Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
In Re: Sri V. Satyanarayana Rao S/O. Sri ... vs Unknown on 11 October, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2007(6)ALT294
Author: Ramesh Ranganathan
Bench: Bilal Nazki, Ramesh Ranganathan
ORDER Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. This Court by order dated 20.8.2007 initiated Suo motu contempt proceedings, in C.C. No. 754 and 755 of 2007 in W.A. No. 505 and 439 of 2007 respectively. Both the writ appeals were preferred, with the leave of the Court, by persons who, though not parties, are aggrieved by the order passed in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.4.2007.
2. W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 was filed by the first respondent to declare the inaction of the respondents in not giving them necessary police protection, pursuant to his complaint dated 06.04.2007, as illegal and for a consequential direction to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad and the Station House Officer, Kukatpalli to give them police protection on the basis of their representation dated 06.04.2007. In the affidavit, filed in support of W.P. No. 8857 of 2007, the petitioner stated that Survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District admeasuring Ac. 98.10 guntas was item No. 38 of Schedule IV of C.S. No. 14 of 1958 on the file of this Court, that, in the said suit, a preliminary decree was passed on 28.06.1963, that under a deed of assignment dated 29.11.1995 Kazim Nawaz Jung and M/s. Cyrus Investments Limited had assigned their share and interest in the said survey number in favour of Mirza Nazeer Baig and others to an extent of Ac.98.10 guntas, pursuant thereto the petitioner had filed three applications which were all allowed, that they had filed E.P. No. 4 of 1996 before the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District and taken delivery of possession on 17.04.1996 from the Court bailiff, that subsequently they had filed Application No. 516 of 1998 seeking a final decree and a final decree was passed by a single Judge of this Court by order in C.S. No. 14 of 1958 dated 24.04.1998 in respect of the land admeasuring Ac. 98.10 guntas in Sy. No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Petitioner would submit that they had paid the deficit stamp duty for the final decree on 16.07.2007, that the transaction was completed and their title and possession was confirmed. According to the petitioner delivery of possession was recorded in the final decree which has attained finality as no appeal was preferred there against. The petitioner stated that some persons, claiming title from different sources, had filed time barred objections before the District Judge, that the Division Bench of this Court, in O.S. No. 58 of 2004 and batch dated 23.06.2006, had held that the persons who were claiming independent title through different sources had no right over the property in C.S. No. 14 of 1958, that ever since delivery of possession by the Court bailiff, they were in possession and enjoyment of the property and, while they were trying to fence the property to prevent illegal encroachments, some unidentified/unauthorized persons who had no right or title over the property, with the aid of anti-social elements, had tried to interfere with their possession and enjoyment on 06.04.2007 and had threatened them with dire consequences, that their names and addresses were not known to the petitioner, that except them no other person was in possession of the property, that they had made a representation on 06.04.2007 to the respondent seeking police protection, and, inspite of showing their documents of title and possession, the respondents were neither protecting their interests nor giving them police protection to avoid unauthorized interference. According to the petitioners it was very difficult for them to protect their property as some antisocial elements and land grabbers had laid their eyes on the property and that, it was the duty of the respondents, to give them necessary protection.
3. The Learned Single Judge, by order in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007, disposed of the writ petition at the stage of admission directing the respondents to give necessary police protection to the petitioner pursuant to the representation dated 06.04.2007 in respect of the land admeasuring Ac. 98.10 guntas in Sy. No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, Balanagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in respect of which a final decree was passed by this Court, in Application No. 516 of 1998 in C.S. No. 14 of 1958 dated 24.4.1998.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single judge, Writ Appeal Nos. 439 and 505 of 2007 were preferred. Since the averments in both these appeals are similar it would suffice if the contents of W.A. No. 505 of 2007 are referred to. Appellant would state that he, along with 33 others, were in actual possession of the plots in survey No. 172 of Hydernagar Village, that they had filed E.A. No. 38 of 1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996 for redelivery of their plots, that they had filed E.A. No. 36 of 1997, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, to grant interim injunction restraining the first respondent (Writ Petitioner) and others from proceeding with construction and changing the nature of the property, that the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy, after due enquiry, had allowed E.A. No. 36 of 1997 in E.A. No. 38 of 1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996 by order dated 30.04.1997 and had passed an order of interim injunction directing the respondents not to demolish the constructions existing in the suit premises, not to effect new construction and not to alienate the petition schedule properties till disposal of the main application. Appellant states that E.A. No. 38 of 1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996, filed under Section 47 and Order 21 Rules 58, 99, 100 and 101 CPC, is still pending and is posted for enquiry by the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, that the first respondent, without disclosing that E.A. No. 38 of 1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996 was pending, and that an order of interim injunction was issued against him and others by the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy on 30.04.1997, had filed W.P. No. 8857/2007, that the learned Single Judge, without giving notice to the affected parties, had disposed of the writ petition at the stage of admission on 26.04.2007, that the said order was passed believing the misrepresentation of the first respondent and, in such circumstances, grant of police protection in favour of the first respondent was contrary to law. The appellant contends that the first respondent and others, under the guise of the impugned judgment, had started constructing walls and rooms, fencing the compound etc., which was in disobedience of the order of injunction of the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy dated 30.04.1997.
5. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, in W.A. No. 439 and 505 of 2007 dated 09.07.2007, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Balanagar Division, Cyberabad filed his affidavit wherein he stated that, pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007, the first respondent (writ petitioner) had approached the Inspector of Police, Kukatpalli Police Station on the evening of 14.05.2007 seeking police protection on 15.05.2007 since they apprehended trouble on that particular day, that in due obedience of the orders of this Court the Inspector of Police had provided police protection to the first respondent by deputing a Head Constable and three constables, that the appellants had submitted a representation dated 16.05.2007 that the first respondent (writ petitioner) had encroached into their land, that the Inspector of Police, in his letter dated 16.05.2007, while informing that there was a dispute regarding the boundaries between the appellant and the first respondent, had requested the Mandal Revenue Officer to conduct a survey and demarcate the boundaries between the two parties, that the first respondent had lodged a complaint with the Station House Officer, Kukatpally, on 16.05.2007 at 23.30 hours, stating that, on the night of 16.05.2007 at 2300 hours, some anti-social elements had come to his site, had broken the fencing stones, threatened him with dire consequences and that their names were 1). K. Narasimhulu, 2) P. Venkataiah, 3) Lotti Murali and 4) Boya Ramudu, that on the basis of the complaint a case in Cr. No. 427 of 2007 was registered under Sections 427, 447 and 506 IPC, that all the accused were arrested and, on completion of investigation, a charge sheet in C.C. No. 1044 of 2007 was filed before the IX Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Kukatpally. The Assistant Commissioner further states that the first respondent had completed the broken fencing of his land and had refenced it by 17.05.2007, that police protection was given to the petitioner only on 17.05.2007 as per the orders of this Court in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007 and that, on further enquiry, it was found that the first respondent (petitioner) had engaged a private security agency, viz., Ome Siva Sakthi Securities to protect his land and thereafter did not approach the police for protection. The Assistant Commissioner would state that, except providing police protection, police officials did not interfere with the civil dispute.
6. In his affidavit, filed in the suo motu C.C. No. 755 of 2007, the first respondent, while stating that he has not committed contempt, gives a detailed factual backdrop of the case. He would deny the appellants' contention that, under the guise of the impugned judgment, he had started constructing walls and rooms, fencing etc., and submit that these allegations required further enquiry. He would refer to the contents of the affidavit of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, and the contents of his complaint dated 06.04.2007, to contend that it was only in view of the threat of dispossession in the hands of anti-social elements had he sought police protection and, as it was not granted, he had filed the writ petition. He further states that he was unaware of the names of the persons who were trying to dispossess him and it was only to avoid the imminent danger of dispossession that he was constrained to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. He would submit that, since it is the case of the appellant also that he was in possession of the land in question, there was no motive behind obtaining such an order, that it did not substantially interfere with the due course of justice, that the only technical mistake which he had committed was that he did not furnish the names of persons who had threatened dispossession and this was not done deliberately but due to lack of knowledge. Petitioner states that, since this technical defect would fall in the domain of contempt, he was tendering his unconditional apology. He denies having raised any construction after the injunction order was passed by the Principal District Judge or that he had dismantled any structure. He would state that there was no structure on the land in question, except for the room of watchman which was constructed in the year 1995 and that he had effected repairs in the said rooms from time to time. Petitioner would request this Court to dismiss the contempt and discharge him from the contempt proceedings.
7. Learned Advocate General would refer to the affidavit filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police to submit that the first respondent, under the guise of the order in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007, had refenced the land by 17.05.2006. He would place reliance on Advocate General State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries to submit that the action of the first respondent, in suppressing the order of interim injunction passed the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy, in E.A. No. 36/1997 in E.A. No. 38/1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996 dated 30.4.1997, which order is still in force, his failure to name the persons who were allegedly interfering with his possession, in not arraying the applicants in E.A. No. 36 of 1997 as party respondents in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 and thereby surreptitiously obtaining an order for police protection on 26.04.2007, without disclosing in the writ petition all relevant facts, substantially interfered with the due course of justice and was in Contempt of Court.
8. Sri Mohd. Usman Shaheed, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent, would submit that the first respondent was not guilty of contempt as he had sought police protection only to ensure that he was not dispossessed of the land by anti-social elements. Learned Counsel would submit that, since the first respondent was unaware of the identity or the names of the anti-social elements, he could not name them or array them as respondents in the writ petition. Learned Counsel would submit that the 1st respondent's failure to refer to the order of the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy was a bonafide mistake. He would contend that the first respondent was a layman and was not familiar with the intricacies of the law of pleadings which required that he disclose, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the fact that the order of interim injunction passed by the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy was still in force. Learned Counsel would submit that, even if the first respondent is held guilty of contempt, it was but a technical contempt which did not necessitate any punishment being imposed, more so in the light of the apology tendered by the first respondent. Learned Counsel would submit that, in imposing a sentence for contempt, this Court would give weight to the apology tendered by the first respondent and that, in any event, the sentence of imposition of a fine was the norm and that of imprisonment an exception. Learned Counsel would place reliance on In Re: S. Mulgaokar AIR 1978 SC 727, Rizwan-Ul-Hasan , Sapient Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Amit Govil 2006 Cr.L.J. 2073 (Delhi High Court Division Bench), District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad v. Deelip Balaram Bedekar 2001 Cr.L.J. 3927 (Bombay High Court Division Bench) and Smt. Pushpaben v. Narandas V. Badiani .
9. Before examining whether the 1st respondent herein is guilty of contempt and, if so, the sentence to be imposed, it is useful to extract the order of this Court dated 20.8.2007 whereby contempt proceedings were initiated Suo-motu:
A Writ Petition has been filed by one V. Satyanarayana Rao, being W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 against the Assistant Commissioner of Police Balanagar, alleging therein that some persons were interfering in the possession of land in his possession, which he had got as a result of a final decree in C.S. No. 14 of 1998. Curiously, the persons, who were interfering in his possession, were not even made parties to that writ petition and the police did not file any counter. The learned Single judge of this Court decided the Writ Petition on 26th of April 2007, granting protection to the petitioner pursuant to his representation, dated 06.04.2007. This order was challenged by way of these Writ appeals and when these writ appeals were considered by a Bench of this Court on 23.05.2007, the Court ordered maintenance of status quo. On 11.06.2007, we stayed the operation of the learned Single Judge's order and on 09.07.2007, we directed the 1st respondent to file a report to address the Court as to what steps were taken by the writ petitioner with respect to the property under his protection in pursuance of the order of the Court. The learned Assistant Commissioner of Police, Balanagar has filed a counter, which, prima facie, discloses that certain changes were made in the nature of the property during the operation of the order of the learned Single Judge. The Assistant Commissioner, in his report, has stated, "I further respectfully submit that the Writ petitioner (Sri V. Satyanarayana, the 1st respondent herein) has completed the broken fencing of his land and refenced it by 17.05.2007.
Now, we are told that a third party had already filed a claim petition with respect to the land in question for which, allegedly, the petitioner is in possession of a final decree. That petition is pending before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy and on 30th of April 1997, the learned Judge has passed a detailed order and finally directed.
Hence, in such circumstances, I allow the application and grant interim injunction against the respondents not to demolish the constructions existing in the suit premises or not to effect any new construction and also not to alienate the petition properties till disposal of main applications. Each party is directed to bear their own costs.
This Claim application has been filed by as many as 34 persons. Without making these persons as parties in the Writ Petition and without even making any other person a party to the Writ Petition, the petitioner, by deceiving this Court, was able to get an order, prima facie, to annual the order passed by the learned Single Judge. If there was a threat from any other party, than the claimants in the claim petition, at least those persons would have been made parties to the Writ Petition. Obviously, it appears to us that the Writ Petition was filed only to play fraud with this Court and with the Court of the learned District Judge and it was tried that orders be obtained at the back of the claim petitioners from the High Court, superceding the orders of the District Judge.
In this view of the matter, we feel prima facie that the writ petitioner Sri V. Satyanarayana Rao S/o V.C. Rao has committed contempt of this Court. A notice in the appropriate Rule shall be issued to him as to why he should not be punished for committing contempt of this Court.
10. In the affidavit, filed in support of W.P. No. 8857 of 2007, the first respondent-petitioner had suppressed the fact that the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy, by order in E.A. No. 36 of 1997 in E.A. No. 38 of 1996 in E.P. No. 4 of 1996 dated 30.04.1997, had granted interim injunction restraining them from demolishing the constructions existing in the suit premises, from effecting any new constructions and from alienating the petition schedule property till disposal of the main application. That the said order is still in force is not in dispute. The first respondent-writ petitioner did not array the applicants in E.A. No. 36 of 1997 as respondents in the writ petition. Through a process of subterfuge, and by playing fraud on the Court, he succeeded in obtaining the relief of being provided police protection. As is clear from the affidavit, filed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, the first respondent-petitioner has, consequent to the orders of this Court in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007, made changes to the nature of the property by re-fencing the broken fence which, but for the aforesaid orders of this Court, would have been in willful disobedience of the order of the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy dated 30.04.1997 and in Contempt of Court. The first respondent has not only mislead this Court but has also abused its process. Such unscrupulous and devious methods adopted to circumvent and defeat orders of courts must be curbed. (Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Hannabasappa ).
11. It is the duty of a person invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Court to make a full and true disclosure of all relevant facts. He should not suppress any fact. He must be perfectly frank and open with the Court. (Modern Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P., Education (TRG.) Department 2002(1) ALD 759 (DB)). A person, who approaches the High Court with unclean hands, and withholds vital information in order to gain advantage, would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court. (MCD v. State of Delhi )
12. The Court will neither allow itself to be used as an instrument of fraud nor would it close its eyes to the fact that it is being used as an instrument of fraud. (Guddappa Chikkappa Kurbar v. Balaji Ramji Dange AIR 1941 Bombay 274 (FB), Hamzahaji v. State of Kerala ). The general rule that suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies him from obtaining any relief has been evolved out of the need for Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The suppressed fact must be material in the sense that, had it not been suppressed, it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the Court, whatever view the court may have taken (S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar ).
13. The fact, that an order of injunction was passed by the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy on 30.04.1997 was a material fact, suppression of which has had an effect on the merits of the case. But for this suppression it is doubtful whether the petitioner could have obtained an order of police protection from this Court behind the back of the claimants in E.A. No. 36 of 1997 at whose behest the order of interim injunction was passed or whether he could have, pursuant to the order in W.P. No. 8857 of 2007 dated 26.04.2007, changed the nature of the property by re-fencing the broken fence thereby deliberately violating the order of injunction of the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy dated 30.04.1997.
14. If a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and willfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of the judicial proceeding and thus amount to contempt of court. (Naraindas v. The Government of Madhya Pradesh ; Afzal v. State of Haryana ). An attempt to deceive the court by disguising the nature of a claim is contempt. (S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay ).
15. "Suppressio veri", i.e., the suppression of relevant and material facts is as bad as Suggestio falsi i.e., a false representation deliberately made. Both are intended to dilute- one by inaction and the other by action. "Suppressio veri Suggestio falsi"-suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of what is false. (Black's Law Dictionary with pronounciations-Sixth edition). If a false statement willfully and deliberately made amounts to contempt, suppression of a relevant and material fact would equally amount to contempt as both interfere with the due course of justice and obstruct the administration of justice.
16. In Advocate General State of Bihar , the respondents obtained an interim order from a Single Judge which had the effect of circumventing and nullifying the effect of the orders of the Division Bench of that High Court. In this context the Supreme Court observed:
...While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court, abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of a Judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice we must say, is a Contempt of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression "contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with, "it is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage", per Frank Furter, J. in Offutt v. U.S. (1954) 348 US 11. "the law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope", per Judge Curtis-Raleigh quoted in Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All ER 997 at p. 1006.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn. , Vol. 9, paragraph 38), there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt. It is said:
38. Abuse of process in general. The Court has power to punish as contempt any misuse of the court's process. Thus the forging or altering of court documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the court or the court's officers by deliberately suppressing a fact, or giving false facts, may be a punishable contempt. Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting in bonafides or which are frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. In such cases the court has extensive alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process by striking out or staying proceedings or by prohibiting the taking of further proceedings without leave. Where the court, by exercising its statutory powers, its powers under rules of court, or its inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not in general punish the abuse as a contempt of court. On the other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt....
We are satisfied that the filing of the application dated 14/12/1972, was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice and was, therefore, a criminal contempt of court. The respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence.
(emphasis supplied)
17. The judgment, in Advocate General State of Bihar , was relied upon in Bank of India v. Vijay Transport wherein the Supreme Court observed that a judicial proceeding, which is otherwise permissible, may become an engine of fraud.
18. Sri Mohd. Usman Shaheed, learned Counsel for the first respondent would, however, rely on the observations of the Supreme Court in Rizwan-Ul-Hasan :
...As observed by Rankin, C. J. , in Anantalal Singh v. Alfred Henry Watson, the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the Court's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably clear on the authorities that the Court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety....
(emphasis supplied) and on Re: S. Mulgaokar AIR 1978 SC 727, wherein the Supreme Court observed:
...My opinion on matters touched by my learned brother Krishna Iyer is that, although, the question whether an attack is malicious or ill intentioned, may be often difficult to determine, yet, the language in which it is made, the fairness, the factual accuracy, the logical soundness of it, the care taken in justly and properly analysing the materials before the maker of it, are important considerations, moreover, in judging whether it constitutes a contempt of Court or not we are concerned more with the reasonable and probable effects of what is said or written than with the motives lying behind what is done. A decision on the question whether the discretion to take action for contempt of Court should be exercised in one way or the other must depend on the totality of facts and circumstances.
emphasis supplied)
19. With a cynical disregard for the administration of justice - for which purpose courts exist - the first respondent-petitioner has used the process of the law to defeat that very purpose. While the jurisdiction exercised in cases of contempt is quasi-criminal and the court must be satisfied on the material before it that contempt of court was in fact committed, such satisfaction may be derived from the circumstances of the case. (Ram Autar Shukla v. Arvind Shukla 1955 Suppl (2) SCC 130; Vijay Transport 2000(8) SCC 512). In the case on hand suppression of the fact that an order of injunction was passed by the Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy dated 30.04.1997 and failure of the first respondent-petitioner to array the applicants in E.A. No. 36 of 1997 as respondents in W.P. No. 8857/2007 and thereby obtaining an order of police protection from this Court on 26.04.2007 has prejudiced and interfered with the due course of justice. On a totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case it is evident that the action of the first respondent-writ petitioner has interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings and has obstructed administration of justice. It is established beyond reasonable doubt that he has committed contempt.
20. Sri Mohd. Usman Shaheed would contend that, since the first respondent-petitioner has tendered an unconditional apology for his failure to name persons, who interfered with his possession, in the writ petition and, as he had submitted that this mistake had occurred by oversight and was only due to his lack of knowledge of the intricacies of the law of pleadings, this Court should accept his apology and discharge him from contempt.
21. There cannot be both a justification and an apology. The two are incompatible (M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court ). An apology is not intended to operate as a universal panacea. (M.Y. Shareef , Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali ; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) through the Amicus Curiae v. Ashok Khot ). An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of the offence but is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer's power. (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction ).
22. The apology must not be tendered at a belated stage only with a view to escape punishment. The apology tendered by the contemner, to be accepted by the Court, should be a product of remorse. (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India ). An apology tendered, only after exhausing all avenues of playing mischief and fraud with the Court, cannot be accepted. (Debabrata v. State of W.B. and Mulkh Raj v. State of Punjab ; Ali Bin Abdu v. Mrs. Devasena, Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad 2001 (2) ALD (Crl.) 653 (AP)). An apology made at the fag end is not really an apology as it lacks sincerity. (Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. A. Gopal alias Gopala Menon ). Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity, and in good grace, it is shorn of penitence. Accepting an apology, offered at a time when the contemnor finds that the court intends to impose punishment, would allow the offender to walk away with impunity after committing gross contempt. (Mulk Raj AIR 1972 SC 1197).
23. Public interest demands that when a person has interfered with the judicial process, the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by mere statement of a conditional or an unconditional apology. While it is open to the Court, in an appropriate case, to accept an unconditional apology based on the factual position, dropping the proceeding of contumacious acts deliberately done without compunction, after accepting the apology offered, would be a premium for the flagrant abuse of the judicial process. (Ram Autar Shukla 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 130)
24. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. , the Supreme Court held:
...We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the "slap--say sorry--and forget" school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying "sorry" does not make the slapper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to "say" sorry--it is another to "feel" sorry....
(emphasis supplied)
25. The apology tendered by the first respondent-petitioner shows no sign of genuine remorse or real contrition. He has tendered an apology only after he has been caught in his acts of subterfuge and as his surreptitious attempts to overreach the Court has been foiled. The apology tendered by him is only to escape punishment. Such an apology does not deserve acceptance.
26. Now the question of punishment. Under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. Section 13(a) postulates no punishment for contemptuous conduct in certain cases and the language used therein is with utmost care and caution when it records that, unless the Court is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially interferes with the due course of justice, the question of imposing punishment would not arise. It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of court. It must be shown that the act of contempt would otherwise substantially interfere with the due course of justice which has been equated with "due administration of justice". Substantial interference with the course of justice is the requirement for imposition of punishment. The Contempt of Courts Act places an obligation on to the court to assess the situation itself as regards the factum of any interference with the due course of justice or of obstructing the administration of justice. (Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia (200) 2 SCC 367).
27. Now the judgments relied upon by Sri Mohd. Usman Shaheed, learned Counsel for the first respondent-petitioner.
28. In Smt. Pushpaben , the Supreme Court observed:
...A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no room for doubt that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, however, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment if it thinks that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule....
(emphasis supplied)
29. In District and Sessions Judge, Aurangabad 2001 Cr.L.J. 3927 (Bombay High Court Division Bench), the Bombay High Court held:
...The question is whether in the instant case, a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of fine or both would met the ends of justice. It is true, as we have seen earlier, that Section 12 of the said Act gives an option to the Court to choose from any of the aforesaid three sentences. But we make no bones in observing that, normally a sentence of fine should be imposed and a sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to the rarest of rare" cases, wherein the contumacious act is, per se, is so gross and reprehensible that a sentence of fine would be wholly disproportionate to its gravity. To put it differently, a sentence of fine should be a rule and imprisonment an exception....
(emphasis supplied).
30. In Sapient Corporation Pvt. Ltd. 2006 Cr.L.J. 2073 (Delhi High Court Division Bench), the Delhi High Court opined:
...Having noted the rival contentions as above and considering that the petitioner's application under Section 10 of the CPC had been dismissed and the respondent has seemingly set up an arguable plea of reliefs being different, we are of the view, in the circumstances, that a quietus should be applied to the matter in view of the regret expressed by the respondent and his seeking to be execused for the omission.
Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent as a token of his regret, would voluntarily contribute Rs. 20,000/- to the Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre and would pay another Rs. 5,000/- to the petitioner towards legal costs of these proceedings. Let this be done within 10 days from today. The contempt notice is, accordingly, discharged....
31. While awarding sentence on a contemnor, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of the people in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and their sentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in the administration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award proper punishment to uphold the rule of law, how so high the person may be. (J. Vasudevan v. T.R. Dhananjaya ). There cannot be any laxity, as otherwise law courts would render their orders to utter mockery. Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh ).
The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope.(Jennison v. Baker 1972 (1) All. E.R. 997).
32. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings. Using the process of Court with the oblique motive of gaining advantage, albeit at the cost of sullying the pure stream of the judicial process, is interference with the due course of justice and obstructs the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with not only to punish them for the wrong done but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice. (Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma ; Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana ).
While Courts are not hypersensitive and, ordinarily, impose the sentence of fine as punishment for contempt, in the present case the first respondent-petitioner has used the Court as an instrument for the fraud played by him on the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos. 439 and 505 of 2007 and has, by this process, deliberately flouted the order of injunction of the Principal District Judge, Rangareddy dated 30.04.1997. Mere sentence of fine would, therefore, not suffice.
33. Under Rule 31 of the Contempt of Courts Rules, 1980, where a person charged with contempt is adjudged guilty, and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment, a warrant of commitment and detention shall be made out in Form IV. Rule 32(1) requires the Court to fix the subsistence allowance, in accordance with the status of the contemnor, when he is committed to civil prison. Under Rule 32(2), in the case of suo-motu contempt proceedings, such subsistence allowance shall be borne by the State. Rule 34(1) enables the Court to award such costs as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case.
34. The first respondent is sentenced, under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of fifteen days and with fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In accordance with Section 12(3), read with Rule 32(1) & (2) of the Contempt of Courts Rules, 1980, the first respondent shall be detained in civil prison for a period of fifteen days. His daily subsistence allowance is fixed at Rs. 150/-. The first respondent-petitioner shall in addition, under Rule 34(1), pay costs of Rs. 5,000/-.
35. The contempt case are disposed of accordingly.