Allahabad High Court
Daya Shanker Dubey vs Subhas Kumar on 29 August, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1992CRILJ319
ORDER N.N. Mithal, J.
1. In writ petition No. 33280 of 1990 an order was passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 11-1-1991 directing as under:
Until further orders the respondents are restrained from interfering with the working of the petitioners as panel lawyers. We, however, make it clear that it will be open to the respondents to terminate the appointments of the petitioner in accordance with law.
2. The grievance which the petitioner has made in this contempt petition is that the opp. party is not complying with the aforesaid order and has thus committed contempt of court and should be punished Under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
3. In response to the notice the opp. party has appeared by filing the counter affidavit in which the allegations made by the petitioner have been denied. Opp. party asserts that he has not disobeyed the aforesaid order.
4. In order to understand the background history of the controversy it will be relevant to have some facts in brief. The petitioner was appointed as panel lawyer (Revenue) to look after the cases on behalf of the Gaon Sabhas at the Tahsil Headquarter in Tahsil Meja, district Allahabad for a period of three years w.e.f. 12-2-1990. A policy decision was taken by the State Govt. on 6-2-90 in terms of which a G.O. was issued directing that the terms of the existing Govt. Advocates will extend only up to 28-2-1990 and thereafter fresh appointments to the post will be made. It also provided that a seperate panel of lawyers to work at the Tehsil Headquarter will be prepared. On 9-3-90 the District Collector with reference to the G.O. dt. 6-2-90 invited applications for appointment of Panel lawyer (Revenue) for Gaon Sabhas in Tahsil Meja, Allahabad. In June, 1990 fresh appointments of D.G.C. & Panel Lawyers were made in the State of U.P.
5. The G.O. dt. 6-2-90 came under challenge both in the High Court as also in the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India in Sreelekha Vidyarthi's case (AIR 1991 SC 537). In the aforesaid case the G.O. dated 6-2-90 was quashed by order of the Supreme Court dated 20th Sept. 1990. The State Govt. immediately issued directions to all the District Magistrates to enforce and ensure compliance of the directions given by the Supreme Court before 4-10-90. According to the decision of the Supreme Court all those Govt. counsel who were working on 28-2-90 were to be restored to their position unless their appointment was terminated by a fresh order.
6. From the above narration of facts it will be apparent that all those District Govt. Counsel working on the civil, criminal, revenue side and also on the Urban Ceiling side besides all those appointed at Tahsil Headquarter were restored back to the same position which they were occupying on 28-2-90, the date from which the G.O. dated 6-2-90 was made effective. The admitted position is that on the aforesaid date the petitioner was working as a panel lawyer (Revenue) in Tahsil Meja district, Allahabad. Despite orders passed by the Supreme Court and in spite of the directions issued by the State Govt. on 20-9-90 the petitioner was not given charge of panel lawyer (Rev.) and this prompted him to challenge the action in Writ Petition No. 28581 of 1991 Daya Shankar Dubey v. State of U.P. The said writ petition was finally disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 22-11-90. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sreelekha Vidyarthi's case (AIR 1991 SC537) and in the light of another decision of this Court in S.P. Sharma and Ors. v. State of U.P. dated 15-10-90 the respondents i.e. State of U.P., District Magistrate Allahabad and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Tahsil Meja were directed to pass appropriate order in the case of the petitioner within three weeks from the date on which a certified copy of the order was produced before the concerned authority.
7. The case of the petitioner is that he served a certified copy of the orders passed by this Court on the opp. party but in spite of that he has passed an order on 13-12-90 which does not comply with the directions given by the Court in its order dated 22-11-1990. The petitioner along with two others, therefore, had to file another Writ Petition No. 3380 of 1990 against the State of U.P. and the District Magistrate, Allahabad in which it was prayed that the order dated 13-12-90 and the order dated 24-5-90 be quashed. It is in this writ petition that the order dated 11-1-90 was passed which is alleged to have been disobeyed by the opp. party.
8. In its order dated 13-12-90 passed by the Collector/District Magistrate, Allahabad the line of reasoning adopted is that the Supreme Court's order was not applicable to the case of the petitioner. According to him the said decision only covers the appointments which are made at the level of the State Govt. and not by the Collector. Since the panel lawyers (Rev). for Tahsil in a district are appointed by the Collector the ratio of that decision would not help the petitioner. It is further mentioned in the order that the appointment of the petitioner was terminated by the then Collector by an order dated 24-5-90 and in his place one Vijai Kant had been appointed and he is still continuing on that post. In view of the fact that Vijai Kant is already working as panel lawyer (Rev.) in Tahsil Meja no second person can be given appointment as panel lawyer (Rev.) along with him without violating Rule 114 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Rules. This reasoning is not accepted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, since this controversy has to be resolved in the writ petition it is neither proper nor relevant for this Court to adjudicate upon this controversy and it must be left to be decided at the regular hearing of the main writ petition.
9. In these proceedings the Court is only concerned with the limited question whether the opp. party has disobeyed the order dt. 11-1-91. While the argument of Sri V. C. Misra, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner was that by failing to assign work to the petitioner and in not allowing him to work as Panel Lawyer (Rev), the opposite party has clearly violated the order dated 11-1-91 both in letter and spirit. The contention of Sri A. P. Singh, on the contrary, was that there could be no violation of the order as on that date the petitioner was not even working as the panel lawyer (Revenue) and thus there could be no question of any interference with his working as panel lawyer.
10. It may be noticed that in the petition itself it had been admitted that petitioner's appointment had already been terminated by order dated 24-5-90. What was claimed in the petition was that in view of Sreelekha Vidyarthi's case (AIR 1991 SC 537) the G.O. dated 6-2-1990 had already been quashed and thereafter the position as on 28-2-90 stood restored. In view of this the submission of the petitioner was that even though the petitioner may not have been actually functioning as panel lawyer on 11-1-91 in law he became entitled to act as such and, therefore, failure to assign the work to him by the opp. party amounted to interference with his working. The basis on which the argument of Sri Misra stands, however, pre-supposes that on account of quashing of the G.O. dated 6-2-90 in Sreelekha Vidyarthi's case the panel lawyers (Revenue) also were benefited. This, however, is the main bone of contention between the parties and is yet to be determined after regular hearing in the writ petition. If the Court ultimately holds that due to the quashing of the G.O. dated 6-2-90 panel lawyers (Rev.) in Tahsil will also be benefited then the position may be different. However, at present I am not inclined to express any opinion either way.
11. Sri Misra then drew my attention to Annexure '3' to the petition in which the Chief Standing Counsel Sri A. P. Singh, had given his opinion to the District Magistrate, Allahabad in this matter. According to his advise the order dated 11.-1-91 passed by this Court was interpreted to mean that the panel lawyers (Rev) should be allowed to work as soon as the stay order was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate. He also mentioned about the doubt entertained by the District Magistrate in taking this view because of the fact that the petitioner had already been stopped from working soon after the Govt. had passed the order terminating their engagement. To this, the learned Chief Standing Counsel gave his opinion that the stay order passed by the High Court has reinstated the petitioner for the time being. In the end the District Magistrate was advised to allow the panel lawyer to work forthwith in order to avoid disobedience of the order dated 11-1-1991 and have been warned about likely contempt proceedings. The only advantage which the learned counsel for the petitioner wants to take from this opinion is that despite a clear advise solicited from the Chief Standing Counsel the District Magistrate still acted on his own and failed to give work to the petitioner and thus his act in doing so was deliberate. This aggravates the disobedience of the order.
12. Sri A. P. Singh, learned Chief Standing Counsel who appeared in defence of the opp. party submitted that firstly the opinion given by him to the District Magistrate was privileged communication between the Advocate and his client and, therefore, no use of it could be made by the petitioner. Secondly, his submission was, that he had only given an opinion but the same was in no way binding on the District. Magistrate who was free to take any decision that he thought fit in the matter. The first point can be rejected straight-way as the privilege can be claimed only when the Advocate or the clients are asked to disclose any professional communication between them. Such a privilege, however, cannot be claimed in respect of a document which has already come in possession of the opposite party and has been filed on record. Learned counsel for the opposite party was not in a position to point out any provision of law under which the document, Annexure '3' could not be considered as piece of evidence. The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act are Sections 126 to 129 and none of the section in terms would apply to a situation like this. Sri Singh had sought time after the arguments to show case law on the point but he has failed to do so. In these circumstances the document-Annexure '3' cannot be excluded from consideration. Sri Singh is, however, right in his submission that Annexure '3' is merely an opinion in the matter and the District Magistrate was well within his right to accept it or to take any view which he considers proper.
13. From what has been said above, at least this much is clear that attention of the District Magistrate had been drawn to a plausible interpretation of the order but he, of his volition, came to the conclusion that the order dated 11-1-1991 will not be infringed if he did not assign work to the petitioner. In my opinion, it was certainly a mistake on his part, if he thought so. Once the order had been passed by the Court not only the plain meaning of the language used is to be considered but also the spirit and the sense in which the order had been passed has also to be kept in mind.
14. An unhappy trend is developing these days and we find that the executive tries to find fault with the judicial orders and then busies itself in devicing ways and means of skirting the orders somehow. This is not a 'healthy sign for a young democracy. The judiciary and the executive are but two limbs of the State, the third being the legislature. Each of the three wings has to function and acts in unision and within its own bounds. While doing so each of them must respect the other as much as it expects its action to be respected by others. May be that in some cases the order may be couched in such a laungage that it may create some kind of doubt and confusion in the mind of those who have to comply with it but the best way, in such cases, is not to circumvent the order but to try as much as possible to comply with it first. If that may not be found feasible then to make an effort to approach the Court and seek clarification or modification of the order. Only this will enable the different wings of the State in maintaining a proper balance and harmony. The courts have and should always act with sobriety and utmost restraint and it would also expect similar behaviour from the others. It is painful for any Court to take punitive action against an Officer of the Government and, therefore, it puts a heavier burden and responsibility on the executive also to act in a manner where judiciary will have no occasion to take unsavoury action.
15. Learned Chief Standing Counsel then urged that the opposite party has offered sincere apology if he found to have disobeyed the orders. It may be pointed out that any apology to be acceptable must be sincere and genuine and must be offered at the earliest, when the alleged contemner goes full length in trying to justify his action and then as a kind of alternative offers the apology also, there would be good reason not to accept it. In the present case also there is greater effort in justifying the action then to express genuine regret for causing disobedience of the Court's order, howsoever unwittingly it might be.
16. On a consideration of totality of circumstances in this case I hold that the opposite party did try to circumvent the orders passed by this Court. However, in my opinion it is not a proper case where any punitive action should be taken against the opposite party except to caution him for the future. The Court would expect from him greater care and mature sense of responsibility in the future and hope he will live up to expectation.
17. With the above observations the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.