Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
T.P.M. Chowdeswara Rao vs Mandal Revenue Officer, Orvakal ... on 5 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(3)ALD53, 2002 A I H C 2190, (2002) 3 ANDHLD 53
ORDER V.V.S. Rao, J.
1. The land admeasuring Ac.4-82 cents comprised in Survey No. 441/ B/1 of Kalwa village, Orwakal Mandal, Kurnool District was assigned to one Pasula Hussain Saheb by proceedings dated 14-3-1966 issued by the then Tahsildar. The petitioner herein purchased the said property under registered sale deed dated 18-4-1966. One Pasula Meeralal Saheb who is the son of late Hussain Saheb (the original assignee) filed an application before the 1st respondent under Section (1) of the A.P. Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977 requesting to restore the possession of the said land to him. The 1st respondent conducted enquiry any by an order dated 19-5-1999 declared the sale in favour of the petitioner as void and directed the Mandal Revenue Inspector to resume the land from the petitioner and to handover the same to Meeralal Saheb. Against the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer, the 2nd respondent herein who by proceedings dated 9-10-2000 confirmed the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer. The petitioner thereafter filed a revision before the Joint Collector purportedly under Section 4-B of the Act. The Joint Collector by the impugned order dated 28-12-2000 dismissed the revision affirming the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer as well as the Revenue Divisional Officer. The said order is assailed in this writ petition.
2. Sri Srinivas, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mandlappa v. Mandal Revenue Officer, , in support of his submission that when a transferee of assigned land is in possession of the land for more than 30 years, the Government is denuded of power to resume the same by reason of adverse possession of the transferee. In that view of the matter, according to the learned Counsel, the provisions of the Act have no application.
3. Sri Ratangapani Reday, the learned Counsel appearing for Meeralal Saheb who initiated the proceedings under the Act submits that the above said Division Bench judgment has no application to the facts of the case.
4. The petitioner before the Revenue authorities admitted that the purchase of land by him from the original assigneee is prohibited by the Act. He however pleaded before the authorities that under Section 3(5) of the Act, being a landless poor person, he is also entitled to retain the possession and the transfer in his favour made by Hussain Saheb in the year 1966 cannot be treated as a void transaction. A new ground is sought to be taken in this writ petition, which is noticed hereinabove. Be that as it may, the Joint Collector, the 3rd respondent herein, in the impugned order rejected the contention based on Section 3(5) of the Act holding that the petitioner was working as an Attender and therefore he cannot be treated as a landless poor person. This finding cannot be treated as a grave error requring this Court to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction.
5. In Mandlappa's case (supra) the father of the petitioner had purchased the land under Registered sale deed dated 13-9-1944 and was in possession of the land by the time the Act came into force on 21-1-1977 reason of Sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Act. However, the Joint Collector issued a show-cause notice on 6-10-1998 as to why the assignment in favour of the original assignee should not be cancelled for violating the conditions of patta namely in bringing the land under cultivation within three years from the date of assignment. The petitioner before the Court submitted an explanation that his father purchased the property in good faith for valuable consideration from the original assignee as the land was adjacent to his land. The Joint Collector passed orders of eviction on 19-5-1989. The order passed by the Joint Collector was challenged when the Mandal Revenue Officer initiated proceedings to assign the same land to third parties. The question urged before the Court was that the Joint Collector has no jurisdiction to initiate resumption proceedings under the Act. This found favour with the Division Bench, which accordingly held that the Joint Collector has no jurisdiction either under the Board Standing Orders or under the Act to initiate action for resumption of the land. It was also contended before the Court that by the date of commencement of the Act, the petitioner had perfected the title being in possession for more than 30 years and the Government has no power to take over the land. In that context, the Division Bench placing reliance on Sri Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, , observed:
The A.P. Act 9 of 1977 came into force on 2Ist January, 1977. By the date of commencement of the A.P. Act 9 of 1977, the petitioner has been in possession for over 34 years. A person to get title by adverse possession has to prove that he is in possession of the land for more than 30 years. In the present case there is no dispute that earlier to the petitioner, his father and thereafter the petitioner were in continuous possession since the date of purchase i.e., 13-9-1944. When once the petitioner is in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the commencement of the Act, he has perfected his title by adverse possession against the Government.
6. As can be seen, the case was one that arose under the Board Standing Orders where the Joint Collector passed orders cancelling the assignment (D form patta) for the reason that the original assignee did not bring the assigned land under cultivation within three years as per the conditions of patta. In that connection, it was also observed that the Act has no application. The Division Bench categorically held that when the petitioner is in possession of the land for more than 30 years, prior to the commencement of the Act, the Government cannot resume the land and therefore the transferee of the assigned land perfected the title by the date of commencement of the Act is out side the purview of the Act. In this case, admittedly, the petitioner purchased the property from the original assignee on 18-4-1966 and when the Act came into force on 27-1-1977 it cannot be said that the petitioner has perfected the title by adverse possession.
7. Sri V. Srinivas, learned Counsel for the petitioner however submits that the same principle should necessarily apply to all the purchases made subsequent to the coming into force of the Act where the possession is more than 30 years. The submission cannot be countenanced in view of the judgment of the Full Bench in Dharma Reddy v. Sub-Collector, Bodhan, 1987 (1) ALT 124, where this Court considered the question as to whether the Act is prospective or retrospective. Be it noted, the Full Bench categorically held that the Act not only seeks to protect the assignees but also prohibits transfer of the assigned land on or after commencing of the Act and is retrospective in operation which will apply to all the transfers of assigned lands prior to coming into force of the Act.
8. There is yet another reason for rejecting the writ petition. The petitioner is aware that the proceedings under the Act were initiated at the instance of Pasula Mohammed Saheb S/o Hussain Saheb. Inspite of this, the petitioner did not choose to make him a party to the writ petition. It is well settled that when the necessary parties are not impleaded, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised in favour of the petitioners (see Prabodh Verma v. State of Utter Pradesh). The fact that Pasula Meeralal Saheb filed an application for impleading and vacate stay does not make any difference insofar as applying this principle to the facts of this case.
9. In the result, the writ petition fails and the same accordingly dismissed.