Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

Delhi District Court

Uma Gupta vs Ghanshyam Dass Saini on 18 September, 2023

           IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG,
     ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (SC-POCSO)-02, SHAHDARA
                KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI

Ex. No. 610/2017
CNR no. DLCT01-006989-2017

Smt. Uma Gupta
W/o Rajesh Kumar Gupta,
R/o B-43, East Jyoti Nagar,
Shahdara, Delhi - 110 092.                                            .......Decree Holder

                                                       Versus

1. Sh. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased)
   represented Through his legal heirs.

2. Smt. Kamlesh Saini
   W/o Ghanshyam Dass Saini,
   595, Kesri Mohalla,
   Gali Jain Mandir, Shahdara,
   Delhi - 110 032.                                             ........Judgment Debtors

                       Date of Institution                      :     02.06.2017
                       Date of Judgment                         :     18.09.2023

Objections on behalf of Ravinder Kumar against the taking over the
physical possession of the asuit property in the above Execution
Proceedings on 06.04.2018.

JUDGMENT

1. By this Judgment, I will dispose of the Objections of Sh. Ravinder Kumar against taking over of physical possession of property no. D-1/894, Mansarovar Park, Shahdara, Delhi - 110 032 (hereinafter referred to as the Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

subject property), by the Decree Holder (hereinafter referred to as DH) on 06.04.2018, through Bailiff appointed by this Court in terms of order dated 09.02.2018. It has been alleged by the Objector that on 06.04.2018, the Bailiff appointed by this Court, along with a police person and SPA of the DH had visited the subject property and had taken possession thereof from the Objector, who was in possession thereof since the date of purchase of the same from Judgment Debtor No. 2 (hereinafter referred to as JD No. 2) vide registered Sale Deed dated 24.08.2005. It has further been alleged that at the time of taking over the possession of the subject property, the Bailiff had not shown any documents of the Court and had got the subject property vacated hurriedly.

2. It was only on 07.04.2018, when the Objector engaged a Counsel and got the Court file inspected, that he had come to know that the DH had obtained a Decree for recovery of possession of the subject property in a Counter-claim filed by him against the Judgment Debtors (hereinafter referred to as JDs) claiming herself to be the absolute owner of the subject property on the basis of one registered Sale Deed dated 09.03.2005 purportedly executed by one Sh. Krishan Kumar despite the fact that JDs in their written statement have claimed having sold the subject property to the Objector way back in August 2005.

3. It is further the case of Objector that the DH has filed the aforesaid Counter-claim by concealment of material facts, in the Suit originally filed by Judgment Debtor No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as JD No. 1) against Sh. Krishan Kumar and DH for declaration and cancellation of GPA dated 22.10.2003, purportedly executed by JD No. 1 in favour of Sh. Krishan Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

Kumar and subsequent Sale Deed dated 09.03.2005 executed by Sh. Krishan Kumar in favour of DH as null and void and for permanent injunction. He submits that aforesaid Suit was a collusive Suit and the Counter-claim filed by the DH against the JDs was also collusive.

4. Although, according to him, the proceedings in the Suit stood abated consequent upon death of JD No. 1, however, proceedings in the Counter- claim continued and the DH had obtained a Decree therein without impleadment of the present Objector as a party, despite fully knowing that it was the Objector who was the absolute owner in possession of the subject property, having purchased the same from JD No. 1 vide registered Sale Deed dated 24.08.2005. In fact, according to him, in a Civil Suit No. 133/05 filed by Objector against one Madan Bhai for a Decree of permanent injunction restraining him from interfering with possession of the subject property, a Decree dated 06.10.2005 was passed by Ld. Civil Judge in favour of the Objector. It is further the case of Objector that the collusion between the DH and JDs is apparent from the fact that the JDs had not disclosed about the pendency of the aforesaid Suit/Counter-claim to the Objector at the time of execution of Sale Deed dated 24.08.2005 by JD No. 2 in favour of Objector.

5. Even otherwise, according to him, the DH had taken possession of the subject property on the basis of a wrong site plan and the Objector, being bonafide purchaser of the subject property for valuable consideration, could not have been dispossessed from the Suit property since he had no notice of pendency of the Suit/Counter-claim between the DH and the JDs at the time of purchase thereof. The Objector has thus prayed for Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

restoration of possession of the subject property to him while restraining the DH not to part with possession of the subject property to any third party.

6. Reply to the aforesaid Objections was filed by the DH on 20.07.2018, wherein, it has been alleged that the Objections of Sh. Ravinder Kumar are not maintainable since he was bound by the Judgment and Decree dated 26.12.2016 passed in favour of DH, having purchased the subject property during pendency of the Counter-claim of the DH against his predecessor in interest i.e. JD No. 2. The present Objections, thus, according to DH, are barred by the doctrine of lis-pendens. It has further been alleged in the aforesaid reply that the Bailiff had taken over the possession of the subject property from the Objector in strict compliance of directions of the Court and the Objector cannot claim any equity on account of raising construction in the subject property, after alleged purchase of the same by him, during pendency of the Counter-claim despite being aware of the pendency of the Counter-claim, the DH having filed contempt proceedings in the Court and a police complaint against unauthorized construction in the subject property.

7. DH has denied that the Decree dated 26.12.2016, passed by this Court, was a collusive Decree, in as much as, according to her, the Decree was passed by this Court after the Counter-claim of the DH was contested by the JDs for over a period of almost 12 years. On the other hand, according to DH, the alleged Decree dated 06.10.2005, allegedly passed by Ld. Civil Judge in favour of Objector, was a collusive Decree and the Objector cannot be permitted to take any advantage of the same so as to Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

non-Suit the DH. DH has thus prayed for dismissal of the aforesaid Objections.

8. Final arguments in the aforesaid Objections were, thereafter, heard on behalf of the parties.

9. Ld. Counsel for Objector has emphasized that the Objector, being a bonafide purchaser of the subject property for valuable consideration, without notice of the proceedings pending in the Counter-claim filed by the DH against the JDs, was not bound by the collusive Decree dated 26.12.2016. Thus, it was submitted by him that the Objector was entitled to restoration of possession of the subject property.

10. On the other hand, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for DH that the present Objections are hit by the Doctrine of lis-pendens since the subject property was allegedly purchased by the Objector on 24.08.2005 when, not only, the Counter-claim of the DH against the JDs was pending adjudication, but, even a stay order was also operating against the JDs against creation of any third party interest. He has thus prayed for dismissal of the aforesaid Objections.

11. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the present execution petition was filed by the DH against the JDs seeking execution of Decree dated 26.12.2016 passed by Ld. Additional District Judge-14, (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in a Counter-claim bearing no. CS DJ 13260/16. The Counter-claim was filed by the DH against JDs for recovery of possession of the subject property and for mesne profits in a Civil Suit filed by JD No. 1 against the DH and Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

one Sh. Krishan Kumar seeking declaration in respect of GPA dated 22.10.2003, purportedly executed by JD No. 1 in favour of Sh. Krishan Kumar, and registered Sale Deed dated 09.03.2005, purportedly executed by Sh. Krishan Kumar in favour of DH, as null and void.

12. In their written statement to the Counter-claim, JDs have claimed that the subject property had already been disposed of by JD No. 2 in favour of the present Objector vide registered Sale Deed dated 24.08.2005, on the basis of certain documents executed by JD No. 1 in favour of JD No. 2 in the year 1999. A bare perusal of the record further reveals that the Suit was filed by the JD No. 1 against the DH on 16.04.2005, wherein, the DH has filed the aforesaid Counter-claim against both the JDs on 04.06.2005. Thus, it is apparent from the record that the subject property had allegedly been purchased by the Objector from JD No. 2 on 24.08.2005 i.e. during pendency of the aforesaid Suit.

13. The transfer of subject property by JD No. 2 to the present Objector on 24.08.2005 is thus squarely hit by Provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1882, which incorporates the doctrine of lis pendens. The aforesaid provision, though, does not render the said transfer void, however, it renders the said transfer subject to the Judgment and Decree of the Court in the aforesaid Counter-claim. Further, the provisions of Order 21 Rule 102 of CPC renders Rule 98 and 100 of Order 21 not applicable to the resistance or obstruction in execution of a Decree for possession of immovable property by a transferee pendente-lite.

14. Present objections are thus clearly hit by the Provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequentially by the Provisions of Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

Order 21 Rule 102 CPC and hence, the plea of bonafide purchase of the subject property by the Objector for valuable consideration without notice of pending litigation or of any claim or right of DH qua the subject property is not available to the Objector. The aforesaid plea of the Objector is thus liable to be rejected.

15. Thus, as per the doctrine of lis pendens, as found in Provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882 read with Order 21 Rule 102 CPC, the Objector was bound by the Judgment and Decree dated 22.12.2016 passed in CS DJ 13260/16 irrespective of the fact whether or not he had any notice of pendency of the aforesaid Counter-claim at the time of purchase of subject property from JD No. 2, who was a party in the Counter-claim.

16. While taking the aforesaid view, I derive support from the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in G.T. Girish Vs. Y. Subba Raju (D) by Lrs and Another 2022 SCC OnLine SC 60:

"93. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens is based on the maxim "pendente lite nihil innovetur". This means that pending litigation, nothing new should be introduced. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, 'the TP Act'), which incorporates the Doctrine of Lis Pendens, is based on equity and public policy. It pours complete efficacy to the adjudicatory mechanism. This is done by finding that any disposition of property, as described in the Section by a party to the litigation will, in not any way, detract from the finality of the decision rendered by the Court. It is clear that it is not based on the ground of Notice as laid down by Lord Craanworth in Bennamy v. Sabine, which has been followed by the Privy Council in the decision in 34 Indian Appeals 102. We may notice the following discussion in this regard in "The Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

Transfer of Property, by Mulla, 12th Edition:

"The rule is, therefore, based not on the doctrine of notice, but on expediency, ie, the necessity for fine adjudication. It is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had, or had not, notice of the pending proceeding. This is, of course, no longer the case in England, or in Gujarat and Maharashtra, where the doctrine only affects transactions pendente lite if the lis has been duly registered."

94. It is further important to notice that when a transaction is done, lis pendens or pending a case, the transaction is, as such, not annulled. The transaction is, in other words, not invalidated. In fact, as between the transferor and the transferee, it does not lie in the mouth of the transferor to set up the plea of lis pendens to defeat the disposition of property. Equally, the Principle of Lis Pendens is, not to be confounded with the aspect of good faith or bonafides. In other words, the transferee or the beneficiary of the property, which is disposed of by a party, cannot set up the case that he acted bonafide or in good faith. This enables the Court and the parties in a Suit or a proceeding, which otherwise is in conformity with requirements of Section 52, to proceed in the matter on the basis that the adjudication by the Court, will not, in any way, be subverted or delayed, when the day of final reckoning arrives.

95. The cardinal and indispensable requirement, which flows both from Section 52 and the principle, it purports to uphold, is that the transfer or dealing of the property, which is the subject matter of the proceeding, is carried out by a party to the proceeding. Section 52 uses the word 'party' twice. It refers to the disability of a party to transfer or otherwise deal with the property, pending adjudication. This embargo is intertwined with the beneficiary of the veto against such transfer, being any other party thereto. In fact, the Special Bench of the Madras High Court in Manjeshwara Krishnaya v.

Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

Vasudeva Mallya24, puts the Doctrine of Lis Pendens as an extension of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. Thus, the sine qua non for the Doctrine of Lis Pendens to apply is that the transfer is made or the property is otherwise disposed of by a person, who is a party to the litigation. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens, only subject, however, the transfer or other disposition of property to the final decision that is rendered. The person/party, who finally succeeds in the litigation, can ask the Court to ignore any transfer or other disposition of property by any party to the proceeding. This is subject to the condition that transfer or other disposition is made during the pendency of the lis." (Emphasis mine)

17. I also derive support from the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram (2008) 7SCC 144:

"13. Before we consider the legality or otherwise of the decision impugned in the present appeal, it may be appropriate if we note the relevant provisions of law. Rules 97 to 106 of Order 21 of the Code deal with "resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession to Decree-holder or purchaser". Rule 97 enables the Decree-holder or auction-purchaser to complain to executing Court if he/she is resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of such property by "any person". The Court on receipt of such application will proceed to adjudicate it.

14. Rule 101 requires the Court to make full-fledged inquiry and determine all questions relating to right, title and interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceeding or their representatives. The Court will then pass an order upon such adjudication (Rule 98).

15. Rule 99 permits any person other than the Judgment-debtor who is dispossessed by the Decree-holder or auction-purchaser to make an application to executing Court complaining such dispossession. The Court, on receipt of such application, will Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

proceed to adjudicate it (Rule 100).

16. Rule 103 declares that an order made under Rule 98 or Rule 100 shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a Decree.

17. Rule 102 clarifies that Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21 of the Code do not apply to transferee pendente lite. That Rule is relevant and material and may be quoted in extenso:

"102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite.-- Nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a Decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the Judgment- debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the Suit in which the Decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person."

Bare reading of the Rule makes it clear that it is based on justice, equity and good conscience. A transferee from a Judgment-debtor is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before a Court of law. He should be careful before he purchases the property which is the subject-matter of litigation. It recognises the doctrine of lis pendens recognised by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [ "52. Transfer of property pending Suit relating thereto.--During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any Suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the Suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any Decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a Suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the Suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final Decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such Decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force."] . Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code thus takes into account the ground reality and refuses to extend helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation is pending. If unfair, inequitable or undeserved protection is afforded to a transferee pendente lite, a Decree-holder will never be able to realise the fruits of his Decree. Every time the Decree-holder seeks a direction from a Court to execute the Decree, the Judgment-debtor or his transferee will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer resistance or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation, the Rule has been enacted.

18. Before one-and-half century, in Bellamy v. Sabine [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER 842] , Lord Cranworth, L.C. proclaimed that where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind require that the decision of the Court in the Suit shall be binding not only on the litigating parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the Suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this were not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end.

19. Keeping in view the avowed object, the expression "transferee from the Judgment-debtor" has been interpreted to mean the "transferee from a transferee from the Judgment- debtor" (vide Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries (P) Ltd. v. K. Narayanan [AIR 2003 Mad 203] ).

20. In Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries [AIR 2003 Mad 203] Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

it was urged that the provisions of Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21 of the Code had limited application to the transferee of the Judgment-debtor and could not extend to "a chain of transactions" where the transferee of the Judgment-debtor had transferred his interest.

21. Referring to statutory provisions and case-law, the Court negatived the contention, stating : (Vijayalakshmi case [AIR 2003 Mad 203] , AIR p. 206, para 13) "13. If such contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is to be accepted, then we are closing our eyes regarding the intention of the statute. It is obvious while interpreting the provisions of the statute, the Court must give due weight to the intention of the statute in order to give effect to the provisions. If any narrow interpretation is given and thereby the purpose of the statute is being defeated, the courts must be careful to avoid such interpretations. If we look at Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC, it is very clear that the intention of Parliament with which the statute had been enacted is that the rights of one of the parties to the proceeding pending before the Court cannot be prejudiced or taken away or adversely affected by the action of the other party to the same proceeding. In the absence of such restriction one party to the proceeding, just to prejudice the other party, may dispose of the properties which is the subject-matter of the litigation or put any third party in possession and keep away from the Court. By such actions of the party to the litigation the other party will be put to more hardship and only to avoid such prejudicial acts by a party to the litigation these provisions are in existence. When in spite of such statutory restrictions, for the transfer of the properties, which are the subject-matter of litigation by a party to the proceeding, the courts are duty-bound to give effect to the provisions of the statute."

Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

22. The above observations, in our opinion, lay down correct proposition of law.

23. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of Suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of Decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of "lis pendens" prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject-matter of Suit. "Lis pendens" itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a Decree to be entered in the pending Suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the Judgment-debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rules 98 or 100 of Order 21.

24. In Silverline Forum (P) Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust [(1998) 3 SCC 723] this Court held that where the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication is confined to a question whether he was a transferee during the pendency of a Suit in which the Decree was passed. Once the finding is in the affirmative, the executing Court must hold that he had no right to resist or obstruct and such person cannot seek protection from the executing Court. The Court stated : (SCC pp. 727-28, para 10) "10. It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the Decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions 'arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99' shall be determined by the executing Court, if such questions are 'relevant to the adjudication of the application'. A third party to the Decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the Decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

pendente lite of the Judgment-debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such a transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution Court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act."

(emphasis supplied) (See also Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh [(1996) 5 SCC 539] .)

25. We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline Forum [(1998) 3 SCC 723] . In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the principle that the person purchasing property from the Judgment-debtor during the pendency of the Suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of a Decree. Resistance at the instance of transferee of a Judgment-debtor during the pendency of the proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction by a person in his own right and, therefore, is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated.

26. For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the Decree-holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the Suit in which Decree was passed and sought to be executed against the Judgment-debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order 21.

27. So far as the present case is concerned, the facts are no more in dispute. As already noted earlier, Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 was instituted by the respondent-plaintiff on 10-4-1999. Thus, the litigation was pending in respect of the property and Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

the matter was sub judice. The appellant thereafter purchased the property from Original Defendants 4 and 5 by a registered sale deed on 15-2-2000 i.e. during the pendency of the Suit. It is also not in dispute that ex parte Decree came to be passed against the defendants on 24-5-2001. In the situation, in our considered opinion, the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the transaction in question, and the High Court was wholly right in holding that the case was covered by Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code. The appellant could not seek protection of pendency of Suit instituted by her. The executing Court was not justified in granting stay of execution proceedings. The High Court was, hence, right in setting aside the order of the executing Court.

28. Rule 29 of Order 21 of the Code deals with cases wherein a Suit has been instituted by the Judgment-debtor against the Decree-holder and has no relevance to cases of lis pendens wherein transfer of property has been effected by the Judgment-debtor to a third party during the pendency of proceedings.

29. The High Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the appellant could not be said to be a "stranger" to the Suit inasmuch as she was claiming right, title and interest through Defendants 4 and 5 against whom the Suit was pending. She must, therefore, be presumed to be aware of the litigation which was before a competent Court in the form of Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 instituted by the present respondent against the predecessor of the appellant.

30. As held in Bellamy [(1857) 1 De G & J 566 : 44 ER 842] , the fact that the purchaser of the property during the pendency of the proceedings had no knowledge about the Suit, appeal or other proceeding is wholly immaterial and he/she cannot resist execution of Decree on that ground.

31. As observed in Silverline Forum [(1998) 3 SCC 723] a limited inquiry in such cases is whether the transferee is Ex. No. 610/2017 Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.

claiming his right through the Judgment-debtor.

32. In our Judgment, the High Court was also right in observing that if the appellant succeeds in the Suit and Decree is passed in her favour, she can take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law and apply for restitution. That, however, does not preclude the Decree-holder from executing the Decree obtained by him. Since the appellant is a purchaser pendente lite and as she has no right to offer resistance or cause obstruction and as her rights have not been crystallised in a Decree, Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code comes into operation. Hence, she cannot resist execution during the pendency of the Suit instituted by her. The order passed by the High Court, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal, unlawful or otherwise contrary to law."(Emphasis mine)

18. Further, merely because, the Objector has carried out some construc- tion after purchase of the same, during pendency of the aforesaid Counter- claim, shall not render the decree dated 22.12.2016 non-executable.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the present Objections are de- void of any merit. The same are accordingly dismissed.

20. Ordered accordingly.

Announced in the open Court on this 18th day of September, 2023.

This Judgment consists of 16 number of signed pages.                         Digitally signed by
                                                                 ARUN        ARUN KUMAR
                                                                 KUMAR       GARG
                                                                             Date: 2023.09.18
                                                                 GARG        14:48:58 +0530


                                                          (ARUN KUMAR GARG)

Additional Sessions Judge (SC-POCSO)-02 (Shahdara) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

(formerly ADJ-05 (Central), THC, Delhi) The Judgment has been pronounced in terms of Order no. 35/G-I/Gaz.IA/DHC/2023 dated 29.08.2023 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

Uma Gupta vs. Ghanshyam Dass Saini (deceased) & Anr.