National Green Tribunal
M/S Tirupati Minerals Through Its ... vs Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board ... on 22 July, 2025
Item No.02
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
CENTRAL ZONE BENCH, BHOPAL
(Through Video Conferencing)
Appeal No. 37/2024(CZ)
IN THE MATTER OF:
M/s Tirupati Minerals,
Through its proprietor Subham Dinesh Agrawal,
S/o Shri Dinesh Agrwal, Age- Adult,
R/o Vill: C/o Atul Pathak, Ward No. 15,
Baihar Road, District Balaghat (MP)
Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Madhya Pradesh Pollution
Control Board,
Through its Member Secretary,
Paryavaran Parisar,
E-5, Arera Colony, Bhopal Respondent No.1
2. The Appellate Authority,
Through its Chairperson,
The Executive Director
Environment and Planning
Co-ordination Organization,
Paryavaran Parisar E-5, Arera
Colony, Bhopal Respondent No.2
COUNSELS FOR APPLICANT(S):
Mr. Yadvendra Yadav, Adv.,
COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT(S):
Mr. Mehul Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Prashant M. Harne, Adv.
Ms. Parul Bhadoria, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEO KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. A. SENTHIL VEL, EXPERT MEMBER
Date of completion of hearing and reserving of order : 09.07.2025
Date of uploading of order on website : 22.07.2025
1
Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
JUDGMENT
1. The Appellant has preferred the instant appeal against the impugned order dated 13.09.2024 passed by the Appellate Authority, Environment Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh, and the order dated 06.02.2023 issued by the office of Respondent No.1, MPPCB, imposing/ recovery sum of Rs 60,80,000/- (Rs. Sixty Lacs Eighty Thousand Only) on account of Environment Compensation from the period January 2021 to August 2022.
2. The main contention of the Appellant is that the opportunity of hearing was not provided to the Appellant and further that the calculation which was done by the Respondent is not in accordance with the procedure. Notices were issued to the Respondent and reply has been filed.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
4. The brief facts are that Appellant M/s Tirupati Minerals (Bolder Mine) and the crusher associated with it, M/s Tirupati Minerals (Stone Crusher) are situated at Khasra no 466 (area 0.809 hectares) & part of Khasra no. 467 (area 2.428 hectares) in an area totalling 3.327 hectares. The unit has valid Environmental Clearance for this mine for mining of 28500 M3 of stone/ year which was issued by SEIAA on dated 15.7.2015, which is subsequently transferred in favour of Atul Pathak on dated 28.12.2020. It is stated that a case was registered against appellant as O.A. No 58/2022 titled as "Milind Thakre V/s State of MP & Others" after deliberating the issue in question this Hon'ble Tribunal has passed an order on dated 19.12.2022 with direction to the respondent MPPCB to proceed in accordance with law for calculation of proposed environmental compensation and for its realisation in accordance with law after giving the opportunity of the hearing to the appellant. It is further stated that in compliance of the above order the MPPCB had conducted meeting for finalisation of the EC by a five-member 2 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors. committee consisting of five officers of the Board on 09.01.2023. It is stated that the Appellant preferred and appeal before Appellate authority on where, the Board had never filed any reply to the appeal filed by the appellant before the Appellate Authority. However, the Appellate Authority in para 5 (अ) of the impugned order dated has relied upon the minutes of the meeting by the internal committee of the Board on assessment of EC dated 09.01.2023.
5. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the MPPCB Ms. Parul Bhadoria are that the facts of the present case originate from the orders passed in O.A. No.58/2022(CZ) (order dated 19.12.2022) where the allegations and violations as alleged in the application are as follows:-
"1) One Shri Dinesh Agrawal, resident of Vijaynagar, Balaghat Road, Gondiya (Maharashtra) - 441601, was granted Prior EC vide letter no.
3577/SEIAA/2020 dated 15.07.2015, who transferred the EC to the present Respondent No. 6, M/s Tirupati Minerals for Stone Quarry (Opencast Manual/Semi Mechanized Method) in area of 3.237 Hectares for production capacity of 28,500 CuM/year at Khasra No. 466/467 at village Dahedi, Teh.- Kirnapur, Distt. Balaghat, on the same terms and conditions and validity period under which the Prior EC was initially granted. The EC of the stone quarry was transferred on dated 28.12.2020.
2) That, the respondent no. 6, M/s Shri Tirupati Minerals is also having a silent partner/ undeclared partner Sanjay Kushwaha, having political links, has encroached upon the forest land (बड़े झाड़ का जंगल ) in Khasra No. 465, admeasuring about 13.2940 Hectares as per revenue records, and the respondent no. 6 is operating crusher plant in the said forest land. This is completely in connivance with respondents, having political influence. Thus the residents of the concerned place are even afraid of making complaints against the respondent no. 6, knowing well that Khasra No. 465 is forest land as per revenue record, where it has been entered as forest land (बड़े झाड़ का जंगल). Apart from the Crusher unit, there is storage of excavated earth, as well as transformer and weighing-bridge (धरम कां टा) installed illegally in the land Khasra No. 465 admeasuring 13.294 Hectares. No action is being taken for such illegal installations of heavy machineries and illegal Crusher.
3Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
3) That, the stone crusher is operating illegally, flouting the set norms of MPPCB and rules and guidelines issued by the Board. The respondent unit is operating in Dahedi village Tehsil Kirnapur district Balaghat. The uncontrolled emission of polluted air can clearly be visible at any instant, thereby, the operator are in clear violation without fear of environmental regulations and norms."
6. In the discussion it was found that stone crusher was operating without obtaining Consent to Operate from the board and there was encroachment on the forest lands. The recommendation of the Committee in that application was to the effect that encroachment must be removed and there must be plantation and water sprinkling and that environmental compensation for want of Consent to Operate must be paid by the Project Proponent. For calculation of environmental compensation, the matter was discussed in the said O.A. and the report submitted by the expert body. The method adopted are enumerated as below:-
"III. Environmental Compensation:
1. Shri Tiruapti Minerals (Bolder Mines) holds a valid consent from MPPCB which is valid till 12-10-2022. So far as mining of minerals is concerned, the mine holds a valid CTO. On the other hand the crusher installed did not have a valid CTE for its installation nor any CTO for stone gitti production. Still the crusher was, installed by the proprietor and operations were permitted by the Mining department. This fact is undisputed, because the department has been collecting the royalty for the same. A discussion with the mining officer revealed that stone mining as per their departmental norms, is generally associated with the installation of stone crusher. Hence their mining permission include the operation of a crusher. He elaborated that [kfut] iRFkj dk mÙ[kuh iV~ Vk 'kj vk/kkfjr½is written in their office orders. ¼Øs
2. On the other hand, mining of minerals require EC, but operation of a crusher does not require any EC. After EC, mine is required to obtain CTE as well as CTO from the MPPCB and if crusher is installed it is also required to obtain CTE & CTO from MPPCB. If the proponent so desires, he may obtain a combined CTE / CTO for both mining and stone crushing. In the present case no CTE /CTO was obtained prior to 4 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
installing / running the crusher and mining department has not asked the proprietor to submit the copies.
3. After the filing of this petition, the response from the mining department seems to be piece-meal; information as required, were not supplied completely in one go. The first such reply can be traced back to their letter dated 18-8-2022 which is enclosed in the previous committee report. Other response was given on 31-08-2022, which has been given place in Enclosure. Now a fresh response has been sent on 09-09-2022, which is attached. A bare perusal of these three letters reveal that the detailing of the information has increased sequentially from 18-8-2022 to 31-08-2022 and 09-09-2022.
4. Now in this new letter of 09-09-2022, it has been clearly mentioned that Dinesh Agrawal neither mined the minerals nor installed a stone crusher during his tenancy from 2015 to 2019. After taking over by the new owner in 2019, new owner also did not do anything in year 2020, and has started stone crushing since January 2021. The crusher operated in the month of January 2021 till December 2021, it remained inoperative in the months Jan 2022 to June 2022 and again operated in July & August 2022.
5. From the production data month-wise, it cannot be said that it had operated at its full 48 capacity of 75 T/hr for 10 hours a day for all the days of a month. As ret the installed capacity, the crusher can crush 750 T of stone in a day production and 18750 T in month of 25 days operation. On the contrary the maximum production that has been taken from the crusher in month of June 2022 was 3120 T. It shows that the crusher never operated at full capacity.
6. Hence in this backdrop, the assessment of environmental compensation stands to be a ticklish issue. One method of assessment may be the days of operation of stone crusher as has been worked out at para 2.6 to 2.7. Based on that, the maximum number of days of operation of crusher are 17.01 say 17, and the EC can be calculated as under:
EC =PI x N x R x S x LF ; where:-
EC is Environmental R=A factor in Rupees (Rs.) for
Compensation in Rs. EC i.e. 250
PI = Pollution index of industrial S = Factor for scale of operation
sector i.e. 80 for Red category i.e. 0.5 for small scale
N = Number of days of violation LF = Location factor i.e. 1.0 for
took place i.e. 17 city/town < 1 million
population
Hence EC can be assessed as -
EC = 80 x 17 x 250 x 0.5 x 1.0 = Rs. 1,70,000.00
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Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
7. Another stringent way, when all the month-wise data of operations have been made available now, is to consider the operations of the crusher illegal since January 2021 till August 2022 i.e. without CTE / CTO. Thus for full one year and 8 months (till a closure order was issued on 01-09-2022 by the RO) the crusher operated without CTE/CTO. Based on that the days of violation for full one year of 2021 can be taken as 365 and for 8 months of the year 2022, the days of violation will be 243 days. Total days of illegal operations without CTE & CTO comes out to be 608 days and the EC comes out to be:
EC = 80 x 608 x 250 x 0.5 x 1.0 = Rs. 60, 80,000.00
8. As per the CPCB publication ―Report of the CPCB In-house Committee on Methodology for Assessing Environmental Compensation and Action Plan to Utilize the Fund‖ of 2019, and MPPCB order dated 04-04-2022, the minimum amount of compensation should be Rs. 5000/ day. Accordingly for 608 days of violation the minimum amount of EC can be worked out as under:
EC= 608 x 5000 = 30,40,000.00
9. Thus the EC calculation with various options have been presented in para 4.8 to 4.10. All the EC options as may be possible, were considered and presented by the inspecting team as mentioned in para 4.8 to 4.10. A considered decision on the imposition of EC % may be taken by the EC committee.
IV. Conclusion:
1. Based on the records obtaining before the inspecting team and submissions made in the foregoing paras, following conclusions can be drawn:
1.1 About Encroachment:
1.1.1 It is true that M/s Triupati Minerals has encroached upon the Kh.
no. 465, which happens to be a revenue forest land. The encroachment to the tune of 4350 sqft was found by the previous committee, which has been removed, some crushed material stock still lies in the kh. no. 465 which need to be removed and shifted in kh.no. 467 allotted to M/s Triupati Minerals for stocking. This removal should be accomplished at the earliest, as soon as the rainy weather permits. However the responsibility lies with the revenue department to ensure compliance. The details are discussed in Para 3.0 of the present report. 1.1.2 Quantity of excavation from 2015 till date: From the information obtaining on records, the excavation was not done from 2015 till 2020. It was started from January 2021 and around 9048+ 6 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
200 to 300 m' stone has been excavated as discussed under Para 2.0 of this report.
1.1.3 Calculation of environmental compensation as per rules:
The calculation of environmental compensation as per rules considering various aspects has been presented under Para 4.0 of the present report."
7. The submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellant are that the Board assumed that the stone crushing unit was operational each and every day from the January, 2021, to August, 2021, and contention of the appellant are that the mining activities cannot be conducted in the monsoon season and in the period for which EC was imposed on the Appellant, there were two monsoon seasons.
8. In reply thereof, it has been submitted that he, who seeks equity, must do equity and on that formula the Appellant had to actually narrate and communicate the SPCB with regard to operation of the unit and closure of the said unit. Since no communication has been drawn or informed to the SPCB, thus it was operational during that period. Further, when the month-
wise data of operation was made available to consider the operation of the crusher then it was calculated that since January, 2021, till August, 2021, i.e., without Consent to Establish and Consent to Operate, and for full year and eight months till a closure order was issued on 01.09.2022 by the RO, the crusher operated without CTE and CTO. Based on that formula and calculation, the days of violation for full year of 2021 can be taken as 365 days and for the eight months of the year 2022 the days of violation will be 243 days, thus total days of operation without CTE and CTO comes out to be 608 days and EC comes out to be Rs.60,80,000/- on the formula as narrated by the expert committee. The matter was also reconsidered by a member committee including the Member Secretary, MPPCB and Director Environment with the other technical officers and found that the number of 7 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors. days of violation are 608 days and on the formula EC = PI x N x R x S x LF and that become the calculation as shown as above.
9. During the course of hearing, the matter was asked and a question was raised before the Appellant as to what are the number of days of violation according to the calculation of Appellant but the question was not replied.
We have also examined the order dated 13.09.2024 passed by the first appellate authority and it was found that the reply by the Appellant was filed and the Appellant was given an opportunity of hearing and presenting the case before the authority concerned.
10. According to the calculation done by the appellate authority and expert body, a notice was issued to the Appellant for depositing of the amount and the appellant has deposited the said amount accordingly.
11. In the present case, nothing has been shown by the Appellant that there is a case of failure to exercise the discretion or excess or abuse of discretionary power vested to the respondents. Learned counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the opportunity of hearing was not provided to the Appellant before passing the order impugned. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the opportunity of hearing was provided by the Appellant.
12. It cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. This is what has been held by the Supreme Court in K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 273; N.K. Prasada Vs. Government of India & Ors., (2004) 6 SCC 299; State of Punjab Vs. Jagir Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 129;
Karnataka SRTC & Anr. Vs. S.G. Kotturappa & Anr., (2005) 3 SCC 409; and in Viveka Nand Sethi Vs. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337.
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13. In Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines & Anr. Vs. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 the Court has observed that natural justice is not an unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all.
If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference of the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. The Courts cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact. Nor can they fit into a rigid mould the concept of reasonable opportunity. If the totality of circumstances satisfies the Court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of reasonable opportunity, the Court will decline to be punctilious or fanatical as if the rules of natural justice were sacred scriptures.
14. In Union of India Vs. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:-
"Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible."
15. It is equally well settled that the principles of natural justice must not be stretched too far and in this connection reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal Gupta & Ors. Vs. Asha Devi Gupta & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 492; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 2371 and Canara Bank Vs. Debasis Das, AIR 2003 SC 2041.
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16. In Hira Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. The Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi & Anr. AIR 1973 SC 1260, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that principles of natural justice are not inflexible and may differ in different circumstances. Rules of natural justice cannot remain the same applying to all conditions.
17. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 made reference to its earlier decisions and observed:-
"In A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 150, it was held that the rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is their purpose, there is no reason why, they should not be made applicable to administrative proceedings also especially when it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi- judicial ones. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have a more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasijudicial inquiry. It was further observed that the concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice has been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. The rule that inquiry must be held in good faith and without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably is now included among the principles of natural justice." (Emphasis added)".
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Subhas Chandra Sinha & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1269 while considering the cancellation of the entire examination because of use of mass copy 10 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors. considered the scope of the principles of natural justice in such a matter and observed:-
"It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole were being cancelled. The Board had not charged any one with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must hold a detailed inquiry into the matter and examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the candidates had not adopted unfair means. The examination as a whole had to go........."
19. After referring to the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court in Chairman J&K State Board of Education Vs. Feyaz Ahmed Malik, AIR 2000 SC 1039, emphasised that the Board is entrusted with the duty of proper conduct of examinations.
20. In Biswa Ranjan Sahoo & Ors., Vs. Sushanta Kumar Dinda & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2552, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine whether principles of natural justice were required to be followed in a matter where because of large scale malpractice in the selection process, the selection was cancelled and in this context it was observed:-
"Nothing would become fruitful by issuance of notice. Fabrication would obviously either be not known or no one would come forward to bear the brunt. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal was right in not issuing notice to the persons who are said to have been selected and given selection and appointment."
21. In Union of India & Ors. Vs. O. Chakradhar, AIR 2002 SC 1119, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question whether it was necessary to issue individual show cause notices to each selected person when the entire selection was cancelled because of widespread and all pervasive irregularities affecting the result of selection and it was observed:-
11Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
"The illegality and irregularity are so intermixed with the whole process of the selection that it becomes impossible to sort out right from the wrong or vice versa. The result of such a selection cannot be relied or acted upon. It is not a case where a question of misconduct on the part of a candidate is to be gone into but a case where those who conducted the selection have rendered it wholly unacceptable."
22. In the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 853, the Hon'ble Supreme Court refused to interfere on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice by observing that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
23. It is further to be noted that the Court is to proceed as to whether non-
observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice.
Even, if in a given case, like the fact of the present case there may be some deviation but it has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the petitioner because the decision taken by the respondent was based on the scientific report. This Court does not function as a Court of appeal on the finding of scientific report submitted by the experts. On examining the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that the process adopted or decision made by the respondents is in anyway arbitrary or irrational or in any way in violation of the principles of natural justice. The conclusion is that the petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.
24. Natural justice is at least as old as the first man created on earth - the biblical 'Adam'. J.R. Lucas in his book 'On Justice' states (at page 86):
"Hence, when we are judging deeds, and may find that a man did wrong, there is a requirement of logic that we should allow the 12 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
putative agent to correct misinterpretations or disavow the intention imputed to him or otherwise disown the action. God needed to ask Adam 'Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?' Because it was essential that Adam should not be blamed or punished unless he had done exactly that deed. If the serpent had planted the evidence, or if he had beguiled Adam into eating it under the misapprehension that it came from another, non-forbidden tree, then Adam had not sinned and should not have been expelled from Eden. Only if the accused admits the charge, or, faced with the accusation, cannot explain his behaviour convincingly in any other way, are we logically entitled to conclude that he did indeed do it."
25. In some of the early judgments of this Court, the non-observance of natural justice was said to be prejudice in itself to the person affected, and proof of prejudice, independent of proof of denial of natural justice, was held to be unnecessary. The only exception to this rule is where, on "admitted or indisputable" facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible. In such cases, a Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice, but because Courts do not issue writs which are "futile" - see S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 379 at paragraph 24. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 776, however, the Court observed that this statement of the law has undergone a "sea change", as follows:
"39. Decision of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] whereupon Mr Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non- observance of principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not be read "as it causes difficulty of prejudice", cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, have undergone a sea change. In view of the decisions of this Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] the principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order being 13 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
rendered a nullity. To the principle/doctrine of audi alteram partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principle. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula."
(emphasis supplied)
26. Equally, the prejudice that is caused, apart from natural justice itself being denied, cannot be said to be present in a case in which there are admitted facts. Thus, in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43, the Court held:
"29. We are of the opinion that Mr. Garg is right that the rules of natural justice as we have set out hereinbefore implied an opportunity to the delinquent officer to give evidence in respect of the charges or to deny the charges against him. Secondly, he submitted that even if the rules had no statutory force and even if the party had bound himself by the contract, as he had accepted the Staff Rule, there cannot be any contract with a Statutory Corporation which is violative of the principles of natural justice in matters of domestic enquiry involving termination of service of an employee. We are in agreement with the basic submission of Mr. Garg in this respect, but we find that the relevant rules which we have set out hereinbefore have been complied with even if the rules are read that requirements of natural justice were implied in the said rules or even if such basic principles of natural justice were implied, there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice in respect of the order passed in this case. In respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an officer or an employee of Statutory Corporations like the State Bank of India, there must be an investigation into the charges consistent with the requirements of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice as far as these were applicable to a particular situation. So whether a particular principle of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the background of the nature of charges, the nature of the investigation conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. Here the infraction of the natural justice complained of was that he was not 14 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
given an opportunity to rebut the materials gathered in his absence. As has been observed in On Justice by J.R. Lucas, the principles of natural justice basically, if we may say so, emanate from the actual phrase "audi alteram partem" which was first formulated by St. Augustine (De Duabus Animabus, XIV, 22 J.P. Migne, PL. 42, 110).
xxx xxx xxx
32. The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitably form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross- examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version or the credibility of the statement.
33. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from record or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached on disputed facts but only an explanation of the acts, absence of opportunity to crossexamination does not create any prejudice in such cases." (emphasis supplied)
27. Likewise, in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and Ors. (2006) 1 SCC 667, this Court held that where, on undisputed facts, a retrenchment would be valid in law, the principles of natural justice would not be attracted, unless there is some stigma or punitive measure which would be attached, which would then cause prejudice, as follows:
15Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
"47. If the employees are workmen within the purview of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, they are protected thereunder. Rules 42 and 43 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules provide that before effecting any retrenchment in terms of the provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the employees concerned would be entitled to a notice of one month or in lieu thereof pay for one month and 15 days' wages for each completed year of service by way of compensation. If such a retrenchment is effected under the Industrial Disputes Act, the question of complying with the principles of natural justice would not arise. The principle of natural justice would be attracted only when the services of some persons are terminated by way of a punitive measure or thereby a stigma is attached.
48. In Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. [(2005) 5 SCC 337] it was held: (SCC p. 345, para 22) "22. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an enquiry would be an empty formality. Even the principle of estoppel will apply. [See Gurjeewan Garewal (Dr.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash [(2004) 5 SCC 263].] The principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case."
49. The High Court, therefore, must be held to have erred in law in holding that the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with."
28. In the five-Judge Bench decision in Managing Director, ECIL and Ors. v. B. Karnakumar and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 727, this Court, after discussing the constitutional requirement of a report being furnished under Article 311(2), held thus:
"30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
16
Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
[v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice.
31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal 17 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment." (emphasis supplied)
29. B. Karunakar (supra) was followed by this Court in Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja (2008) 9 SCC 31, as follows:
"21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727] it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the inquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that nonsupply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non- supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside." (emphasis in original)
30. What is important to note is that it is the Court or Tribunal which must determine whether or not prejudice has been caused, and not the authority on an ex parte appraisal of the facts. This has been well explained in a later judgment, namely Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy. Comm. Of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 519, in which, after setting out a number of judgments, this Court concluded:
"38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straitjacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, 18 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as a necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.
39. We are not concerned with these aspects in the present case as the issue relates to giving of notice before taking action. While emphasising that the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in straitjacket formula, the aforesaid instances are given. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of adhering to the principles of natural justice which are grounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness, accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals, etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein for some reason--perhaps because the evidence against the individual is thought to be utterly compelling--it is felt that a fair hearing "would make no difference"--meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimate conclusion reached by the decisionmaker--then no legal duty to supply a hearing arises. Such an approach was endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578], who said that: (WLR p. 1595) "... A breach of procedure ... cannot give [rise to] a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The court does not act in vain."
Relying on these comments, Brandon L.J. opined in Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 1 WLR 582] that: (WLR p. 593) "... no one can complain of not being given an opportunity to make representations if such an opportunity would have availed him nothing."
In such situations, fair procedures appear to serve no purpose since the "right" result can be secured without according such treatment to the individual.
19Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
40. In this behalf, we need to notice one other exception which has been carved out to the aforesaid principle by the courts. Even if it is found by the court that there is a violation of principles of natural justice, the courts have held that it may not be necessary to strike down the action and refer the matter back to the authorities to take fresh decision after complying with the procedural requirement in those cases where non- grant of hearing has not caused any prejudice to the person against whom the action is taken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order passed is always null and void. The validity of the order has to be decided on the touchstone of "prejudice". The ultimate test is always the same viz. the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
42. So far so good. However, an important question posed by Mr Sorabjee is as to whether it is open to the authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with the requirement of the principles of natural justice on the ground that affording such an opportunity will not make any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed by the authority.
This was so held by the English Court way back in the year 1943 in General Medical Council v. Spackman [1943 AC 627]. This Court also spoke in the same language in Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Chitra Srivastava [(1970) 1 SCC 121], as is apparent from the following words: (SCC p. 123, para 7) "7. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr C.B. Agarwala, contends that the facts are not in dispute and it is further clear that no useful purpose would have been served if the Board had served a show-cause notice on the petitioner. He says that in view of these circumstances it was not necessary for the Board to have issued a show-cause notice. We are unable to accept this contention. Whether a duty arises in a 20 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
particular case to issue a show-cause notice before inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be passed."
43. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, Mr Sorabjee may also be right in his submission that it was not open for the authority to dispense with the requirement of principles of natural justice on the presumption that no prejudice is going to be caused to the appellant since the judgment in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725] had closed all the windows for the appellant.
44. At the same time, it cannot be denied that as far as courts are concerned, they are empowered to consider as to whether any purpose would be served in remanding the case keeping in mind whether any prejudice is caused to the person against whom the action is taken. This was so clarified in ECIL itself in the following words: (SCC p. 758, para
31) "31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and given the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment."
21Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even when we find that there is an infraction of principles of natural justice, we have to address a further question as to whether any purpose would be served in remitting the case to the authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by this Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725]."
(emphasis supplied)
31. In State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364, a Division Bench of this Court distinguished between "adequate opportunity"
and "no opportunity at all", and held that the "prejudice" exception operates more especially in the latter case. This judgment also speaks of procedural and substantive provisions of law which embody the principles of natural justice which, when infracted, must lead to prejudice being caused to the litigant in order to afford him relief, as follows:
"32. Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the preceding para, would setting aside the punishment and the entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii) be in the interests of justice or would it be its negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be the latter. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.
33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire 22 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this:
procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under -- "no notice", "no opportunity" and "no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order 23 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727]. The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice -- or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action -- the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it 'void' or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.] 24 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision."
32. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. (1999) 6 SCC 237, the expression "admitted and indisputable facts" laid down in Jagmohan (supra), as also the interesting divergence of legal opinion on whether it is necessary to show "slight proof" or "real likelihood" of prejudice, or the fact that it is an "open and shut case", were all discussed in great detail as follows:
"16. Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Court's discretion to refuse relief even though the rules of natural justice have been breached, on the ground that no real prejudice is caused to the affected party.
Xxx xxx xxx
22. Before we go into the final aspects of this contention, we would like to state that cases relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of "real substance" or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed. See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578] (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University [(1971) 1 WLR 487], Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [(1980) 1 WLR 582] and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R. v. Ealing Magistrates' court, ex p Fannaran [(1996) 8 Admn LR 351, 358] (Admn LR at p. 358) 25 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
(see de Smith, Suppl. p. 89) (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be "demonstrable beyond doubt" that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMahon [(1987) 2 WLR 821, 862] (WLR at p. 862) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant [1959 NZLR 1014] however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is "real likelihood -- not certainty -- of prejudice". On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn., 1996, pp. 271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40], Megarry, J. in John v. Rees [(1969) 2 WLR 1294] stating that there are always "open and shut cases" and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J. has said that the "useless formality theory" is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that "convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms". More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the "useless formality" theory n R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton [1990 IRLR 344] by giving six reasons. (See also his article "Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?" 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the "useless formality theory" has been made much earlier in "Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow" by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27-63) contending that Malloch [(1971) 1 WLR 1578] and Glynn [(1971) 1 WLR 487] were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p.
596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a "real likelihood" of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the 26 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
courts can, in exercise of their "discretion", refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364], Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.
23. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the "useless formality" theory and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as, in the case before us, "admitted and indisputable" facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed out by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
33. In Aligarh Muslim University and Ors. v. Mansoor Ali Khan (2000) 7 SCC 529, the aforesaid authorities were relied upon, and the answer given was that there is no absolute rule, and prejudice must be shown depending on the facts of each case, as follows:
"24. The principle that in addition to breach of natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has been developed in several cases. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [(1984) 1 SCC 43] Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) also laid down the principle that not mere violation of natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than non-issue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed, quoting Wade's Administrative Law (5th Edn., pp. 472-75), as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 31) "[I]t is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. ... There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with, and so forth."
Since then, this Court has consistently applied the principle of prejudice in several cases. The above ruling and various other rulings taking the 27 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
same view have been exhaustively referred to in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364]. In that case, the principle of "prejudice" has been further elaborated. The same principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460]
25. The "useless formality" theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of "admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion" referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case."
34. In Union of India and Ors. v. Alok Kumar (2010) 5 SCC 349, this Court, after eschewing a hyper-technical approach, held that prejudice must not merely be the apprehension of a litigant, but should be a definite inference of the likelihood of prejudice flowing from the refusal to follow natural justice, as follows:
"83. Earlier, in some of the cases, this Court had taken the view that breach of principles of natural justice was in itself a prejudice and no other "de facto" prejudice needs to be proved. In regard to statutory rules, the prominent view was that the violation of mandatory statutory rules would tantamount to prejudice but where the rule is merely directory the element of de facto prejudice needs to be pleaded and shown. With the development of law, rigidity in these rules is somewhat relaxed. The instance of de facto prejudice has been accepted as an essential feature where there is violation of the non-mandatory rules or violation of natural justice as it is understood in its common parlance. Taking an instance, in a departmental enquiry where the department relies upon a large number of documents majority of which are 28 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
furnished and an opportunity is granted to the delinquent officer to defend himself except that some copies of formal documents had not been furnished to the delinquent. In that event the onus is upon the employee to show that non-furnishing of these formal documents have resulted in de facto prejudice and he has been put to a disadvantage as a result thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
87. In ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727] this Court noticed the existing law and said that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are neither incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether, in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of denial of report to him, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has clarified even the stage to which the departmental proceedings ought to be reverted in the event the order of punishment is set aside for these reasons.
88. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of this Court in Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [(2008) 9 SCC 31] at pp. 38- 39 where the Court held as under: (SCC para 21) "21. From the ratio laid down in B. Karunakar it is explicitly clear that the doctrine of natural justice requires supply of a copy of the enquiry officer's report to the delinquent if such enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority. It is also clear that non-supply of report of the enquiry officer is in breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the enquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. If he is unable to satisfy the court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically be set aside."
89. The well-established canons controlling the field of bias in service jurisprudence can reasonably be extended to the element of prejudice as well in such matters. Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact or there should be such definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from 29 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
such default which relates to statutory violations. It will not be permissible to set aside the departmental enquiries in any of these classes merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice."
35. Under the broad rubric of the Court not passing futile orders as the case is based on "admitted" facts, being admitted by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, non-challenge or non-denial, the following judgments of this Court are all illustrations of a breach of the audi alteram partem rule being established on the facts of the case, but with no prejudice caused to the person alleging breach of natural justice, as the case was one on admitted facts:
(i) Punjab and Sind Bank and Ors. v. Sakattar Singh (2001) 1 SCC 214 (see paragraphs 1, 4 and 5);
(ii) Karnataka SRTC and Anr. v. S.G. Kotturappa and Anr. (2005) 3 SCC 409 (see paragraph 24);
(iii) Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 337 (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 26);
(iv) Mohd. Sartaj and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2006) 2 SCC 315 (see paragraph 18);
(v) Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Manjeet Singh and Anr. (2006) 8 SCC 647 (see paragraphs 17 and 19);
(vi) Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India and Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 54 (see paragraphs 26 to 32);
(vii) State of Manipur and Ors. v. Y. Token Singh and Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 65 (see paragraphs 21 and 22); (viii) Secretary, A.P. Social Welfare Residential Educational Institutions v. Pindiga Sridhar and Ors. (2007) 13 SCC 352 (see paragraph 7)
(ix) Peethani Suryanarayana and Anr. v. Repaka Venkata Ramana Kishore and Ors. (2009) 11 SCC 308 (see paragraph 18);
(x) Municipal Committee, Hoshiapur v. Punjab State Electricity Board and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 216 (see paragraphs 31 to 36, and paragraphs 44 and 45);
(xi) Union of India and Anr. v. Raghuwar Pal Singh (2018) 15 SCC 463 (see paragraph 20).
36. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals:
30Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.
(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
(3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.
(4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.
(5) The "prejudice" exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.
37. After the perusal of the order impugned, nothing has been shown by the Appellant that if there is any failure of the justice or any prejudice has been caused by the calculation as done by the five member expert committee.
There is no breach of natural justice and opportunity of hearing was provided to the Appellant and the calculation as done by the expert committee is in accordance with the number of violation of days which is calculated from the day of violation till the continuation of the violation and 31 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors. nothing has been shown by the Appellant of any other calculation of days method and only argued that mining is not possible in the specific season.
38. In view of the above discussion, the order impugned passed by the SPCB calculating the environmental compensation is in accordance with the guidelines issued by the CPCB, and is in accordance with the rules and there is no irregularity or illegality. Thus, the Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) has no merit and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed.
Sheo Kumar Singh, JM [ Dr. A Senthil Vel, EM 22nd July, 2025, Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) AK 32 Appeal No.37/2024(CZ) M/s Tirupati Minerals vs. MP Pollution Control Board & Ors.