the State of Madras or Andhra, as the case may be, and not in the other State or inter-state sales. Section 53 had provided that the laws in existence in the territories which were constituted and had become part of the State of Andhra would continue to be governed by the laws which were enacted by the State of Madras. In terms of Section 53, the laws enacted by the State of Madras would continue to operate as before. It had not stipulated that the States would continue to be one.

Para 28. With respect to reasoning given in paragraph 30 in Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals Pvt. Ltd. (supra), we would acknowledge that creation of a new State was an unforeseen event and could give rise to unusual situations, but this cannot be a ground and reason to treat inter-state sales between the two successor states as intra-state sales. This would be contrary to the Constitution and even the Statute i.e. the Reorganisation Act. Whenever a new State is created, there would be difficulties and, issues would arise but these have to be dealt within the parameters of the constitutional provisions and the law and not by negating the mandate 16 of the Parliament which has created the new state in terms of Article 3 of the Constitution. Creation of the new political State must be given full legal effect. We would, therefore, respectfully overrule the contrary observations and ratio recorded in paragraphs 29 and 30 in Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in light of the legal position elucidated and explained above.

Analysis of the case:

10. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the core issue involved in these matters is whether respondent No.1-State Government is having power to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 by way of impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016 exercising the powers conferred under Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.
11. It is relevant to extract Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 which reads as follows:
"101. Power to adapt laws: For the purpose of facilitating the application in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana of any law made before the appointed day, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of two years from that day, by order, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until 17 altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority."

12. It is pertinent to mention here that the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014 which was to commence from the appointed day, was notified by the Central Government vide Notification No.S.O.655 (E), Ministry of Home Affairs dated 14.03.2014 published in the Gazette of India with 02.06.2014 as the appointed date.

Accordingly, on 02.06.2014 the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh was bifurcated and divided into the reorganized State of Andhra Pradesh and the new State of Telangana. The reorganized State of Andhra Pradesh and the new State of Telangana were described as 'successor State' vide clause (j) to Section 2 of the Reorganization Act. As per the provisions of Section 101 of the A.P. Reorganisation Act, the appropriate Government i.e., the State of Telangana is empowered by order, to make such adoption and modification of any law as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act made before 02.06.2014, by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of facilitating the application of such law in the State of Telangana before expiration of two years from 02.06.2014 and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to adoptions and modifications so made until 18 altered, repealed or amended by competent Legislature or other competent authority.

13. It further appears from the record that respondent No.1- State Government had issued the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113, dated 01.06.2016 exercising the powers conferred under the above said provisions of the Act, 2014, repealing the A.P. Land Grabbing( Prohibition) Act, 1982 by assigning the reasons. It is also relevant to extract the operative portion of the G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016, which reads as follows:

"Whereas, the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (A.P.Act No.12/1982) was enacted to arrest and curb the unlawful activities of land grabbers from their organised attempts to grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands belonging to Government, other State agencies. The object of the Act was to dispose of the case of land grabbing within a period of six months.
2. And Whereas after formation of State of Telangana, the functioning and efficacy of the Special Courts and Special Tribunals are examined and it is noticed that the object of constituting the Special Courts and Special Tribunals for disposal of the cases of land grabbing cases within prescribed period is not achieved and there are instances that took years in taking cognizance of the cases itself.
3. And whereas, section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (Central Act No.6 of 2014), the appropriate Government i.e., the State of Telangana is empowered by order, to make such adaptations and modifications of any law (as defined in section 2 (f) of the Act) made before 02.06.2014, whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient, for the purpose of facilitating the application of such law in the State of Telangana before expiration of two years from 02.06.2014; and thereupon every such law shall have 19 effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.

4. Taking into consideration of overall functioning, it is found that the object and purpose of the enactment was not achieved.

5. Therefore, it is decided to repeal Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and its application to the State of Telangana. Accordingly, the following notification will be published in an Extraordinate Issue of Telangana State Gazette dated 01.06.2016.

NOTIFICATION

1. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 101 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 (Central Act 6/2014), the Governor of Telangana hereby makes the following order, namely;

(a) This order may be called Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (AP Act 12/1982) Repeal Order, 2016.

(b) It shall come into force with effect from the date of the order........"

14. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No.1-State Government is not having authority or jurisdiction to repeal the Act, 1982 through impugned G.O in the absence of any legislation, is not tenable under law, on the ground that Section 101 of the Act, 2014, specifically envisages that the appropriate Government is having power to make such adoptions and modifications of the law, by way of repeal or 20 amendment before expiration of two years from appointed day i.e. 02.06.2014.

15. In the case on hand, respondent No.1-State Government after obtaining necessary orders as per the business rules and also approval from the Cabinet, had issued the impugned G.O, exercising the powers conferred under Section 101 of the Act, 2014, especially the petitioners have not questioned the Provisions of Section 101 of the Act, in the above writ petitions.

Unless and until the petitioners have questioned the provisions of Section 101 of the Act, 2014, they are not entitled to contend that respondent No.1-State Government is not having power, authority or jurisdiction to repeal the Act, 1982. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand on the sole ground that the petitioners have not questioned the provisions of Section 101 of the Act.

16. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petitions to hold that the respondent No.1-State Government is not having jurisdiction to issue the impugned G.O.Ms.No.113 dated 01.06.2016.

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17. Accordingly, all the Writ Petitions are hereby dismissed.

No costs.

Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.

__________________ ALOK ARADHE, CJ _________________________ J.SREENIVAS RAO, J 29.08.2024 PGP/PSW