Karnataka High Court
Xxxx vs Sri. Abhilask K on 25 April, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.11726 OF 2024
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION No.8786 OF 2024
CRIMINAL PETITION No.11808 OF 2024
CRIMINAL PETITION No.71 OF 2025
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.11726 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . SRI BALAMANJUNATHASWAMIJI
S/O NANJAPPA,
2
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
PEETADHYAKSHA OF
SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT,
RESIDING AT SRI MUTT,
HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE,
BENACHAKALLU ROAD,
HULIYURUDURGA HOBLI,
KUNIGAL TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 123.
2 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY HULIYURUDURGA POLICE,
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R-1;
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 (2)
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND
CANCEL THE BAIL ORDER PASSED BY THE HON'BLE ADDL.
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (FTSC-1) AT TUMAKURU IN
CRL.MISC.NO.796/2024 DATED 22.06.2024 IN GRANTING
ST
REGULAR BAIL TO THE 1 RESPONDENT / ACCUSED NO.1 FOR
OFFENCES P/U/S 376, 354A (i)(ii), 417, 342, 506 R/W 34 OF IPC,
1860, U/S 4 AND 6 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, U/S 66(E) AND 67(A) OF
I.T. ACT, 2000, U/S 3(f) OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
(PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988 AND U/S 30 OF THE ARMS
ACT, 1959.
3
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8786 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
SRI MANJUNATHA N., @
BALAMANJUNATHA SWAMIJI
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT
HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE,
HULIYURDURGA HOBLI,
KUNIGAL TALUK
TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 101.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE )
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH HULIYURUDURGA POLICE
TUMAKURU
REPRESENTED BY SPP OFFICE
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R1;
DR. SHYAMSUNDAR S.U., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
SPL.C.NO.266/2024 FILED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT
4
HULIYURDURGA POLICE, ARISING OUT OF CHARGE SHEET DATED
03.05.2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-I, TUMAKURU FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 4, 6, 11(iv) AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, SECTION 66(E)
AND 67(A) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, SECTION
376, 354(A)(1)(i), 354(A)(1)(ii), 417, 342, 506 R/W SECTION 34
OF IPC SECTION 3 OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF
MISUSE) ACT, 1988 AND SECTION 30 OF ARMS ACT 1959.
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.11808 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. ABHILASH K.,
S/O KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS
TRUSTEE OF
SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI TRUST (R)
RESIDING AT SRI MUTT,
HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE ,
BENACHAKALLU ROAD,
HULIYURUDURGA HOBLI,
KUNIGAL TALUK,
TUMAKURU - 572 123.
5
2. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY HULIYURUDURGA POLICE,
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI KARTHIK N., ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R2 )
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439(2)
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND
CANCEL THE BAIL ORDER PASSED BY THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (FTSC-1) AT TUMAKURU IN
CRL.MISC.NO.797/2024 DATED 22.06.2024, IN GRANTING
ST
REGULAR BAIL TO THE 1 RESPONDENT/ACCUSED NO.2 FOR THE
OFFENCES P/U/S 354-A(i)(ii), 342 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC IN
CR.NO.50/2024 UNDER HULIDURGA POLICE STATION U/S.11(iv)
AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012 AND UNDER SECTION 3(f) OF THE
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988.
IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.71 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SRI ABHILASH K.,
S/O KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
TRUSTEE OF
SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT,
HANGARAHALLI,
CHOWDANAKUPPE,
TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 123.
(ADDRESS AS PER AADHAR CARD)
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
6
SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE )
AND:
1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH HULIYURUDURGA POLICE
TUMAKURU
REPRESENTED BY SPP OFFICE,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R1;
SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
SPL.C.NO.266/2024 FILED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT
HULIYURDURGA POLICE, ARISING OUT OF CHARGE SHEET DATED
03.05.2024, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-I, TUMAKURU, FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 11(iv) AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, SECTION 354(A)(1)(ii),
342 R/W 34 OF IPC, SECTION 3 OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
(PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988.
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
7
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The batch of these petitions are filed by the accused or the
complainant as the case would be, seeking different reliefs. Since
parties to the lis are common arising out of a solitary incident, they
are taken up together and considered by this common order.
2. Heard in Criminal Petition Nos. 8786 of 2024 and 71 of
2025 Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for
the petitioners, Sri B.N.Jagadesha, learned State Public Prosecutor
for respondent No.1; Dr. Shyamsundar S.U, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2 in Crl.P.No.8786 of 2024 and
Sri Akshay S, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 in
Crl.P.No.71 of 2025; in Criminal Petition Nos. 11726 of 2024 and
11808 of 2024 Sri Akshay S, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor for respondent No.2, Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned
senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1 in Criminal petition
8
No.11726 of 2024 and Sri N.Karthik, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 in Criminal Petition No.11808 of 2024.
3. For the sake of convenience, facts obtaining in Criminal
Petition No.8786 of 2024 would be narrated.
4. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
4.1. The petitioner is a pontiff of Sri Vidyachowdeshwari Mutt,
Huliyurudurga, Tumkur District. In the year 2022, the petitioner is
said to be suffering from skin decease near his groins. Therefore,
for the purpose of medical treatment he had asked one of his
associates Mr. Abhishek to search for a Dermatologist. Abhishek
then recommends one Dr. Roopa who is said to be his close friend.
Abhishek had served the petitioner as his assistant between 2019
and 2022. Dr.Roopa, was a renowned doctor treating patients for
skin decease. Thus, Dr. Roopa treats the petitioner. Over periods of
treatment and improvement, it is the averment in the petition, that
the said doctor was asking the petitioner to send pictures of the
parts which underwent treatment, which are his private parts. A
year later, the petitioner then meets Abhishek who is said to have
9
demanded certain money for construction of a house. The petitioner
is said to have refused. Subsequently, Dr. Roopa, Abhishek and
another Nandish collectively, as part of the alleged criminal
conspiracy, began to harass and threaten the petitioner. The
intimidation was that, if the pontiff did not agree to pay ransom,
intimate videos would be shown to all devotees and persons
connected with the mutt. The petitioner on being exasperated by
the harassment and the attempted extortion, registeres a complaint
before the jurisdictional Police which becomes a crime in
Crime No.14 of 2024 for the offences punishable under
Sections 120B, 384, 34 of the IPC and 66E of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 ('the IT Act' for short) naming 6 accused in
the said crime viz., Abhishek, Roopa, Srinivasa, Rajesh, Chethan
and Nandish.
4.2. After registration of the said crime and investigation
ensuing, the 2nd respondent who is said to be the devotee of the
Temple registers a complaint against the petitioner before the
jurisdictional police for offences punishable under Sections 4, 6, 8
and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
10
('the POCSO Act' for short), Section 66E of the IT Act and
Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. While
filing the charge sheet, Section 8 of the POCSO Act is deleted and
Section 11(iv) of the POCSO Act, Sections 417 and 342 of the IPC,
Section 67A of the IT Act, Section 3 of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the
Arms Act, 1959 are added. The said complaint becomes a crime in
Crime No.50 of 2024. The accused were the pontiff and one
K.Abhilash. The allegation in the complaint was that, in the year
2017 when the victim was 14 years of age, she was suffering from
health problems. Therefore, the parents, on the advise of her
father's friend, took her to Sri Vidhyachowdeshwari Temple ('the
Temple' for short). Then they became acquainted with the pontiff
who used certain kavades to seek answers to their problems and he
instructed them to perform pooja of Devi at home.
4.3. Thereafter, the complainant began to visit the mutt for
the purpose of treatment. It is at that point in time, the petitioner is
alleged to have taken her into the "Garbhagudi" while alone and
sexually assaulted her. Such incident is said to have been repeated
11
during the subsequent visits in the Temple. In 2019 while at the
Temple, accused No.2 Abhilash assaulted her after instructing her
to enter the room with bedsheets. Later, she is said to have
attempted suicide, but another person intervened and advised her
to inform her parents. This is the fulcrum of the complaint. The
complaint is registered on 07-03-2024 for the incidents that are
said to have taken place in 2017 or the latest in 2019. Accused
Nos. 1 and 2 including the pontiff were taken into custody and later
enlarged on bail. The police conduct investigation and file a charge
sheet before the concerned Court adding several offences. The
charge sheet now is for the offences punishable under
Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 417, 342, 506, 34 of the IPC;
Sections 4, 6, 11(iv), 12 of the POCSO Act; Sections 66E, 67A of
the IT Act; Section 3 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. Pursuant
to filing of charge sheet, the matter is committed to the Court of
Sessions and is now pending as Spl.C.No.266 of 2024. Filing of the
charge sheet, the subsequent institution of criminal proceedings
and it's continuation, is what has driven the petitioner/pontiff to this
Court in the subject petition.
12
4.4. Criminal Petition No.71 of 2025 is filed by accused No.2.
The allegations are the same; the facts obtaining that led to
registration of crime are also the same. Accordingly, the facts
narrated in Criminal Petition No.8786 of 2024 would become
applicable to the facts obtaining in this case as well and, therefore,
they would not require any reiteration.
4.5. The other two petitions - Criminal Petition Nos.11726 of
2024 and 11808 of 2024 - are preferred by the complainant
challenging the grant of regular bail to the pontiff and accused No.2
- Abhilash in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.796 of 2024 and 797 of
2024 both, by orders dated 22-06-2024.
5. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J.Chouta appearing
for the petitioner/pontiff and accused No.2 in the companion
petition would vehemently contend that the complaint is registered
after about seven years of the incident, that too for offences that
would become punishable under the POCSO Act, only to wreak
vengeance, as the pontiff registers a crime of misrepresentation
13
against Abhishek and Roopa and all others. Therefore, the
complaint is set up by registering a crime without there being any
substance whatsoever. If at all the pontiff indulged in such acts,
nothing stopped the complainant, who is said to have informed her
parents in 2019 itself, from filing the complaint and she should not
have waited for five years to register the crime. It is his contention
that once the crime is registered with a delay of seven years, it
would naturally contain all the embellishments. He would contend
that it is gross misuse of the POSCO Act or any other offence
alleged in the case at hand. Every offence is hit by delay. The
pictures that are projected are the ones where the complainant
comes close to the pontiff to take a selfie on the mobile phone and
these are projected as proximity with the pontiff. The incidents
narrated stop at 2019 and the complaint, as contended, is
registered on 07-03-2024. There is no direct evidence. Every crime
is brought in on hearsay evidence.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
complainant would refute the submissions to contend that the
charge sheet is filed after investigation. The matter is now
14
committed to the Court of Sessions. What is remaining, is framing
of charges and continuation of trial. It is at that stage the petitioner
approaches this Court in the subject petition. The learned counsel
submits that all the offences against the petitioners in both these
petitions i.e., accused Nos.1 and 2 are clearly met in the case at
hand. Therefore, there should be no indulgence shown by this Court
at this juncture. He would also take this Court through the
documents appended to the charge sheet to demonstrate that the
witnesses have clearly spoken about what the pontiff or accused
No.2 have done. Though they are not eyewitnesses, they are
witnesses whose statements are credible. All these will have to be
tested in evidence.
7. In the other two cases filed by the complainant, the
learned counsel would contend that bail could not have been
granted to both accused Nos.1 and 2. Therefore, the complainant
has challenged grant of regular bail to both the accused in the teeth
of the offences alleged.
15
8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. What forms the
fulcrum of the present lis are three crimes viz., Crime Nos.50 of
2024; 52 of 2024 and 335 of 2024. Though the offences are
different, the fulcrum of the offence remains the same. The entire
issue gets triggered from registration of the complaint. Therefore,
the complaint is required to be noticed. It reads as follows:
"ರವ ೆ,
ಾ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ ,
ಹು ಯೂರುದುಗ ೕ ಾ ೆ,
ಕು ಗ ಾಲೂ , ತುಮಕೂರು "#ೆ
ಇಂದ:
XXXXXX
XXXXXX
'ಾನ)*ೇ,
+ಷಯ: 2017-ೇ .ಾ /ಂದ /ರಂತರ0ಾ1 #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ 4ಾಗೂ ನನ5
ಇ6ೆ7 ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 ಅ ಾ)6ಾರ 'ಾ: 'ಾನ;ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕಡು=>ರುವ
ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG ಮ4ಾ ಸಂ.ಾIನ ಮಠದ .ಾGKೕ"
Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಇವರ ಸಹವ= Oಾದ ಅP#ಾQ
16
ೆ (CೊಡRಅS) ಇವರ +ರುದ8 ಾನೂನು ಕBಮ ಜರು1ಸಲು ೋ /ೕ:ದ
ದೂರು.
ಈ UೕಲVಂಡ +ಷಯ ೆV ಸಂಬಂ ;ದಂ ೆ ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮX ದೂರು
ಸ ; ೊಳ @ವYCೇ-ೆಂದ*ೆ ನಮX ಸGಂತ ಊರು Lೆಂಗಳ[ರು ಾ'ಾ\]ಾಳ)ದ ಸಣ_3V Lೈಲು ಆ1ದುa,
-ಾನು ಇ bೕ ಹುcd Lೆeೆfರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಮಂಜು-ಾg ರವರು Lೆ.ಾVಂನ Kೕಟi ೕಡi
ಆ1 ೆಲಸ 'ಾ: ೊಂ:ದುa ಾj ]ೆBೕಮಲ ಾ ¹.ಆi ರವರು ಗೃl Oಾ1ರು ಾ>*ೆ.
ನನ ೆ 14 ವಷ ಇCಾaಗ ಅಂದ*ೆ 2017-ೇ .ಾ ನ ನನ ೆ ಆ*ೋಗ)ದ ಸಮ.ೆ)
ಉಂnಾ1ದa ಂದ ನನ5 ತಂCೆಯ .ೆ5ೕlತ*ಾದ ಪYಟd.ಾGK ರವರ ಸಲ4ೆಯಂ ೆ ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj
ನನ5ನು5 ತುಮಕೂರು "#ೆ, ಕು ಗ ಾಲೂಕು ಹು ಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ?ಯ ಹಂಗರಹ?@
ಮಠದ ರುವ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋದ ಗುಣ0ಾಗುವYCಾ1 =?;ದa ಂದ ನಮX
ತಂCೆ ಾj 4ಾಗೂ ಪYಟd.ಾGKಯವ*ೊಂf ೆ ನನ5ನು5 f-ಾಂಕ:25/03/2017 ರಂದು qದಲ
Lಾ ೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠ ೆV ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬಂfದುa ಆ fನ ಮಠದ .ಾGKOಾದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ
.ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಇದaರು. ಅವರು ನಮXಗಳ ಪ ಚಯ 'ಾ: ೊಂಡು ನsನ tಾj#ೆಯನು5
=?ದು ೊಂಡು ನನ ೆ Oಾ*ೋ uಾ-ಾಮ= ಪBvೕಗ 'ಾrìCಾa*ೆ ಎಂದು =?; ಇವತು> ಅಮXನವರ
ಪBxೆ5 ಬ*ೆಸಲ ಕವEೆ 4ಾ3 -ೋಡು ೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ? ಅಮXನವರನು5 ಮ-ೆ ೆ ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 ಪyzೆ
'ಾ:ದ ಸ 4ೋಗುವYCಾ1 =?;ದರು. ಇCೇ fವಸ .ಾGKೕ"ಯವರು ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj ೆ ನನ ೆ
xಾಸ{ -ೋಡುವYCಾ1 4ೇ? ನನ5 ೈ -ೋ: ನನ ೆ ಎರಡು ಮದು0ೆOಾಗುವYCಾ1 qದಲ-ೆಯದು
ಲ| 'ಾ)*ೇ} ಆಗುತ>Cೆ. ಅCಾದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮ-ೆಯವರು -ೋಡುವ ಹುಡುಗನನು5
ಮದು0ೆOಾಗು ೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಇದು ಸ 4ೋಗLೇ ೆಂದ*ೆ ಕದ ೕ ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:ದ*ೆ
ಸ 4ೋಗುತ>Cೆಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಅವತು> ಸಂzೆ ಮಠfಂದ -ಾವYಗಳ 4ೊರಟು 4ೋzÉವY. ಮ-ೆ ೆ
4ೋ1 .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ೇ?ದ ಪyzೆಗಳನು5 -ೇಮಗಳನು5 'ಾ:CೆವY. ಇCಾದ ಒಂದು 0ಾರದ
ನಂತರ 6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರನು5 ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ನಮX ಮ-ೆ ೆ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ
ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ಅವ*ೊಂf ೆ ಬಂfದುa ಆ ಸಮಯದ -ಾನು ಜೂ) ೊಡು0ಾ ೈ
ಅP#ಾQ ಈತನು ನ/5ಂದ ಜೂ) ಪEೆಯು0ಾಗ ೈಯನು5 l:ದು ೊಂಡನು. -ಾನು ೈ
S:; ೊಂEಾಗ ಆತನು .ಾ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದನು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ನಮX ಮ-ೆಯ Cೇವ ೆ ಪyzೆ
'ಾಡು0ಾಗ, ಮಂಗeಾರ=ಯನು5 'ಾಡು0ಾಗ ಅP#ಾQ ನನ5 ಪಕV ಬಂದು /ಂತು ೊಳ @ವYದು
'ಾಡು=>ದaನು. -ಾನು ಇದನು5 ;ೕ ಯ.ಾ•1 ೆ ೆದು ೊಳ@ ಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Cೇವರನು5
ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋದರು. ಪyzೆ ೆಂದು 35 .ಾ+ರಗಳನು5 ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjjಂದ ಪEೆದು ೊಂಡರು.
ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ನನ5 ೈ ಪYನಃ ಊತ ಬಂfದa ಂದ ನಮX ಾj Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ.ಾGK"
ರವ ೆ ಆ ಾಗ •ೕs 'ಾ: +6ಾರ =?;ದುa .ಾGKೕ"ಯವರು ನನ5ನು5 Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV
17
ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬರುವಂ ೆ 4ೇ?ದa ಂದ 2-3 Lಾ ಪYನಃ -ಾವYಗಳ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠ ೆV 4ೋ1ದುa ಆ
ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ: ೊಡು=>ದaರು. ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ fವಸಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾನು
ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjvಂf ೆ ಮಠ ೆV ಪyzೆ ೆಂದು 4ೋದ ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" -ರವರು ನಮX ತಂCೆ
ಾj ೆ ಇವ? ೆ cೕ 'ಾಡಲು ಕ ; ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದುa ಇCಾದ ಪYನಃ 15 fನಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾವY ಮಠ ೆV
4ೋದ ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ ೆ ಅಡು ೆ ಮ-ೆ ೆ 4ೋ1 cೕ. 'ಾ: ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು 4ೇ?ದುa
ಆ ಸಮಯದ ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj .ಾGKೕ" ರವರ ಬ?bೕ ಕು?=ದaರು. -ಾನು ಅಡು ೆ ಮ-ೆಯ cೕ
'ಾಡು0ಾ ೆƒ ಅP#ಾQ. ೆ. ಈತನು lಂf/ಂದ ಬಂದು ನನ5ನು5 ಬಲ0ಾ1 ತS„ ೊಂಡನು. ನನ ೆ
ಭಯ0ಾ1 3ರು†Cಾಗ ಆತನು ನನ5 Lಾjಯನು5 ಆತನ ೈಗ?ಂದ ಮು†‡ ತ]ಾ‚jತು Oಾ ಗೂ
4ೇಳLೇಡ ಎಂದು ೇ? ೊಂಡನು -ಾನು cೕ ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 .ಾGKೕ" ರವ ೆ ೊnೆdನು. ನನ ೆ
ಭಯ0ಾ1ರುವYದ ಂದ -ಾನು Oಾ ಗೂ 4ೇಳ ಲ.
ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ -ಾವYಗಳ ಪYನಃ ಮಠ ೆV ಪyzೆ ೆ 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ಯು ನನ ೆ cೕ
'ಾ: ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು =?;ದುa ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj ೆ Lೇ*ೆ ೆಲಸ 4ೇಳ =ದaರು. -ಾನು cೕ 'ಾಡುವ
ಸಮದಯ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅ ೆ ಬಂದು -ಾನು ಓದು=>ರುವ xಾ#ೆಯ ಬ ೆƒ ಸೂV ಬ ೆƒ +6ಾರ
'ಾ: qLೈ ನ .ೆ ‚ ೆ ೆದು ೊeೆ[ @ೕ ಾ Lಾ ಎಂದು ಎಡ ೈ l:ದು ಎeೆfದುa ಆ ಸಮದಯ
-ಾನು =ರಸV ; ನಮX ಅಪ‚ Lೈಯು ಾ>*ೆ -ಾನು ಬರುವYfಲ0ೆಂದು 4ೇ? cೕ ಇಟುd ಬಂCೆನು. ಅವತು>
ಮಠfಂದ -ಾವYಗಳ 0ಾಪ Lೆಂಗಳ[ ೆ 4ೋCೆವY.
ಈ ಘಟ-ೆ ಆದ ನಂತರ ಸು'ಾರು 20 fನಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾನು ಅಮX †ಕVಮXರವ*ೊಂf ೆ
ಮಠ ೆV ಪyzೆ ೆ 4ೋ1ದುa ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಬಂfರ ಲ. ಆ fನ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು
ನಮX ಾj ೆ ನನ5 ಬ? 11 ರೂ ಗಳನು5 ಮಗಳ ಬ? ೊ: ಮುಡುಪY ಕcd;>ೕ/ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು.
ನಮX ಾj ನನ ೆ 11 ರೂ ೊcdದುa -ಾನು ಅದನು5 Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಒಳ1ನ ಗಭ ಗು: ಮುಂfನ ¹ÌçÃs
ಒಳ ೆ 4ೋCಾಗ ಅ Aವ ಂಗ, ಸುಬBಮಣ) .ಾGK 4ೊeೆ +ಗBಹಗಳ ಇದುa ಅ ಹಣ ಇಡಲು
.ಾGKೕ" ºÉýzÁUÀ £Á£ÀÄ ಹಣವನು5 ಇಡಲು ಬ1ƒCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ರವರು ನನ5 .ೊಂಟವನು5
l:ದು ೊಂ:ದುa ನನ ೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 lಂCೆ =ರು1Cಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ೈ/ಂದ ನನ5 Lಾjಯನು5
ಮು†‡ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೈಗ?ಂದ ಮುcdದರು. ನನ ೆ 3ರಚಲು 4ೋCಾಗ
.ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ ೆ ೊ=>ರುವ +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬಳ; /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮXನನು5 Lೇ ಾCೆB
.ಾjಸು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ಏನೂ 'ಾತ-ಾಡCೆ ಇರLೇಕು ಎಂದು ಭಯಪ:;ದರು. ಅಲCೆ /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ ೆ
/ನ5 ಬ ೆƒ ಸುಳ @ 4ೇ?>/ ಎಂCೆ#ಾ 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 4ೊರ ೆ ಬಂದರು. ನನ ೆ
ಭಯ0ಾ1 ಅ ನEೆದ +6ಾರವನು5 Oಾ ಗೂ 4ೇಳCೆ ಸುಮX-ಾ1 Snೆdನು. ನಂತರ ಪB= Lಾ
-ಾವYಗಳ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ನಮX ಾjಯ ಕEೆjಂದ 11 ರೂ ಮುಡುಪನು5, ನ/5ಂದ
Cೇವ ೆ ಇ:ಸLೇ ೆಂದು 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಗಭ ಗು: ೆ ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ #ೈಂ1ಕ
Cೌಜ ನ) 4ಾಗೂ tಾಸ1 ಅಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa Oಾ ಾದರೂ 4ೇ?ದ*ೆ ನಮX ತಂCೆ
18
ಾjಗಳನು5 +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬಳ; .ಾjಸುವYCಾ1 4ೆದ ;ದರು. ಇದ ಂದ -ಾನು 'ಾನ;ಕ0ಾ1
-ೊಂfದುa ಮ-ೆಯ Oಾ ಗೂ 4ೇ?ರ ಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು
ನಮX ಅಮXನವರ qLೈ ನಂ.8105794040 ಾ 'ಾ: ನನ5 ಆ*ೋಗ) +6ಾ ಸುವAvÉ
'ಾತ-ಾ: ನಂತರ 0ಾ‹•ಆŒ +:ೕvೕ` ಾ 'ಾ: ನನ ೆ Lೆತ>#ೆOಾಗುವಂ ೆ Lೆದ ಸುವYದು,
tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋ ಸುವಂ ೆ 4ೇಳ =>ದaರು. ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ -ಾನು 'ಾ:ರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ.
4ಾಗೂ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ¥sÉÆÃs 0ೆ•.ೈ‹ /ಂದ ಅAೕಲ +:vೕಗಳ Eೌs #ೋŽ ಂ ಕ?ಸು
ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದುa -ಾನು ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ Eೌs #ೋŽ ಂ ಗಳನು5 .ಾGKೕ"ವರ 9008459995
UÉ 0ಾ‹•ಆŒ ಮೂಲಕ ಕ?;ರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ.
2019-ೇ .ಾ ನ -ಾವYಗಳ ಪYನಃ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ರವರು ನಮX ತಮX
4ಾಗೂ ಾj †ಕVಮX ರವರುಗಳನು5 .ೊಪY‚ 4ಾಗೂ ಹೂವನು5 3ತು> ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು .ಾGKೕ" 4ೇ?
ಕ?;ದರು. ಆಗ CೊಡR ಅP#ಾQ ರವರು Uೕ#ೆ ಒಣ1 4ಾ3ರುವ LೆŽ Aೕ‹ಗಳನು5 ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು
4ೋ1 ರೂಂನ EqÀÄ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದa ಂದ -ಾನು ಅವನು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ LೆŽAೕ‹ ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು
4ೋ1, ರೂಂ-ೊಳ ೆ ಇಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ CೊಡR ಅP#ಾQ 4ೊರ1/ಂದ Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು -ಾನು
3ರು†Cಾಗ ಅP#ಾQ ನನ ೆ 3ರುಚದಂ ೆ ಕು?ತು ೋ Lಾ1ಲು ೆ ೆಯು ೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ? †ಲಕ ೆ ೆದು.
ಅವನು ಒಳ ೆ ಬಂದು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಯನು5 S†‡ tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd ನಂತರ ನನ ೆ Cೈlಕ
ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾಡಲು l:ದು ಎeೆCಾ:ದುa ನನ ೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 3ರು†Cಾ1 ಅವನು .ಾGKೕ" /ನ ೆ ಏನೂ
4ೇ?#ಾG -ಾನು ಏನು 'ಾ:>ೕ/ ಅಂತ ಎಂCೆ#ಾ 4ೇ?ದನು5 ನಂತರ ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3 ೊಳ @ವಂ ೆ 4ೇ?
ಅವನು ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು 4ೊರ ೆ 4ೋದನು. -ಾನು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು 0ೇ /ಂದ
ಅ bೕ ಇದa Cೇವರ ;ೕ*ೆjಂದ zಾjಂ‹ 'ಾ: •ಾ)/ ೆ -ೇಣು 4ಾ3 ೊಳ@ಲು ;ೕ*ೆಯನು5
ಕಟುd=>ರು0ಾ ೆƒ ಅ bೕ ೆಲಸ 'ಾಡುವ ಅP•ೇ (†ಕV ಅP) ಬಂದು ನನ ೆ Lೈಯುa ಇದ-ೆ5#ಾ /ಮX
ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ ೆ 4ೇಳ ಇಲCೇ 4ೋದ*ೆ ಇ ೆ ಬರುವYದ-ೆ5ೕ / ಸು ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದನು. ಅವತು> -ಾವY
0ಾಪ Lೆಂಗಳ[ ೆ 4ೋCೆವY ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 -ಾನು ನಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ ೆ 4ೇಳ ಲ. ಇCಾದ
ನಂತರ -ಾವYಗಳ ಮಠ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ#ೆಲ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ಾಗೂ ಅP#ಾQ, ೆ ಅವರು ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ
ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa, ಮ-ೆಯ ಇCಾaಗ +:vೕ ಾ 'ಾ:
'ಾತ-ಾಡುವYದು, tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಳನು5 ೋ ಸುವಂ ೆ ಒ ಾ>jಸುವYದು 'ಾ:ರು ಾ>*ೆ.
ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ fನಗಳ ನಂತರ ಅಂದ*ೆ ನನ ೆ f-ಾಂಕ -ೆನಪY ಇರುವYfಲ -ಾನು ನನ5 ಾj
ನನ5 ತಮX ಕುxಾ ಮೂರು ಜನರು ನಮX ಾj ೆ ಹು•ಾ ಲದ ಸಲು0ಾ1 ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠ ೆV
ಮ'ಾ)ಹ5 ಸು'ಾರು 1-00 ಗಂnೆ 0ೇeೆ ೆ 4ೋ1ದುa ಈ ಸಮಯದ ಮಠದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ
.ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಇದaರು. †ಕVಮX ಪBuಾವ= ರವ ಗೂ ಸ4ಾ ಹು•ಾ ಲದ ಬ ೆƒ =?;Cಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"
ರವರು ಅವರನು5 ಇ°è ೇ ಕ*ೆ; -ಾನು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ: ಗುಣ ಪ:ಸುವYCಾ1 4ೇ?ದa ಂದ ನಮX
ಾjಯವರು ಇದನು5 ನಂS ನಮX †ಕVಮXರವ ೆ •ೕs 'ಾ: ಬರಲು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಅವರು ಬರಲು
19
ಸಮಯ ಇದುaದ ಂದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ5 ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ ತಮX/ ೆ 6ೌಡನಕು]ೆ‚ ೆ 4ೋ1 ೋ?,
/ಂLೆಹಣು_, ಕು: ೆ, ಬ 'ೕಠ ೆV ಪyzೆ .ಾ'ಾನು ತರಲು 4ೇ? ನನ ೆ ಅ bೕ ಇದುa ಪyzೆ ೆ *ೆ:
'ಾ: ೋ, ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಆಗ ಸಮಯ ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 5-00 ಗಂnೆ ಆ1ತು>. ನನ5 ತಮX 4ಾಗೂ
ಅಮX .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ೇ?ದ ವಸು>ಗಳನು5 ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬರುವYCಾ1 4ೇ? 4ೋದರು. -ಾನು
Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಕಸ ಗು:; -ೆಲ ಒ*ೆ; ಅ bೕ ಕು?=Cಾaಗ ನನ5 ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ ತಮX ಪyzೆ
.ಾ'ಾನುಗಳನು5 ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬಂfದುa .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅವYಗಳನು5 ೆ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ಬ 'ೕಠ ೆV
4ೋ1 ಪyzೆ ೆ *ೆ:R 'ಾ: ೊ?@ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 6-30 ಗಂnೆಯ ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ
ನನ5 ತಮX ಪyzೆ ೆ *ೆ: 'ಾಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ5 qLೈ ೆ 0ಾ‹• ಅŒ ಮೂಲಕ
ಾ 'ಾ: 4ೋ1 CೊಡR ಅPರೂಂನ ಕು?ತು ೊಳ@ಲು 4ೇ?ದರು. -ಾನು ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ .
ಅP#ಾQ ರವರ ರೂಂ ಬ? ಇCಾaಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಸzೆ"ಯ Uೕ#ೆ - ಇದa ಾಂEೋ" ]ಾ ೆ‹
ೆ ೆದು ನನ5 ಮುಂCೆbೕ Lೆತ>#ೆOಾ1 ಾಂEೋ" 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು ಅP#ಾQ ರವ ೆ •ೕs 'ಾ:
-ಾನು 'ಾEಾ ಎಂದು ೇ?ದರು. ಅವನು ಹೂಂ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?Cೆನು ಆಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅವರ
ಮ-ೆಯವರು Oಾ*ಾದರು ಬಂದ*ೆ -ೋEೋ ಎಂದು 4ೇ? •ೕs ಕ‹ 'ಾ: ನನ ೆ ಮಂಚದ Uೕ#ೆ
ಮಲ ೊVೕ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು -ಾನು ನಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ ೆ 4ೇಳ ವYCಾ1 ೕ ೆ 4ೇಳ ವYCಾ1
4ೇ?ದa ಂದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ ೆ ೊ=>¯ÉÝà ಇ*ೋ ೕ ೕ¸Áì ಅCಾ)ವ K/¸ÀÄÖç ಕ*ೆಸು=>ೕvೕ
ಕ*ೆಸು ನನ ೆ ಎ#ಾರು ೊತು> ಎಂದು 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ಎeೆದು ೊಂಡು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಗಳನು5
ಅವ*ೇ ೆ ೆದು -ಾನು Lೇಡ Lೇಡ ಎಂದರೂ ಸಹ ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ನನ5 ಇ6ೆ7 ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ
Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದರು. Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದ ನಂತರ ಬnೆd 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು 4ೊರ ೆ Lಾ
Oಾ*ಾದರು ೇ?ದ*ೆ Cೇವರ 'ಾ)ನ 'ಾಡು=>Cೆa ಎಂದು 4ೇಳLೇ ೆಂದು 4ೇ? .ಾGKೕ" ಅ ಂದ
4ೊರಟು 4ೋದರು. ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ ಸಮಯದ ನಂತರ ನಮX ಅಪ‚ †ಕVಪ‚ †ಕVಮXನು5 ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು
ಬಂದರು. .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನಮXಗಳ ಬ? Cೇವ ೆ ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:; ಕಳ l; ೊಟdರು.
ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ -ಾವYಗಳ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"
4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ನನ ೆ Uೖ ೈ ಮುcd #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa ಮಠದ bೕ
ೆಲಸ 'ಾಡು=>ದa ನಂfೕ• ರವರು ಎ•ೊdೕ Lಾ ನನ5ನು5 ಅ ಂದ ಒಬ„eೇ ಕೂರದಂ ೆ ಕ?;ರು ಾ>*ೆ.
ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ ೆ 0ಾ‹• ಆŒ ಮೂಲಕ +:vೕ ಾ 'ಾ: Cೇಹದ
tಾಸ1 uಾಗಗಳನು5 ೋ ಸುವಂ ೆ ಒ ಾ>jಸುವYದು 'ೕ ಯŽ• ಸಮಯದ +:vೕ ಾ
'ಾಡುವYದು 'ಾಡು=>ದುa ಇCೇ ವಷ ದ ಜನವ 'ಾ4ೆಯ ಅಂದ*ೆ f-ಾಂಕ: 15/01/2024 ರಂದು
.ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ ೆ •ೕs 'ಾ: ನನ5 †ಕVಪ‚ನ ಮಗeಾದ 14 ವಷ ದ /ನ5 ತಂ1 ಪಲ+ಯನು5
ನ-ೊ5ಂf ೆ ಮಲ1ಸು ಎಂದು ೇ?ದುa -ಾನು •ೕs ಕ‹ 'ಾ:Cೆನು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Lಾಲ
ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" Oಾಗ ೕ, ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ಆಗ ೕ ನನ ೆ 'ಾ:ರುವYfಲ. ಇದ ಂದ -ಾನು
20
ಮನ-ೊಂದು, Oಾ ಗೂ 4ೇ? ೊಳ@#ಾರCೆ ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ : ಮ-ೆಯ bೕ ಆತXಹ ೆ) 'ಾ: ೊಳ@ಲು
ಪBಯ=5;ರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ.
ಆದa ಂದ ಹು ಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ? ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG ಮ4ಾಸಂ.ಾIನ
ಮಠದ .ಾGKೕ" ಆದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ
ರವರು -ಾನು ಅ]ಾBಪ>eಾ1ದa 2017 ಂದ ಇCೇ ವಷ ದ f-ಾಂಕ: . 15/01/2024 ರವ*ೆಗೂ ನನ5
Uೕ#ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ, .ಾGKೕ"ಯು ನನ5 ಇ6ೆ7 ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದುa ಈ
+6ಾರವನು5 ಮ-ೆಯ 4ೇ?ದ 'ಾಟ ಮಂತB 'ಾ: ನನ5 ತಂCೆ ಾjಯನು5 .ಾjಸುವYCಾ1
Lೆದ ೆ 4ಾ3ರುವYದಲCೇ qLೈ ನ +:vೕ ಾ ನ 'ಾತ-ಾ:ದ ನನ5 Cೇಹದ tಾಸ1
-ೋ:ರುವYದದಲCೇ +6ಾರ 4ೊರ ೆ ೊ ಾ>ದ ನನ5ನು5 4ಾಗೂ ನನ5 ಮ-ೆಯವರನು5 "ೕವ ಸlತ
SಡುವYfಲ0ೆಂದು Lೆದ ೆ 4ಾ3ರು ಾ>*ೆ. -ಾನು ನನ5 ತಂCೆ ಾj ೆ ಏ-ಾದರೂ 4ೆಚು‡ ಕ:U
'ಾಡು ಾ>-ೆಂದು 4ೆದ ಇ ಯವ*ೆಗೂ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ ಅP#ಾQರವರು
3ರುಕುಳವನು5 ಸl; ೊಂಡು ಮ-ೆಯ Oಾ ಗೂ 4ೇಳCೆ ವ6ಾರವನು5 ಮು†‡cdರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ಆದa ಂದ
ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ 4ಾಗೂ ಹಠಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗು
ಅವನ ಸ4ಾಯಕ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ರವರ +ರುದ8 ಾನೂನು ೕ ಾ) ಕBಮ ಜರು1ಸLೇ ೆಂದು ಈ fವಸ
ತಡ0ಾ1 ಬಂದು ದೂರು ಸ ; ೊಂ:ರು ೆ>ೕ-ೆ."
The date of the complaint is 07-03-2024. The subject of the
petition is sexual harassment by the pontiff from the year 2017.
Instances that have happened from the year 2017 up to the year
2019 are narrated in the complaint. The Police conduct investigation
and file a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet, as
obtaining in Column No.17, reads as follows:
"17. ೇ;ನ ಸಂ\ಪ> .ಾ*ಾಂಶ
ಕು ಗ ೕ ಉಪ+uಾಗ 0ಾ)'>ಯ, ಕು ಗ ಾಲೂಕು ಹು ಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ?@
ಹಂಗರಹ?@: ( ೆ.".Cೇವಪಟdಣ) ಯ ರುವ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಮಠ ೆV ಈ
Cೋ•ಾ*ೋಪ ಾ ಪcd ಅಂಕಣ-12 ರ , ಕಂಡ ಆ*ೋ'-1 ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ,ಎs @ Lಾಲಮಂಜು-ಾಥ
.ಾGKೕ"ಯು 'ೕ ಾಧ)--*ಾ1ದುa, ಆ*ೋ'-2 ಅP#ಾQ. ೆ ಈತನು ಆ*ೋ'-1 ರವ ೆ
21
ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾ1ದುa, ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV ಸಂಬಂ ;ದಂ ೆ ಎ1 ರವರು ಎ2 ರವ*ೊಳ ೊಂಡಂ ೆ ಟB dನು5
-ೊಂದ 'ಾ:;, ಎ1 ರವರು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ 4ಾ Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಸIಳದ qದಲು †ಕVCಾದ
Cೇವ.ಾIನವನು5 'ಾ: ೊಂಡು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ: ೊಂ:ದುa, .ಾವ ಜ/ಕ ೆ xಾಸ{ವನು5 4ೇ? ೊಂಡು
ಬರು ಾ> f-ೇ f-ೇ ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV .ಾವ ಜ/ಕರು ಆಕ˜ ತ*ಾ1 4ೆ†‡ನ ಸಂtೆ)ಯ ಬಂದು
4ೋಗು=>ದುa, ಅCೇ ೕ= CೊಡR CೊಡR *ಾಜ ಾರ ಗಳ , -ಾ)Oಾ ೕಶರು, l ಯ ೕ
ಅ ಾ ಗಳ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV ಬಂದು 4ೋಗು=>ದa ಂದ ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನವY ಇನೂ5 4ೆ†‡ನCಾ1
ಪBವಧ 'ಾನ ೆV ಬಂfರುತ>Cೆ.
ಈ ಪBಕರಣದ .ಾ\-1 ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 xxxx ರವ ೆ ಹು•ಾ ಲ0ೆಂCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ
ತಂCೆ .ಾ\-3 ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ.4ೆ™.; ರವರು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ರುವ ABೕ +CಾG6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV
qದಲು f-ಾಂಕ:25-03-2017 ರಂದು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ABೕ +CಾG6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV ಬಂCಾಗ
ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ೈಯನು5 -ೋ: /ನ ೆ qದಲ-ೆಯದು ಲ| 'ಾ)*ೇ} ಆಗುವYCಾ1, ಈ
ಮದು0ೆOಾದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮ-ೆಯವರು -ೋಡುವ ಹುಡುಗನ zೊ ೆ ಮದು0ೆOಾಗುತ>Cೆ ಎಂದು =?;, ಇದು
ಸ 4ೋಗLೇ ೆಂದ*ೆ ಕದ ಪyzೆ 'ಾಡLೇ ೆಂದು =?;, ಮನš ;ದa ಂದ ಅದರಂ ೆ .ಾ\-1
ರವರ ಮ-ೆಯ ಎ1 ಎ2 ರವರು ಪyzೆಗಳನು5 'ಾ:ರು ಾ>*ೆ.
f-ಾಂಕ:27-03-2017 ರಂದು ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರನು5
Lೆಂಗಳ[ ನ ಾ'ಾ\]ಾಳ)ದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಮ-ೆ ೆ ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋCಾಗ ಮ'ಾ)ಹ5 12-30
ಂದ ಮ'ಾ)ಹ5 1-00 ರ ನಡು0ೆ ಎ2 ರವ ೆ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಜೂ) ೊಡು0ಾಗ ಎ2 ರವರು #ೈಂ1ಕ
ದೃ˜djಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ೈಯನು5 l:ದು ೊಂಡುರು ಾ>-ೆಂದು,
f-ಾಂಕ:23-06-2017 ರಂದು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-2 ಮತು> .ಾ\-3 ರವ*ೊಂf ೆ
ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವ ೆ ಅಡು ೆ ಮ-ೆ ೆ 4ೋ1 ತನ ೆ cೕ
'ಾ: ೊಂಡು ತರುವಂ ೆ 4ೇ?ದa ಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಅಡು ೆ ಮ-ೆಯ cೕ 'ಾಡು=>Cಾaಗ ಮ'ಾ)ಹ5
ಸು'ಾರು 2-00 ಗಂnೆ ಸಮಯದ ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ lಂಬfjಂದ ಬಂದು #ೈಂ1ಕ
ದೃ˜djಂದ ತS„ ೊಂ:ರು ಾ>-ೆಂದು,
f-ಾಂಕ:13-07-2017 ರಂದು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-4 ಪBuಾವ=ರವ*ೊಂf ೆ
ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವ ೆ ¹ÌçÃs ಇರುವ
ಗಭ ಗು: ೆ ಮು:ಪನು5 ಕcdಸುವ -ೆಪದ , .ಾಯಂ ಾಲ 5-00 ಗಂnೆ ಸಮಯದ ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು
4ೋ1 .ಾ\-1 ರವರ .ೊಂಟ ಮತು> tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಳನು5 #ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ ಮುcdCಾಗ, .ಾ\-1
ರವರು 3ರು† ೊಳ@ಲು ಪBಯ=5;Cಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು /-ೇ-ಾದರೂ ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 Oಾ ಾದರು
4ೇ?ದ*ೆ ತನ ೆ ೊ=>ರುವ +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬ?; /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮXನನು5 .ಾjಸು ೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೆದ ;,
'ಾನ;ಕ0ಾ1 .ಾ\-1 ರವರನು5 ಕು1ƒ;, Cೈlಕ0ಾ1 /ಶPÀÛಳ-ಾ51 'ಾ:, ಅ'ಾನ+ೕಯ0ಾ1
22
ಮೃಗದಂ ೆ ವ= ; ಇCೇ ೕ= .ಾ\-1 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV ಬಂCಾಗ#ೆಲ, ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವ ೆ
#ೈಂ1ಕ0ಾ1 Cೌಜ ನ) 'ಾಡು=>ದುa, ಎ ರವರು ತನ5 qLೈ /ಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಆ*ೋಗ)
+6ಾ ಸುವ -ೆಪದ 'ಾತ-ಾ:, ನಂತರ .ಾ\-1 ರವ*ೊಂf ೆ 0ಾ‹• ಆ› ನ +:vೕ
ಾ 'ಾ: tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋ ಸುವಂ ೆ ಮತು> ೕs 0ೆ• .ೈ‹ /ಂದ ಅAೕಲ
+:vೕ ಗಳ ಂ ಗಳನು5 Eೌs#ೋŽ 'ಾ: ಕಳ lಸುವಂ ೆ Lೆದ ;ದa ಂದ, .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಎ1
ರವರು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ 'ಾ:ರು ಾ>*ೆ.
2019-ೇ .ಾ ನ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-2 ಮತು> .ಾ\-4 ರವ*ೊಂf ೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ
ABೕ+Cಾ) 6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವ ೆ ಎ2 ರವರು ಒಣಗಲು 4ಾ3ರುವ LೆŽ
Aೕ‹ ಗಳನು5 ತಂದು ರೂಂ ನ ಇಡುವಂ ೆ =?;ದa ಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು LೆŽ Aೕ‹ ಗಳನು5 ಎ2
ರವರು 4ೇ?ದಂ ೆ ರೂಂ ನ ಇಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ2 ರವರು ರೂಂ ಒಳ ೆ 4ೋ1 Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3 .ಾ\-1
ರವರ ಬnೆdಯನು5 S†‡ tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd ಬಲವಂತ0ಾಗ Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾಡಲು
ಬಂCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು zೋ*ಾ1 3ರು† ೊಂ:ದa ಂದ Sಟುd 4ೋ1ರು ಾ>-ೆಂದು, ಇCೇ ೕ= ಎ1
ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\1 ರವ ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ Cೌಜ ನ) ಮುಂದುವ ;ದುa,
f-ಾಂಕ:25-04-2022 ರಂದು ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ತಮX ಕುಟುಂಬCೊಂf ೆ
ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 6:30 ಗಂnೆಯ ಎ1 ರವರು
.ಾ\-1 qLೈ ೆ 0ಾnಾ•Œ ಾ 'ಾ: ಎ2 ರೂಂ ನ ಇರುವಂ ೆ =?;ದುa ಅದರಂ ೆ .ಾ\-1
ರವರು ಎ2 ರವರ ರೂಂ ಬ? ಇCಾaಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರನು5 ಎ2 ರವರ ರೂಂ £ÉÆಳ ೆ
ಕ*ೆದು ೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3 ಎ2 ರವ ೆ Oಾ*ಾದರೂ ಬಂದ*ೆ -ೋ: ೊಳ @ವಂ ೆ =?;,
ಎ1 ರವರು Lೆತ>#ಾ1 ಾಂEೋ" 4ಾ3 ೊಂಡು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 ಎಂದು =?fದaರು
ಸಹ ಮಂಚದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮಲ1 ೋ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?Cಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ತನ5 ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ ೆ 4ೇಳ ವYCಾ1,
ೕಸ ೆ 4ೇಳ ವYCಾ1 =?; +*ೋ ;Cಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು ತನ ೆ ೕಸರು, K/ಸdi
ೊ=>ಲದವರು Oಾರು ಇಲ, ತನ ೆ ಎಲರೂ ೊತು> ಎಂದು 4ೇ? ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 .ಾ\-1ರವರು
Lೇಡ0ೆಂದರು 'ಾK ಕ žೇತB0ಾದ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನದ , ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ
ಬnೆdಗಳನು5 ೆ ೆದು ಮೃಗದಂ ೆ ವ= ;, ಅ'ಾನ+ೕಯ0ಾ1, ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3ಯ Uೕ#ೆ
#ೈಂ1ಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:, ಮನುಕುಲ 4ಾಗೂ ಸ'ಾಜ ತ#ೆತ1ƒಸುವಂತಹ lೕನ ಕೃತ)ವನು5
'ಾ:ರು ಾ>ನಂತ, ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV ಬಂCಾಗ ಹಲ0ಾರು .ಾ ಎ1 ಮತು>,
ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ Uೖ ೈ ಮುcd #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ರು ಾ>*ೆಂದು ಎ1 ರವರು 0ಾ‹• ಆ›
+:vೕ ಾ ಮುtಾಂತರ ಾ 'ಾ: tಾಸ1 ಅಂ ಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋ ಸುವಂ ೆ
ಒ ಾ>j;ರು ಾ>*ೆಂದು 4ಾಗೂ ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನ ೆV, ಬರುವ 4ೆಣು_ ಮಕVeೆ[ ಂf ೆ
#ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ ವ= ಸು=>ದa ಬ ೆƒ .ಾ\-7 ನಂfೕಶರವ ೆ 6ೆ-ಾ51 =?fದa ಂದ ಈ +6ಾರವನು5
4ೊರಗEೆ ಎ#ಾದರೂ 4ೇ?ದ*ೆ .ಾ\-7 ರವರನು5 ಎ1 ರವರು ತನ5 ಬ? ಇದa 'ಸೂ> /ಂದ
23
.ಾjಸುವYCಾ1 Lೆದ ೆ 4ಾ3ರು ಾ>*ೆಂದು, ಎ1 ರವರು ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರ 4ೆಸ ನ xಾಸ{
4ೇ? tಾj#ೆ 0ಾ; 'ಾಡುವYCಾ1 .ಾ\-1 ಮತು> .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವ ೆ
ವಂ†;ರು ಾ>*ೆಂದು ತ/tೆಯ ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎಲ ರವರ +ರುದ8 ಆ*ೋಪ ಕಂಡು §A¢gÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ J1
gÀªÀgÀÄ PÀ®A 376, 354(J)(I)(II), 506, 417, 342 gÉ/« 34 L.¦.¹ PÀ®A 4, 6
¥ÉÆÃPÉÆìà PÁAiÉÄÝ, PÀ®A 66(ಇ), 87 (ಎ) ಐ.n ಆ d, ಕಲಂ 3(ಎ›) 'ಾK ಕ ಸಂ.ೆIಗಳ ದುರುಪvೕಗ
ಪB=ಬಂಧ ಅ /ಯಮ-1988 ಮತು> ಕಲಂ 30 xಾ.ಾ{ಸ{ಗಳ ಆ /ಯಮ-1959 ೕತ) ಕೃತ)0ೆಸ1
ರು ಾ> -ೆಂದು ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ಎ2 ರವರು ಕಲಂ 354 (J) (I)(II), 342 ಐ'; gÉ/« 34 L.¦.¹ PÀ®A 11
(iv) 12 ೕ ೊ•ೕ PÁAiÉÄÝ ಮತು> ಕಲಂ 3(J¥sï) 'ಾK ಕ ಸಂ.ೆIಗಳ ದುರುಪvೕಗ ಪB=ಬಂಧ
ಅ /ಯಮ-1988 ೕತ) ಕೃvÀåªÉಸ1ರು ಾ>-ೆಂದು ಈ Cೋ•ಾ*ೋಪ ಾ ಪತBವನು5
/0ೇf; ೊಂ:ರು ೆ>,
(/0ೇದ-ೆ: ಈ ಪBಕರಣದ ಎ›.ಎ .ಎ ವರf ಮತು> ಇತ*ೇ Cಾಖ#ಾ=ಗಳನು5
ಪEೆಯLೇ ಾ1ದುa ಬಂದ ಕೂಡ#ೇ ಕಲಂ 173 (8) ;ಆi.'.; ೕ ಾ) 4ೆಚು‡ವ Cಾಖ#ಾ=ಗಳನು5
'ಾನ) ಘನ -ಾ)Oಾಲಯ ೆV /0ೇf; ೊಳ@#ಾಗುವYದು.)"
The offences alleged now, while filing the charge sheet, are quite
different from what was alleged at the time of registration of crime.
In the charge sheet, the offences alleged are as follows:
(a) Under Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 417, 342,
506, 34 of the IPC;
(b) Under Sections 4, 6, 11(iv), 12 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
(c) Under Sections 66E, 67A of the Information Technology
Act, 2000;
(d) Under Section 3 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention
of Misuse) Act, 1988
24
(e) Under Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959.
In the light of the offences being under five enactments, I deem it
appropriate to consider them offencewise.
10. Let me first consider the offence alleged under the
Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988. Whether
offence under this enactment can be alleged in the teeth of the
allegation need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the
matter. A coordinate Bench of this Court had clearly interpreted the
Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 in Dr.
SHIVAMURTHY MURUGHA SHARANARU v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA1 to hold that it would not become applicable to the
religious institutions in the State of Karnataka. The said judgment is
followed by this Court in Dr. SHIVAMURTHY MURUGHA
SHARANARU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA2, wherein it has been
held as follows:
".... .... ....
A. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE)
ACT, 1988.
1
W.P.No.2331 of 2023 disposed on 22-05-2023
2
2024 SCC OnLine Kar.19105
25
11. The 5th charge is for offences punishable under
Section 3 and 7 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1988. Sections 3 and 7 read as follows:
"3. Prohibition of use of religious
institutions for certain purposes.--No religious
institution or manager thereof shall use or allow
the use of any premises belonging to, or under the
control of, the institution--
(a) for the promotion or propagation of any
political activity; or
(b) for the harbouring of any person accused or
convicted of an offence under any law for
the time being in force; or
(c) for the storing of any arms or ammunition;
or
(d) for keeping any goods or articles in
contravention of law for the time being in
force; or
(e) for erecting or putting up of any
construction or fortification, including
basements, bunkers, towers or walls
without a valid licence or permission under
any law for the time being in force; or
(f) for the carrying on of any lawful or
subversive act prohibited under any law for
the time being in force or in contravention
of any order made by any court; or
(g) for the doing of any act which promotes or
attempts to promote disharmony or feelings
of enmity, hatred or ill-will between
different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities;
or
(h) for the carrying on of any activity prejudicial
to the sovereignty, unity and integrity of
India; or
26
(i) for the doing of any act in contravention of
the provisions of the Prevention of Insults
to National Honour Act, 1971 (69 of 1971).
.........
7. Penalties.--Where any religious institution
or manager thereof contravenes the provisions of
Section 3, Section 4, Section 5 or Section 6, the
manager and every person connected with such
contravention shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five
years and with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees."
(Emphasis supplied)
Sections 3 and 7 as quoted supra need not detain this
Court for long or delve deep into the matter qua its
interpretation as a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a case
concerning the same accused, in Writ Petition No. 2331 of
2023 disposed of on 22-05-2023 has held as follows:--
"A. THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF
MISUSE) ACT, 1988 IN A NUTSHELL:
(i) This Act is a small statute in all comprising of ten
sections. Itsone line Preamble reads: 'An Act to
prevent the misuse of religious institutions for
political and other purposes.' Section 1 gives the
title; sub-section (2) of Section 1 gives the Act a
pan-India application; sub-section (3) fixes 26
May 1988 as the date w.e.f. which the Act has
come into force. Section (2) is the 'dictionary
clause' of the statute. It inter alia defines the
terms like ammunition, arms, political activity,
political party, religious institution, manager of
such institution, etc.
(ii) Section 3 of the statute prohibits use of any
religious institution or its premises for promotion
of political activity, harboring of any
accused/convict or for storing arms &
ammunitions; it also bars commission of any
unlawful or subversive acts or any act which
promotes disharmony, hatred, enmity or ill-will
between communities/groups of people. Further,
its prohibits extends to any act calculated to
insult the National Honour. Section (4) prohibits,
subject to certain exceptions, entry of
arms/ammunition or persons carrying them into
religious institution. Section 5 prohibits use of funds &
27
properties of 'religious institutions' for political party or
activity or for the commission of any offence. Section 6
prohibits allowing of any ceremony, festival,
congregation, procession or assembly organized by or
for any political party into the religious institution.
(iii) Section 7 of the statute prescribes the penalties; sub-
section (1) of section 8 provides for disqualification &
removal of employees of any religious institution on
conviction for the offence under this Act; sub-section
(2) of section 8 empowers the Criminal Court to injunct
the accused from exercising the powers and duties of
his office/post in the religious institution 'pending trial'
of criminal cases; sub-section (3) provides for filling of
vacancy in such a contingency arising out of order of
removal/restraint. Section 9 enjoins employees of the
religious institutions with a duty to give information to
the Police about the contravention of any provisions of
the Act; it also prescribes penalty for infraction of this
duty. Section 10 repeals the ordinance that preluded
this Act.
B. AS TO APPLICABILITY OF THE 1988 ACT TO THE CASE
OF THE PONTIFF:
(i) Petitioner-Pontiff happens to be one of the accused in
the subject criminal cases and he having been
arrested, continues to be in the judicial custody since
01.09.2022. After investigation, the Police have filed
the charge sheet and the trial Court has taken
cognizance of the alleged offences which prima facie
involve moral turpitude; these offences are punishable
under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) read with
section 149of IPCandsections 17, 5(1) & 6 of POCSO
Act, 2012, is apparent from the prosecution papers. As
already mentioned above, the Government Order dated
13.12.2022 appointing the Administrator for the Mutt &
its institutions, was put in challenge inter alia by the
Petitioner & others in two Writ Petitions Nos.
25316/2022 & 25318/2022. This Court has handed the
judgment today invalidating the said appointment, of
course with some observations. Be that as it may.
(ii) Learned Sr. Advocate Mr. C.V. Nagesh appearing for
the Petitioner argued that going by the intent & policy
content of the 1988 Act, there is absolutely no scope
for the invocation of any of its provisions and therefore,
the impugned order is liable to be voided. This is
disputed by the learned A.G. In construing the nature,
scope & application of plenary legislations like the one
at hands, courts are entitled to take into account such
external & historical facts as may be necessary. They
28
can also have regard to the surrounding circumstances
that obtained at the time whilst the statute was
enacted. This is the practice in all the civilized
jurisdiction. Lord Halsbury in Herron v. Rathmines and
Rathgar Improvement Commissioners observed at
page 502 as under:
........ ........ .......
(iii) The 1988 Act came to be enacted by the
Parliament when there was terrorism & turmoil in
the State of Punjab and around perpetrated by
unscrupulous individuals attempting to threaten
the sovereignty & integrity of the nation; a sort of
secessionist tendency was exhibited by
generating fear amongst the masses; the shrines
& religious places as holy as the Golden Temple
in Amritsar were being misused for creating
communal disharmony & hatred. These nefarious
acts and other of the kind, the statute in question
seeks to proscribe and makes them punishable.
All other offences howsoever gruesome, would
not fit into the restrictive framework of the
statute, notwithstanding the enomity of moral
turpitude involved therein.
(iv) Courts should be less willing to extend express
meanings if it is clear that the statute in question
was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in
its operation rather than liberal or permissive.
How liberally a statute is to be construed
depends on the nature of enactment, and
strictness or otherwise of the words in which the
legislature has expressed its intent. Therefore
there is force in the vehement submission of Mr.
Nagesh that the 1988 Act mainly focuses on
serious & distinct acts of nefarious designs that
have something to do with secessionist
tendencies, terrorism, or such other offences,
ejusdem generis. This view gains support from
the texture & architecture of the various
provisions in the Act, namely, the charging and
penal sections. The offences alleged against the
Petitioner - Pontiff apparently lack the nature &
kind of the acts contemplated by the Act,
although what is alleged against him are grave.
Therefore, this Act is not applicable.
C. AS TO INVOKABILITY OF SECTION 8(2) OF THE 1988
ACT:
(i) Mr. CV Nagesh secondly contended that provisions of
Section 8(2) of the 1988 Act were not invokable in the
29
given fact matrix of the case, assuming that the said
Act is otherwise applicable. He structures this
argument on the basis of the expression "pending trial"
employed in sub-section (2) of Section 8. He also told
the Court that trial is a concept obtaining in criminal
jurisprudence; there is no indication the provision in
question has employed the term with a different
meaning; and that, according to him, unless the trial
commences, the question of pendency of trial would
not arise. Learned AG disputed this contending that the
term should receive a liberal interpretation to include
all criminal cases wherein, on the filing of the charge-
sheet the cognizance of offence has been taken by the
Court. He hastened to add that Section 8(2) has the
characteristic of civil law although it is enacted in a
penal statute and therefore, strict construction is not
warranted.
(ii) Let me examine the nature, scope & meaning of
Section 8(2) which has the following text:
"Where any manager or other employee of a
religious institution is accused of an offence under this
Act and a charge-sheet for the prosecution of such
person is filed in any court and the court is of the
opinion, after considering the charge-sheet and after
hearing the prosecution and the accused, that a prima
facie case exists, it shall pass an order or direction
restraining the person from exercising the powers or
discharging the duties of his office or post pending
trial."
This provision authorizes the trial judge to
injunct any manager or other employee of a religious
institution who happens to be an accused, from
exercising the powers or discharging the duties of his
office or post 'pending trial'. The questions, what is
meant by 'trial' and when the 'trial commences', are no
longer res integra. The following observations of the
Apex Court at paragraph 38 of Hardeep Singh v. State
of Punjab are a complete answer to the said questions:
"...the law can be summarized to the effect
that as 'trial' means determination of issues adjudging
the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has
to be aware of what is the case against him and it is
only at the stage of framing of the charges that the
court informs him of the same, the 'trial' commences
only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not
approve the view taken by the courts that in a
criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being
taken..."
30
Admittedly, in the subject criminal cases, the
investigation having been completed, charge sheet has
been filed and the trial court has taken cognizance of
the offences, is true. However, the charges are yet to
be framed after hearing the prosecution and the
accused, as prescribed by this section. In the light of
the observations in HARDEEP SINGH, the trial cannot
be said to have commenced; trial that has not
commenced, cannot be said to 'pend'. If that be so, it
is not a case of 'pending trial', as contemplated by
Section 8(2). Thus, the pendency of trial as being a
sine qua non for the invocation of sub-section (2) of
section 8, the subject application could not have been
moved in the court below.
(iii) The vehement contention of learned AG that the
expression 'pending trial' employed in section 8(2)
should receive liberal construction since that provision
has characteristics of a 'civil law', is difficult to
countenance, regard being had to its text. The
provision which employs concepts of criminal law, such
as, 'accused', 'offence', 'charge sheet', 'prosecution',
etc. as its building blocks. Merely because, it empowers
Criminal Court, to issue restraint order, one cannot at
once hastily jump to the contra conclusion. Thus, the
said provision having in its muscle criminal law
elements in abundance, cannot be treated as a piece of
civil law. It hardly needs to be stated that normally,
penal laws are construed with usual strictness; the
argued case of the Respondent - State, does not carve
out an exception to this general norm.
(iv) It is not uncommon that a penal statute may have a
few provisions civil in nature. Illustratively,
section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 provides for awarding maintenance and, section
357A provides for awarding compensation to the
victims of crime; such provisions arguably can be
construed as being civil in nature. However, that is not
the case when it comes to the text & context of section
8(2) of the 1988 Act. When the Parliament has made a
dictionary clause for whole of the Act, leaving the term
'pending trial' undefined; there is no reason for not
construing the said term as belonging to the realm of
criminal jurisprudence. If something different was
intended, the Parliament would have indicated the
same by an appropriate text. Courts by interpretative
process cannot rewrite the statute.
(v) The above approach of this Court to the provisions of
Section 8(2) gains support from the following
31
observations at paragraphs 42, 43 & 44 of Hardeep
Singh, supra:
"...It is a settled principle of law that an
interpretation which leads to the conclusion that a
word used by the legislature is redundant, should be
avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has
deliberately and consciously used the words for
carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim
"A VerbisLegisNon Est Recedendum" which means,
"from the words of law, there must be no departure"
has to be kept in mind... The court cannot proceed
with an assumption that the legislature enacting the
statute has committed a mistake and where the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the
court cannot go behind the language of the statute so
as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a
political reformer or of a wise counsel to the
legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing
that the legislature intended what it has said and
even if there is some defect in the phraseology etc., it
is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The
statute requires to be interpreted without doing any
violence to the language used therein. The court
cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for
the reason that it has no power to legislate... No word
in a statute has to be construed as surplusage. No
word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless.
Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent
fully and completely. While construing a provision, full
effect is to be given to the language used therein,
giving reference to the context and other provisions
of the Statute. By construction, a provision should not
be reduced to a "dead letter" or "useless lumber". An
interpretation which renders a provision an otiose
should be avoided otherwise it would mean that in
enacting such a provision, the legislature was
involved in "an exercise in futility" and the product
came as a "purposeless piece" of legislation and that
the provision had been enacted without any purpose
and the entire exercise to enact such a provision was
"most unwarranted besides being uncharitable..."
D. AS TO THE PHRASE 'carrying on of any unlawful or
subversive act' EMPLOYED UNDER SECTION 3(f) OF THE
1988 ACT:
(i) Mr. Nagesh, draws attention of the court to the
expression 'carrying on of any unlawful or
subversive act' employed in clause (f) of section
3 and contended that the said phrase is used in
distinction to the phrase the 'commission of any
unlawful act'; this according to him is to signify
that the alleged pernicious act should have
elements of continuity and seriousness, not only
as an ordinary offence define under the Penal
32
Code, 1860, but something more & distinct. This
submission merits acceptance and, reasons for
this are not far to seek: The 1988 Act has been
enacted keeping in view the turmoil created by
'anti-national' acts that were perpetrated mainly
within the precincts of shrines, temples & other
religious institutions in Punjab & around, as
already discussed above. The historical
background of the statute needs to be borne in
mind whilst construing its provisions, need no
reiteration. The phrase 'carrying on of any
unlawful or subversive act', employed in Section
3(f) of the Act obviously means such serious acts
that are not just committed as sporadic acts, but
those which have the factors of continuity, in
their perpetration or effect. In other words, they
do not have sporadicity, but have continuity, both
in degree and duration. Otherwise, the
Parliament would have employed the usual
phrase such as 'commission of an act'.
(ii) Mr. Nagesh's reliance on K.P.S.
Sathyamoorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu in a measure
come to his aid.
The Madras High Court at paragraph 24, observed
as under:
"...So far as the third above Section i.e.
Section 3(g) of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is concerned,
it requires the premises or the religious
institution i.e. the Kanchimatt to have been used
to promote disharmony or feeling of enmity or
hatred or ill-will between different religious,
racial, language or religion groups or castes or
communities. Here again, the Section requires
the use of the premises or religious institution
as a place or instrument for promoting
disharmony or hatred or ill-will. That the
framers of law have not intended an isolated
event or utterance but made use of the term
"use", which would mean habitual, well -
designed with continuity making use of the
premises or institution for repeated commission
of the act in the usual manner and therefore an
isolated or casual utterance or reference made
cannot be construed to mean using the premises
or the religious institution since the term "use",
at this juncture, has got wider connotation in
the context of the case..."
(iii) To put it in a grammatical sense, there is a subtle
difference between 'commission of an act' and
'carrying on of an act; the former roughly falls
33
into past perfect tense, whereas the latter fits
into the present perfect continuous tense.
In Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik, the Apex Court
has said: "...present perfect continuous tense is used
for a position which began at some time in the past
and is still continuing...". It hardly needs to be stated
that in the construction of statutes, their words and
phrases must be interpreted in their ordinary
grammatical sense unless there be something in the
context, or in the object of the statute in which they
occur or in the circumstances in which they are used,
to show that they were used in a special sense different
from their ordinary grammatical sense vide Corporation
of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver
Island. Added, the offences alleged against the
Petitioner under IPC and POCSO, apparently
having elements of sporadicity, do not fit into the
architecture of section 3(f) of 1988 Act. The
contra contention of learned AG if accepted,
would bring into precincts of the statute which
textually speaking the Parliament did not even
remotely intend.
E. AS TO MEANING OF THE TERM 'religious institution'
UNDER SECTION 2(f) OF THE 1988 ACT:
(i) There is force in the submission of learned Senior
Advocate Mr. Nagesh that in the dictionary clause of
the Act, 'religious institution' has been defined
and the impugned order transcends this
definition in extending the restraint beyond the
Mutt, to even the educational institutions run
under its aegis. The operative portion of the said
order has the following text:
"Requisition given by the Investigating Officer
dated 28.11.2022 to pass an order under
Section 8(2) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention
of Misuse) Act, 1988 is allowed. Accused No. 1 is
restrained from exercising the Powers or discharging
the duties of SJM Mutt and other institutions running
under the said Mutt as a Pontiff and head of the
institution pending conclusion of trial.'
Learned AG appearing for the State contended
that the Mutt and its educational institutions in all
numbering 105, in terms of their management are so
intertwined with each other that they constitute a
singularity and, the Pontiff manages & administers both
of them; he draws attention of the Court to a
paragraph in the registered Trust Deed which indicates
that the Pontiff shall be the 'supreme authority', there
being none above nor below who can veto his
34
decisions. Therefore, he had sought for placing a liberal
interpretation on this term, to include such institutions
thickly associated with the religious institution. He
highlights the possible consequences of placing
restrictive meaning on the said term.
(ii) Let me examine the definition itself as given in section
2(f); it has the following text:
"religious institution' means an
institution for the promotion of any religion or
persuasion, and includes any place or premises
used as a place of public religious worship, by
whatever name or designation known."
Penal statutes in a modern State are
actuated with some policy to curb some public
evil. Such statues are primarily directed to the
problems before the Legislature based on
information derived from past and present
experiences. They may also be designed by use of
general words to cover similar problems arising
in the future. Therefore, ordinarily, the
legislatures in their wisdom employ a 'dictionary
clause', so that the words & phrases employed in
the statute are construed as provided in its
definition clause and, not in their common
parlance. It hardly needs to be stated that, in any
language, words do not have fixed contours as
eruditely said by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
in Towne v. Eisner:
"...A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used..."
Similarly, it is apt to recall what Maxwell writes in
this regard:
"...The words of a statute, when there is
doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the
sense in which they best harmonize with the subject
of the enactment. Their meaning is found not so much
in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of
language, nor even in its popular use, as in the
subject, or in the occasion on which they are used,
and the object to be attained. Grammatically, words
may cover a case; but whenever a statute or
document is to be construed, it must be construed not
according to the mere ordinary general meaning of
the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of
the words as applied to the subject matter with regard
to which they are used, unless there is something
35
which renders it necessary to read them in a sense,
which is not their ordinary sense in the English
language so applied..."
(iii) If, at the beginning was the word, the word changes its
meaning as soon as it is put to the test of reality.
Statutes change not only by formal legislative
amendment but also and even more by an
imperceptible metamorphosis of the established
thought, political usages and habits. It is pertinent to
see what Justice G.P. Singh says:
"...The problem of interpretation is a problem
of meaning of words and their effectiveness as a
medium of expression to communicate a particular
thought. A word is used to refer to some object or
symbol in the real world and this object or symbol has
been assigned a technical name referent. Word and
phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references
to referents. But words of any language are capable of
referring to different referent in different contexts and
times. More over, there is always the difficulty of
borderline cases falling within or outside the
connotation of a word. Language, therefore, is likely
to be misunderstood. In ordinary conversation or
correspondence it is generally open for the parties to
obtain clarification if the referent is imperfectly
communicated. The position is, however, different in
the interpretation of statute law. A statute as A
statute as enacted cannot be explained by the
individual opinions of the legislators, not even by a
resolution of the entire Legislature. After the enacting
process is over the Legislature becomes functus officio
so far as that particular statute is concerned, so that it
cannot itself interpret it. The Legislature can no doubt
amend or repeal any previous statute or can declare
its meaning but all this can be done only by a fresh
statute after going through the normal process of law
making..."
(iv) Section 2(f) is a case of 'means and includes' definition.
The Legislature has power to define a word even
artificially. So the meaning of a word in the definition
clause of a statute may either be restrictive or
expansive. When a word is defined to mean such and
such, the definition is prima facie restrictive &
exhaustive. Where the definition of a word is inclusive,
its meaning is prima facie extensive. When the inclusive
part of a definition specifically states what all is
included, Courts in the interpretative process cannot
widen such inclusion. The Apex Court in P.
Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology has
discussed the matter as under:
36
"...A particular expression is often defined by the
Legislature by using the word 'means' or the word
'includes'. Sometimes the words 'means and includes'
are used. The use of the word 'means' indicates that
"definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other
meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put
down in definition". The word 'includes' when used,
enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as
to comprehend not only such things as they signify
according to their natural import but also those things
which the clause declares that they shall include. The
words "means and includes", on the other hand,
indicate "an exhaustive explanation of the meaning
which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be
attached to these words or expressions". The use of
the words "means and includes" in Rule 2(b) would,
therefore, suggest that the definition of 'college' is
intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and
would cover only the educational institutions falling in
the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other
educational institutions are not comprehended..."
(v) The term 'religious institution' employed in
Section 8(2) does not have elasticity which the
learned AG wants this Court to ascribe to it. It
does not admit anything that is not provided in
the inclusive part of the definition under Section
2(f). Even in this inclusive part, the educational
institutions of the Mutt do not fit, because of the
employment of the qualifying expression in the
inclusive part, namely, 'a place of public religious
worship'. The educational institutions are
certainly not such a place. Thus, the impugned
order transcends the statutory definitions to the
prejudice of the Petitioner and therefore, suffers
from an added legal infirmity.
In the above circumstances, this Petition
succeeds; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the
impugned order, costs having been made easy.
Nothing herein above observed shall cast its
shadow on the trial and decision making in the subject
criminal cases."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the finding that the very Act is not
applicable to the subject religious institution, as the Act
was notified at the time of reign of terror in Punjab and
Haryana, the Act had been brought into effect which
deals with search of arms in religious institutions. In the
light of the finding rendered by the co-ordinate Bench
qua the same parties, it is ununderstandable as to how
37
the charge for offences punishable under Sections 3 and
7 supra of the Act, could even be framed and the said
charge being permitted to continue, would on the face of
it, become an abuse of the process of law.
12. A herculean effort that is made by the learned
Additional Special Public Prosecutor to justify the action
of laying down the charge for the afore-quoted offences
under the Act would tumble down in the teeth of the
aforesaid finding, rendered by the coordinate Bench. It is
submitted across the Bar that the judgment of the co-ordinate
Bench though is tossed before the Division Bench, there is no
interim order of stay of the findings recorded by the coordinate
Bench. What is directed by the Division Bench is change in the
Administrator and nothing against the finding recorded.
Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the 5th charge laid
against the petitioner is unsustainable and requires to be
obliterated."
In the light of the reasons rendered by the coordinate Bench which
is subsequently followed in several cases it can be safely inferred
that the offence under the Religious Institutions (Prevention of
Misuse) Act, 1988 is loosely laid against the petitioner. Therefore,
the same needs to be obliterated.
11. The other offence is under Section 66E of the IT Act.
Section 66E od the IT Act reads as follows:
"66-E. Punishment for violation of privacy.--
Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes
or transmits the image of a private area of any person
without his or her consent, under circumstances violating
the privacy of that person, shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not
exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both.
38
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section--
(a) "transmit" means to electronically send a visual image
with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons;
(b) "capture", with respect to an image, means to videotape,
photograph, film or record by any means;
(c) "private area" means the naked or undergarment clad
genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast;
(d) "publishes" means reproduction in the printed or
electronic form and making it available for public;
(e) "under circumstances violating privacy" means
circumstances in which a person can have a reasonable
expectation that--
(i) he or she could disrobe in privacy, without
being concerned that an image of his private
area was being captured; or
(ii) any part of his or her private area would not be
visible to the public, regardless of whether that
person is in a public or private place."
This section punishes whoever intentionally or knowingly captures,
publishes or transmits image of the private area of any person with
or without his or her consent. In the entire complaint or the charge
sheet, there is no allegation that the pontiff has captured the image
of the private area of the victim and has transmitted the same.
Therefore, there is no offence under Section 66E of the IT Act that
39
can be laid against the petitioner. The next offence is Section 67A
of the IT Act which reads as follows:
"67-A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of
material containing sexually explicit act, etc., in
electronic form.--Whoever publishes or transmits or
causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic
form any material which contains sexually explicit act or
conduct shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to five years
and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the
event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years
and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees."
This section punishes for publishing or transmitting of material
containing sexually explicit images in the electronic form. This again
is loosely laid against the petitioner, as there is no allegation or
complaint or narration in the summary of the charge sheet that
there is transmission of material containing sexually explicit act.
Therefore, the offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000
are unsustainable.
12. The third one is offence punishable under Section 30 of
the Arms Act, 1959. Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959 reads as
follows:
40
"30. Punishment for contravention of licence or
rule.--Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or
any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder, for
which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both."
Section 30 punishes a person for contravention of licence or a rule.
Whoever would contravene the condition of a licence or any
provision of this Act and where no punishment is provided
elsewhere will be punished. A bald allegation is made against
accused No.2 that he has threatened the victim about 7 years ago
showing his revolver. Except this bald allegation, there is no
whisper about the usage, mainly, when, where and how the
licenced arm was used. It is not the case of the complainant that
the arm was not licensed. It is the contravention of the conditions
of licence, which is not proved even to the slightest. Therefore, the
said offence is also loosely laid against accused No.2. Three of the
heads of the offences that are noted hereinabove are therefore
untenable. What remains now are the offences under the IPC and
the POCSO Act. They pertain to the allegation of rape, sexual
harassment, intimidation, cheating or otherwise. Even under the
POCSO Act they are the same, of sexual assault on a victim. A
41
perusal at the complaint, summary of the charge sheet and
statement of witnesses, are all indicative of the fact that incidents
that have happened in the year 2017 and 2019 at best, are
complained of in the year 2024, that too after the pontiff registers a
crime against certain inimical persons.
13. Before embarking upon consideration with regard to the
facts obtaining in the case at hand, now it is necessary to notice the
judicial landscape with regard to delay in registration of such crime,
alleging offences of rape, that has taken place decades ago or
several years ago.
13.1. The Apex Court in the case of KISHAN
SINGH v. GURPAL SINGH3 holds as follows:
"22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging
an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible
explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an
explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for
quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the
allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured
version of events. In such cases the court should carefully
examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated
litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may
initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side
3
(2010) 8 SCC 775
42
with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the
criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is
lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party
because of a private and personal grudge and to
enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal
proceedings, the court may take a view that it
amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts
and circumstances of the case. (Vide Chandrapal
Singh v. Maharaj Singh [(1982) 1 SCC 466 : 1982 SCC (Cri)
249 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 : AIR 1982 SC 1238]; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC
(Cri) 426 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604]; G.
Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513 : (2000) 2 SCC 636 : AIR 2000 SC 754];
and GorigePentaiah v. State of A.P[(2008) 12 SCC
531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446])"
13.2. The Apex Court, on the aforesaid issue, in the case
of PARKASH CHAND v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH4 has
held as follows:
"20. There is admittedly a delay of 7 months in
lodging the FIR in the case of alleged rape. If the case
is reported immediately apart from the inherent
strength of the case flowing from genuineness
attributable to such promptitude, the perceptible
advantage would be the medical examination to which
the prosecutrix can be subjected and the result of such
examination in a case where there is a resistance. It is
the case of the prosecution that she raised hue and cry
and therefore apparently she would have resisted.
Possibly, a medical examination may have revealed
4
(2019) 5 SCC 628
43
signs of any resistance or injuries. In this case the High
Court has proceeded on the basis of testimony of the
prosecutrix and sought to fortify it by the extra-judicial
confession made before PW4 and PW5."
13.3. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH PATEL v.
STATE OF JHARKHAND5, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
16. Further, there is an inordinate delay of nearly
11 days in lodging the FIR with the jurisdictional police.
The explanation given by the prosecutrix in not lodging the
complaint within the reasonable period after the alleged offence
committed by the appellant is that she went to her house and
narrated the offence committed by the appellant to her mother
and on the assurance of Purnendu Babu, PW 3, the mother
remained silent for two to four days on the assurance that he
will take action in the matter. Further, the explanation given
by the prosecutrix regarding the delay is that at the time
of commission of offence the appellant had threatened
her that in case she lodges any complaint against him,
she would be killed. The said explanation is once again
not a tenable explanation. Further, in the reason assigned
by the High Court regarding not lodging the complaint
immediately or within a reasonable period, it has
observed that in case of rape, the victim girl hardly dares
to go to the police station and make the matter open to
all out of fear of stigma which will be attached with the
girls who are ravished. Also, the reason assigned by the trial
court which justifies the explanation offered by the prosecution
regarding the delay in lodging the complaint against the
appellant has been erroneously accepted by the High Court in
the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999,
decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] . In addition to that, further
observation made by the High Court regarding the delay is that
the prosecutrix as well as her mother tried to get justice by
interference of PW 3, who is a common friend of both of them
5
(2013) 3 SCC 791
44
and PW 4, the doctor with whom the prosecutrix was working as
a nurse. When the same did not materialise, after a lapse
of 11 days, the FIR was lodged with the jurisdictional
police for the offence said to have been committed by the
appellant. Further, the High Court has also proceeded to
record the reason that the prosecutrix had every
opportunity to give different date of occurrence instead
of 14-2-1993 but she did not do it which reason is not
tenable in law. Further, the High Court accepted the
observation made by the learned trial Judge wherein the
explanation given by the prosecutrix in her evidence
about being terrorised to be killed by the appellant in
case of reporting the matter to the police, is wholly
untenable in law. The same is not only unnatural but also
improbable. Therefore, the inordinate delay of 11 days in
lodging the FIR against the appellant is fatal to the
prosecution case. This vital aspect regarding inordinate delay
in lodging the FIR not only makes the prosecution case
improbable to accept but the reasons and observations made by
the trial court as well as the High Court in the impugned
judgments are wholly untenable in law and the same cannot be
accepted. Therefore, the findings and observations made by the
courts below in accepting delay in lodging the FIR by assigning
unsatisfactory reasons cannot be accepted by this Court as the
findings and reasons are erroneous in law.
17. Further in the case in hand, PW 3, who is a common
friend of the appellant and the prosecutrix, according to the
prosecution case, has categorically stated that he does not know
anything about the case for which he had received the notice
from the court to depose in the case. PW 4 has stated in his
evidence that the prosecutrix was getting nursing training
privately in his chamber for the last three years as on the date
of his examination, namely, on 16-11-1995. He has stated in his
examination-in-chief that on 14-2-1993 when he opened his
chamber the prosecutrix came to his chamber and further stated
that her mother did not tell him anything. He has been treated
as hostile by the prosecution, he was cross-examined by the
prosecutor, in his cross-examination he has categorically stated
that he has told the police that he does not know anything
about the incident. He has further stated that neither the
prosecutrix nor her mother told him about the incident and
further stated that he does not know anything about the case.
45
18. Further, neither the doctor nor the IO has been
examined before the trial court to prove the prosecution case.
The appellant was right in bringing to the notice of the trial
court as well as the High Court that the non-examination of the
aforesaid two important witnesses in the case has prejudiced
the case of the appellant for the reason that if the doctor would
have been examined he could have elicited evidence about any
injury sustained by the prosecutrix on her private part or any
other part of her body and also the nature of hymen layer, etc.
so as to corroborate the story of the prosecution that the
prosecutrix suffered unbearable pain while the appellant
committed rape on her. The non-examination of the doctor who
had examined her after 12 days of the occurrence has not
prejudiced the case of the defence for the reason that the
prosecutrix was examined after 12 days of the offence alleged
to have been committed by the appellant because by that time
the sign of rape must have disappeared. Even if it was
presumed that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured and
no injury was found on her private part or any other part of her
body, finding of such rupture of hymen may be for several
reasons in the present age when the prosecutrix was a working
girl and that she was not leading an idle life inside the four walls
of her home. The said reasoning assigned by the High Court is
totally erroneous in law.
19. In view of the above statement of evidence of PW 3
and PW 4 whose evidence is important for the prosecution to
prove the chain of events as per its case, the statement of
evidence of the aforesaid witnesses has seriously affected the
prosecution case. Therefore, the courts below could not have,
by any stretch of imagination, on the basis of the evidence on
record held that the appellant is guilty of committing the offence
under Section 376 IPC. Further, according to the prosecutrix,
PW 3 who is alleged to have rescued her from the place of
occurrence of offence, has clearly stated in his evidence that he
does not know anything about the incident in his statement
thereby he does not support the version of the prosecution. The
High Court has erroneously accepted the finding of the trial
court that the appellant has not been prejudiced for non-
examination of the doctor for the reason that she was working
as a nurse in the private hospital of PW 4 and being a nurse she
knew that the information on commission of rape is grave in
nature and she would not have hesitated in giving the
46
information to the police if the occurrence was true. Further, the
finding of the courts below that non-examination of the IO by
the prosecution who has conducted the investigation in this case
has not caused prejudice to the case of the appellant, since the
prosecution witnesses were unfavourable to the prosecution who
were either examined or declared hostile by the prosecution,
which reasoning is wholly untenable in law. Therefore, the
finding and reasons recorded by both the trial court as well as
the High Court regarding non-examination of the abovesaid two
witnesses in the case has not prejudiced the case of the
appellant is totally an erroneous approach of the courts below.
For this reason also, we have to hold that the findings and
reasons recorded in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal
No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] that the trial
court was justified in holding that the prosecution has proved
the charge against the appellant and that he has committed the
offence on the prosecutrix, is totally erroneous and the same is
wholly unsustainable in law.
20. The finding with regard to the sentence of the
appellant recorded by the trial court which is accepted by the
High Court on the basis of the solitary testimony of the
prosecutrix which is supported by the evidence of her mother,
PW 2 is once again an erroneous approach on the part of the
High Court. The offence of rape alleged to have been committed
by the appellant is established without any evidence as the
prosecution failed to prove the chain of events as stated by the
prosecutrix. Since the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 did not
support the prosecution case, but on the other hand, their
evidence has seriously affected the story of the prosecution.
Therefore, the courts below could not have found the appellant
as guilty of the charge and convicted and sentenced him for the
offence of rape.
21. Further, one more strong circumstance which has
weighed in our mind is that they had good acquaintance with
each other as they were classmates and they were in terms of
meeting with each other. The defence counsel had alternatively
argued that the appellant had sex with her consent. The High
Court proceeded not to accept the said argument by giving
reasons that the appellant failed to explain as to under what
circumstance he had sex with the consent of the prosecutrix
47
when she was confined in his house. The contention urged on
behalf the appellant that it was consensual sex with the
prosecutrix is to be believed for the reason that she herself had
gone to the house of the appellant though her version is that
she went there at the request of the appellant to take back her
book which she had given to him. This is a strong circumstance
to arrive at the conclusion that the defence case of the appellant
is of consensual sex. Further, the prosecution case is that after
the offence was committed by the appellant he had locked the
room from outside and left. After half an hour Purnendu Babu,
PW 3 arrived and unlocked the room. This story is improbable to
believe and the prosecutrix has not lodged the complaint either
immediately or within reasonable period from the date of
occurrence. The complaint was indisputably lodged after a lapse
of 11 days by the prosecutrix. In this regard, it is pertinent to
mention the judgment of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P.
[(2008) 15 SCC 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751] , the relevant
paragraph of which is extracted hereunder for better
appreciation in support of our conclusion: (SCC p. 141, para 12)
"12. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh case
[State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 316] to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375
and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions
relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A
of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be
raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case
of alleged rape. It is however significant that Sections 113-A
and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the
same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of
abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised
against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear
presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar
presumption with respect to rape is visualised as the
presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in
its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as
allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a
prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness
whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be
presumed that her statement should, without exception, be
taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can,
at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no
injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely.
We believe that it is under these principles that this case,
and others such as this one, need to be examined."
48
22. For the aforesaid reasons the prosecution case is not
natural, consistent and probable to believe to sustain the
conviction and sentence of the appellant for the alleged offence
said to have been committed by him.
23. The trial court as well as the High Court should
have appreciated the evidence on record with regard to
delay and not giving proper explanation regarding delay
of 11 days in filing FIR by the prosecutrix and non-
examination of the complainant witnesses viz. the doctor
and the IO which has not only caused prejudice to the
case of the appellant but also the case of prosecution has
created reasonable doubt in the mind of this Court.
Therefore, the benefit of doubt must enure to the
appellant. As we have stated above, the testimony of the
prosecutrix is most unnatural and improbable to believe
and therefore it does not inspire confidence for
acceptance of the same for sustaining the conviction and
sentence. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned
judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11-
2006 (Jhar)] requires to be interfered with by this Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and
set aside the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of
1999, decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] . If the appellant has
executed bail bonds, the same may be discharged."
13.4. In the case of MOHD. ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR
6
PRADESH , the Apex Court holds as follows:
".... .... ....
26. The obtaining factual matrix has to be appreciated on
the touchstone of the aforesaid parameters.
27. Be it clearly stated here that delay in lodging
FIR in cases under Section 376 IPC would depend upon
facts of each case and this Court has given immense
6
(2015) 7 SCC 272
49
allowance to such delay, regard being had to the trauma
suffered by the prosecutrix and various other factors, but
a significant one, in the present case, it has to be
appreciated from a different perspective. The prosecutrix
was missing from home. In such a situation, it was a
normal expectation that either the mother or the brother
would have lodged a missing report at the police station.
The same was not done. This action of PW 2 really throws
a great challenge to common sense. No explanation has
been offered for such delay. The learned trial Judge has
adverted to this facet on an unacceptable backdrop by
referring to the principle that prosecutrix suffered from
trauma and the constraint of the social stigma. The
prosecutrix at that time was nowhere on the scene. It is
the mother who was required to inform the police about
missing of her grown-up daughter. In the absence of any
explanation, it gives rise to a sense of doubt.
28. That apart, the factum that the appellant informed
the mother of the victim that he had left the prosecutrix at the
door of her house also does not command acceptance. The
recovery of the prosecutrix by the brother and his friends also
creates a cloud of suspicion. We are not inclined to believe the
prosecution version as has been projected that one Arif had
informed the brother of the prosecutrix that his sister was at his
place but for reasons best known to the prosecution, Arif has
not been examined. That apart, the persons who were
accompanying the brother have also not been examined by the
prosecution. Thus, the manner of recovery of the prosecutrix
from the house of Arif remains a mystery.
29. Be it noted, there can be no iota of doubt that on the
basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is
unimpeachable and beyond reproach, a conviction can be based.
In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge as well as the High
Court have persuaded themselves away with this principle
without appreciating the acceptability and reliability of the
testimony of the witness. In fact, it would not be inappropriate
to say that whatever the analysis in the impugned judgment [
Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 2006, decided on 25-3-2009 (All)] ,
it would only indicate an impropriety of approach. The
prosecutrix has deposed that she was taken from one place to
50
the other and remained at various houses for almost two
months. The only explanation given by her is that she was
threatened by the accused persons. It is not in her testimony
that she was confined to one place. In fact, it has been borne
out from the material on record that she had travelled from
place to place and she was ravished a number of times. Under
these circumstances, the medical evidence gains significance,
for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there
are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the
non-examination of the witnesses, the testimony of the
prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the
medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the
testimony of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to
inspire confidence. It can be stated with certitude that
the evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality
which can be placed reliance upon."
13.5. The Apex Court in HAJI IQBAL v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH7 holds as follows:
".... .... ....
13. There is something more to add to the aforesaid and
the same goes to the root of the matter. We take notice of
the fact that for the alleged act of gang rape of 2018, the
FIR came to be lodged sometime in the year 2022 i.e.
after almost a period of four years. We do not propose to
say anything in regard to delay in lodging the FIR as the trial
against the other accused persons is in progress. The trial court
on its own will examine this aspect.
14. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the
greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same
time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress,
humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused
must also be protected against the possibility of false
implication, particularly where a large number of accused are
involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad
7
(2023) 20 SCC 209
51
principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when
the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would
not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no
presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of
such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment
or exaggeration. [See: Raju v. State of M.P. [Raju v. State of
M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 133: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751] ]
15. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get
the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially
on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly
frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such
circumstances the court owes a duty to look into the FIR
with care and a little more closely.
16. We say so because once the complainant decides
to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure
that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the
necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that
the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that
they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for
the court to look into the averments made in the
FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not.
17. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court
owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case over
and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The
court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not
restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered
to take into account the overall circumstances leading to
52
the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for
instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as
alleged.
18. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that
no case is made out to put the appellant herein to trial for the
alleged offence."
The Apex Court in HAJI IQBAL's case clearly holds that in exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has
a duty to look into the FIR very closely. It is empowered to take
into account every circumstance leading to initiation of registration
of the case as well as materials collected during the investigation.
The case before the Apex Court was considering quashment of FIR
for the offences of rape and criminal intimidation.
13.6. The Apex Court in SURESH GARODIA v. STATE OF
ASSAM8 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
13. In the said case, the Court has given a caution that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
8
(2024) 12 SCC 150
53
rarest of rare cases. The Court would normally not embark upon
an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of
the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint.
14. However, we find that the present case would fall
under Categories Nos. 5 and 7 of the categories of cases culled
out by this Court in the said case.
15. We find that lodging a case after 34 years and
that too on the basis of a bald statement that the
prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of
offence, could itself be a ground to quash the
proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the
FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a
long period of 34 years. The material on record shows
that the relationship was consensual, inasmuch as the
son who is born from the said relationship has been
treated by the appellant as his son and all the facilities,
including cash money, have been provided to him."
In the aforesaid case, the very complaint was lodged 34 years after
the incident without any explanation for delay. The Apex Court
holds that criminal proceedings against the accused can be quashed
on the ground of delay, particularly when the proceedings are
initiated solely based on the victim's statement.
13.7. A singular thread of reason that runs through the
judgments of the Apex Court quoted supra is, in cases of allegation
of rape, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. should be circumspect in analysing the complaint and the
54
attendant circumstances attached to the said complaint. If the facts
obtaining in the case at hand are considered on the bedrock of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court, it would be rather difficult
for the proceedings to be permitted to be continued. The complaint
clearly narrates that it was in 2017 the act of sexual assault
happens. The next incident is in 2019. There is nothing for five
years. In 2024 the complaint is registered. Therefore, the complaint
with regard to the offence under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be
permitted to be continued on sheer delay in registering the crime.
Delay is totally unexplained or vaguely explained in the complaint
that runs into 10 pages.
14. On a blend of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the
afore-quoted judgments and if such enunciation is pitted to the
facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unequivocally
emerge is that delay in lodging the FIR would vitiate the
proceedings, unless delay is satisfactorily explained. The delay that
the Apex Court considers in the aforementioned cases were all
considering the offence of rape and the delay in those cases ranged
from 8 days to 7 months. The delay in the case at hand is 7 years
55
and if the event of 2019 is considered, it is 5 years. A perusal at the
complaint or the summary of the charge sheet quoted supra, would
clearly indicate that the delay is not explained satisfactorily even to
its semblance. Therefore, the delay in registering the crime has
vitiated the registration and the proceedings in the aftermath.
Therefore, the delay which is totally unexplained or vaguely
explained would undoubtedly vitiate the entire proceedings in any
given case. If the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet
are considered on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex
Court in the aforesaid judgments, the allegations made for the
offences punishable under the IPC would undoubtedly be vitiated by
delay. What remains is the offence under the POCSO Act.
15. If the complaint had been registered in 2017 when the
complainant was alleged to be of 16 years of age, it would have
been a circumstance altogether different. Though it cannot be the
law that in cases under the POCSO Act mere delay will vitiate the
proceedings, in the light of the complaint and the summary of the
charge sheet all of which would project incidents of 2017 without
explanation for delay or a bald explanation for delay, for the very
56
reasons rendered to hold the offences under the IPC being vitiated,
the offences under the POCSO Act also get vitiated.
17. In light of the aforesaid circumstances, it is appropriate to
refer to judgments of other High Courts, addressing the issue of
delay in registration of cases involving offences under the POCSO
Act.
17.1. A Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, in the case
of STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) v. MANOJ RAM9, holds as
follows:
"1. By the present criminal leave petition filed under section
378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State seeks leave
to appeal against the judgment dated 22.09.2014 passed by Ms.
Illa Rawat, Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No.
79/2013 whereby the respondent (accused before the trial court)
was acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections
363/366/376 of the Penal Code, 1860 and charges under
Sections 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act,
2012.
..... ..... .....
25. According to the prosecution case, the prosecutrix went
missing on 15.04.2013. If the prosecutrix went missing on the
aforesaid date the mother who is expected to have necessitous
concern, should have gone to the police station to lodge a missing
report which could have prompted the Investigating Officer to act
accordingly. It is worthwhile to mention that in rape cases
the delay in filing FIR by the prosecutrix is not unusual on
9
2016 SCC OnLine Del 3136
57
account of trauma and agony suffered as also the fear of
social stigma. However, what prevented the mother of the
prosecutrix to lodge a missing report remains unanswered.
PW9 stated that on 15.04.2013 in the evening she searched for
her daughter here and there and returned home. Again on
16.04.2013, she searched for her daughter in the morning and
found her inside the park. Since she was disturbed she did not
talk with the victim. On 17.04.2013 in the evening when she
asked her daughter about 15.04.2013 she disclosed the
fact of rape. On 18.04.2013 she caught hold of the accused
and reported the matter to police.
26. In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3
SCC 393, this Court held as under:-
"12...First information report in a criminal case is an
extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of
corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The
importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated
from the standpoint of the accused.
The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the
report to the police in respect of commission of an offence
is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances
in which the crime was committed, the names of the
actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the
names of eyewitnesses present at the scene of
occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report
quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of
afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only
gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger
creeps in of the introduction of coloured version,
exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of
deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential
that the delay in the lodging of the first information
report should be satisfactorily explained..."
27. In Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao reported in
2008 (14) SCALE 118, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:
"18. Having gone through the depositions of PW-1 and PW-
3, to which out attention was invited by learned Counsel for the
State, we are convinced that in the light of the overall evidence,
58
analysed by the High Court, the order of acquittal of the
Respondent is well merited and does not call for interference,
particularly when the First Information Report was lodged by the
complainant more than one month after the alleged incident of
forcible poisoning. Time and again, the object and importance of
prompt lodging of the First Information Report has been
highlighted. Delay in loding the First Information Report,
more often than not, results in embellishment and
exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A
delayedreport not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of coloured
version, exaggerated account of the incident or a
concocted story as a result of deliberations and
consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on
its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in
loding the report should be satisfactorily explained."
28. In view of the settled proposistion of law as well as
on the above conduct of the mother, no reasonable and
plausible explanation has been tendered as to why the FIR
was lodged belatedly by the complainant after knowing
from her daughter about the alleged rape. The delay in
lodging FIR creates a suspicion about the version of the
prosecution.
..... ..... .....
30. It is noteworthy that there is no medical evidence
to connect the respondent with the offence of rape. As for
charge framed under Section 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of
POCSO Act, 2012 is concerned we find that the prosecution was
not able to establish the charges under Section 363, 366 and 376
of the Penal Code, 1860 and therfore the question of
determination of age of the prosecutrix does not arise.
..... ..... .....
34. In the present case, on a cumulative reading and
appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the
considered view that the the quality of the testimony of
prosecutrix as also the testimonies of the other witnesses
is not such which is sufficient for the conviction of
respondent for such alleged heinous offence."
59
17.2. A Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh,
in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. VED PRAKASH
AND ORS.10, holds as follows:
"Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondents Ved Prakash,
Ajay and Mithin @ Sahil of the offences punishable under Sections
120-B, 376-D, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 of the
POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(iii)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
whereas respondent Mohinder was acquitted of the offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 376-D, 506 of IPC and Section
3 of the POCSO Act, the State has filed the instant appeal.
..... ..... .....
36. In our considered view, the delay has to be
considered in the back ground of the facts and
circumstances of each case and is a matter of appreciation
of evidence. It is well settled that the delay in registering FIR
cannot by itself be a ground to doubt the case of the prosecution.
37. In cases of delay, the Courts are required to examine the
evidence with a close scrutiny and in doing so; the contents of the
FIR should also be scrutinized more carefully. If Court finds that
there is no indication of fabrication or it has not been concocted
or engineered to implicate innocent persons then, even if there is
a delay in lodging the FIR, the case of the prosecution cannot be
dismissed merely on that ground. The disinclination to inform the
family or report the matter to the police might be due to
apprehension and attitude of the society towards the victim.
Therefore, the delay in lodging the complaint in such cases does
not necessarily indicate that her version is false.
38. In the instant case, the victim is alleged to have
been sexually assaulted in September, 2015 and lodged
the complaint only in May, 2016 that too on the pretext
that when she came to know that her obscene
video/photographs were being uploaded on the Whatsapp,
which allegations ultimately have been found to be false.
10
Cr. A. No. 217 of 2018, Disposed on 01-09-2023
60
39. In such circumstances, inordinate and unexplained
delay in registering the FIR casts cloud of suspicion
regarding the credibility of the prosecution story when
read with the testimony of the victim, medical evidence
and all other evidence led by the prosecution. The
inordinate delay in registration of FIR and the time and
opportunities which the victim had, to report the matter to
the police or any other person by raising an alarm when
she was forced to undergo the trauma of rape is
unexplainable.
40. It is here that the requirement of the testimony of
the victim being credit worthy to be termed as sterling
witness whose version can be accepted without
corroboration steps in. It is here that the version of the
victim on the core spectrum of the crime should remain
intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the said
version in material particulars in order to enable the Court
trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the
other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty
of the charge alleged.
..... ..... .....
42. The credit worthiness of the testimony of the victim has
already been discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. The
victim when put to test as laid down in Rai Sandeep Deepu case
(supra), fails the test of being sterling witness of a high
quality and calibre whose version should therefore be
unassailable and such quality should be in a position to
accept it on face value without any hesitation.
43. Not only is the case set up by prosecution suspect
but even the contradiction, improvement and
embellishments are so significant, which cannot be
ignored. Moreso, the statement of the victim neither stood
corroborated from medical evidence nor from any other
material on record and even the story regarding uploading
of photographs belies her claim.
44. There is no doubt that rape causes great distress and
humiliation to the victim of rape but at the same time false
allegation of committing a rape also causes humiliation
61
and damage to the accused. An accused has also rights
which are to be protected and the possibility of false
implication has to be ruled out.
..... ..... .....
48. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, the
testimony of victim has to be consistent and natural in line
with the case of the prosecution and free from infirmities
which inspire confidence in the Court. It cannot be
presumed that the statement of the victim is always true
or without any embellishment.
49. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, we
find that the testimony of the victim is not natural and
consistent with the case of the prosecution as her version
has no correlation and does not find corroboration with
other material being medical, scientific and expert
evidence.
50. Having considered the entire case of the prosecution
thoroughly and in its right perspective, we are of the firm view
that if the evidence of the victim is read and considered in
totality of the circumstances along with the other evidence
on record on the basis of which the offence is alleged to
have been committed, then her deposition does not inspire
confidence and was otherwise required to be corroborated
with other evidence on record. Moreover, the view taken by
the learned trial Court is reasonable and plausible where the
evidence has been considered in its right perspective and there is
palpably no misreading of the evidence."
17.3. Again, another Division Bench of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh, in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
v. PARVEEN KUMAR AND ORS11, holds as follows:
"..... ..... .....
4. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 09.07.2013
framed charges against accused Parveen Kumar under Sections
11
Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 2015, Disposed on 10-09-2025
62
363, 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 4 of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for
short 'POCSO Act') Act and Section 3(1)(XII) of the Schedules
Castes and Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
(SC & ST Act) and against accused Arvind Kumar under Sections
363, 366-A of IPC and Section 17 of POSCO Act, to which they
did not plead guilty and claimed trial.
..... ..... .....
22. When the statement of the prosecutrix is carefully
scrutinized, we find that the same is not of sterling quality
and does not inspireconfidence as it contains material
inconsistencies and contradictions which affects the core
of the prosecution case.
23. The medical evidence on record also reveals that no
internal or external injury on her body as well as on her private
parts was found and there was also no sign of any recent sexual
intercourse because neither any blood, nor any secretions etc.
were found. Hence, it can be said that the doctor opined about
the possibility of sexual assault with the prosecutrix during the
night of 05.06.2013 only on the basis of rupture of hymen.
However, in the cross examination, the doctor admitted that the
rupture of hymen was old and if that be so, it cannot be said that
sexual act had taken place with her during the night of
05.06.2013. Therefore, the medical evidence on record is of no
help to the prosecution and creates a doubt about the prosecution
story. It has also come in the evidence that the police
station was about 10 kms away from the village of the
prosecutrix and despite that the matter was reported to
police after quite delay and there is no explanation why the
matter was not reported at the earliest. All these deficiencies
cast grave doubt over the veracity of the prosecution case.
24. We are aware that conviction for the offence of
sexual assault can be founded on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix but the same has to be of sterling quality.
Given the fact that testimony of the prosecutrix does not
inspire confidence coupled with the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the
prosecution has been able to prove its case against
accused Parveen beyond all reasonable doubt.
63
25. So far as accused Arvind Kumar is concerned, there is no
evidence on the record to link him with the offence in question. A
bare perusal of statements of the prosecutrix as well as her
parents go to show that none of them have deposed anything
against him. There is no evidence on the record to show that he
aided accused Parveen in the alleged commission of offence.
Moreover, when the offence against accused Parveen is not
proved, then accused Arvind also cannot be held liable for the
offence in question.
26. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no
interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal, dated
06.02.2015, passed by the learned Special Court, Una, HP, in
SCST case No.2/2013, is required. The view taken by the learned
Trial Court was the only possible view, as such the appeal, which
sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail
bonds are discharged."
17.4. A Division Bench of the High Court of Tripura, in the case
of TRIDIP CHAKMA v. STATE OF TRIPURA12, holds as follows:
"This present appeal has been filed under
Section 374(2) of Cr. P.C., 1973 against the judgment and order
of conviction and sentence dated 12.08.2024 passed by the
learned Special Judge (POCSO), Dhalai Judicial District, Ambassa,
in connection with the case No. Special (POCSO) 04 of 2022
convicting the appellant to suffer R. 1 for 10 (Ten) years for the
commission of offence punishable under section 376(2)(f) of
the Penal Code, 1860 and also liable to pay a fine of Rs-10,000/-
(Rupees Ten thousand) only for the said offence, in default, of
payment of such fine, the convict shall undergo further R.I. for a
period of 6(six) months. Further to suffer R.I. for 02(Two) years
for the commission of offence punishable under Section 506 of
the Penal Code, 1860 and also liable to pay a fine of Rs-5,000/-
(Rupees five thousand) only for the said offence, in default of
payment of such fine the convict shall undergo further R.I. for a
period of 3(three) months and also further to suffer R.I. for
07(Seven) years for the commission of offence punishable
under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and also liable to pay
12
2026 SCC OnLine Tri 83
64
a fine of Rs-10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only for the said
offence, in default, of payment of such fine, the convict shall
undergo further R.I. for a period of 6(six) months.
..... ..... .....
24. The delay of about ten days in lodging the FIR,
though sought to be explained, assumes significance in the
facts of the present case. The explanation offered for such
delay does not find consistent support from the
prosecution evidence itself. This Court is of the opinion
that when such a ghastly incident allegedly occurred on
21.06.2022, and the victim fell ill on 22.06.2022 and
disclosed the incident, the complainant mother filed the
complaint only on 01.07.2022, after a lapse of several
days, merely on the pretext of performing the funeral rites
of her deceased sister-in-law. Such delay in lodging the
FIR in a sensitive case of this nature, and the reasons
assigned for the same, appear unnatural and raise serious
doubts in the mind of this Court.
In Vijayan v. State of Kerala (supra), the Hon'ble
Apex Court has cautioned that in cases resting solely on
the testimony of the prosecutrix, unexplained or
inadequately explained delay in lodging the FIR, coupled
with absence of supporting medical or other evidence,
makes it unsafe to sustain a conviction.
25. The medical evidence, as deposed by PW-2, does not
lend corroboration to the prosecution case. PW-2 categorically
stated that no fresh external injury was found on the body or
private parts of the victim and that the hymen was torn, old and
healed. The pregnancy of the victim, though established, has not
been medically linked to the appellant.
26. Though it is true that absence of medical
corroboration is not by itself fatal to the prosecution but
the said principle applies where the oral testimony is
otherwise found to be cogent, consistent and trustworthy.
In the present case, the oral evidence itself suffers from
inconsistencies, and therefore the lack of medical
corroboration assumes relevance while appreciating the
cumulative effect of the evidence.
65
..... ..... .....
29. As regards the presumption under Section 29 of
the POCSO Act, it is well settled that such presumption
arises only after the prosecution establishes the
foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt. In the present
case, in view of the inconsistencies in the prosecution
evidence, the unexplained aspects surrounding delay, and
the absence of corroborative medical or independent
evidence, this Court is of the view that when the
foundational facts themselves have not been established,
the same does not attract the statutory presumption.
..... ..... .....
31. In view of the above discussion and overall evaluation
of the evidence and in light of the settled principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as cited supra, this Court finds that
the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
17.5. In the aforesaid judgments, the High Courts of Delhi,
Himachal Pradesh, and Tripura, while dealing with cases involving
offences under the POCSO Act, observe that, unexplained delay in
lodging the FIR or complaint raises a doubt on the prosecution's
story. Further, where such cases rest solely on the victim's
statement, in the absence of any medical evidence for
corroboration, the testimony must be of sterling quality, failing
which, a conviction for offences under the POCSO Act cannot be
sustained. Therefore, on sheer delay, both, the offences under the
IPC and the POCSO Act also reach the same conclusion of they
being obliterated.
66
18. What remains are two writ petitions viz., Writ Petition
Nos.11726 of 2024 and 11808 of 2024, filed by the victim
challenging the regular bail granted to accused Nos.1 and 2. In the
light of the reasons rendered towards obliteration of very
proceedings qua accused Nos.1 and 2, these two petitions
challenging regular bail would be unnecessary to be considered.
Therefore, they should stand dismissed.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition No.8786 of 2024 and Criminal Petition No.71 of 2025 are allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in Spl.C.No.266 of 2024 pending before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTSC-I, Tumakuru, stand quashed.
(iii) Criminal Petition No.11726 of 2024 and Criminal Petition No.11808 of 2024 stand dismissed.
67Consequently, pending applications if any, also stand disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ