Telangana High Court
The State Of Telangana vs D. Seshagiri Rao on 24 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, HYDERABAD
***
WRIT APPEAL No.176 of 2024
Between:
The State of Telangana and Two Others.
...Appellant
VERSUS
D.Seshagiri Rao (Died) per LRs and Nine Others
...Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 24.04.2026
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
____________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
2
* THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
+ WRIT APPEAL No.176 of 2024
JUDGMENT:(per Hon'ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar) %Dated 24.04.2026 # Between:
The State of Telangana and Two Others.
...Appellant VERSUS D.Seshagiri Rao (Died) per LRs and Nine Others ...Respondents ! Counsel for appellant : Sri D.V.Chalapathi Rao, learned Government Pleader ^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri B.Venkat Rama Rao, learned counsel for R-1.
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1. AIR 2013 SC 1793
2. (2015) 5 SCC 321 3.2011 (15) SCC 383 4.2008 SCC Online Cal 396
5.(2003) 2 SCC 111 6.2024 SCC Online TS 4007 7.2025 SCC Online SC 447
8.(2013) 4 SCC 465 9.2026 INSC 21
10. (1936) 38 BOMLR 987 3 HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD **** THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR WRIT APPEAL No.176 of 2024 DATE :24-04-2026 Between :
The State of Telangana represented by its Principal Secretary, Hyderabad and two others ...Appellants And D.Seshagiri Rao (Died) per LRs and Nine Others.
... Respondents.
JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar) Heard Sri D.V.Chalapathi Rao, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellants and Sri B.Venkat Rama Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 (died per LRs-respondent Nos.9 and 10), 2, 9 and 10 .
2. The present appeal is filed aggrieved by the order dated 06.06.2023 passed in W.P.No.37583 of 2015 by a learned Single Judge of this Court in allowing the Writ Petition.
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3. The appellants herein are the official respondents-State of Telangana and respondent Nos.1 and 2 are the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge.
4. The parties herein are referred to as they are arrayed in the Writ Petition.
5. The Writ Petition was filed assailing the suo motu proceedings dated 01.06.2007 in File No.F/3271/6(1)/2006 issued by the appellants under Section 8(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, 'the ULC Act'), Statement under Section 9 and subsequent notices and orders under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) dated 27.07.2007, 08.08.2007 and 28.12.2008, respectively, in respect of writ petitioners lands to the extent of Acs.1.38 guntas in Sy.No.484, to the extent of Acs.2.30 guntas in Sy.No.485 and Ac.1.30 guntas in Sy.No.486 of Bachupally Village, Quthbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, passed by the respondent No.2 and to quash the same as being illegal, without jurisdiction, arbitrary, void and violative of the principles of natural justice and also to delete the writ petitioner's land from the prohibited list of the Government lands.
6. The facts, in brief, leading to filing of the present Writ Petition are that the petitioners claim ownership over agricultural land admeasuring Acs.10.00 guntas situated in Sy.Nos.484, 485 and 486 of 5 Bachupally Village, Quthbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Their claim of title originates from an agreement of sale dated 09.09.1981, followed by execution of registered sale deeds in the years 1990 and 1993. Pursuant thereto, mutation proceedings were effected in their favour. It is contended that the subject lands were originally ancestral properties of K.Subhan Reddy, K.Chandra Reddy and another.
7. According to the petitioners, petitioner No.1 purchased Acs.5.00 guntas of land from K.Kista Reddy who belongs to the branch of said K.Chandra Reddy and the petitioner No.2 purchased Acs.5.00 guntas of land from K.Raghava Reddy, Mohan Reddy and their family members who belong to the branch of said K.Subhan Reddy. It is further stated that petitioner No.1 retained an extent of Ac.5.00 guntas, whereas petitioner No.2, alienated Ac.4.04 guntas out of Ac.5.00 guntas, in favour of third parties and retained Ac.0.36 guntas.
8. The said lands are agricultural lands and are outside the purview of the ULC Act. The petitioners had no knowledge and no notice of suo motu proceedings that were issued by the official respondents in respect of the lands owned by the petitioners. All such enquiries and proceedings which were taken up behind the back of the writ petitioners under the ULC Act are impugned in the Writ Petition. 6
9. On behalf of the official respondents a counter-affidavit is filed denying the averments made by the petitioners and contenting that suo motu proceedings were initiated under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act on the basis of the information received from the Special Officer and Competent Authority, ULC, that the landlords, K.Raghava Reddy and K.Mohan Reddy, held vacant land in Bachupally Village in excess of ceiling limit in Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration and they have not filed declaration as required under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act. Notice under Section 6(2) of the ULC Act dated 13.06.2006 was served on the landlords, K.Raghava Reddy and K.Mohan Reddy, died per LRs on 19.06.2006. The landlords failed to file declaration in spite of service of notice. Hence, provisional order dated 28.04.2007 under Section 8(1) of the ULC Act was passed and as no objections were submitted by the declarants/legal heirs, Section 8(4) order was passed on 01.06.2007. Hence, they pray for dismissal of the Writ Petition.
10. Learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners contended that the subject lands were exempted under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988, which specifies that every major family member was entitled to hold Acs.5.00 guntas of agricultural land. Further, as per the said G.O., the petitioners were entitled to hold the subject land and the authorities ought not to have passed orders by treating the lands as belonging to K.Raghava Reddy and K.Mohan Reddy alone, who are neither owners 7 of the property nor alive on the date when the land was declared surplus.
11. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for Assignment submitted that the ULC Act came into force with effect from 17.02.1976 and any alienation in favour of the petitioners by the landlords in the year 1981 and subsequent thereto is void under Sections 5(3) and 10(4) of the ULC Act and therefore, the petitioners do not have any locus standi to file the Writ Petition.
12. The learned Single Judge upon appreciation of the contentions raised therein, observed that notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act was allegedly issued to the legal heirs of K.Raghava Reddy viz., K.Laxmamma and three others and legal heirs of K.Mohan Reddy viz., K.Kannamma and K.Bal Reddy calling upon them to surrender/deliver possession of 98982.06 square meters each. However, on perusal of the original record produced by the learned Government Pleader for Assignment, it was further observed that the same does not disclose the dispatch of notice dated 28.12.2007 issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act through RPAD or service of notice on the legal heirs of the declarants by any other mode. It was also observed that in the order dated 11.03.2008, the date of service of notice under Section 19(5) was blank, from which it could be inferred that Section 19(5) notice dated 28.12.2007 was not issued to the declarants/legal heirs. Thus, 8 there is non-compliance of the mandatory procedure as contemplated under the ULC Act.
13. In this regard, the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of UP v/ s. Hari R am 1 wherein it was held that requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act is mandatory. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed the effect of the Repeal Act, 1999 that the mere vesting of the land under sub- section (3) of Section 10 of the ULC Act would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land, unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.03.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivered of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful possession under sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act.
14. It was also held that much prior to initiation of ULC proceedings, the subject lands were mutated in the name of the petitioners and as per the contents of the sale deeds dated 13.08.1990 and 05.05.1993, the petitioners were already delivered possession of the subject land and they were in actual physical and vacant possession of the same and thereby, the failure of the respondents to issue notice under 1 AIR 2013 SC 1793 9 Section 10(5) of the ULC Act either to the legal heirs of the declarants or to the petitioners, results in setting aside the impugned orders passed by them being contrary to the mandatory provisions of the ULC Act.
15. As regards the contention of the respondents that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the ULC proceedings, since the sale deeds of the petitioners were executed in the year 1990 and subsequent thereto are void. As per Section 5(3) read with Section 10(4) of ULC Act is concerned, the learned Single Judge noted that the ULC proceedings were initiated in the year 2006 and prior to Section 6(2) notice dated 03.06.2006, the petitioners have already purchased the subject property. It is an admitted fact that Bachupally Village comes under peripheral area of Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration and general exemption is granted for holding Acs.5.00 guntas of land under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 apart from 1000 square meters under Section 4(1)(b) of the ULC Act and the land purchased by each of the petitioners under registered sale deeds dated 13.08.1990 and 05.05.1993 is less than Acs.5.00 guntas. Therefore, held that the petitioners have locus standi to challenge the ULC proceedings and accordingly, allowed the Writ Petition and held the impugned proceedings and panchanama to be void.
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16. Learned Government Pleader for Assignments appearing for the appellants mainly contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate properly that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the impugned proceedings. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Assam v/ s. Bhaskara Jyothi Sharm a 2 wherein it was held that even if competent authority fails to issue notice to the land owners in terms of Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, would itself is not sufficient to attract Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and that failure to issue notice under Section 10(5) will not vitiate the proceedings under the ULC Act.
17. It is further argued that there is inordinate delay of eight years in filing W.P.No.37583 of 2015. As per the judgment of Syed M aqbool Ali v/ s. State of UP 3 , if the Writ Petition is belated, unless there is good and satisfactory explanation for delay, the petition is to be rejected on the ground of delay and latches. It is also stated that the declarants having participated in the ULC proceedings, have not challenged the proceedings under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act, which had attained finality.
2 (2015) 5 SCC 321 3 2011 (15) SCC 383 11
18. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2/writ petitioners contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is legal and valid considering the provisions of the ULC Act, which do not call for further scrutiny of the Appellate Court. He vehemently contended that the subject agricultural lands fall within the peripheral limits of Hyderabad Agglomeration area long after ULC Act came into force. The subject lands were continued to be agricultural lands but not vacant lands as alleged by the appellants. Even after the ULC Act is made applicable, the same is exempted under G.O.Ms.No.737 dated 31.10.1988 in the hands of original pattadars i.e. transferors of the writ petitioners and therefore, it did not hit by the provisions of the ULC Act. The authorities of the appellants initiated proceedings under Section 6(2) of the ULC Act, 30 years after the Act came into force.
19. It is contended that when suo motu proceedings were initiated, the patta and possession of the subject lands in the name of the writ petitioners in the revenue records to the knowledge of the authorities, and the entire proceedings issued under the ULC Act 1976 were initiated and concluded in violation of principles of natural justice without issuing any notice much less behind back of the writ petitioners. The consideration and determination of the standard holding of deceased pattadars who have no title as holding of 12 determination and declaration which surplus holders passing the impugned orders against a dead person is non-est in the eye of law as whole proceedings were taken up in the name of the dead person i.e. writ petitioners' vendor's family.
20. Learned counsel further argued that the possession under panchanama dated 11.08.2008 is taken without following the procedure under the provisions of the ULC Act. Therefore, the panchanama as well as the entire proceedings under Section 10 of the ULC Act are vitiated.
21. Learned counsel places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hariram 's case (1 supra), as referred by the learned Single Judge for non-compliance of the procedure contemplated under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is legal and valid basing on the settled proposition of law, which does not call for any interference of this Court.
22. Learned counsel also places reliance upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in R om a Bose v/ s. State of W est Bengal 4 to contend that the competent authority has no inherent power or any authority to take suo motu action under the provisions 4 2008 SCC Online Cal 396 13 the ULC Act. In the absence of the statutory provision, the exercise of suo motu power by the competent authority is wholly without jurisdiction and any order passed in purported exercise of such power is a nullity in the eye of law. The said order has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 05.12.2014 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.19765 of 2014.
23. Learned counsel for the respondents further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Bhavnagar University v/ s. P alitana Sugar M ill (P ) Lim ited 5 , wherein it was held that it is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all part of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
24. Learned counsel further places reliance upon an order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Chief Com m issioner of Land 5 (2003) 2 SCC 111 14 Adm inistration v/ s. M anu Bhai Shankar Bhai P atel 6 , wherein the authorities have not issued prior notice to writ petitioners therein, who are in possession of the land, and therefore, the impugned proceedings therein stands abated. So also relied upon other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.P .Electrical Equipm ent Corporation v/ s. Tahsildar 7 , Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan P athan v/ s. State of M aharashtra 8 , Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v/ s. State of Gujarat 9 and in Nazir Ahm ad v/ s. The K ing Em peror 10 and finally contended that the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of failure to act in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the statute of issuance of notice before initiating suo motu proceedings.
25. We have given our earnest consideration to the various contentions raised by either parties and perused the record, including the authoritative pronouncements referred to above.
26. Open perusal of the material on record, the following points arise for consideration by this Court:
i) "Whether the initiation of suo motu proceedings by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and 6 2024 SCC Online TS 4007 7 2025 SCC Online SC 447 8 (2013) 4 SCC 465 9 2026 INSC 21 10 (1936) 38 BOMLR 987 15 Regulation) Act, 1976, in the absence of an express statutory provision enabling such exercise of power, is legally sustainable and within jurisdiction?
ii) Whether the proceedings culminating in orders under Sections 8(4), 9 and 10(1) to 10(3) of the ULC Act suffer from violation of principles of natural justice on account of non-issuance or non-service of notice upon the declarants and/or the persons in actual possession of the subject land?
iii) Whether compliance with the mandatory requirements under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act, particularly in relation to issuance and service of notice for surrender of possession, has been duly established by the appellants?
iv) Whether the alleged taking of possession through panchanama, without prior notice and without the presence or participation of the persons in possession, constitutes valid and lawful dispossession in the eye of law?
v) Whether mere vesting of land under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act, in the absence of actual physical possession taken in accordance with law, is sufficient to confer absolute title upon the State?
vi) Whether the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches?
27. The facts reveal that the respondents herein, who are the writ petitioners, father and son, claimed ownership along with possession individually over an extent of Acs.5.00 guntas of land purchased from 16 K.Kista Reddy and Acs.5.00 guntas of land purchased from K.Raghava Reddy, Mohan Reddy and their family members, covering the subject survey number by virtue of the agreement of sale dated 09.09.1981. The subject agricultural land falls within the peripheral limits of Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration area long after ULC Act came into force and the subject lands were continued to be agricultural lands and not vacant lands. Even ULC Act was made applicable and same are exempted under G.O.Ms.No.733 dated 31.10.1988 in the hands of original pattadars i.e. transferors of writ petitioners and therefore, not hit by the ULC Act.
28. Admittedly, the ULC Act was enacted as social welfare legislation with the avowed object of preventing concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and to ensure its equitable distribution. The scheme of the Act contemplates determination of excess vacant land through a structured procedure commencing from Sections 6 to 9 and culminating in vesting under Section 10. However, such vesting is not absolute in its operation unless it is coupled with lawful dispossession in accordance with the procedure prescribed under sub- sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 thereof.
29. Section 6 of the ULC Act reads as under:
6. (1) Every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement or this Act shall, within such period as 17 may be at the commencement of this Act shall, within such period as may be prescribed, file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and such other particulars diction specifying the location, extent, value and such other particulars as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there isa building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by him (including the nature of his right, title or interest therein) and by him (including the nature of his right, title or interest therein) and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain...
2) If the competent authority is of opinion that
(a)...
(b) in any State which adopts this Act under clause (1) of (b) in any State which adopts this Act under clause (1) of article 252 of the Constitution, any person holds at the commencement of this Act, vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, then, notwithstanding anything vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), it may serve a notice upon such person contained in sub-section (1), it may serve a notice upon such person requiring him to file, within such period as may be specified in the requiring him to file, within such period as may be specified in the notice, the statement referred to in sub-section (1). notice, the"
30. Similarly, Section 8 of the ULC Act contemplates that, "8. (1) On the basis of the statement filed under section 6 and after such (I) On the basis of the statement filed under section6 18 and after such Preparation inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make the competent Preparation inquiry as the competent authority may deem fit to make the competent authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who of draft authority shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under section 6. has filed the statement under section 6. (f) Every statement prepared under sub-section (I) shall contain the (2) Every statement prepared under sub-section (1) shall contain the following particulars, namely:
(i) the name and address of the person;
(ii) the particulars of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by such person; which there isa building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein, held by such person;
(iii) the particulars of the vacant lands which such person desires to retain within the ceiling limit; to retain within the ceiling limit;
(iv) the particulars of the right, title or interest of the person in the vacant lands; and in the vacant lands; and
(v) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) The draft statement shall be served in such manner prescribed on the person concerned together with a notice any objection to the draft statement shall be preferred within thirty days of the service thereof. (4) The competent authority shall duly consider any objection received, within the period specified in the notice referred to in sub-section (3) or within such further period as may be specified by the competent authority for any good and sufficient reason, from the person on whom a copy of the draft statement has been served under that sub-section and 19 the competent authority shall, after giving the objector a reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders as it deems fit."
31. The authorities under the ULC Act suo motu initiated proceedings under Section 6(2), three decades after the Act came into force. More importantly, such proceedings were initiated against persons who were either not the owners of the land or were no longer alive at the relevant point of time. When suo motu proceedings were issued, the patta and possession in respect of subject lands stood in the name of writ petitioners in the revenue records and the entire ULC proceedings initiated and concluded without notice to the petitioners, much less behind the back of the writ petitioners. In the absence of any express statutory provision conferring suo motu power upon the competent authority under the ULC Act, the very initiation of proceedings suffers from lack of jurisdiction and is liable to be declared unsustainable in law.
32. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners assumes significance in this regard in the case of R om a Bose (4 supra), wherein the Calcutta High Court has held that the competent authority being an authority under the statute has not been vested with any suo motu power under the ULC Act and in the absence of the statutory provision, the exercise of suo motu power by the competent authority is wholly without jurisdiction and any order passed 20 in purported exercise of such power is a nullity in the eye of law. This view was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLA No.19765 of 2014 dated 05.12.2014.
33. Therefore, this Court holds that the initiation of suo motu proceedings by the competent authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence of an express enabling provision, is without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.
34. Further, the record reveals a complete failure on the part of the authorities to adhere to the principles of natural justice. Neither the original declarants nor the writ petitioners, who were in actual possession of the land, were served with notices of the proceedings. In particular, as per the findings of the learned Single Judge, there is no material to establish that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued or served in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge on perusal of the original record produced by the learned Government Pleader before him, held that it does not disclose dispatch of any notice through RPAD or any legally recognized mode, nor does it evidence acknowledgment of service. It is well settled that issuance and service of notice under Section 10(5) is mandatory, as it affords an opportunity to the person in possession to voluntarily surrender the land. Only upon failure to comply with such notice can the authority resort to forcible dispossession under Section 10(6). Therefore, 21 non-compliance with these mandatory provisions renders the entire process of taking possession legally unsustainable.
35. The importance of compliance with Section 10(5) of the ULC Act assumes greater significance when viewed in light of the Repeal Act, 1999.
36. Section 3 of the Repeal Act reads as under:-
" Section 3 Savings -
(1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment or any Court to the contrary:
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under subsection (1) of Section 20.
(2) Where-
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the state Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and 22
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land, then such land shall not be restored, unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.
Section 4. Abatement of legal proceedings:-All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any Court, Tribunal or any authority shall abate; Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act insofar as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority."
37. Section 3 of the Repeal Act saves only those cases where (i) possession of the excess land has been taken over by the State Government, or (ii) compensation has been paid. Section 3 of the Repeal Act makes it abundantly clear that only those cases where possession of excess land has been taken over by the State Government prior to the repeal are saved. In all other cases, where possession has not been taken in accordance with law, the proceedings under the principal Act stand abated.
38. Sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act respectively which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present Appeal read as under:
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"10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit-
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary".
39. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder or any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government and for this purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person to surrender or deliver possession of such land. It is only when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub section (5) within a period of thirty days of the service of notice, and for that purpose may use force, if necessary. Therefore, the provisions of sub-section (6) are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the ULC Act, within the prescribed period.
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40. The legal position in this regard has been authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari R am 's case (1 supra), wherein it was unequivocally held that where the possession of the subject land has not been taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, the proceedings under the Act would not survive and mere vesting of the vacant land with the State Government by operation of law, without actual possession, is not sufficient. Mere vesting under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act does not confer the State with de facto possession unless it is followed by voluntary surrender under Section 10(5) or forcible dispossession under Section 10(6) thereof. Thus, in the absence of compliance with these mandatory provisions, the proceedings stand abated upon coming into force of the Repeal Act. The said view was upheld in the judgment in A.P . Electrical Equipm ent Corporation's case (6 supra) and Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia's case (9 supra).
41. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear that although notifications under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) were issued, the appellants have failed to establish that possession of the subject land was taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6). The reliance placed on the panchanama dated 11.08.2008 is misconceived, as the same was drawn unilaterally 25 without issuing prior notice and without the presence or participation of the persons in actual possession. Such symbolic or paper possession does not satisfy the legal requirement of actual physical possession.
42. The same has been reiterated in Chief Com m issioner of Land Adm inistration's case (6 supra) holding that a panchanama drawn without prior notice to, or participation of, the person in possession does not amount to lawful taking of possession. Such unilateral recording is only symbolic and cannot satisfy the requirement of actual physical possession under the ULC Act.
43. The writ petitioners have demonstrated that they were in continuous possession of the subject lands pursuant to registered sale deeds executed much prior to initiation of ULC proceedings. Even assuming that such transfers were hit by provisions of the ULC Act, the failure of the authorities to follow due process under Section 10 disentitles the State from claiming the benefit of vesting.
44. Further, all the proceedings were taken up in the name of a dead person i.e. writ petitioners' vendors family and passing of the impugned order against a dead person is non-est in the eye of law.
45. The appellants have contended that there is an inordinate delay of about eight years in filing the writ petition. However, the facts disclose that the writ petitioners were not put on notice at any stage of 26 the proceedings and were unaware of the same. The proceedings themselves were conducted behind their back.
46. Further, the issue pertains to deprivation of property without following due process of law. Such illegality goes to the root of the matter and cannot be sustained merely on the ground of delay. In the absence of proper notice and in view of continuing illegality, the plea of delay and laches cannot be invoked to defeat the rights of the writ petitioners.
47. Therefore, this Court holds that the proceedings initiated under the ULC Act, insofar as they culminated in alleged vesting under Section 10(3), are rendered incomplete and legally unenforceable due to non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act. The State having failed to establish that actual physical possession of the subject land was taken prior to the coming into force of the Repeal Act, the entire proceedings stand abated under Section 3 of the Repeal Act. Consequently, the impugned proceedings, including the panchanama and all consequential actions, are held to be declared void and non est in the eye of law, as they do not create, extinguish or affect any legal rights. In view of the above, all the issues are answered against the appellants and in favour of the writ petitioners.
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48. In light of the foregoing findings, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated both facts and law. The conclusions arrived at are in consonance with the statutory framework and binding precedents. Thus, no perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error is demonstrated in the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the appellate jurisdiction and consequently, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
49. W.A.No.176 of 2024, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
_______________________________ MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J _____________________ GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J Date:24.04.2026 Note:
LR copy to be marked.
(B/o) GJ