Madhya Pradesh High Court
K.P. Agnihotri vs State Of M.P. on 5 January, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999CRILJ1483
Author: S.B. Sakrikar
Bench: S.B. Sakrikar
ORDER S.B. Sakrikar, J.
1. Applicant/Accused has directed this petition Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the charge-sheet filed against the applicant by the Inspector, Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Indore in the Court of Special Judge, Dhar.
2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass are, that at the time of incident, in the year 1988, -the applicant was posted as Sub-Inspector in the Office of the Regional Transport Commissioner at Dhar. It is alleged in the charge-sheet that the applicant when posted as Sub-Inspector in the Transport Department at Dhar, in the month of October, 1988, registered one vehicle Tempo Trax bearing registration No. MK-F-6930 indicating that the laden weight of the said vehicle is 1400 Kg. and sitting capacity 06 + 1 and as such recovered the tax from the owner @ Rs. 240/- per year. It is also alleged that at the time of the incident the applicant had no jurisdiction to register the vehicle in question for which he was not authorised. It is alleged that the applicant, while, registering the said vehicle, with the intention to extend monetary advantage to the owner, reduced the sitting capacity of the said vehicle from 8 + 1 to 6 + 1 passengers only and similarly reduced the weight of the vehicle from 1950 kg. to 1400 kg., when the said vehicle was temporarily registered by the Registering Authority, Indore for the sitting capacity at 8 + 1 on a temporary certificate of Registration. It is alleged that by reducing the weight of the vehicle in question and the sitting capacity, the State Government was put to loss due to recovery of the tax at the lesser rate. By reducing the sitting capacity to 6 + 1, the owner of the vehicle got the authority to ply the vehicle on the National Highways. On the aforesaid facts, an offence was registered against the applicant punishable Under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and on investigation a charge-sheet was filed.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant prayed for the quashment of the alleged charge-sheet mainly on the ground that in view of the provisions of M.P. Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1985, which was then in force, the tax recovered by the applicant was proper and prima facie no case of pecuniary advantage to the owner and the loss to the government is made out against the-applicant. He also submitted that the charge-sheet filed against the applicant also deserves to be quashed on the ground of delay. Learned counsel argued that the matter relates to December, 1988. The First Information Report was registered on 22-12-1995 and the charge-sheet against the applicant was filed on 17-9-1998. On the aforesaid facts the charge-sheet deserves to be quashed on the ground of delay. Learned counsel also submitted that in the later years the proper tax was recovered from the owner in accordance with the amended provisions of M.P. Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam as amended from time to time. Learned counsel submitted that, no prima facie evidence or material is available on the record for prosecuting the applicant for the offences Under Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. He relied on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 128 : 1998 Cri LJ 1 Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate AIR 1989 SC 2222; State of U.P. v. R.K. Shrivastava 1992 (1) SCC 225 : 1992 Cri LJ 2717; Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Naik and l998 JT(7) SC 1 : 1998 Cri LJ 4596 Rajdev Sharma v. State of Bihar.
4. In oppugnation, learned Govt. Advocate, for the respondent submitted that for quashment of the FIR or the criminal proceedings, powers Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should be exercised sparingly and cautiously. At this stage, this Court is not supposed to sift or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the applicant for framing of the charge. Learned G.A. also contended that some important facts are stated in the First Information Report and the material collected by the prosecution during the investigation, a prima facie case for proceeding against the applicant for the offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act is made out and in view of the facts and circumstances, the charge-sheet filed against the applicant cannot be quashed at this initial stage of the trial. Shri Desai also argued that the objections raised on behalf of the applicant can be raised and decided by the trial Court while considering the case on framing of the charge against the applicant. Learned G.A. relied on the decisions of the Apex Court reported in 1995 (2) SCC 449, State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal 1996 (8) SCC 164 : 1996 Cri LJ 1372, State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla and 1996 (7) SCC 440 : 1996 Cri LJ 1877, Mushtaq Ahmed v. Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi.
5. I have considered submissions of the learned counsel for parties and carefully perused the charge-sheet filed against the applicant before the Special Judge Dhar, in Special Case No. 2/98.
6. The law is well settled on the point that when the allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, no offence or a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused is made out; the criminal proceedings instituted on its basis are liable to be quashed, constituting abused of the process of the Court. But, as held by Hon'ble The Supreme Court in cases of Rajendra Agrawalla, 1996 Cri LJ 1372 (supra), Thirukkural Perumal, (1995 (2) SCC 449) (supra) and Mohd. Habibur Rehman Faizi 1996 Cri LJ 1877 (supra), such powers should be very sparingly and cautiously exercised and the Court at this stage should not sift or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the accused. At this stage, on perusal of the charge-sheet filed against the applicant, without expressing any opinion on the point that from the material available on the record what charges could be framed against the applicant and considering the case only on the point that from the facts and material available on record, a prima facie case for initiating criminal proceedings against the applicant is made out or not, in my considered opinion from the facts and the evidence collected by the prosecution, a prima facie case for instituting a criminal proceeding against the applicant is made out.
7. In a letter dated 11th September, 1995 of the Dealer through whom the said vehicle was sold to the owner, available at page 32, stated that the gross weight of the vehicle is 1950 kg. with sitting capacity 8+1 (driver). In the said specifications, a temporary registration Certificate at page 16 was issued by the Registering Authority, Indore on 20-12-1988. On perusal of the said registration, it emerged that initially the sitting capacity was mentioned as 8 + 1; but later on it was corrected to 6 + 1. In the letter dated 26-7-95 at page No. 37 of the Regional Transport Officer, Dhar, it is clearly mentioned that the said correction using green ink was done by the applicant bearing his initials. It is not in dispute that under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Motoryan Karadhan Adhiniyam as in force on the date of registration, the tax recoverable on the vehicles exceeding 1520 kg. of weight was Rs. 300/-. 'While on the said vehicle only Rs. 240/- tax was recovered indicating its weight only at 1400 kg. Similarly, under the aforesaid Act, the tax recoverable on the vehicle for the sitting capacity of 6 + 1 is less than the tax recoverable on the vehicles having sitting capacity of more than six passengers. In order dated 24th August, 1998 for sanction to prosecute the applicant issued by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs, State of M.P., it is mentioned that by reducing the weight of the vehicle in question and the sitting capacity, the Public Exchequer was put to loss by recovering less tax than the prescribed. It is also mentioned that the applicant also made some interpolations in the sitting capacity of the vehicle in question in the temporary registration certificate issued by the Registering Authority, Indore. By reducing the sitting capacity, the owner of the vehicle was given monetary advantage as well as other advantages for plying the vehicle on the Highways.
8. In view of the aforesaid facts and the evidence collected by the prosecution, a strong case for initiating criminal proceedings against the applicant is made out and on this count the proceedings at this initial stage cannot be quashed Under Section 482, Cr.P.C.
9. The other contention of the learned counsel for applicant is that the proceedings are liable to be quashed on the ground of delay. It is no doubt true that the law is well settled on the point that under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the accused has a right of speedy trial and in case of inordinate delay in conclusion of the proceedings Court has discretion Under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. In the instant case, the matter pertains to December, 1988, the F.I.R. was registered on 22-12-1995 and the charge-sheet against the applicant was filed in the Court concerned on 17-9-1998. But in the light of the aforesaid facts as also in view of the facts and the offence alleged against the applicant, it will not be proper in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings at the initial stage. Even, considering otherwise, though, it is a matter of December, 1988, the F.I.R. in 1995 was for the first time registered on the basis of a letter received on 14-6-1995 by Hon'ble The Lokayukt of the State, filed at Page No. 9 along with the charge-sheet and thereafter on investigation, the charge-sheet was filed in 1998. The proceedings in the Court are pending only from 24-9-1998 when the applicant first appeared before the Court.
10. In case of Abdul Rehman Antulay 1992 Cri LJ 2717 (supra), the Apex Court has held that each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused and the prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution, but when does the prosecution, become persecution depends upon the facts of the given case. Hon'ble The Supreme Court also held that while determining whether undue delay has occurred resulting in violation of right of speedy trial one must have regard to all attending circumstances including the nature of the offence, number of the accused and witnesses, the workload of the Court concerned, prevailing local condition and so on what is called the systemic delays. In this case the Apex Court also held that ordinarily speaking where the Court comes to the conclusion that right of speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only curse open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice and in such a case it is open to the Court to make such other appropriate order.
11. Applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case 1992 Cri LJ 2717 (supra) the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant in the case on hand cannot be quashed at this stage on the ground of delay.
12. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the law applicable, the prayer for quashment of the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant cannot be accepted and the petition filed by the applicant deserves the fate of dismissal.
13. Consequently, the petition devoids any substance and merit. I decline its admission and DISMISS the same at the motion hearing stage. However, it is made clear that the applicant shall be at liberty to raise all the objections raised in this petition before the trial Court at the stage of framing of charge and the findings if any recorded in this order shall not come in the way of the trial Court while considering the case on charge.