Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
R. Sriramulu And Ors. vs The Govt. Of A.P. Rep. By Its Secretary To ... on 11 November, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997(1)ALT178
Author: M.H.S. Ansari
Bench: M.H.S. Ansari
ORDER M.H.S. Ansari, J.
1. Heard Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Sri S. Ramachander Rao, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents 2 to 4, none having appeared for Respondent No. 1.
2. The petitioners 3 in number are practising Advocates of standing and were appointed as Standing Counsel to the Religious Charitable Institutions and Endowments by the 1st respondent herein in its Order in G.O.Rt.No. 429, dated 31-10-1994 for a period of three years. The petitioner No. 1 was appointed for the said institutions in Andhra Area, 2nd Petitioner for Telangana area and 3rd petitioner for the Rayalseema Area. The term of the petitioners would expire on 31-10-1997 on completion of three years. However, by G.O.Rt. No. 763, Law.(A) Department, dated 28-10-1996, Respondents 2 to 4 have been appointed in the place of the petitioners as Standing Counsel for the said Institutions in the respective three regional areas of the State. The petitioners by virtue of the said orders dated 28-10-1996 were requested to hand over all pending files to the newly appointed Standing Counsel. The petitioners have assailed the said order and sought a writ in the nature of Mandamus for declaring the G.O.Rt.No. 763, dated 28-10-1996 appointing respondents 2 to 4 as Standing Counsel as arbitrary, illegal, unfair and unjust.
3. Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the termination of petitioners' appointments by appointing respondents 2 to 4 in their place even before expiry of three years term without assigning any reasons is arbitrary and high handed besides being unfair and unjust. According to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the change in the ruling party of the State Government is the sole reason for this unjust action and therefore the same is arbitrary and illegal. According to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is a case of en masse termination of appointment of Government Pleaders without assigning any reasons and is therefore arbitrary and liable to be struck down.
4. Sri S. Ramachander Rao, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the respondents 2 to 4 submitted that petitioner No. 3 submitted his resignation and the same was accepted by the State Government in its G.O.Rt.No. 102, dated 10-2-1995 and the 3rd petitioner along with certain other Standing Counsel who submitted similar resignations were requested to continue in their respective posts till alternative arrangements are made. It was also brought to the notice of this Court by Sri S. Ramachander Rao. Learned Senior Counsel that the State by G.O.Rt.No. 86, dated 1-2-1995, in exercise of its powers under paragraph 5 of the Executive Instructions issued in G.O.Ms.No. 57, Law, dated 16-3-1990 terminated the services of the petitioners 1 and 2 by issuing one month's notice and directed that they be continued till new Standing Counsel are appointed.
5. Paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No. 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990 reads as under:
"5. Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. However, either party may terminate the engagements by giving one month's notice."
6. The validity of the said paragraph (5) is not questioned and was already upheld by this Court in the decision Vilas Rao v. State of A.P, 1993 ALT (Supp.) (1) 588. Power is thus vested in the Government to terminate the services of Law Officers by resorting to paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No 57, Law Department, dated 16-3-1990.
7. As noticed above, Government have resorted to the said power by issuing notice of termination by giving one month's notice in respect of petitioners 1 and 2 vide G.O.RtNo. 86, dated 1-2-1995. The third petitioner's resignation was accepted vide G.O.Rt.No. 102, dated 10-2-1995. The petitioners, however, were allowed to continue until new Standing Counsel were appointed. By impugned G.O.Rt.No. 763, dated 28-10-1996, Respondents 2 to 4 have been appointed as Standing Counsel.
8. The question for determination, however, is whether the resort to procedure specified in paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No. 57, dated 16-3-1990 can be adopted by the Government only in the event of there being any complaint or in the case of incompetence of a particular Law Officer as contended by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. According to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the order of termination en masse is arbitrary. Reliance was placed by Sri M.V. Ramana Reddy, for his aforesaid contention, upon the judgment of Supreme Court is Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., and the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Battarusetti Chenna Kesavarao and Ors. v. The Govt. of A.P. rep. by its Secretary to Law Department, Hyderabad and Anr., .
9. The aforesaid two decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, (supra 2 and 3 cited) were in relation to appointment of Government Pleaders at District level and not with respect to the appointments in the High Court. In Kesava Rao's case (supra 3 cited), a learned Judge of this Court also held that change in the Ruling party of the State Government cannot be a valid reason for terminating the services of all the Government Pleaders and the Assistant Government Pleaders in the District en masse by giving one month's notice. To my mind, however, the aforesaid decisions relate to appointments at District Level and are not therefore applicable to the instant case. The instant case is directly covered by a decision of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers' Association, AIR 1994 SC 1655 = 1994 (1) ALT 29 (D.N.). In that case, the Supreme Court held that termination of appointments of Government Pleaders without any reasons is not arbitrary. It may be relevant to extract a passage from the said judgment which reads as under:
"..........The appointments may, therefore, be made on considerations other than merit and there exists no provision to prevent such appointments. The method of appointment is indeed not calculated to ensure that the meritorious alone will always be appointed or that the appointment made will not be on considerations other than merit. In the absence of guidelines, the appointments may be made purely on personal or political considerations and be arbitrary. This being so, those who come to be appointed by such arbitrary procedure can hardly complain if the termination of their appointment is equally arbitrary. Those who come by the backdoor have to go by the same door. This is more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates that the appointment is terminable at any time without assigning any reason. Such appointments are made, accepted and understood by both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last. The fact that they are made by public bodies cannot vest them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever made, is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception, some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them".
The Supreme Court noted the difference in the mode of selection and appointment in the two sets of officers viz., the Government Counsel in the High Court and the District Government Counsel. As already noted above, the Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra 2 cited) and Chenna Kesava Rao's case (supra 3 cited) are in respect of Counsel at District level and not in the High Court. The Supreme Court in U.P.State Law Officers case, AIR 1994 SC 1655 = 1994 (1) ALT 29 (D.N.) observed that the ratio in Srilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra 2 cited) "can hardly be applied to the appointments of the law Officers in the High Court whose appointment itself was arbitrary and was made in disregard of Article 14 of the Constitution, as pointed out above. What is further, since the appointment of District Government Counsel is made strictly on the basis of comparative merit and after screening at different levels, the termination of their services is not consistent with the public interest".
10. The Supreme Court thus distinguished the decision in SriLekha Vidyarthi's case (supra 2 cited) though upheld the ratio laid down in that decision and held that the same is inapplicable to the appointments of Law Officers in the High Court.
11. In the light of the above, the judgment of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. U.P.State Law Officers Association , AIR 1994 SC 1655 = 1994 (1) ALT 29 (D.N.) would apply on all fours to the instant case which deals with appointments of law Officers in the High Court and not the decision in Sri Lekha Vidyarthi's case (supra 2 cited) and Chenna Kesavarao's case (supra 3 cited) which deal with appointment of Government Pleaders at District level.
12. It has therefore to be held that in terms of paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms. No. 57, extracted above, insofar as appointment of Law Officers in High Court is concerned, either party i.e., the Government or the Law Officer concerned can terminate the engagement by giving one month's notice. It is not postulated therein that reasons should be assigned by either party. No reasons, therefore, need to be assigned and non-furnishing of reasons would not vitiate the orders of termination.
13. Lastly, it was contended that the impugned action of terminating the appointment, without assigning any reasons amounts to humiliating the petitioners giving scope to the peers in profession to think that the appointments were terminated as the petitioners were not discharging their functions properly. The termination in the instant case is simpliciter termination giving one month's notice. No stigma, thus is discernable by the orders of termination. Moreover, the mode and manner of selection of the law officers which has been so vividly referred to by the Apex Court in the U.P. State Law Officers case (supra 4 cited) and wherein it was observed that "such appointments are made, accepted and understood by both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last"
leaves no scope for contending that any termination of the engagement by resort to the procedure in paragraph 5 of G.O.Ms.No. 57 would cast any stigma on petitioners by the said orders of termination. No stigma is intended and none can be spelt out no matter in whatever way the impugned action is looked at or any of the orders of appointment either of petitioners or Respondents 2 to 4 or the notice of termination in G.O.Rt.No. 86, dated 1-2-1995 is read.
14. In the light of the above, I see no ground to entertain the above Writ Petition and the same is accordingly dismissed at admission stage.