Karnataka High Court
The General Manager, Ksrtc vs Pandu S/O Loku on 25 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: II(1998)ACC43, 1998ACJ1389, ILR1997KAR1259, 1997(2)KARLJ559
Author: M.P. Chinnappa
Bench: M.P. Chinnappa
JUDGMENT M.P. Chinnappa, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Awards passed by the M.A.C.T. & Dist. Judge, Gulbarga, the appellants have preferred their respective appeals questioning the correctness of the Judgment and the Award in each case.
2. The brief facts leading to these 15 appelas are that on 12-5-86 at about 12.15 p.m the K.S.R.T.C. bus bearing No. MYF 6056 was being driven by one Basappa of Humnabad Depot in a rash and negligent manner and in high speed. When the bus was so passing near Channur bridge on Humnabad Chincholi road it turned turtle and the passengers sustained injuries. Therefore, the injured persons lodged claims under Section 110-(A) of the M.V. Act claiming compensation for the injuries sustained by them. One of the persons succumbed to the injuries and therefore, his legal representative lodged a claim claiming compensation for the death of the deceased.
3. During the pendency of the case, a Lok Adalat was held in Gulbarga District and all these matters were settled amicably before the said Lok Adalat awarding compensation in favour of these injured persons and also to the L.Rs. of the deceased.
That matter was placed before the Accident Claims Tribunal & District Judge, Gulbarga, to record compromise. However, the District Judge instead of recording the compromise held that the compromise petition was not signed by one Sri B.S. Patil who is the Sr. Counsel appearing for the claimants before the Tribunal but it was signed only by his junior colleague. Further he also held that the compensation awarded as per the terms of the compromise petition was not just and reasonable. Therefore, he proceeded to consider the applications ignoring the compromise petition filed before him.
After examining the claimants and the doctor who examined the claimants on being referred to by the Tribunal to fix their disability awarded compensation much more than the amount agreed to in the compromise. The respondent KSRTC questioned the order of the learned Tribunal refusing to record compromise and awarding compensation after enquiry, etc.
4. Heard the Learned Counsel for the appellants and the Learned Counsel for the respondents.
5. Though the Tribunal passed separate orders in each case, in view of the fact that these claims arise out of a single accident and also the questions of law and facts are same, all these cases are disposed of by this common Judgment. Retain the original of this Judgment in M.F.A. 1117/87 and a copy thereof in all the other petitions.
6. At the very outset the Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that when the respondents did not file any protest petition not to accept the compromise petition and when they have not even alleged before the Tribunal that any fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or foul method was used to enter into the compromise, it was not open to the Court to reject the compromise petition on its personal opinion that the compromise arrived at and the compensation awarded under the compromise is not just, is contrary to the provisions of law. He also submitted that the compensation awarded after examining the claimants and witnesses is exhorbitant taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained by various persons and also the age of the deceased. Wherefore, he submitted that these appeals deserved to be allowed and the compensation should be restricted only to the amount fixed under the compromise petitions.
7. Per contra, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents herein has contended that the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the compensation agreed to be paid by the K.S.R.T.C. was not just and reasonable and the compromise petition also was not signed by the Sr. Counsel who was appearing for the appellant. Therefore, the discretion used by the Tribunal cannot be called in question before this Court. He also submitted that the respondents have waived their right by. participating in the subsequent proceedings by cross-examining the witnesses and arguing the cases. Wherefore, there is no cause of action for the appellants to question that order. He also submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal after holding enquiry and awarding compensation is just and reasonable and the same does not call for interference by this Court.
8. It is an admitted fact that a Lok Adalat was held in the District and a compromise was arrived at. All the petitioners have signed the compromise petitions and under their signatures the learned Advocate Sri B.S. Patil has also signed the petitions. On behalf of the respondents the learned advocate appearing for them also subscribed his signature. Further Sri B.S. Patil also filed vakalath for and on behalf of the petitioners. Under those circumstances, the very finding of the learned Tribunal to the effect that he refused to record the compromise on the ground that the Sr. Counsel did not participate and he did not sign the compromise petitions, cannot be a ground to reject the applications. The claimants who presented the compromise petitions did not make any grievance or a protest petition before the Tribunal alleging that either a fraud, misrepresentation or any other mal-practice using force was played on them to compel them to arrive at the compromise. They have not even denied their signatures found on the compromise petitions. To put it shortly, they have not made any complaint either on the ground that the compromise was entered into against their will and consent or that the compensation awarded under the terms of the compromise is insufficient, etc. Therefore, the first ground on which the Tribunal refused to record the compromise is not well founded.
9. The next ground stated by the Tribunal to reject the compromise petition is that it was satisfied that the compensation agreed to be paid by the K.S.R.T.C. under the compromise petitions is not just and reasonable.
10. At the very outset for the foregoing reason it must be mentioned that the Tribunal had no role to play when the parties have agreed for the terms and conditions stipulated in the compromise petition which was signed by both the parties. Besides that, this compromise was arrived at before the Lok Adalat where retired District Judge acted as conciliator. There is absolutely nothing for him to compel these petitioner to enter into the compromise. On the other hand, the Tribunal should have given more weight to the compromise arrived at by the parties before the Lok Adalat. Under those circumstances, the very refusal of the Tribunal to record the compromise is contrary to law.
11. The Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the compensation agreed to be paid by the appellant is not just and reasonable. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the compromise petition. In support of his argument he also placed reliance on a decision reported in ASWATHA REDDY v. ANJANAPPA, wherein it is held:
"A party challenging a compromise can file a petition under Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 or an appeal under Section 96(1) of CPC in which he can question the validity of the compromise.... the compromise should not be recorded in a casual manner, but the Court must apply its Judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. There is a responsibility cast on the Court to satisfy itself about the lawfulness and genuineness of the compromise as the compromise accepted before the Court will acquire the sanctity of a Judicial Order."
Absolutely there is no doubt about the principle enunciated by their Lordships in this decision. The question is whether there is any doubt regarding the genuineness of the compromise petition fifed by both the parties or about the lawfulness of the compromise. No application was filed.
12. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that, according to the M.V. act, the Tribunal should be satisfied that a just compensation is awarded. In this case, the Tribunal was not satisfied after ascertaining the injuries sustained by the claimants. Therefore, it did not agree. This argument is unsustainable. It is not open to the Tribunal to say that the parties when they have voluntarily and with full knowledge entered into a compromise, is not valid on the ground that the quantum of compensation is not just and reasonable. Presently I will demonstrate as to how the compensation awarded by the Tribunal also is unjust and unreasonable. But suffice it to add that when the parties voluntarily and with full knowledge consented to receive certain sums of money as compensation, the Tribunal without any basis cannot hold that the quantum is unjust and unreasonable.
13. The learned counsel for the respondents further placed reliance on a decision reported in PRITHVICHAND RAMCHAND SABLOK v. S.Y. SHINDE, wherein Their Lordships have held that it is the duty of the Court to see that consent terms are consistent with relevant laws as otherwise the consent decree passed would not operate as res judicata. In this case, the question of res judicata does not arise. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that certain norms are fixed by the Motor Vehicle Act in cases where the compensation should be awarded only on the basis of these norms only. In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the quantum of compensation fixed is not in consonance with the decision rendered by the Court and also the law. However, he failed to show violation of any law in entering into the compromise.
14. As against that, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a decision rendered by our High Court reported in DTY. GENERAL MANAGER v. KAMAPPA, 1993(1) KLJ 584 wherein this Court has held that if both the parties to a daim petition enter into a settlement and request the Tribunal to fix the agreed sum as compensation payable in the case, unless there is inherent material on the face of the record which would indicate that there has been some fraud or collusion, it is not open to the Tribunal to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and for valid reasons to hold that the agreed amount is not just and correct. As stated earlier, the Tribunal has not given any cogent or convincing reasons to refuse to record the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalath.
15. The Lok Adalaths are held with a laudable object of achieving the object of reducing the heavy pendency in Courts. The Government also has spent a huge sum in this regard and Lok Adalaths are held in every taluk and District headquarters to settle the dispute between the parties. These matters were discussed in detail in the presence of the advocates of the respective parties and also the petitioners. The assistance of Sr. advocate and retired District Judge was taken as a conciliator to decide the quantum of compensation and the parties also were satisfied in the normal course and arrived at a just quantum of compensation. Taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained by them, age and other factors, such agreement arrived at between the parties cannot be lightly brushed aside or refuse to act upon by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also has a responsibility to see that due sanctity is given to such compromises and the parties are encouraged to settle matters so that the Tribunal also would be contributing and encouraging the parties to compromise their cases instead of making them to wait for the compensation which would be awarded after a lapse of long years. If the Tribunals were to insist in all the cases for finding out as to whether the compromise arrived at is just and reasonable or that the agreement is otherwise tainted with doubt, etc., the very purpose of conducting the Lok Adalath would be defeated. In this case as stated above, when the parties are not making any allegations against the agreement to compromise, only the Tribunal holding that the compensation awarded is not just is not a ground to reject it. With this background now it is necessary to find out to some extent as to whether the compromise arrived at is just and reasonable.
16. In MFA. 1117/87 the corresponding MVC. NO. being 218/86, Rs.1,750/- was the compromise amount but the Tribunal had awarded Rs. 6,000/-. The injuries sustained by the claimant as per Ex. P-1 the Medical Certificate are :
"Tenderness and swelling near left ankle joint. Movement possible but restricted & painful. 1 cm over the right arm, 3 cm around the elbow joint. Size 2 cm x 1 cm injuries are simple in nature."
17. In MFA. 1119/87 the corresponding MVC No. being 143/86 the compromise amount was Rs. 1,750/- but the Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000/-. As per Ex. P-1 the M.C. the injury is contused laceration over right ear and the wound was reddish in colour and it was simple in nature.
18. In MFA. 1120/87 - M.V.C. No. 69/86 the deceased was 70 years of age. Compromise compensation was R. 16,200/- but the Tribunal enchanced it to Rs. 29,200/-, taking the loss of dependency at Rs. 16,200/-, 5,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs. 6,000/-towards loss of expectation of life, and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses.
19. In MFA. 1121/87 - M.V.C. No. 152/86 the compromise compensation was Rs. 1,750/- but the Tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/ -. The Medical Certificate Ex. P1 discloses symptoms of fracture at the base of 5th lateral dorsal right foot. Small crack at the lower level of Simula.
20. In MFA. 1122/87 - MVC No. 144/86 the compromise compensation was Rs. 1,750/- but the Tribunal enchanced to Rs. 22,000/-. The wound certificate disclosed contusion over the right shoulder and pain in the buttock.
21. In MFA. 1123/87 - MVC. No. 145/86 the compromise amount is Rs. 1.750/- whereas the tribunal enhanced it to Rs. 5,000/-. In this case no evidence was let in and even the claimant was not examined.
22. In MFA 1124/87 - MVC. No. 157/86 the compensation initially was Rs. 1.750A. The Tribunal enhanced it to Rs. 4,000/-. Ex. P-1 showed that the claimant complained of pain over right shoulder but there was no visible injury.
23. In MFA. 1125/87 - MVC. No. 146/86 the compensation awarded was Rs. 1,750/- through compromise but the Tribunal enhanced it to Rs. 6,000/-. Ex. P-1 M.C. showed contusion measuring 3" x 3" above the left eye- reddish in colour and simple in nature.
24. In MFA. 1126787 - MVC. No. 148786 initial amount awarded was Rs. 10,000/- through compromise. But the Tribunal enhanced it to Rs. 25,500/-. Ex.P1 disclosed right collar bone fracture with abrasion over right shoulder. Doctor opined that the injury was grievous in nature.
25. In MFA. 1400/87 - MVC. No. 156/86, Rs. 1,750/- was the compromise amount awarded. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,000/-. The injuries are contused abrasion over the left aspect of the right fore-arm - reddish in colour. Simple in nature.
26. In MFA 1401787 - MVC. No. 155/86 Rs. 1,750/- was enhanced by the Tribunal to Rs. 15,000/-. Injury sustained was - complaint of pain in the right hand and left lower limb but no visible injury was seen.
27. In MFA. 1402787 - MVC. No. 158/86 Rs. 1,750/- was awarded through compromise but the Tribunal enhanced it to Rs. 5,000/-. Ex. P-1 shows tenderness of ankle at right side. Injury was simple and no fracture and no disability.
28. In MFA. 1403/87 - MVC. No. 219/86 Rs. 1,750/- was initially awarded through compromise. But the Tribunal enhanced this sum to Rs. 15,000/-. The injuries as per Ex. P-2 are :
"Undisplaced crack fracture, greater tubrosity of right head of humeras. Restriction of movement in all directions by the last 15 to 20 degrees."
Ex. P-1 is the X-ray.
29. In MFA. 1404/87 - MVC. No. 154/86 Rs. 1,750/- was enhanced to Rs. 20,000/- by the Tribunal. The petitioner complained of pain all over the body. No visible injury was seen. P.W. 1 doctor has stated that there was crack fracture of C-6 with secondary perianthritis of right shoulder joint. The petitioner had restriction in abduction movements or right shoulder joint by last 70 degrees.
30. In MFA. 1410/87 - MVC. 153/86 the compensation of Rs. 15,000/- was enhanced to Rs. 25,000/-. No doctor was examined in this case. The claimant in his deposition on 17.1.87 has stated that the entire skin below his right knee was decayed upto the ankle. The skin had lost its original colour and there were keloid marks at two places. Skin grafting was done over the decayed skin.
31. From the above, it is clear that in most of the cases, the matter was settled for a sum of Rs. 1,750/- but the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 6,000/-, Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 25,000/-, Rs. 22,000/-, Rs. 5,000/-, Rs. 4,000/-, Rs. 6,000/-, Rs. 4,000/-, Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 5,000/ -, Rs. 15,000/-, and Rs. 20,000/- in some cases and in a case of death, the matter was settled for Rs. 1.6,200/- but the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 29,200/-. In another case, the matter was settled for Rs. 15,000/- but the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 25,000/-. In one more case the settlement was for Rs. 10,000/- but the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 25,500/-. From this it is clear that the Tribunal has awarded the compensation almost, two times the amount arrived at in the settlement. It may be mentioned that the Tribunal has awarded the compensation as stated above only on the basis of the evidence of Dr. Ravindra Shah who examined these claimants on being referred to him by the Tribunal suo moto. There is no application filed by the claimants requesting the Tribunal to direct this doctor to examine him nor they have appeared before any other doctor to establish the disability. On the other hand, the Tribunal itself has taken the cause and referred these claimants to the doctor who is examined in this case. The doctor who examined and treated these claimants immediately after the incident has not been examined before the Court. Therefore, the matter was settled before Lok Adalath only on the basis of the Medical Certificate available on the file which were issued by the doctor who examined the patients immediately after the accident. At that time there was no certificate issued by any doctor to show the disability, if any, suffered by the claimant. Under those circumstances, the parties have agreed for a certain amount only on the basis of the injuries sustained by them. Therefore, the Tribunal which has taken personal interest to refer the claimants to the doctor & to award enhanced compensation on the basis of the evidence of that doctor dearly shows that it wanted to frustrate the compromise arrived at by both the parties. Actually the Tribunal ought to have received the compromise petition duly signed by both the parties and should have accepted it as he had no other materials to show that the compensation awarded was unjust and unreasonable. Therefore, it is dear that the Tribunal has taken for granted that the settlement of the claims was not just. It is nothing but a surmise and conjuncture of the Tribunal. With this background, he had increased the compensation awarded to the claimants.
32. It may also be mentioned here that in MVC 145/86 the claimant as well as the doctor were not examined but the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs, 5,000/-. Further, in a case where one person died in the accident and admittedly the deceased was 70 years old and the matter was settled for a sum of Rs. 16,200/- the Tribunal applied the multiplier of 6 and also taking into consideration his earning, instead of holding that he was a dependant on his sons for his maintenance. In the normal course, only a sum of Rs. 15,000/-for no fault liability would have been just compensation. However, the matter was settled for Rs. 16,200/-. In such a case also, it has awarded a sum of Rs. 29,200/-. From this it is clear that the Tribunal has ignored the compromise arrived at by both the parties willingly and with their due consent, there being no threat or promise or any mal practice played on them. It should have given more sanctity to that compromise and it is also well known fact that in a compromise there should be give and take on both sides. This compromise was arrived in the year 1986 and after recording evidence these cases were disposed of by the Tribunal in the year 1987. That means the matters were disposed of after 1 172 years. The benefit which they derived by this decree is taken into consideration is not on the higher side. Therefore, the learned Tribunal has not applied its mind in its proper perspective and also not realised that such a compromise should be encouraged as it would be advantageous to the public at large. Therefore, I hold that the compensation awarded by the tribunal in the above cases are highly exhorbitant.
33. At this stage the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that though the compensation awarded is on a higher side, the same may be restricted to the amount already deposited by the appellant in all the cases. He also submitted that it is not possible to recover the amount which has already been withdrawn by the claimants even though in some cases they have been paid a little more than what they deserve, yet the award may be restricted only to the amount which has already been deposited in the Court. Along with the appeals the appellants filed applications to stay the execution of the award. This Court has directed the stay of the operation of the order subject to the condition that the appellant deposit 50% of the amount awarded by the Tribunal. In compliance with that direction, the appellant has deposited 50% of the amount awarded by the Tribunal, As stated earlier, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is almost double the amount for which the parties have settled. Therefore, if the order is modified holding that the claimants are entitled for the sum of money already deposited by the appellant in the Court in the respective claim petitions, the purpose would be achieved, with a little margin this side or that side.
34. The learned Counsel for the respondents however, argued that since the appellant has not preferred any appeal or revision as soon as the Tribunal failed to record the compromise memo filed before it. is now estopped from raising this contention in these appeals. This argument is unsustainable. Though the compromise petition was filed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had not passed any order rejecting the compromise petitions. On the other hand, it postponded the same and recorded the evidence of the parties, thereby the appellant did not have a cause of action to come to this Court questioning the action taken by the Tribunal. Even otherwise, it cannot be said that the appellant is estopped from taking this contention in these appeals. Therefore, viewed from any angle the order of the Tribunal rejecting the compromise petition is not in the proper perspective and the award passed by it in all these appeals also deserves to be modified as stated above.
35. In the result, therefore, I proceed to pass the following :
ORDER All these appeals are allowed modifying the Judgments and Decrees passed by the Tribunal restricting their claims only to the amount already deposited by the appellant and withdrawn by the respective claimants in full and final satisfaction of the award However, there is no order as to costs, in these appeals.