Madras High Court
B.Uma vs Indian Bank on 30 April, 2026
W.P.No.7402 of 2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 20.04.2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 30.04.2026
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T.VINOD KUMAR
W.P.No.7402 of 2008
and M.P.Nos.1 and 3 of 2008
B.Uma .. Petitioner
vs
1.Indian Bank
Rep By Its General Manager/Appellate Authority,
No.55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
2.The Deputy General Manager/
Disciplinary Authority, Indian Bank,
Circle Office/Vigilance Cell, 55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
3.Mr.G.N.Hedge
The Deputy General Manager/disciplinary Authority,
Indian Bank, Circle Office/Vigilance Cell,
55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
4.Mr.R.Ramabadran
The Enquiry Officer, Indian Bank,
Vigilance Department,
No.66 Rajaji Salai, Chennai 1
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W.P.No.7402 of 2008
5.The Chief Manager
Indian Bank, Circle Office/Vigilance Cell,
55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8. … Respondents
Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to
issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of the 2nd respondent in
Ref. CO:CH:VIG:V 594 dated 07.03.2007 and the order passed in Ref.CO:CH:VIG:FC
340 V 594 dated 05.05.2008, quash the same and further direct the 2 nd respondent to
reinstate the petitioner in service with all attendant benefits including continuity of
service, back wages and other service benefits.
For Petitioner : Mr.R.Singaravelan, Sr.Counsel
for M/s.S.F.Mohamed Yousuf
For Respondents : Mr.Jayesh B.Dolia, Sr.Counsel
for Mr.V.Kalyanaraman
for R1 to R3 & R5.
No appearance – R4.
ORDER
Petitioner’s Contentions :
1. The case of the petitioner is that she was appointed as Clerk in the first respondent Bank in the year 1995 and was posted initially in Sriperumbudur Branch upto 09.07.2002 and thereafter, she was transferred to work at Anna Nagar Branch, whereat, she had joined duty on 10.07.2002.2/70
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2. It is also the case of the petitioner that on 20.05.2006 while she was on duty, the Assistant Manager one Mr.Misra told her that on 18.05.2006 a fictitious loan account in the name of one Mr.Kasi was opened with a credit of Rs.1,65,000/- and asked her to verify the same; that after verification, she had informed the then Senior Manager one Mr.Kamalakannan that the said fictitious loan account was opened from the node of one Mr.Balasubramanian, a clerk of the respondent bank; that the said Mr.Balasubramanian was on leave on the day when fictitious bank account was opened; that on she informing the same to the Senior Manager, he had directed to have the account cancelled immediately debiting money from Intermediary account; that the Assistant Manager Mr.Misra and the Senior Manager Mr.R.Kamalakannan who had instructed her to cancel the account had signed the vouchers for such withdrawal of money from the Intermediary account to cancel the fictitious account opened in the name of Mr.Kasi; that she had reported the same to the Branch Manager one Mr.Ramraj; that the Branch Manager on being informed by her of the opening of fictitious account and the action taken to close the same, became indifferent, nervous and asked her to attend other work leaving the matter as such; and that she did not suspect the conduct of the Branch Manager, Senior Manager or Assistant Manager at that point of time, in asking her to 3/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 verify and to close the said account by drawing the amount standing to the credit of fictitious account from intermediary account of the bank.
3. The petitioner further contended that on the following day i.e, on 21.05.2006 while she was discharging her regular duties, she had met the Branch Manager Mr.Ramaraj in his cabin at about 11 am, since, he had sent a word through Senior Manager; that when she came to the cabin of the Branch Manager, the Senior Manager and Assistant Manager Mr.Misra were already there; and that all three of them jointly stated that she has obtained a Demand Draft for Rs.1,20,000/- favouring M/s.Indira cars from the fictitious loan account of Mr.Kasi, besides she had also transferred a sum of Rs.45,000/- from the said Kasi's account to another fictitious Savings Bank account opened in the name of Mr.Baskar; that on all the 3 officials of the Branch confronting her with the aforesaid statement, she became nervous and denied their allegations vehemently, upon which she was confined in the cabin of the Branch Manager and threatened her to give a statement in writing that she had transferred the monies from the sundry deposit account to loan intermediary account using the nodes of her colleague Clerk Mrs.R.Vanaja and the Assistant Manager Mr.Rajaram without their knowledge, as otherwise, they will cause her immediate arrest by the Central Crime Branch of the Police; that fearing the said officials can do anything, she had given a letter dated 4/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 21.05.2006 as dictated by the Branch Manager; and that the Branch Manager, Senior Manager and the Assistant Manager have resorted to the aforesaid action only to make her scapegoat for the financial irregularities that have taken place in the bank which were in the knowledge of the concerned officials.
4. The petitioner further contended that the Branch Manager/the first respondent after obtaining letter from her under coercion on 21.05.2006, had issued proceedings dated 24.05.2006, styling himself as the Disciplinary authority, suspended her from service, claiming her involvement in the opening of fictitious account of one Mr.Baskar; that she had denied the aforesaid allegation by her letter dated 26.05.2006 narrating the circumstances under which the letter dated 21.05.2006 was given by her to the Branch Manager and others, and sought for revocation of suspension as she is innocent.
5. It is the further case of the petitioner that noticing that the Branch manager, Senior Manager and Assistant Manager are seeking to make her as a scapegoat for all the omissions and commissions that have taken place in the branch of the respondent bank by implicating her in one way or other, she had approached this Court and obtained anticipatory bail in Crl.O.P.No.13283 of 2006 dated 06.06.2006; that the 5 th respondent 5/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 thereafter issued a show cause notice dated 30.06.2006 in relation to six financial irregularities alleged to have been committed by her of the respondent bank to the tune of Rs.6,00,000/- and sought her explanation; that even before she could submit her reply to the said notice, the 5th respondent issued another notice dated 07.07.2006, whereby, she was required to reply to the eight alleged financial irregularities noted therein, involving an amount of Rs.10,63,583/-; that she had submitted a combined reply dated 04.08.2006 to the two show cause notices issued to her; that the respondents thereafter without considering and without applying their mind to the explanation submitted by her, issued another show cause notice dated 03.01.2007 in all containing 40 charges including the charges which formed part of the notice dated 30.06.2006 and 07.07.2006; and that she had submitted her detailed charge wise reply/ explanation to the same vide letter dt. 09.02.2007.
6. The petitioner further contended that while she had submitted her explanation to the show cause notices as issued by the respondents and was awaiting its consideration, the 2nd respondent claiming of not being satisfied with her explanation, had issued charge memo dated 07.03.2007 under the signature of third respondent, containing 40 charges, along with 50 documents; that the respondent also appointed one Shri.Sriram Selvaraj, as the Enquiry Officer to conduct enquiry; that the third respondent further claimed that the Enquiry Officer will intimate the date, time and venue for the 6/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 enquiry to be held; that the respondent in the meantime changed the Enquiry Officer and appointed one Sri.S.Nedunchezhiyan as Enquiry Officer; that the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 24.07.2007 served 47 additional documents and list of witnesses numbering to 19; that the said documents were not furnished to her, when the respondents had issued her show cause notice dated 03.01.2007 to which she had submitted her explanation on 09.02.2007; that if only the respondents had furnished the said documents along with show cause notice issued, the same would have facilitated her to give effective reply to substantiate her claim of she being innocent and being falsely implicated in the matter; and thus, the respondents have flouted the rudimentary principles of jurisprudence at each and every stage of the proceedings.
7. It is the further case of the petitioner that the charges 1 to 23 of the charge memo dated 03.01.2007 relate to alleged fictitious account of one Mr.Baskar; that a perusal of the additional documents supplied to her would show that the credit and debit transactions into the aforesaid fictitious account have been done by other colleague Clerks and the officers of the bank, besides her; that in so far as the other charges are concerned, the same have been performed by the other colleague Clerks and the Officers of the bank and wherever the transaction has been done by her, the same was approved by higher officials of the bank; that in so far as the charge 35 relating to issue of bankers 7/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 pay order for a sum of Rs.2,59,452/- is concerned, though she had prepared the contra voucher, the same was authorised by the officer of the bank namely Mr.Misra; that the said Bank pay order (BPO) was signed by the Assistant Manager and another officer of the Bank; that in so far as the other charges relating to NPI account and loan intermediary account are concerned, the aforesaid transactions had been done by her and another Clerk as being a single window transactions which are within the pecuniary limit specified for clerks; that the respondents were projecting the case as if she had misused the nodes of all the clerks and officers of the Branch and did the transactions single handily; and that she is the lone beneficiary of the said transactions.
8. It is further contended by the petitioner that she did not commit any act detrimental to the interest of the bank and had acted bonafide in all transactions and it is humanly impossible to recollect and use the passwords of all the Clerks and officers in relation to the charges levelled against her relating to various transactions of the bank; and that she is being falsely implicated.
9. The petitioner also contended that the respondents even before issuing first show case notice dated 30.06.2006 containing alleged 6 financial irregularities, have filed a complaint with the Central Crime Branch (CCB) Egmore, Chennai on 09.08.2006 8/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 against her alone, knowing fully well that other Clerks and Officers of the Bank havedone the transactions, which only goes to show the malafide intention on the part of the respondent in singling out the petitioner and initiating disciplinary action against her apart from getting a crime registered vide FIR No.669 of 2006.
10. It is the further case of the petitioner that while the respondents intended to single out her in relation to the various irregularities of omissions and commissions of the respondent bank, the CCB in the charge sheet, filed had arrayed seven(7) other officials of the respondents bank as co-accused in addition to her, which only goes to show the involvement of other accused in crime; and that in order to cover-up their own actions, have implicated her in the aforesaid crime registered.
11. The petitioner further contended that on the respondents changing the Enquiry Officer and appointing one Mr.Neduchezhyan as Enquiry Officer vide proceedings dated 21.05.2007, the said Enquiry Officer had acted in a biased manner by not granting her time to submit her explanation including her request to avail the assistance of the lawyer to defend herself; and that on petitioning against the aforesaid actions of the Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 12.10.2007, the respondents have changed the Enquiry Officer vide proceedings dated 24.11.2007 and appointed the 6 th 9/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 respondent as Enquiry Officer; that the 6th respondent who is appointed as Enquiry Officer from Vigilance Department of the respondent, and the presenting officer is a senior person at the managerial level in the Vigilance Department, while her request to availing the assistance of the lawyer had been denied, which only goes to show that the respondents wanted to implicate her in one way or other; and thus, the entire proceedings lack fairness, transparency and are thus, vitiated.
12. It is also the further case of the petitioner that since, the charges levelled against her are complex, criminal in nature and the alleged irregularities involve cyber crime apart from the nature of documents that the respondents intended to rely, she had submitted a representation dated 05.12.2007 to the 6th respondent to allow her to engage a lawyer of her choice to defend her, as the presenting officer as well as the Enquiry Officer are legally trained persons while she is incompetent to place her defence efficiently and effectively on account of the technical issues involved in the matters; and that the aforesaid request made by her is in consonance with Clause 12(a)(iii) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 10.04.2002; and that the Enquiry Officer without considering the circumstances in which she had made the aforesaid request and not being able to defend herself with representatives of the Union, on account of one of the witnesses cited himself was a representative of the Union and cannot be taking sides; that the 10/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 respondents however, mechanically rejected her request for lawyer’s assistance; that even before the decision rejecting her request is communicated, the enquiry proceedings were conducted and concluded within five days and thus, the enquiry proceeding were held in gross violation of principles of natural justice.
13. It is the further case of the petitioner that Clause 19.4 of the Bipartite settlement in explicit terms prohibits conduct/continuation of domestic enquiry once steps are taken to prosecute an employee or to get an employee prosecuted; that since, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had taken cognizance of FIR.No.669 of 2006 in C.C.No.1609 of 2008, the respondents could not have initiated the disciplinary action or proceed further with the same and ought to have awaited for the outcome of the prosecution initiated on the basis of the complaint made by the respondents before the CCB.
14. The petitioner also contended that the Enquiry Officer while informing her of forwarding her request for assistance of lawyer to the Disciplinary authority, without waiting for the decision of the disciplinary authority had set her exparte and proceeded with the enquiry, and filed his report; and that in the exparte enquiry completed in five days, the 4th respondent had claimed that witnesses MW-1 to 24 had spoken about the 11/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 charges levelled against her and have marked 93 documents, only goes to show that the manner and method in which the enquiry proceeding is held, is only make belief and false; that one of the witnesses M.W-21 whose statement is sought to be put against the petitioner, claimed of he having verified, the alleged incriminating documents stated to be in her in writing with that of the admitted documents without even establishing as how and when the petitioner admitted the documents to be in her handwriting for the said witnesses to give his expert opinion claiming that the alleged fraudulent incriminating documents when compared to the admitted documents of the petitioner are in the same handwriting and thus, the charges against the petitioner is to be considered as proved.
15. The petitioner further contended that in so far as the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondents are concerned, all the witnesses except MW-4, MW-21, all other witnesses are interested witness being the employees of the respondent Bank or connected with the affairs of the bank, or having interest in the office of the respondent bank and thus, the said witnesses cannot be considered as independent witnesses whose deposition against the petitioner can be taken as establishing the guilt of the petitioner. On the other hand it is contended that it is a case of no evidence. 12/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
16. It is the further contention of the petitioner that the statement of the witness MW-4, on which, much reliance is sought to be placed to claim of the alleged charge being established against the petitioner, the MW-4 by her statement, had only claimed the petitioner approaching her and requesting to deposit some amount into her account, which her husband got in a case, and by mere deposit of amount into the account of the said witness and she withdrawing the said amount later and handing it over to the driver of the petitioner, cannot automatically be construed as the said money belonging to the bank and being illegally transferred by her to the MW-4's account, for the respondents to connect the said transaction to the charge of misconduct levelled against her.
17. It is also contended by the petitioner that some of the witnesses who have been examined before disciplinary authority to prove the charges against her, themselves are arrayed as accused in the charge sheet filed by the CCB after conducting investigation into the complaint lodged by the respondents; and relying on the statements made by the said persons, who are co-accused in the crime only goes to show the predetermined approach of the respondents to implicate the petitioner in the alleged irregularities and shows non-application of mind by the disciplinary authorities while 13/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 passing the impugned order dated 05.05.2008 by which she has been dismissed from service.
18. Petitioner also contended that she having submitted her explanation to the show cause notice dated 30.06.2006, 07.07.2006, 03.01.2007, the disciplinary authority could not have passed the impugned order merely accepting the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer without independently considering the explanation submitted by her to the above mentioned show cause notices issued and thus, the disciplinary authority had failed in his duty while passing the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008.
19. The petitioner further contended that she having filed the present writ petition on 25.03.2008 seeking for quashing of the charge sheet dated 07.03.2007, the respondents ought to have waited for the outcome of the writ petition rather than proceeding to issue the show cause notice dated 09.04.2008 and thereafter, passing the impugned order, thereby, seeking to frustrate her challenge to the charge memo.
20. The petitioner contended that since, the statement made in the disciplinary proceeding can be used against her in criminal case as the charges in criminal case and 14/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 in disciplinary proceedings are one and the same, the respondent were duty bound to provide legal assistance in terms of the Bipartite Settlement which the respondents have wrongly denied; that the aforesaid denial by the respondents is without considering that any statement/admission made by her in the disciplinary proceedings can impact her defence in the criminal case, and in such an eventuality, it would result in economical death of the petitioner.
21. The petitioner further contended that the respondent by merely examining the witnesses and marking the documents without proving the same, have sought to arrive at conclusion against the petitioner which is contrary to the known manner of proving the document: that the respondents before passing the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008 did not afford her an opportunity of hearing as mandated under Bipartite Settlement dt. 10.04.2002; and thus, the entire action of the respondents in issuing the impugned proceedings, ignoring the settled principles of law including violation of principles of natural justice would entitle her to challenge the impugned proceedings, by way of writ petition without availing the remedy of appeal.
22. In support of the above contentions urged, reliance is placed on the following decisions:
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(i) Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570.
(ii) Alamgir vs. State (NCT, Delhi), reported in (2003) 1 SCC 21
(iii) Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 210.
23. Contending as above, the petitioner seeks for allowing the writ petition by setting aside the charge memo dated 07.03.2007 and also the impugned order dated 05.05.2008.
Respondents Contentions :
24. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents in the writ petition as well as in the amendment petition bein M.P. No. 2 of 2008.
25. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that the petitioner had challenged the impugned order dated 05.05.2008 by which she was removed from service of the respondents, without availing the remedy of appeal Provided under Regulation 17 of the respondent / Bank i.e., Indian Bank Officers Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 ( in short ‘Regulations, 1976) r/w.Clause .19.14 of the Bipartite agreement; that the petitioner filed the present writ petition on 25.03.2008, 16/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 challenging the charge memo dated 07.03.2007, after a lapse of one year; that the petitioner while filing the present writ petition, had failed to mention about either the conclusion of enquiry proceedings or she having been furnished with a copy of enquiry report as submitted by the enquiry officer appointed to go into the charges against petitioner under charge memo dated 07.03.2007; that the petitioner resorted to suppression while filing the present writ petition; that the petitioner having alleged bias against the enquiry officer and on the disciplinary authority changing the enquiry officer, did not avail the opportunities granted to her by the enquiry officer by taking part in the enquiry proceedings; and thus, the petitioner cannot allege of violation of principles of natural justice or she not being provided with sufficient opportunity.
26. The respondents contented that the petitioner in relation to the charges, had been taking contradictory stand to suit her convenience; that having regard to the contradictory stand taken by the petitioner, the claim of the petitioner of she being falsely implicated by the respondents to cover up their own omissions and commissions is only invented for the purpose of causing prejudice against the respondents.
27. The respondents contend that the petitioner by her explanation dated 04.08.2006 submitted in reply to the show cause notice dated 30.06.2006 and 07.07.2006, insofar as the transfer of amount of Rs.2,59,542/- had claimed of she having 17/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 made a contra voucher for making Bank Pay Order for Rs.2,59,542/- on the faith that Mrs.Hemavathy, who has been working as Sweeper in the Bank had deposited the amount in the OBC collection account; that M.W.4 in to whose account the aforesaid money is transferred, had stated that the petitioner had approached her, stating that her husband is getting some funds from the Pondy Bazar Platform Traders case and it cannot be accounted in his name and for the said reason M.W.4 having regard to the long standing relation agreed for the said amount to be deposited into her account; that the petitioner thereafter having requested her to withdraw the said amount and hand it over to her the driver, which was duly acted upon by M.W.4, would go to show that the petitioner taking advantage of her position of working with the bank and noticing excess amount in sundry account, had transferred the said amount to the intermediary account, issued BPO and deposited the same into the M.W.4 account and thereafter by withdrawing the said amount got it collected through her driver; and that the aforesaid act would go to show the candid involvement of the petitioner in committing irregularities affecting the interest of the Bank.
28. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that if only the petitioner did not commit any illegality or resorted any fraudulent act, there was no reason for her to offer to pay a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- to the Bank, under her explanation dated 18/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 04.08.2006 submitted in response to the show cause notices dated 30.06.2006 and 07.07.2006.
29. It is further contended by the respondents that the request of the petitioner for assistance of lawyer was denied as the documents sought to be relied upon by the respondents in order to prove charges against the petitioner, are all regular documents of the Bank, handled by petitioner during her service and as such there is no need to have the assistance of a Lawyer to defend on her behalf.
30. It is also contended that the respondents while rejecting the request of the petitioner for assistance of a Lawyer permitted her to take assistance of a representative from any of the three unions as provided under Bipartite settlement dated 10.04.2002;
that the availing of assistance of a Lawyer by the charge sheeted employee is not a right conferred, but is subject to discretion of the respondent bank; that as the enquiry officer and the presenting officer being the regular employees of the respondent bank and not being legally trained, petitioner cannot insist for availing the assistance of a Lawyer to defend her in Disciplinary Proceeding; and that inspite of respondent bank in order to ensure fairness, having changed the enquiry officer, pursuant to the allegation of bias by the petitioner, the petitioner for the reasons best known did not chose to avail the said opportunity.
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31. The respondents further contended that the petitioner being fully aware of the enquiry proceedings and despite being informed by the enquiry officer of completion of examination of Management evidence by issuing telegram on 14.12.2007 and calling upon the petitioner to appear for enquiry on 15.12.2007 at 10 A.M, failed to appear before the enquiry officer by making use of the opportunity and as such the petitioner cannot now plead or urge that the enquiry proceedings are vitiated or farce or she not being granted adequate opportunity.
32. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the petitioner in her explanation dated 04.08.2006 having admitted to the fact of she preparing the contra voucher for making Bank Pay Order in her own handwriting, cannot now claim that the M.W.21 who is an independent witness and forensic expert having made a statement before the Enquiry Officer in relation to the handwriting appearing on the said document as not being admitted handwriting of her, for comparing the same with the other documents.
33. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the falsity of the stand taken by the petitioner as to her admitted signature and writing on the documents 20/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 referred to by the independent witnesses M.W.21 in his report M.Ex.11, is borne out from the fact that the petitioner is now disowning the documents under her own signature and handwriting viz., leave application dated 15.12.2004, application for P.F. loan dated 02.12.2004 and provident fund nomination dated 28.02.2003 only to wriggle out of the charges being faced by her.
34. It is also contended by the respondents that since, neither Enquiry Officer nor the presenting officer are having any legal background, the request of the petitioner for allowing her to avail the assistance of lawyer was rejected and instead, the petitioner was advised to avail the assistance of Union, as she is a member of the Union and the representatives of the Union are well versed with conducting of Departmental Proceedings and for the said reason the petitioner cannot claim of having been denied the opportunity to defend herself without establishing the prejudice that had been caused to her, by the denial of the aforesaid request.
35. It is also further case of the respondents that on the second respondent rejecting the request of the petitioner for availing the assistance of a lawyer, at the first instance under letter dated 29.08.2007, the petitioner had approached the appellate authority and availed the remedy of appeal; that the said appeal was also rejected on 21/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 24.09.2007; that the petitioner did not challenge the said proceedings; thus, the request of the petitioner to avail the assistance of lawyer ad its rejection had attained finality; that the petitioner thereafter made allegation of bias against the enquiry officer; that the second respondent in order to ensure fairness, changed the enquiry officer and appointed the 4th respondent as new enquiry officer; and that petitioner on change of enquiry officer, once again, cannot seek for assistance of a lawyer, which issue had attained finality earlier in absence of any challenge to the order of 2 nd respondent dated 29.08.2007 as affirmed by the appellate authority vide proceedings dated 24.09.2007.
36. It is thus, contended by the respondent that the endeavor of the petitioner to raise the said plea while laying a challenge to the impugned proceedings is only an afterthought, as the petitioner by the time of filing present writ petition was fully aware of the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings, as also the Enquiry Officer having submitted his report apart from being in receipt of the copy of the enquiry report, which she sent to her to offer her explanation; and that the petitioner having sought four weeks time to offer her explanation.
37. It is also contended by the respondents that the petitioner by her letter dated 17.03.2008 (submitted on 19.03.2008) having sought for four weeks time to 22/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 submit her explanation and the respondents having granted time till 27.03.2008, the petitioner in order to prevent the respondents from taking any further action, had filed the present writ petition on 25.03.2008, laying a challenge to the charge sheet, suppressing the fact of conclusion of enquiry and she being furnished with a copy of enquiry report to enable her to submit her explanation to the findings recorded by the Enquiry officer on the charges.
38. Insofar as the claim of the petitioner with regard to the respondents requiring to hold its hand on account of initiation of prosecution as per Clause 19.4 of the Bipartite settlement, it is contended that the said clause of the Bipartite settlement authorizes for initiation of disciplinary proceedings, after a lapse of one year from the initiation of prosecution and the interpretation sought to be placed by the petitioner on clause 19.4 of the Bipartite agreement is wholly misplaced.
39. It is contended by the respondent that the stipulation in clause 19(4) of the Bipartite Settlement, prohibiting the institution and continuation of disciplinary proceedings is entirely different; and that mere pendency of the criminal case against the delinquent employee beyond the period specified in Bipartite settlement cannot act as a bar for initiation of departmental action; and thus, the respondents have initiated 23/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 disciplinary action against the petitioner, after one year of lodging of a complaint against the petitioner, as the accused in criminal case was not put on trial within a year of commission of offence.
40. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SBI and others v. Neelam Nag and another, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 491.
41. On behalf of the respondents, it is further contended that the petitioner though had taken the plea of enquiry proceedings being held ex-parte and she being denied opportunity to defend herself with assistance of the lawyer, however, sought to allege bias against the second enquiry officer, resulting in the respondents changing the enquiry officer, even after which the petitioner having failed to take part in the enquiry proceedings, cannot now claim that the enquiry is vitiated. Further, the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner would amount to petitioner approbating and reprobating to suit her convenience.
42. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that a delinquent who remained ex-parte, despite being granted sufficient opportunities to submit explanation for the charges of misconduct and refusing to participate in the disciplinary proceedings 24/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 cannot be permitted to complain later of being denied reasonable opportunity, and the proceedings are held in violation of principles of natural justice. In support of the aforesaid contention reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bank of India V. Apurba Kumar Saha, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 615.
43. It is also contended by the respondents that on the disciplinary authority furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner on 13.03.2008 and petitioner had sought time to submit her explanation and without submitting explanation within the time granted, had approached this Court by filing the writ petition on 25.03.2008 laying challenge to the charge sheet and not to the enquiry report or to the findings recorded therein.
44. It is further contended that as the time permitted for offering explanation on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer was over by 27.03.2008, the 2 nd respondent issued show cause notice dated 09.04.2008 informing the petitioner of the proposed action which the respondents intend to take and directed the petitioner to offer her explanation; that as the petitioner failed to offer her explanation, the respondents passed the impugned order, whereby the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in his 25/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 enquiry report on each of the charges was found acceptable by the disciplinary authority for awarding the punishment of removal from service.
45. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the disciplinary authority, while concurring with the findings of the enquiry officer on the charges, is not required to pass a detailed order giving reasons for agreement like in the form of judgment and the said requirement is only when the disciplinary authorities disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer, a detailed disagreement note is required to be issued.
46. Contending as above, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy General Manager, Appellate Authority and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612.
47. On behalf of the respondents, it is further contended that having regard to the nature of the charges against the petitioner and the material that is considered by the enquiry officer while conducting enquiry into charges and recording his finding thereon; and that disciplinary authority taking note of the findings had awarded punishment by 26/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 passing the impugned order, that all the charges are concerning factual aspects and does not involve any legal aspect; that the petitioner without availing the remedy of appeal had approached this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; that it is well settled position of law that a writ Court cannot go into the disputed question of facts or examine the documents or appreciate the evidence, as the same would amount to the High Court conducting a trial by itself or acting as first appellate authority.
48. On behalf of the respondents, it is further contended that the scope of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in interfering with the punishment imposed in the disciplinary enquiry had been subject matter of consideration before the Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Managing Director, SBI (Infra), and the Hon’ble Division Bench, referring to the settled position of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various decisions, had held that the Court is only required to ensure as to whether the enquiry has been conducted in a proper and fair manner and sufficient opportunity is provided to the delinquent and the adequacy and reliability of evidence is not relevant and so long as some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the department / authority is available, the same has to be sustained. (See – The Managing Director, SBI, Mumbai v. M. Palaniappan - WA.No.2541 of 2021 dated 27.09.2024 – MHC – DB.) 27/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
49. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that since, the petitioner having been granted sufficient time at all stages of the enquiry and also thereafter by furnishing copy of the enquiry report seeking explanation and also being issued with the show cause notice of the proposed action, cannot allege that the enquiry was not conducted in proper and fair manner or she was not provided sufficient opportunity, thereby the impugned order being vitiated or opposed to principle of natural justice.
50. On behalf of the respondents, it is further contended that the claim of the petitioner of she being singled out by the respondents, even though the involvement of other employees having been found by the investigating authority, and being arrayed as A2 to A7 in CC.No.1609 of 2008, it is contended that the said claim of the petitioner is unfounded as the respondent bank had already initiated disciplinary action with regard to their alleged involvement / lapse and had awarded appropriate punishment to the concerned delinquent officers; that the respondents are not trying to protect or shield any one nor has anything personal against the petitioner, except in relation to irregularities committed by her amounting to misconduct for which the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and impugned order has been passed based on the proved charges. Contending as above, the respondents seek for dismissal of the writ petition. 28/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 Consideration by the Court :
51. Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the materials available on record.
52. Having regard the contentions urged on either side, the following issues arise for consideration :
(a) Whether the petitioner can be allowed to lay a challenge to the Charge Memo dt. 7.03.2007 by which disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent dt. 05.05.2008, dismissing the petitioner from service, without the petitioner availing the remedy of appeal provided under Regulation 17 of the Indian Bank officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976.
(b) Whether Clause – 12(a)(iii) of the Bipartite Settlement dt. 10.04.2002, confer a right on the delinquent to avail the assistance of a lawyer to defend her in the disciplinary proceedings or is a restricted right.
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(c) Whether Clause-19 of the Bipartite Settlement dt. 10.04.2002 requires the respondent-bank to defer the disciplinary proceedings pending adjudication of the Criminal case registered.
53. Before proceeding to deal with the issues as noted above, it is pertinent to note, that the petitioner had filed the present writ petition on 25.03.2008 seeking for calling for the record of proceeding dt.07.03.2007 and quashing of Charge Memo dt.07.03.2007. The petitioner however, at the time of filing of the writ petition neither mentioned about the conclusion of the Enquiry into the charges and the report submitted by the Enquiry officer nor the petitioner being furnished with a copy of the same calling for her comments on the findings recorded or she seeking time to submit her comments thereon. The petitioner however, after receiving the enquiry report and seeking time to submit her comments, on a change of mind, filed the present writ petition, with initial prayer, suppressing the above factual aspects.
54. As the challenge was initially made to the Charge Memo, after an year of its issuance, no interim orders were passed therein. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the 2nd respondent issued Show cause notice dt. 09.04.2008, informing the 30/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 petitioner of the proposed action to be taken and called upon the petitioner to submit her explanation. Even at this stage, the court record does not reflect petitioner, bringing to the notice of the court the proposed action being taken by the respondent-bank. In as much as there was no order restraining the respondent-bank proceeding with further action on the show cause notice, and as the petitioner failed to submit her explanation to the same, the respondent-bank passed the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008, by which the petitioner was dismissed from service. It is upon passing of the said order, the petitioner filed Miscellaneous petition on 16.06.2008 in the writ petition vide M.P. No.2 of 2008, seeking amendment of the writ prayer to challenge the order dt. 05.05.2008. Though, it was contended by the petitioner, that since, the writ petition was taken up for hearing on day to day basis and was being adjourned to short dates, the respondent-bank ought not to have passed the order dt. 05.05.2008, this Court having regard to the submissions made in the said Miscellaneous petition, noting that the there was no submission made or undertaking given by the counsel for respondent to the above effect, felt it appropriate to allow the said miscellaneous petition vide order in M.P. No. 2 of 2008 dt.07.08.2008 and accordingly, the prayer in the writ petition stood amended. Judicial Precedents on the Subject :
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55. Though, painstakingly elaborate submissions were made on behalf of the petitioner by referring to voluminous documents filed along with writ petition viz., in the form of evidence recorded before the enquiry officer and documents relied upon by the respondent bank, to contend that no case is made out against the petitioner for initiation of departmental action by issuing a charge memo at the first instance, and thereafter passing the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service without notice, however it is to be noted that for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee and for awarding punishment, what is required is to be seen ‘preponderance of probabilities’ and not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as required in a criminal prosecution. [ See : G.M., State Bank of India v. R. Periyasamy, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 101].
56. Further, the disciplinary proceedings are not Quasi Criminal in nature, the strict rules of evidence do not apply and being quasi- judicial proceedings, the Court is required to see only the procedural fairness. [See: Uttarkhand Transport Corporation vs. Heera singh Parihar reported in (2020) 20 SCC 677.
57. It is to be noted that the object of initiation of disciplinary proceedings is to ascertain as to whether the officer concerned is suitable to be retained in service or the employer has lost confidence in the employee and bonafide loss of confidence is 32/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 confirmed. The test for ascertaining loss of confidence in employee is bonafide or not, had been laid down by the Apex Court in Kanhaiyalal Agarwal vs.Factory Manager, Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd., reported in (2001) 9 SCC 609.
58. The Apex Court also held that even, if by the misconduct of the employee, the employer does not suffer any financial loss, he can be removed from service in case of loss of confidence. (See – State Bank of India and another Vs. Bela Bagchi and others (2005) 7 SCC 435)
59. Thus, in disciplinary proceedings, the disciplinary authority is only required to consider as to whether based on the material available, the employee can be said to have committed the act of misconduct, due to which the employer has lost confidence in the employee. Once, employer losses confidence, particularly in respect of a person holding an office of trust and confidence as to such employee would not truthfully and carefully carry on duties and the loss of confidence is bonafide, the punishment imposed of dismissal from service cannot be interfered with by the court on ground of sympathy or generosity. [ See : (i) Sudhir Vishnu Panwalkar v. Bank of India, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 271 ; (ii) Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 254; (iii) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. 33/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 Chandrasekhar Reddy, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 481; and (iv) T.N.C.S. Co. Ltd. v. K. Meerabai, reported in (2006) 2 SCC 255].
60. Further, it is well settled that interference with the orders of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority following the enquiry proceeding is only in exceptional and well defined circumstances, where the Court is satisfied that there has been violation of principles of natural justice or the enquiry proceedings has been conducted contrary to statutory regulations or the decisions of the disciplinary authority is ex-facie arbitrary, capricious or vitiated by consideration of extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case or the punishment awarded is so disproportionate to the proved article of charge, so as to shock the conscious of the court.
61. It is also equally well settled, that in disciplinary proceedings awarding punishment to delinquent employee, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of the facts, and if there is some evidence on each findings can be based on the adequacy or even reliability of the evidence cannot be gone into by the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as any such recourse resorted to by the High Court would amount to re-appreciation / re-evaluation of evidence which is not permitted under Article 226 of Constitution of India. [See - (i) State of Andhra Pradesh 34/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 v. S.Sree Rama Rao, reported in 1963 SCC Online SC 6; (ii) B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749; (iii) Bhupinder Pal Singh Gill V. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 113; (iv) State of UP and another v. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and another, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 310; and (v) State of Bihar and others v. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130.]
62. The Apex Court in the case P. Gunasekaran (infra), held that by re- appreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Apex Court laid down the parameters with regard to non interference by the High Court in the disciplinary proceedings as under :
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
[ See : Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610] 35/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
63. The principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of N. Gangaraj (infra). [ See : State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423.
64. It is also trite law that in disciplinary proceedings even ‘hearsay’ evidence is permitted as long as there is reasonable nexus and credibility. Thus, sufficiency of evidence in departmental enquiry is beyond scrutiny. [See : State of Haryana & others v. Rattan Singh, reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491.]
65. Thus, in a challenge to the disciplinary order directly under Article 226 of Constitution of India by way of a Writ, the Court is required to be cautious in entertaining such a challenge made, by by-passing the remedy of appeal, particularly when a challenge requires the writ Court to undertake an adjudication process with reference to documents and evidence involving mixed question of fact and law. The High Court in writ petition cannot be called upon to undertake the adjudication process on factual aspects by considering the documents and evidence, which have been considered by the enquiry officer and by the disciplinary authority, thereby acting as a first appellate authority. The appropriate course of action in such cases, would be to 36/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 relegate the delinquent to avail the remedy of appeal as per the Act, Rules or Regulation as may be applicable.
66. Further, any endeavor by this court to consider the rival contentions urged, by examining the documents marked in the course of enquiry proceedings or the statements recorded, to arrive at a conclusion as to whether based on the said documents and depositions, the enquiry officer could have arrived at the conclusion and the disciplinary authority based on the said finding having taken action, would firstly amount to reassessing the evidence and secondly, the court replacing its view with that of the Enquiry officer and the Disciplinary authority, amounting to this court conducting trial in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India. The Apex Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (infra), had held that court will not act as an appellate court and re-assess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record and is only required to consider as to the evidence led is ‘acceptable evidence’ or not. [State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584.] 37/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
67. Further, writ proceedings are summary in nature and disputed questions of facts cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction. [ See : Sumedha Nagpal v. State of Delhi, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 745]
68. It is also equally well settled by judicial precedents that, where the statute or the Rules or Regulations provides for an appeal mechanism, and the appellate authority being competent to go in to the factual aspects, in addition to the disciplinary authority, the writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot be entertained. The Apex Court in Satyawati Tandon case (infra), dealing with alternative remedy, referring to the Constitution Bench judgment of the of Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal (infra), wherein it was observed -
"The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self- imposed limitations. Resort that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed.38/70
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up."
had allowed the Civil Appeal filed by the United Bank of India by setting aside the order of the High Court. [ See : United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon & other, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110; and Thansingh Nathmal & others v. Superintendent of Taxes, reported in (1964) 6 SCR 654 = 1964 SCC online SC 13 ].
69. The Apex court in the aforesaid judgment also referred to the parameters which are to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as laid down by the Apex Court in City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others., reported in (2009) 1 SCC 168].
70. A Division Bench of this Court while considering the scope of judicial interference in disciplinary proceedings had observed that an employee of a public Bank 39/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 where the money of customer and public at large are dealt with, high standard of integrity and honesty is expected from the employee. The Division Bench observing as above and by considering various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court on the scope of interference by a writ Court, held that when the enquiry has been conducted to be proper and the report submitted by the enquiry officer had also been based on materials and the evidence available, it is for the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority to decide on the quantum of punishment to be imposed on the delinquent. [ See :
Managing Director, SBI v. M. Palaniappan (supra)].
Discussion and Analysis :
71. Having surveyed the legal position, as to the parameters and scope of interference with an order of disciplinary authority in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I proceed to examine the case of the petitioner.
72. Though, in the facts of the present case, it is contended by the petitioner that on account of refusal of the respondent-bank, permitting her to be defended with assistance of a lawyer has resulted in procedural lapse and fair play, apart from resulting in violation of natural justice affecting her Constitutional rights, making the action of the 2nd respondent passing the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008 vitiated and amenable to 40/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 challenge by the present writ petition, firstly, it is to be noted that in disciplinary proceedings, the delinquent is required to defend himself/herself against the charges and unless the statute, rules/regulations permit the delinquent to be represented by someone else. Thus, there is no vested or absolute right to be represented by any other person or counsel. Secondly, the delinquent while claiming that on account of not being allowed to be defended by another person is required to demonstrate as to what is the prejudice that has been caused to her on account of denial of such representation and mere claim of prejudice by itself would not be sufficient. [See: Union Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan (1998) 4 SCC 310].
73. The fact pattern in the present case as detailed herein above, would show that on the respondents issuing three notices dt. 30.06.2006, 07.07.2006 and 03.01.2007 to the petitioner and not being satisfied with the explanations submitted by her on 04.08.2006 and 09.02.2007 in relation to the irregularities and misconduct, as pointed out in the said notices, had initiated departmental enquiry under Charge Memo dt. 07.03.2007. Thus, this court is also of the view that the claim of the petitioner that a duty is caused on the disciplinary authority to consider her explanation submitted earlier, is without any basis and does not merit consideration.
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74. On the 2nd respondent initiating departmental enquiry, appointed one Shri. Sriram Selvaraj, an officer working in the vigilance department of respondent bank as enquiry officer; and at that stage, the petitioner did not raise any objection or felt the need to avail the assistance of a lawyer to defend herself. It is only when the 2 nd respondent changed the enquiry officer and appointed one Mr. S. Nedunchezhiyan, as enquiry officer and the said officer serving additional documents as filed by the respondent bank and list of witnesses to be exmined by the bank in support of the charges, vide letter dt. 24.07.2007, it appears that the petitioner realizing the direction in which departmental enquiry is heading, sought time on health grounds by addressing a letter dt. 19.08.2007 where under she had made a request for allowing her to avail the assistance of a lawyer to defend on the ground that the charge memo as issued contains charges which are ‘complex in nature’ and also ‘cyber crime law’. However, the petitioner while submitting her detailed explanation to the notices as noted herein above, neither felt the charges are ‘complex in nature’ nor involving ‘cyber crime law’.
75. On the other hand a perusal of the reply submitted by the petitioner dt. 04.08.2006 shows admission on part of the petitioner of misconduct atleast in respect of some of the charges and it for the said reason, the petitioner had agreed to make good the loss caused to the respondent-bank by making payment.
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76. On behalf of the petitioner, though, it is contended that the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008, having observed that based on the independent witness statement, the enquiry authority having held the charges as proved, except M.W.4, and M.W.21, all other witnesses have some interest or other with the respondent-Bank, being value appraiser, son of a sweeper, and as such are interested witnesses and not independent witnesses, and as such their statements cannot be relied; and that in so far as the statement of M.W.4 is concerned, the same only mentions about the money being deposited, withdrawn from her account and being handed over to petitioner driver, which cannot be construed charge being proved; and thus, it is a case of no evidence, it is pertinent to note that the M.W.4 in her statement mentioned that she being neighbor of the petitioner, had agreed to get an amount of Rs. 2,59,542/- deposited in to her bank account, which the petitioner claimed as belonging to her husband professional work. The petitioner at no place, denied the factum of M.W.4 not being her neighbor or she not having any acquaintance with her or she asking her to withdraw the amount deposited into her account and hand it over to her driver. The aforesaid fact is sufficient to shoe existence of some evidence as to the involvement of petitioner, for initiation of departmental enquiry and taking action, attracting the principle of preponderance of probability.
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77. In so far as the contention of the petitioner with regard to the statement of M.W. 21 (forensic expert), that as no document is confronted to her or she having admitted either her handwriting or the document, the statement of the said witness that the disputed documents when compared with her admitted handwriting or signatures, cannot be accepted as proved, it is to be noted that if only the petitioner had taken part in the enquiry proceeding, it would have been open for her to take such a plea. On the other hand the petitioner did not participate or cooperate with the conduct of the enquiry proceedings by the enquiry officer and due to non cooperation by the petitioner, the respondents have to rely upon the available material to prove the charges against the petitioner. Further, the petitioner by her explanation dt. 04.08.2006 having admitted of preparing the contra voucher for making Bank Pay Order for Rs, 2,59,542/-, cannot now claim that the same is neither her admitted handwriting nor she having admitted the said documents. The sufficiency or adequacy of evidence cannot be gone into by the High Court in a writ petition under Art. 226 of Constitution of India. [ See : State of Haryana & others v. Rattan Singh (supra)]
78. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 = (1964) 4 SCR 718, while considering the jurisdiction of the High Court 44/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution held as under :
23. That takes us to the merits……. “In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.”…….
(underlining supplied by court)
79. The aforesaid view has been reiterated in the case of State Bank of India & Anr. v. K.S. Vishwanath, reported in (2022) 15 SCC 190.
80. Further, the admission by the petitioner by her reply dt. 04.08.2006, even though for part of the charges and conditional, coupled with the fact that the petitioner did not choose to withdraw the said conditional offer later, not only results in loss of confidence but also goes to show doubtful integrity and existence of some evidence against the petitioner. In such circumstances, the employer cannot be compelled to continue with the services of the petitioner, more particularly taking note of the fact that 45/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 the petitioner was working in Bank, requiring to maintain high degree of trust, honesty and integrity. Further, as held by various judicial precedents, in departmental enquiries what is required is not strict proof, but preponderance of probability. [See : State Bank of India v. R. Periyasamy (Supra)].
81. Since, in the facts of the present case, the respondents having issued show cause notices to the petitioner, followed by a charge memo, conducting enquiry, furnishing enquiry report to the petitioner, inviting explanation and thereafter issuing second show cause notice with regard to proposed punishment, it cannot be said that there is any procedural lapse or violation or lack of fairness in conduct of disciplinary proceedings.
82. The petitioner however, for the reasons best known did to take part in the enquiry proceedings and remained ex-parte, inspite being given sufficient opportunities by the enquiry officer. The respondents have placed on record the fact of the enquiry officer informing the petitioner by telegram on 14.12.2007 of completion of evidence by the Management and called upon the petitioner to appear on 15.12.2007; and that on the failure of the petitioner to appear on the said date and after waiting for some time, the enquiry officer had closed the enquiry proceedings by noting non appearance of the 46/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 petitioner. It is only after the enquiry officer closing the proceedings after adjourning the same for some time on 15.12.2007 , the petitioner got issued a reply telegram in the afternoon, once again, making the same allegation of bias against the 4 th respondent enquiry officer, who was appointed, replacing the earlier enquiry officer Mr. S. Nedunchezhiyan. This only goes to show the procedural fairness on part of the respondent-bank. Thus, the petitioner having failed to take part in the enquiry proceeding despite being given opportunities including changing of enquiry officers and not cooperating with Enquiry officer, cannot question the validity of the ex-parte enquiry held or be allowed to claim of she not being given reasonable opportunity. [ See :
Chairman cum M.D., Coal India Ltd., v. Ananta Saha, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 142 ;
Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha (supra) : and State Bank of India v. Narendra Kumar Pandey, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 740. ]
83. The petitioner having not submitted explanation to the show cause notices issued to her with regard to the proposed action to be taken on the basis of the findings recorded in the enquiry report on the charges, cannot claim that the disciplinary authority is required to consider explanation submitted by her earlier to the show cause notices while awarding punishment, ignoring the fact that, not being satisfied with the said explanation only, the respondent-bank took a decision to initiate departmental 47/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 enquiry and issued Charge Memo, and appointed an enquiry officer to conduct enquiry in to the charges by examining the witnesses and the documents and to submit report.
84. The enquiry officer having caused detailed enquiry into the charges by considering the available evidence, examining the witnesses, had submitted his report holding that charges 1 to 40 (except charge no. 12, 26,38 to 40 and 23 partly ) leveled against are proved. It is on the basis of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the report, the disciplinary authority had issued show cause notice dt. 09.04.2008. Even prior to the issuance of show cause notice, the 2nd respondent furnished a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and sought for her explanation on the findings recorded. The petitioner on receiving the said report having sought four weeks time by her letter dt. 17.03.2008, which time however was granted till 27.03.2008, the petitioner without controverting the findings by submitting her explanation, had filed the present writ petition challenging the Charge Memo dt. 07.03.2007. The petitioner while filing the present writ petition did not even whisper about the subsequent developments including the receipt of copy of the enquiry report on 13.03.2008 and the findings on the charges. The said conduct on part of the petitioner would amount to suppression and disentitles from being granted any relief by this court in exercise of discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
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85. The petitioner also claimed that on she making a request to the enquiry officer / 4th respondent to allow her to avail the assistance of a lawyer, the 4 th respondent having informed her of the said request being forwarded to the Disciplinary authority / 2nd respondent; and that even before the 2nd respondent taking any decision thereon, having conducted and completed the enquiry proceedings in five days, shows the proceedings being farce, resulting in violation of principles of natural justice.
86. However, as noted herein above and as contended by the respondents, rightly so, that in so far as the request of the petitioner for availing the assistance of a lawyer to defend her was rejected by the 2 nd respondent on 29.08.2007 and the petitioner aggrieved by the said decision had filed appeal which was also rejected on 24.09.2007. Thus, the said order having become final in absence of any further challenge, the claim of petitioner of she having made a request to the 4th respondent for availing assistance of a lawyer and the said request being forwarded to the 2 nd respondent, is of no consequence, as neither the 4th respondent nor the 2nd respondent could have acted as a second appellate authority by sitting over the decision of the appellate authority dt. 24.09.2007, which the petitioner for the reasons known to her allowed it to attain finality. Thus, the petitioner cannot allege lack of procedural fairness or violation of 49/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 principles of natural justice for her to by-pass the appellate remedy and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court directly.
87. Further, even though it is contended by the petitioner that having regard to the voluminous documents including computer statements and use of computer nodes of other staff members being in relation to cyber crime, she had sought for assistance of a lawyer to defend herself, it is to be noted the petitioner while submitting her detailed explanation to the show cause notices dated 30.06.2006 and 07.07.2006 or for that matter, even to the show cause dated 03.01.2007, never raised the issue of charges being complex in nature or involvement of cyber crime law, requiring to be gone into / examined by an expert or seeking for appointment of an expert. Thus, the petitioner is precluded from raising the plea of Charge Memo involving issues which are complex in nature or relating to cyber crime.
88. Thus, the claim of the petitioner of prejudice being caused to her on account of not being allowed to defend herself with the assistance of lawyer, in the considered view of this Court is only to cover up her non-participation in the enquiry proceedings, so as to claim of the enquiry proceedings and any findings recorded therein, being vitiated. If only the petitioner felt the charges are complex in nature or 50/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 involving cyber crime law, she should not have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary authority and the Enquiry officer. On the other hand the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the enquiry officer partially, by filing a petition seeking to avail the assistance of a lawyer and on the said request being rejected, appealed before the appellate authority.
89. However, on the appeal being rejected, the petitioner remained silent and did not chose to participate in the enquiry proceedings atleast under protest. Thus, it is implied that the petitioner having accepted the decision regarding the rejection of her application to avail the assistance of a lawyer to defend. The petitioner thereafter having raised the plea of bias on part of the second enquiry officer(s) Mr. S. Neduncheziyan and thereafter also against the 4th respondent, only goes to show that the petitioner at no point of time had any intention to participate in the enquiry proceeding and only intended to drag the departmental proceedings on the pretext of seeking assistance of a lawyer. This would be further evident from the fact that, on the 2 nd respondent furnishing a copy of the enquiry report, the petitioner sought four weeks time instead of refusing to submit explanation on account of denial of assistance of a lawyer. The above approach adopted by the petitioner only shows of she approbating and reprobating to suit her convenience. Therefore, the non-participation of the petitioner in the enquiry 51/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 proceedings is to be considered as conscious decision and therefore cannot be held as resulting in violation of principles of natural justice for her to invoke writ jurisdiction of this court directly.
90. In so far as claim of the petitioner that as per the Bipartite settlement, before being visited with departmental action, she should be given an opportunity of hearing, it is to be noted, that the petitioner having sought time to submit her explanation on the findings of the enquiry officer, did not choose to file her explanation and remained silent, which prompted the respondents to issue show cause notice dt. 09.04.2026. The petitioner on receipt of the show cause notice, neither sought for time to submit her reply nor filed any reply, resulting in the 2nd respondent passing the impugned order dt. 05.05.2008. The non participation of the petitioner in the departmental proceeding from the beginning, including non submission of explanation to the enquiry report findings and also to the show cause notice as issued to her regarding the proposed disciplinary action, only goes to show the non-willingness of the petitioner to take part in the proceedings, which action has to be considered as petitioner waiving her right to be heard by submitting explanation. In absence of filing explanation / reply to the show cause notice, the petitioner cannot seek for being granted hearing, as even if any such hearing is granted, the same would only be a formality/ ritual, without the delinquent 52/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 offering any explanation. On the other hand granting of opportunities by the respondent shows sufficient compliance with natural justice.
91. The Hon’ble Supreme Court speaking though his Lordship Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in the case of Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee (infra), dealing with natural justice in Departmental enquiry held as under :
13. The last violation regarded as a lethal objection is that the Board did not enquire of the respondent, independently of the one done by the Regional Inspector. Assuming it to be necessary, here the respondent has, in the form of an appeal against the report of the Regional Inspector, sent his explanation to the Chairman of the Board. He has thus been heard and compliance with Regulation 26, in the circumstances, is complete. Natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction.
No man shall be hit below the belt — that is the conscience of the matter.
[reported in (1977) 2 SCC 256] 53/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 Thus, the contention of the petitioner on this count also is without any merit and is accordingly, rejected.
92. In so far as challenge to the impugned order and the findings recorded therein, would go to show that the same relate to factual aspects and are not concerning the question of law. A writ court cannot undertake the exercise of re-appreciation or re- evaluation of evidence on factual aspects, by acting as an first appellate authority. The evidence on factual findings can only be gone into by the appellate authority in addition to the disciplinary authority, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran (supra) and other cases as referred to in Para 59 (supra).
93. Though petitioner contended that since, the charges against her in disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature and any findings recorded therein would impact her defence in the criminal case, and it is for the said reasons the petitioner having sought the assistance of a lawyer to defend, it is to be noted that the difference between the departmental enquiry and the criminal prosecution has been well settled by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court that both the proceedings i.e., Departmental and Criminal proceedings can go simultaneously. It is also well settled that mere acquittal in criminal proceedings not necessarily should lead to dropping of departmental action. 54/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
94. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohammed Yousuf Miya and others reported in 1997 (2) SCC 699, had brought out the distinction between departmental enquiry and criminal trial and held as under :-
“8. We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry 55/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.”
95. The aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court was reiterated in the case of State Bank of India vs. R.B.Sharma (2004) 7 SCC 27.
96. Further, the petitioner though had claimed that on account of her request for being provided assistance of a lawyer being rejected, she having refrained from taking part in the enquiry proceedings as it would cause prejudice to her case, the petitioner except making the aforesaid statement has not been able to demonstrate as to what is the prejudice that was caused to her, because of not being permitted to avail the assistance of a lawyer. Further, a perusal of the letter dated 19.08.2007, by which the petitioner had 56/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 sought for permission to avail the assistance of a lawyer to defend herself, shows that except stating that the respondent bank framed serious and complex charges against her and that the transactions attract cyber crime law, did not detail as to the nature of complexity of charges or which of the charges related to cyber crime law. The mere use of terminology as ‘complex nature’ or transactions attracting ‘cyber crime law’ by itself would not make the charges levelled against the petitioner of grave nature which cannot be dealt or defended by any of representatives of the three unions, for her to avail the assistance of a lawyer. It is a well known fact that the representatives of the union deal with complex nature of charges levelled against its members regularly in the course of employment and some of the representatives of the union though are not practicing lawyers, but have pursued studies in law and possess legal acumen dealing with issues day in day out. It is for the said reason, the representatives of the union appear and defend the employees/workmen before forums like Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court, etc., Thus, the claim of the petitioner that only by permitting the assistance of a lawyer to defend her would be appropriate and not other persons and thereby causing prejudice, does not appeal to this court for being accepted.
97. Further, the claim of the petitioner that as per Clause 12(a)(iii) of the Bipartite Settlement dt. 10.04.2002 she is entitled to avail the assistance of a lawyer, and 57/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 the rejection of her request by the 2nd respondent is contrary to the terms of settlement, in order to consider the said plea, it would be useful to extract the said clause, reading as under :
12. The procedure in such cases shall be as follows : (a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation as also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross- examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witnesses and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended –
(i) (x) by a representative of a registered trade union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry.
(y) where the employee is not a member of any trade union of bank employees on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a registered trade union of employees of the bank in which he is employed :
OR
(ii) at the request of the said union by a representative of the state federation or all India Organisation to which such union is affiliated.
OR
(iii) with the Banks permission, by a lawyer.58/70
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98. A reading of the above clause of the Bi-partite settlement shows that an employee is permitted to defended by a third party, as specified in sub-clause (i) an (ii), and the employer has no discretion or authority to reject such request. However, when it comes to be defended by a lawyer under sub-clause (iii), the same is subject to condition, i.e., permission being granted by the Bank. Though, it is contended that each of the sub-clause is separated by ‘or’ and thus the delinquent has a choice, and such request cannot be rejected, it is to be noted that in case of choice covered by sub-clause
(iii) is concerned, the same is not a vested right or choice left to the delinquent as in case of sub-clause (i) or (ii), but is subject to permission by the Bank, which is to be construed as a ‘restricted right’. Thus, a discretion is vested in the employer (bank) to consider as to whether circumstances warrant the delinquent to be defended by a lawyer or not. However, the decision of the employer-bank in relation to exercise of discretion can always be called in question.
99. In the facts of the present case petitioner had infact called in question the action of the 2nd respondent, rejecting her request vide proceedings dt. 29.08.2007 by filing appeal, and on the said appeal being rejected vide order dt. 24.09.2007, did not 59/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 take further action and allowed said order to attain finality. Further, the contention of the petitioner that it is for the delinquent to make a choice of either (i), (ii) or (iii), and the employer has no role to play, is also with out any merit, as by accepting such a plea would make the words used in sub-clause (iii) viz., “with the Banks Permission”, otiose and redundant.
100. Though, it is also contended by the petitioner that such action can be questioned even when a challenge is laid to the final order of the disciplinary authority, the said contention cannot be accepted, after conclusion of proceedings being a belated challenge and is liable to be rejected.
101. Thus, even where the Rules or standing orders or agreements provide for allowing a delinquent to be represented by a third party or a counsel, such right can be granted as a restricted or controlled right and refusal to grant representation through an agent does not violate the principles of natural justice. [See:(i) Cipla Ltd. Vs. Ripu Daman Bhanot, reported in (1999) 4 SCC 188] ; and (ii) D.G.Railway Protection Force and others vs. K.Raghuram Babu, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 406] 60/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008
102. In so far as the claim of the petitioner that as per clause 19.4 of the Bipartite Settlement, particularly with reference to the proviso contained therein, the respondents ought to have differed the departmental action, as criminal prosecution has been initiated, the said plea raised by the petitioner is no longer resintegra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the same sub-clause i.e. clause-4 in the case of SBI v Neelam Nag (supra), and held as under :
21. On the plain language of clause-4, in our opinion, it is not a stipulation to prohibit the institution and continuation of disciplinary proceedings, much less indefinitely merely because of the pendency of criminal case against the delinquent employee. On the other hand, it is an enabling provision permitting the institution or continuation of disciplinary proceedings, if the employee is not put on trial by the prosecution within one year from the commission of the offence or the prosecution fails to proceed against him for want of any material.
103. In the facts of the present case the incident complained against the petitioner having occurred between the period January, 2006 to March, 2006, and the respondent Bank having lodged a complaint with CCB on 09.08.2006, the filing of the charge sheet by the investigating agency in February, 2008 cannot act as a restriction for the respondents to initiate disciplinary action after one year from the date of occurrence of the incident, which falls in the year 2007. Thus, the initiation of disciplinary action by the respondent bank by issuing charge memo dt. 07.03.2007 cannot be held as violating the Bipartite settlement dt. 10.04.2002.
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104. The further contention of the petitioner that, the disciplinary authority while passing the impugned order did not record reasons and merely extracted the findings of the Enquiry officer and stated he is agreeing with said finding, thus shows non application of mind, and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside, it may be noted that since, the enquiry authority having found various charges against the petitioner as having proved, the disciplinary authority, accepting the said findings is not required to supplement or support the said finding by recording elaborate reasons again. Such requirement arises only when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, he is required to issue disagreement note.
105. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank & others (infra) has held :
11. ……… Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. … [ Reported in (2021) 3 SCC 806].62/70
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106. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Apex Court again in State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 1908.
107. Thus, considered from any angle, this court is of the view that the petitioner firstly, without taking part in the enquiry proceeding atleast under protest and allowing the said proceedings to conclude and thereafter laying a challenge to the charge memo after receipt of enquiry report ; and secondly, having sought for assistance of a lawyer to defend her and on the said request being rejected and the appeal preferred there against also having been rejected vide order dt. 24.09.2007 and allowing the said order to attain finality without there being a further challenge, cannot allege infraction of procedure in conducting enquiry and thus, the enquiry being vitiated, for her to approach this court directly without availing the remedy of appeal as contemplated under the Regulations, 1976.
108. In so far as submission of the petitioner that this court having allowed M.P.No.2 of 2008 seeking amendment of the prayer, is required to consider as to whether the action of the 2nd respondent in passing impugned order dt. 05.05.2008 dismissing her from service, is valid or vitiated, it is to be noted that for allowing the 63/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 amendment of prayer, the court only considers the prima facie case, and at the time of hearing, if the court comes to a conclusion that the matter involves disputed question of facts or does not involve any question of law but requires consideration of factual aspects, the court while rejecting the writ petition can always relegate the parties to avail the alternative remedy provided under the Statute or Rules / Regulation. Thus, the said contention urged is devoid of merit. [See : Genpact Private Ltd., v. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (2022) 18 SCC 782].
Consideration of cases relied by the Petitioner :
109. In so far as the reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision of the Apex Court in Magan Bihari Lal vs. State of Punjab (supra), the subject matter under consideration relates to a Criminal Appeal and Evidentiary value of opinion under Evidence Act, 1872. Firstly, as noted herein above, the strict rules of Evidence Act are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings to ‘prove beyond doubt’ as in a criminal trial. Secondly, the claim of the petitioner that the statement of M.W. 21 viz., the forensic expert of he having compared the handwriting on the disputed documents with the handwriting of the petitioner on admitted documents like leave application, contra 64/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 voucher prepared for BPO as admitted by the petitioner herself and PF application, even in absence of being proved as required under Evidence Act, would go to show the ‘preponderance of probability’ of involvement of the petitioner for initiation of disciplinary action. Thus, the aforesaid decision is of no assistance to the case of the petitioner.
110. The case of Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi) (supra), on which reliance placed by the petitioner, also relates to criminal appeal and deals with Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Thus, for reasons noted in preceding para, the same would not advance the case of the petitioner.
111. In so far as reliance placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others (supra), to buttress the submission that mere tendering of documents by the respondent-bank would not amount to proving the contents of the documents, it is to be noted in the facts of the present case the respondent-bank did not merely tender the documents which it intended to rely upon. On the other hand the witnesses examined spoke about the document and marked the same, like M.W. 21 marked M.Ex.11 to prove the contents of the said documents. 65/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 However, in absence of the witnesses examined by the respondent-bank and the documents marked by them not being put cross examination at the hands of the petitioner due to her own decision not to take part in the enquiry proceeding, resulted in contents of said exhibits being taken as proved and forming the basis of some evidence against the petitioner. Thus, the aforesaid decision is also of no assistance to advance the case of the petitioner.
Conclusion :
112. In view of the above discussion and analysis, this Court is of the view that the challenge by the petitioner to the charge sheet / Memo dated 07.03.2007 and to the dismissal order / impugned order dated 05.05.2008 as issued by the 2 nd respondent, invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India by way a writ petition, cannot be allowed, as the same requires detailed examination of documents and evidence involving factual aspects; and that the petitioner is to be relegated to avail the remedy of appeal provided under the Regulation 17 of Regulations, 1976. It is for the said reason this court had refrained from expressing any opinion on the documents or merits of the matter. The observations if any, in the order, are limited to the extent of considering as to whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke 66/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 the writ jurisdiction or to be relegated to avail the remedy of appeal and thus, cannot be construed as expression of opinion or recording of finding by this court.
113. However, taking note of the fact that the petitioner on being served with the impugned order had challenged the same before this Court by way of a miscellaneous petition seeking amendment of the prayer in the writ petition filed by her earlier challenging the charge sheet and this Court having ordered the amendment of the prayer by its order dt. 07.08.2008, this Court is of the considered opinion that the time spent by the petitioner in pursuing the said challenge before this Court can be excluded in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
114. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal before the appellate authority, as provided under Regulation 17 of the Regulations., 1976. In the event of the petitioner filing the appeal within 30 days from today, the respondent shall entertain the said appeal without reference to the limitation of 45 days prescribed under the Regulations, 1976 and decide the said appeal in accordance with law, uninfluenced by observations if any, made herein above. The respondents / appellate authority shall afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, and thereafter (i) pass a speaking order ; and (ii) communicate the said order to the 67/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 petitioner at the address mentioned in the memorandum of appeal, within two weeks from the date of passing of the order.
115. No order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions viz., M.P.Nos.1 and 3 are closed.
30.04.2026 Speaking order / Non-speaking order Index : Yes / No Neutral Citation : Yes / No msv/tsh/dh 68/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 To
1.Indian Bank Rep By Its General Manager/Appellate Authority, No.55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
2.The Deputy General Manager/ Disciplinary Authority, Indian Bank, Circle Office/Vigilance Cell, 55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
3.The Chief Manager Indian Bank, Circle Office/Vigilance Cell, 55 Ethiraj Salai, Chennai 8.
69/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis W.P.No.7402 of 2008 T. VINOD KUMAR, J.
msv/tsh/dh Pre-Delivery Order in W.P.No.7402 of 2008 30.04.2026 70/70 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis