Delhi High Court
Mohini Syal vs Kushal Kumar on 22 October, 1980
Equivalent citations: 18(1980)DLT497, 1980(1)DRJ158
JUDGMENT Sultan Singh, J.
(1) This is a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to punish the respondent for having committed willful breach of an undertaking given by himon 24/8/1979 to Smt. Manju Goel,Additional Controller, Delhi in proceedings for recovery of possession under section 21 of the Delhi Rent control Act, 1958.(cereinafter , at the Act). The respondent made the following statment on 24/8/1979 belore the Additional Controller;i with draw the objections field by me to the petition under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control act. The petitioner is entited to possession of the disputed premiles in pursuance of the order obtained by them under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. I undertake to vacate the premises by 30/6/1980 and to deliver peaceful vacant possetion to the general atorney of smt. Mohini Syal i.e. Shri K.C. Syal of 14, Tagore Park, New Delhi. I may be granted time till then" sd/- Kaushal Kumar sb.00 Manju Goel 24/8/79 Arc, Delhi." After the staement by the respondent, statement of the petitioner's counsel was recorded who agreed to grant time to the respondent up to 30/6/1980. The Additional Controller passed the following order on 24/8/1979. "INview of the above statements the objections to the petition for possession are dismissed as withdrawn. The respondent is granted time to vacate the premises in question i.e. the 1st floor June,1980. File be consigned to records."
sb.00 Manju Goel A.R.C. 24.8.79 The respondent did not deliver possession of the premises according to his said statements and therefore the petitioner made this petition has arisen in the following circumstances. The petitioner as owner-landlady filed an application under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958 in March, 1977 stating that she wanted to let out the first floor of the property D-70, Panchsheel Enclav(Masjid Moth Residental Scheme) New Delhi to the respondent for a fixed period of two years as she was living at Bombay and would require the same after two years when she would be coming to Delhi. The Additional Controller recarded the statements of the petitioner and the respondent on 30th March, 1977 and passed the following order: "Having regard to the facts stated in the petition and the statement of the parties made above the permission under Section 21 of the D.R.C. Act is granted to the petitioner Mrs. Nohini Syal to let out the first floor of the premises No.D-70, Panchsheel Enclave(Masjid Moth Residential Scheme) New Delhi delineated in the enclosed plan mark B to the respondent Shri Kaushal Kumar for residential purposes for a limited period of two years w.e.f. 1.4.77." The respondent after the expiry of two years did not deliver possession to the petitioner. She filed an appliction for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act on or about 5th May, 1979. The respondent filed objections stating that the petitioner earlier had been granted permission under Section 21 of the Act m the year S975 for a period of two years, that he has been in possession of the premises since March, 1975, that after the expiry of the said period of two years, the petitioner again applied for premission under section 21 of the Act and the same was granted to her in March, 1977, that the premises were let for residence-cum-offfice purposes, that the petitioner had sold the property in question to Mrs.Kunj Gupta wife of Shri SB.Gupta resident of 4 B, Ansari Road, Daryaganj. Delhi fora total consideration of Rs. 2,80,000.00, that the possession of the ground floor and the barsati floor had been given to Mrs. Kunj Gupta, the purchaser, that an agreement to sell prior to sale was executed on 12th Nov. 1978 between the petitioner and Mrs. Kunj Gupta. Inother words, the respondent challenged the validity of permission granted to the petitioner u/s 21 of the Act. The sale of the suit property by the petitioner to smt. Kunj Gupta took place on 29th May, 1979 and the objections bythe respondent were filed on 17th August, 1979.011 24th August, 1979, however,the respondent withdrew his objections to the petition for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act and undertook to vacate the premises by 30th June, 1980. Show cause notice of the contempt petition was issued to the respondent who filed his reply on 28th August, 1980 supported by an affidavit The respondent in his reply to the show cause notice submits that the petitioner has suppressed facts, has committed fraud on the cause of Justice before this Court, that the premises were let after permission for a fixed term fur a period of two years and were again let out for two years in March, 1977 with permission under Section 21 of the Act, the petitioner entered into an agreement to sell on 13th November, 1978 and sold the property to Mrs. Kunj Gupta on 29th May, 1979 in consideration of Rs2,81),0b0/, that the petitioner has no locus standi, she being no longer landlady of the premises after the sale on 29th May, 1979, that the Additional controller had no jurisdiction to record the undertaking or the statement of the respondent on 24th August 1979, as the petitioner ceased to have any interest in the property after transferring the same on 29th May, 1979, that the undertaking dated 24th August, 1979 is a nullity as the Additional Controller lacked inherent jurisdiction to record the statement of the respondent, that the permisson under Section 21 of the Act was invalid as the conditions prescribed therein were not complied, there is no estoppel aganist statute, that the petitioner has filed another application before the Additional Controller for revival of the petition for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act, that the said undertaking was the result of misrepresentation, froud and suppression of material facts, that the respondent is under no obligation to obey the said undertaking dated 24th August, 1979 and that he has not committed any contempt under Section 2(b) of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Along with the reply the respondent has filed a copy of the sale deed dated 29th May 1979 between the petitioner and Mrs. Kunj Gupta together with a copy of the application dated 1st July, 1980 filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act together with the reply dated 30th July, 1980 to the said application filed by the respondent before the Additional Controller.
(2) The main contention of the respondent is that in view of the judgment in S.B. Noronah vs. Prem Kumari Khanna, the permission granted by the Additional Controller under Section 21 of the Act on 30th March, 1977 was a nullity and therefore all proceedings subsequent thereto including the undertaking of the respondent are null and void and not binding upon him. The argument is that the petitioner let out the premises for residence-cum- commercial purposes, that the permission dt. 30th March, 1977 was a mindless order, that the conditions of Section 21 of the Act were not complied with and therefore the order is a nullity. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to various portions of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, but no observation has been brought to my notice that the nermission granted by the Additional Controller under Sectional of the Act was a nullity or void.
(3) In para 18 of the said judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows : "WHENan application under Section 21 is filed by the landlord and/or tenant, the Controller must said himself by such inquiry as he may make, about the compulsive requirements of that provision. If he makes a mindless order, the Court, when challenged at the time of execution, will go into the question as to whether the twin conditions for sanction have really been fulfillled. Of course, there will be a presumption in favor of the sanction being regular, but it will still be open to a party to make out his case that in fact and in truth the conditions which make for a valid sanction were not present".
(4) From this observation it seems to me that there is a presumption of the permission granted by the Rent Controller being regular. A right is however conferred on the tenant to challenge the same and to make out a case that the conditions necessary for a valid sanction were not present when the permission was granted. Thus prima facie the sanction dated 30th March, 1977 was a valid one. The petitioner filed an application for recovery of possession and the respondent filed objections dated 17th August, 1977 on various grounds challenging the permission order dated 30th March, 1977. In other words, an opportunity was availed of by the respondent to raise the objections against the proceedings held by the Additional Controller under Section 21 of the Act prior to 17th August, 1979 when objections were filed. But for the reasons known to the respondent he withdrew all the objections to the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, he admitted that the petitioner was entitled to, possession of the disputed premises in pursuance of the order of the Rent Controller as per his statement dated 24th August, 1979 before the Additional Controller. He further gave an undertaking to the Additional Controller to vacate the premises by 30th June, 1980 and to deliver possession to Shri K..C,Syal, general attorney of the petitioner. After the withdrawal of these objections and dismissal of the same by the Additional Controller, the respondent has no right to re-agitate the validity or otherwise of the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. The preseat objections are barred byprinciples of resjudicata in view oF the order dated 24th August, 1979 of the Additional Controller and he is also estopped from re-agitating the same by making representation to the Additional Controller that he would vacate the premises by 30th June, 1980 and deliver peaceful possession to the petitioner. He has taken advantage by giving the undertaking and the petitioner changed his position on account of this representation dated 24th August, 1979 the respondent is therefore estopped from challenging the previous proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. Thus in view of the dismissal of the objections of the respondent by the Additional Controller on 24th August, 1979 I hold that the respondent has now no locus standi to challenge the permission proceedings.
(5) The next objection of the respondent is that admittedly the property in question was sold by the petitioner to Mrs. Kunj Gupta by means of a sale deed dated 29th May, 1979 and therefore she ceased to be the landlady on 24th August, 1979 when the said undertaking was given and as such she is not entitled to take or continue any proceedings for recovery of .possession or to institute any petition for alleged contempt of court. In other words, the contention is that the petitioner having transferred the property cannot continue proceedings in execution of the order for recovery of possession. This argument has no force. The fixed term tenancy expired on 31st March, 1979 and the application for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act was filed on 5th May, 1979. The petitioner was admittedly landlady owner on 5th May, 1979. The order dated 30th March, 1979 granting permission to let out for a limited period under Section 21 of the Act is an order capable of execution at the instence of the petitioner. The petitioner is a decree-holder within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads as under : "2(3) 'decree-holder' means any person in whose favor a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made". Section 21 of the Act reads as under : S. 21 : Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed manner lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law,the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord with in such time as may be prescribed, place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises".
(6) When the permission is granted to the landlord under Section 21 of the Act to let out the premises for a limited period and the tenant does not vacate the same after the expiry of the fixed period, the landlord has a right to move an application for recovery of possession after the expiry of the fixed period and the Controller has jurisdiction to get the possession delivered to the landlord. The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 were framed under Section 56 of the Act. Rule 23 provides that the Controller and the Tribunal under the Act shall, as far as possible, be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in. deciding any question relating to procedure not specially provided by the Act and the Rules. It is admitted before me that Mrs. Kunj Gupta, purchaser of the suit property from the petitioner since the date of purchase i.e. 29th May, 1979 has not taken any proceedings to take possession of the premises from the respondent or any other proceedings for her substitution, under Order 21 rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure up to this date. The petitioner is the recorded person in the records of the Rent Controller in whose favor the said order for recovery of possession was passed under Section 21 of the Act. The petitioner is thus the decree-holder under Section 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also admitted on record that execution proceedings started on 5th May, 1979 and the sale took place on 29th May, 1979. No provision of law has been brought to my notice that if the transferee does not take any action for his substitution or for any proceedings under Order 21 rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the transferor i.e. decree-holder cannot continue the execution proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Madan Lal vs. Harkishan Lal, 1966 P.L.R. (Delhi Section) 14 wherein an application for eviction on grounds of non-payment of rent and sub-letting was filed and thereafter the landlord sold the premises. It was held that the decree for eviction cannot be passed after the sale and that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable. The facts of this case are not applicable to the instant case. In proceedings under Section 2 ' of the Act the permission is granted and there is jurisdiction to the Controller to execute that permission, after the expiry of the fixed period of tenancy and to get the possession of the premises delivered to the landlord. Admittedly the property in the instant case was sold on 29th May, 1979 while the permission under Section 21 was granted on 30th March, 1977 and the execution application was filed on 5th May, 1979. This authority therefore doss not help the respondent. The respondent then referred to Roshan Lal Devi Dass and others vs. Man Mohan Chopra which is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. In this Judgment it has held that eviction proceedings do not become incompetent on transfer of property by landlord during it pendency and the same can be maintained and continued by the landlord and the transferee. It seems tome that as long as the transferee of the suit property does not approach the court for his substitution or for taking any action in pursuance of the decree or sale in his favor, the transferor-decree-holder has a right to take execution proceedings and to continue the same if already instituted. There is no bar in law. A decree or order passed in favor of a person can be executed by that person. It is however true that if once a transferee is substituted or approaches the court for (aking action, under the Assignment Deed or any deed by which the rights under the decree stand transferred to him. the transferor ceases to have any right under the decree or the order capable of execution. In the instant case admittedly the transferee Mrs. Gupta has not taken any action of any nature whatsoever up to this date. In Radhakisan vs. Daudas and others, Air 1935 Nagpur 230 the Division Bench while dealing with acase under Order 21 rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed as follows: "IT is well established that the person appearing on the face of the decree as a decree-holder is the only person entitled to execute it. Therefore, if a transferee of a decree does not apply under Order 21 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure for execution the executing court cannot refuse to allow execution at the instance of the transferor till the transferee is formally recognised by the court by the substitution of his name for that of the original decree-holder".
(7) In Sambhunath Auddy vs. Tarak Nath Auddy and others, it was held that a mortgagor could apply for extension of time even after assignment. In this case there was a redemption decree. The mortgagor subsequently transferred right, title and interest in the mortgaged property to his wife and thereafter applied for time to deposit in court the mortgage amount. The question was raised whether the mortgagor had locus standi to continue proceedings after assignment of his right. It was held that the mortgagor could apply for extension of time even after assignment. Similarly in Brijlal vs. Dulichand 1972 M.P. L.J. 826 it was observed as follows : "ORDER21 rule 16, Civil Procedure Code merely permits the executing court to allow the assignee to execute the decree. But if the assignee does not come forward, the executing court can by no stretch of imagination prevent the decree-holder from executing his decree. That is the right of the every decree-holder. Thus Order 21, rule 16, Civil Procedure Code, will not at all be attracted to such a situation and although the respondent might have declared that he had assigned the right under the decree in favor of the defense Department, he cannot be prevented from executing the decree. If the assignment be valid the execution will be for the benefit of the respondent himself".
(8) I am thus of the considered opinion that the petitioner has locus standi to continue the execution proceedings inpursuance of the permission granted under Section 21 of the Act. In all the cited cases the decree-holder took proceedings after assignment. In the case before me execution proceedings were initiated on 5th May, 1979 i.e. prior to the sale of the property by the petitioner in favor of Mrs. Kunj Gupta which took place on 2Jth May, 1979. There is thus no force in the objection raised by the respondent that all proceedings before the Additional Controller are null and void or that the petitioner has no locus standi to continue the execution proceedings after 29th May, 1979.
(9) Learned counsel for the respondent next argues that the time was granted by the petitioner to the respondent to vacate the promises up to 30th June, 1980 and the same was granted by the controller and there is no mention of any undertaking in the order dated 24th August, 1979 and that it was merely a compromise and if the respondent did not deliver possession up to 30th June, 1980 it was not violation of any undertaking. In Bajranglal Gangadhar Khernka and another vs. Kapurchand Ltd. the Division Bench observed as under: "THEREis no reason why even in a consent decree a party may not give an undertaking to the Court. Although the court may be bound to record a compromise, still, when the court passes a decree, it puts its imprimnture upon those terms and makes the terms a rule of the court; and it would be open to the court, before it did so, to accept and undertaking given by a party to the Court. Therefore there is nothing contrary to any provision of the law whereby an undertaking cannot be given by a party to the court in the consent decree, which undertaking can be enforced by proper committal proceedings", (10) In the instant case before me the statement is made by the respondent to the court i.e. the Additional Controller. It is true that it was done with the consent of the petitioner. The petitioner accepted the undertaking of the respondent and agreed not to take possession till 30th June, 1980. This is an undertaking to the court on the basis of the compromise between the parties. It was further held in the said judgment by Chagia C.J. that, "an undertaking entered into or given to the court by a party or his counsel or solicitor is equivalent to and has the effect of an order of the Court .................When an undertaking is given by a party to the court, it becomes an order of the court and a particular mode is prescribed for enforcing that particular order. That mode is that proceedings for contempt can be taken out for the enforcement of that order". The Supreme Court in Babu Ram Gupta vs. Sudhir Bhasin and another, observed as follows . "INfact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the court amounts to contempt of court is that the contenner by making a false representation to the court obtains a benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution".
(11) The Supreme Court regarding compromise and an undertaking given by the party observed, "There is a clear cut distinction between a compromise arrived at between the partics or a consent order passed by the court at the instance of the parties and a clear and categorical undertaking given by any of the parties. In the former, if there is violation of the compromise or the order no question of contempt of court arises, but the party has a right to enforce the order or the compromise by their executing the order or getting an injunction from the Court". In the instant case before me there is compromise between the parties as well as undertaking by the respondent on the basis of which the Additional Controller passed the order dated 24th August, 1979. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that disobedience of a void order is not contempt of court and relies upon Sultan Ali Nanghiona s/o Muhammad Ali vs. Nur Hussain, Air (36) 1949 Lahore 131 (F.B.) and para 42, Vol. 17 of American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition. He refers to the following observations in para 42 Vol. 17 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition : "NEVERTHELESS,it is frequently declared that the disobedience of an order made without or in excess of jurisdiction is not punishable as contempt. In other language, it is said to be no contempt to disobey a void order".
(12) The crucial question however is whether the order passed in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act a void order. The answer is in the negative.
(13) Learned councel next submits that the respondent has a right to remain in possession as the permission under Section 21 of the Act was invalid, erroneous or void. He says that he is unable to comply with the order to deliver possession on account of transfer of property by the petitioner in favor of Mrs. Gupta. As already stated, the petitioner has a right to continue the execution proceedings as long as the transferee does not choose to get herself substituted. Learned counsel next submits that all these questions arise also before the executing court i.e. before the Additional Controller where the petitioner has taken proceedings for revival of the execution application with a view to obtain possession and which proceedings were instituted prior to institution of the present contempt petition. He therefore submits that the contempt petition is premature and in any case the same is liable to be stayed till the decision of the matter by the executing court. There is no ground for stay of the contempt proceedings. The respondent has raised objections which are not tenable in law with a view to disobey willfully the solemn undertaking dated 24th Aagust, 1979 after getting his objections dismissed. The Civil contempt involves disobedience to a court's order affecting the rights of other parties to that order. The purpose of the contempt proceedings in such a ca¯e is to secure compliance with the order of the court. If no proceedings are taken in this petition it would amount to giving a license to flout and violate the undertaking given by him. He has argued all his objections before me arising in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act. His objections are meaningless simply on the ground that after getting his objections dismissed he is barred under the principles of res judicata and the doctrine of estoppel from re-agitating the same.
(14) Learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contends that it is not at all necessary for proper determination of the present contempt petition to go into the previous history of the case which led to the giving of the undertaking by the respondent on 24th August, 1979. He submits that the respondent has willfully committed the breach of the undertaking given to the court and therefore he should be punished. He further submits that the respondent is resisting with all his might to violate the undertaking. It is stated that after the expiry of the period of undertaking on 30th June, 1980 the respondent filed a caveat before the Additional Controller to resist the order for the recovery of possession. When the petitioner filed an application for revival of execution proceedings and for issue of warrant of possession on 1st July, 19 0, the respondent again filed objection against the issue of warrant of possession. His actions before the Additional Controller i.e., the executing court and in this court in reply to the present contempt petition show that he has no intention to fulfill his undertaking. He played a fraud With the court and obtained the time without any intention to vacate the premises by 30th June, 1980. It seems to be correct that in contempt proceedings it is not necessary to go into the previous history of the case. The court is not concerned with the right or wrong order paused by the court prior to the undertaking given by a litigant. In Kruthivanti Kutumba Rao vs. Muthi Venkata Subha Rao and others, it has been held whether order is valid or irregular unless it is vacated, it has got to be obeyed '. Similar are the observations made in Subodh Gopal Base vs. Dalmia Jam & Co. Ltd. and others, . In Narain Singh vs. S. Hardayal Singh Harika, Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Patiala, the court made the following observation: "SOlong as the injunction order has not been vacated or modified by the court granting it, or has not been reversed on appeal, no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be. the order must be obeyed. Violation of the order of injunction cannot be excused on the ground, that though the court acted within its jurisdiction but the order that it passed was erroneous."
(15) I am of the confirmed view after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that the order passed under Section 21 of the Act was not erroneous, that the same was passed in accordance with law, that the respondent having withdrawn his objections to the permission under Section 21 of the Act cannot re-agitate the same. lam also of the view that it is not necessary to go into the history of the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act up to the date i.e.. 24th August, 1979 when the respondent gave the undertaking. In this view I am supported by the observations made in Jayantilal Hiralal & Co. vs. Human Narayan Velinkar, Air 1932 Bombay 638 to the following effect: "MR.Engineer, who appears for the defendants, has sought to go into the previous history of the matters which led up to the passing of the order of 16th October, 1931. In my opinion it is quite unnecessary for the proper,determination of this notice of motion to go into such matters."
(16) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the civil contempt, what is called contempt in procedure "bears a two-fold character, implying as between the parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the State, a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the court in the public interest "(Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol.8Para38). la Phonographic Performance Ltd. vs. Amusement Caterers (Peckham) Ltd. 1963 (3) The All England Law Reports, 493, contemner complied with the order but punishment was inflicted on him because it was found that he was treating the order of the court as not worthy of notice. It is now well known that a breach of the undertaking is misconduct amounting to contempt. Civil contempt has been defined by Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as "willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction order, writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court." From the narration of the facts of the present case and the steps taken by the respondent from time to time to resist delivery of possession in pursuance of the undertaking dated 24th August, 1979 leaves no doubt in my mind that the respondent has been disobeying the undertaking given by him with full knowledge of its consequences. The respondent is contesting the execution proceedings for recovery of possession before the Additional Controller. He has raised all the possible untenable objections to the present contempt petition. He has challenged the jurisdiction of the Controller although he withdrew his objections before the Controller. He thinks that there is no time limit for a judgment dettor to resilt delivery of possession. He has no regard for the statement made by him. He has no regard for the undertaking given by him on 24th August, 1979. After the arguments by the learned counsel for the parties, I recorded the statement of the respondent-contemner on 9th October 1980. He admits that he gave the undertaking, that his statement was recorded by the Additional Controller containing the said undertaking dated 24th August 1979, he admits that he is still in possession of the premises and that he and his family are in possession of the same. When I asked him if he was prepared to deliver vacant possession of the premises he avoided the question thrice. On further asking he showed his willingness to deliver possession of the premises to the petitioner. I thereafter asked him when he would deliver possession and the answer given is as follows .' "I will require a reasonable time to vacate the premises and I have not given a thought what would be the reasonable time for delivery of possession."
(17) This shows that he has no desire to deliver possession for the time being unless compelled to do so. This is willful disobedience of the undertaking which was incorporated in the order dated 24th August, 1979 of the Additional Controller. After giving my careful consideration to the facts of the present case, I am of the view that sentence of fine under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act would be insufficient and that sentence of imprisonment is necessary for the ends of justice.
(18) I hold that the respondent is guilty of willful breach of the undertaking given by him to the Additional Controller, Delhi on 24th August, 1979. He is not prepared to abide by it. The court is not powerless. It has power to enforce an undertaking. It can be enforced by commital and execution. I, therefore, make the following orders : (I)I hold Kaushal Kumar, respondent guilty of contempt of court. Accordingly, I sentence him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2000.00under section 12 of the contempt of courts Act, 1971. He is directed to be taken in custody. (ii) Vacant possession of the first floor of the premises at D-70, Panchsheel Enclave, Masjid Moth Residential Scheme, New Delhi be got delivered to the petitioner or her attorney Mr. K.C. Syal. Warrant of possession be issued by the registry of this court with respect to the said premises against the respondent and all persons who may be in possession of the same. If necessary the locks may be broken and doors removed for delivery of possession. Police aid be also provided. The respondent shall pay Rs. 200.00 costs of these proceedings to the petitioner. Surinder Kumar Prem Kumar