Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Bajranglal And Anr. vs Ramdeo And Anr. on 12 November, 1987
Equivalent citations: 1988(1)WLN289
JUDGMENT M.C. Jain, J.
1. These second appeals have been filed by the defendants against the judgments and decrees of the learned District Judge, Bikaner dated 26-9-1986 and 7-2-1987 respectively by which he dismissed them and confirmed the judgments of the Additional Munsif No. 1, Bikaner, decreeing the suits for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent. The questions involved in both the appeals are similar and as such they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The facts of the case giving rise to Appeal No. 151 of 1986 may be summarised thus. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for the recovery of rent and mesne profits with the allegations in short, that the defendant is a habitual defaulter in payment of rent, in previous suit No. 50 of 1975, he was given benefits under Section 13(4), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (here in after to be called as 'the Act') accordingly, it was dismissed and he has again defaulted in payment of rent for more than 6 months i.e. from 1st September, 1978. The defendant admitted in his written statement that he is in occupation and possesion of the suit premises on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 30/-, and in the previous suit No. 50 of 1975, he had been given benefits under Section 13(4). The remaining allegations of the plaint have been denied. He has averred that he has not committed any default in payment of rent, on the refusal of his money orders of rent he deposited their amounts in the court, no default has been committed and the suit deserves to be dismissed. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties which was produced, the trial court held that the defendant had committed defaults in payment of rent of eight months, i.e. October, November and December, 1978 and January, February, April, August and September, 1979 and accordingly decreed the suit for ejectment. This was confirmed by the learned District Judge in appeal, as said above.
3. The facts of the other case giving rise to the Appeal No. 29 of 1987 are that the plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant appellant with the allegations, in short that the defendant committed default in payment of rent, Suit No. 65/74 was filed for ejectment on this ground, he was given benefits under Section 13-A of the Act, suit for ejectment was dismissed and he has again defaulted in payment of rent for more than six months. The defendant admitted in his written-statement that he is in occupation and possession of the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs. 56/-Suit No. 85/74 was filed for ejectment and it was dismissed. The remaining allegations of the plaint have been denied. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence which was produced, the learned trial court held that in the previous Suit No. 64/74, the defendant had been given benefits under Section 13-A of the Act, he has again committed default in payment of rent of 9 months, i.e. November and December, 1975, January, February, March, May, June & July, 1976 and April, 1977, and accordingly decreed the suit for ejectment. This was confirmed by the learned District Judge, Bikaner, as said above
4. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that it is well proved from the findings recorded by the learned trial court and confirmed by the learned lower appellate court that no amount of rent was due for six months, the provisions of Section 13(1)(a)of the Act are not attracted in any case, mere defaults in payment of rent of different six or more months do not attract the provisions of this clause and this clause simply requires that an amount of rent should remain due for six or more months. He further contended that the defendants validly deposited the amounts of rent in the court after the money orders were refused by the respondents, it was not necessary for them to send written notices under Section 19-A(3)(b) of the Act requiring their landlords to specify the bank and the account number and Section 13(1)(a) has to be read with Section 19-A(4) of the Act. He also contended that the word 'AND' appearing in clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 19-A should be read as 'OR' otherwise the object of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 would be frustrated. He relied upon Martin & Harris (P) Ltd. v. Prem Chand 1974 RLW 115 (FB); Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P. , Khemka & Co. v. State of Maharashtra and Girdhari Lal and Sons v. Babir Nath .
5. In reply, it has been contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that is well proved from the evidence on record that the defendents committed defaults in payment of rent of more than six months, it is not necessary under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act that there should be default in payment of rent of continuous six months and this clause is fully attracted, if defaults in payment of rent of six or more months are committed. He further contended that admittedly, the defendant-appellants did not comply with the provisions of Section 19-A(3)(b) of the Act by sending notice to the plaintiff-respondents requesting them to intimate their banks and account numbers before depositing the amounts of rent in the court, as such the deposits made in the court were not valid, they cannot be taken into consideration and the provisions of Section 19A (3) of the Act were inserted in the Act to eliminate the deposits in the Court. He relied upon Utkal Contractors v. State of Orissa , Hanuman Das and Ors. v. Sanwal Ram 1982 RLR 916 and Sobhraj v. Bhanwar Lal 1964 RLW 251.
6. It is the admitted case of the parties that in both the cases, the defendants did not send any notice requiring the plaintiff-respondents to specify their banks and account numbers wherein the rent could be deposited by them as required under Section 19-A(3)(b) of the Act and they deposited the amounts of rent in the court under Section 19-A(3)(c) of the Act.
7. The main question for consideration in their appeals is whether the amounts of rent so deposited in the court are valid and they can be taken into consideration under Section 19-A(4) of the Act. On analysis, Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 19-A of the Act runs as under:
(i) Where the tenant has remitted the rent by postal money order under clause (a) and the money order is received back by him under a postal endorsement of refusal or unfound; and
(ii) where the landlord does not specify a Bank and Account Number under clause (b); or
(iii) where there is a bonafide doubt as to the person(s) to whom the rent is payable;
(iv) the tenant may deposit such rent with the court within 15 days of the expiry of the period of 10 days referred to in clause (b) and in the case of such bonafide doubt, as aforesaid, within 15 days of the time referred to in Sub-section (1); and
(v) further continue to deposit with the court any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the premises
8. It is clear from the above analysis of clause (c) that in all cases other than bonafide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, rent can be deposited in the court, if the following two conditions are satisfied, namely:
(i) The rent has been remitted by postal money order and it has been received back under a postal endorsement of refusal or unfound; and
(ii) the landlord has not specified a Bank and Account Number despite notice in writing requiring the same.
9. It is well known fact that a great difficulty is experienced, much time is required, many formalities are required to be observed and great expenses are to be incurred in depositing an amount in court. What to say in withdrawing it therefrom ? Previously, Rules 267 to 275 and 277, General Rules (Civil), 1952 dealt with such repayments. Now Rules No. 70 to 276, 278, 280, 286 and 290, General Rules (Civil), 1986 deal with them. Under these Rules, following steps have to be taken for re-payment of amounts, namely:
(1) Application in the prescribed form F.25 has to be moved by the person entitled for repayment containing correct and complete particulars in its columns No. 1 to 4. The signature of the applicant is to be witnessed.
(2) The application is registered in the Register No. 19. Thereafter, the application is sent to the official having the custody of the relevant file or to the record room if the file has been consigned there, for the comparison of the particulars of the application with the file and for filling up the columns Nos. 5, 6 & 7 of the application.
(3) The Munsarim/Reader is then required to report in Column No. 8 of the application whether the amount is still in deposit and the applicant is entitled for its repayment.
(4) Then the application is Laid before the concerned Presiding Officer for passing repayment order on it.
(5) After the order is passed, the repayment Order is prepared in G A Form (F 120) and entries are made in the Register of Receipts of Deposits (No. 16) and Register of Repayment of Deposits (No. 17).
(6) Thereafter, the repayment order is sent to the Treasury for passing it;
(7) After the repayment order is received back duly passed by the Treasury, it is delivered to the applicant and his signature is obtained in the remark column of the Register No. 17.
(8) Lastly, the applicant obtains the payment from the Bank on presentation duly passed repayment order.
10. Required report cannot be made in Columns No. 5 and 6 of the application (Form No. 25) for want of challans in the file or necessary entries in the Register No. 16. Generally the challans are not filed in the Court by the depositors to harass their opponents. In such cases orders have to be sought from the Court for directing the depositors to file the challans or to give their particulars. Frequently, the treasury returns the repayment from with objections. Much time is consumed in removing them. After three years, the amounts deposited stand lapsed. There is a separate lengthy, cumbersome and more time consuming procedure for the repayment of such amounts. In such cases, prior sanction of the Accountant General is also required vide Rule 289. Besides the said difficulties of litigant public, much time of the Presiding Officers and the staff of the courts is consumed in the process of depositing the amounts in the courts and repaying them which can better be utilised in the disposal of cases.
11. It has been observed at Page 28 Volume I of the Report of the U.P. Judicial Reforms Committee, 1950-51(under the chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Wanchoo) as follows:
There is a complaint that applications for refund of money are inordinately delayed and that only when parties spend money, they get refund voucher within a reasonable time.
12. Chapter XIV of the 'Report of the Committee for Investigation of causes of corruption in Subordinate Court in U.P. (1963), (Under the chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. Mukerji) starts as under:
Obtaining of refund voucher from a court and then to realise its money from the treasury or State Bank is cumbersome process. There is a complaint that applications for refund of money are inordinately delayed and it affords opportunities for corruption. It is only when the parties grease the palms of subordinate officials that they get refund vouchers with in a reasonable time.
13. It has been observed in Dr. Brahmanand v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi at page 1199 paras 1 and 3, as follows:
Of course, in the absence of special and adequate grounds the tenant cannot drive the landlord to collect his rent every time through the court with all the attendant inconvenience and expense It has further been observed in para 3 as under:
but harrassing the landlord by straight away depositing the rent in court without fulfilments the conditions required by Section 7-C(1) is also unwarranted. Section 7-C(6) by using the expression 'where the deposit has been made as aforesaid' takes us back to Section 7-C(1). That is to say, the deposit is permissible only when the condition in Section 7-C(1) is complied with. If the landlord refuses to accept rent paid to him a deposit is permissible. But payment need not be by physical tender, person to person. It can be by money order, or through messenger or by sending a notice to the landlord asking him to nominate a bank into which the rents may be regularly paid to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord refused under these circumstances, then a court deposit will be the remedy.
14. For the first time, the Legislature made provisions for depositing rent in the bank account of the landlord by Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976. Prior to this Amendment Act of 1976, there existed provisions for remitting rent by money order and depositing it in the court in case of refusal of money order or of bonafide doubt as to the person to whom the rent was payable. Withdrawal of an amount from bank is much more easier than from a court. No application is required to be moved, no amount is spent, nor much formalities are required to be observed and not much time is spent in the withdrawal of an amount from a Bank. In no case an amount deposited in the court can be paid to the landlord the same day. It can be withdrawn from the bank on the same day. No time of the Presiding Officer and the staff is consumed in depositing the amount in the bank and in withdrawing therefrom.
15. Circular No, 27 P.I. dated December 3, 1986 has been issued by this Court in the administrative side to the Subordinate Courts of Rajasthan for directing tenant to deposit rent in the bank account of the landlord and not in the Court. It runs as follows:
To: All Subordinate Courts.
Sub: Simplification of the proceedure regarding refund of rent deposited under Sections 13(4) and 19-A(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.
Sir, It has been observed by the Court that the system of deposit of rent amount in the Treasury in Cases under "The Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 and the refund thereof later on, is so cumbersome that it dislocates the office-work and the person entitled to refund has to face many difficulties.
The court has considered the matter and ordered that till necessary amendment in this regard is made in the General Rules (Civil), 1952, the concerned court should ask the landlord in ejectment suits to give his option about the mode of acceptance of the rent amount and if he opts to receive the money through the Bank, he should be asked to disclose his Bank account number and the tenant be directed to deposit the rent and other amount etc. in the Bank account of the landlord. This deposit of rent amount will, however, be without prejudice to rights of the parties concerned. The tenants having so desposited the rent amount shall be under obligation to produce photo copy of such receipt in the Court which may be placed on record of the case. It would be a deposit and payment under Sections 13 and 19-A of the aforesaid Act.
16. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the word "AND" appearing in clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 19A, after "refusal" or "unfound" and before "where the landlord", should be read as "OR" otherwise it would render the word "AND" appearing in the opening part of the Sub-section redundant. There is no great force in this contention. The word "OR" also appears in this clause. If the intention of the Legislature would have been that the rent may be deposited in the Court after the compliance of clause (a) or clause (b) only, it could have used the word 'OR' instead of 'AND'. Because of the said difficulties in depositing an amount in the court and its withdrawal therefrom, the legislature provided that the amount should be deposited in the Court only after exhausting both the methods Laid down in clauses (a) and (b). It has been observed in R.M.D.C. v. Union of India , as follows:
To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider according to Lord Coke: (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the remedy., The reference here is to Heydon's case, (1584) 3 CO Rep 7a : 76 ER 367 (A-1). These are principles well settled, and were applied by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (B). To decide the true scope of the present Act, therefore, we must have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation and the purposes thereof, the mischief which is intended to suppress and the other provisions of the statute, and construe the language of Section 2 (d) in the light of the indication furnished by them.
17. It has been observed in Utkal Contractors v. State of Orissa , that a statute is best understood if one knows the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest guide for its interpretation.
18. It has been held in Nasuruddin v. S.T.A. Tribunal AIR 176 SC 331 at page 338 para 26, as under:
The word 'OR' cannot be read as 'AND'. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust does not entitle a Court to refuse to give its effect.
19. It has been observed in Punjab P & T Co. v. Commissioner, I.T., West Bengal , as under:
The word 'or' is often used to express an alternative of terms defined or explanation of the same thing in different words. Therefore if either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in Sub-clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions Laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the opening part of cl. (b) with the word "and" appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying conditions in Sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the other Sub-clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than 6 persons and shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power were during the same period not held by less than 6 persons.
20. It has been observed in Ishwar Singh Bindara v. State of U.P. , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, as under:
In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, it is stated at page 135 that "and" has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfilment of all the conditions that it joins together, and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as "or". Similarly in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Ed., it has been accepted that "to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions "or" and ''and" one for the other.
It clearly states that 'AND' has generally a cumulative sense. But by force of context or to carry out the intention of the legislature, it may be necessary to read it as 'OR'. There is neither anything in the context nor in the legislative intent warranting to read 'AND' as 'OR'. Previous and the existing provisions of Section 19A of the Act and the said difficulties in depositing an amount in the Court and withdrawing it therefore leave no doubt that the legislature designedly and intentionally used 'AND' in clause (c) to eliminate the said difficulties. It lays down that the rent is to be deposited in the Court within 15 days of the expiry of the period or ten days of the giving of the notice under Section 19-A(3)(b) the Act to the landlord. Absence of any period within which the rent remitted by money order and refused can be deposited in the Court indicates, it is not now provided that rent can be deposited in the Court on the refusal of the money order only. Section 19-B, existed prior to the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, provided limitation for depositing the rent remitted by money order and refused by the landlord. The existing provisions of Section 19-B also support this view.
21. The clause (c) is in fact not an independent clause. In other words, rent cannot be deposited in the Court at the first instance. This is clear from the fact that the word 'OR' does not find place in between the clause (b) and clause (c) as appears in between the clauses (a) and (b). Even reading 'AND or 'OR' in clause (c), it still remains a qualified clause. Rent can be deposited in the Court either when the money order is received back with the remark of "Refusal" or "Unfound" or when the Landlord does not specify his bank and account number despite written notice for the same. Even according to the interpretation of clause (c), as put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellant, rent can be deposited only after the compliance of either clause (a) or clause (b). Compliance of both the conditions could also be required and has rightly been required by the legislature for eliminating the deposit in the court. It is clearly provided in clauses (b) and (c) that the tenant may continue to deposit the rent of subsequent months in bank or in the Court, as the case may be. No such provision appears in clause (a) in respect of the rent of the subsequent period. Reading all the three clauses of Sub-section (3) of Section 19A together, it is clear that the tenant has to comply with the provisions of both these clauses before depositing the rent in the Court. After their compliance, he may deposit rent in the Court. There after, he may continue to deposit the rent in Court in respect of the subsequent months to escape ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent as has been held in Sobh Raj v. Bhanwarlal 1974 RLW 251 para 12.
22. It has been held in Firm Amur Nath v. Tek Chand , that it is not the function of the Court where the meaning of a statute is clear not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship.
23. It has been observed in Kail Kumar Sen v. Makhan Lal AIR 1969 Assam & Nagaland 66 (FB) at 73 para 22, as follows:
Again, when some benefit is conferred under an Act subject to performance of certain condition and the benefit to be enjoyed affects rights of others adversely, the conditions imposed by law must be strictly enforced Another eloquent passage from Maxwell at page 364 is worth quoting Where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations, formalities or conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred and it is therefore probable that such was the intention of the legislature.
24. In both these cases, the defendants did not issue any notice under Section 19-A(3)(b) of the Act requiring the plaintiffs to specify their bank and account numbers. It is thus clear that the said Condition No. 2 was not fulfilled in any of these cases. As such the deposits of the amounts of rent with the court were not valid. They cannot be taken into consideration.
25. It has been observed in Manak Chand Durga Prasad v. Bulaki Das Baheti , as follows:
After all, under the ordinary law a tenant cannot go and deposit rent before the Rent Controller or before any other person and claim that he has discharged his obligation towards the landlord in the matter of payment of rent. It is only because of the provisions of the Act that a tenant can in certain circumstances deposit his rent with the Rent Controller in a prescribed manner. It is only when the deposit is made in the prescribed manner and also in the circumstances specified in Section 21 that the deposit is a valid deposit and can be treated as a deposit of rent A deposit of rent is permitted only under two circumstances, first, where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in Section 4 and secondly, where there is a bonafide doubt as to the person or persons to when the rent is payable. In the instant case, the tenant does not say that he has any doubt as to the person to whom he has to pay the rent. Therefore, the only other circumstance which would have justified and validated his payment of rent to the Controller would be the circumstance in which the landlord refused to accept the rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in Section 4. That is a condition precedent which must be satisfied in order to render a deposit of rent valid--see: Bengal Tent Factories Ltd. v. Amiya Prova Das Gupta (1960) 64 Cal. WN 342.
26. It has been observed in Hameed v. Radhey Lal 1983 (1) Allah-bad Rent Cases 401 at page 404 para 8, as follows:
A deposit made under Section 30(1) would be good deposit provided it is made after complying with the requirement of the said Sub-section. Where it is held that the landlord had not refused to accept the rent, the tenant does not get any right to make any such deposit. Since it was not a valid deposit, the amount could not be taken into consideration while disposing of the matter under Section 20(4) of the Act. The courts below have taken correct view of law. I do not find any merit in this petition.
27. The Suit No. 274/83 (Renumbered) pertaining to the Second Appeal No. 151/86 was filed on 27-10-1979 and the rent was claimed in it from 1st October, 1978. Admittedly the amount of rent from October, 1978 to February, 1979 was remitted by money order. On its refusal, the amount of rent from October, 1978 to March, 1979 was deposited in the court under Section 19-A and the rent from April, 1979 to July, 1979 was subsequently deposited in the Court, prior the filing of the suit. It is also admitted case of the defendant-appellant that no notice was sent to the plaintiff landlord requiring his bank and account number, it is clear that the rent from October, 1978 to February, 1979 was not remitted by money order within the time specified in Section 19A(1) of the Act. It is also clear that the rent of March, 1979 was deposited in the court even without first remitting it by money order. As such the deposit of the amount of rent in the court was not valid. In other words, the rent of the months from October, 1978 to March, 1979 remained outstanding for more than six months on the date of the suit.
28. The suit No. 79 of 1983 which has given rise to the Appeal No. 29 of 1987 was filed claiming rent from 1st November, 1975. In the previous suit, the defendant paid rent upto 31st October, 1978 and obtained benefits under Section 13A(6) of the Act. Thereafter, the appellant remitted rent of December, 1975 by money order and subsequently rent of the months of November and December, 1975 and January and February, 1976 was remitted by money order dated 20-3-1976. On its refusal, the rent of November, 1975 to March, 1980 was deposited in the Court on 27-4-1976. Subsequently, amounts of rent of one month i.e. March, 1976 and six months i.e. April to September, 1976 were deposited. Admittedly, no notice under Section 19A(3)(b) was given by the appellant (tenant) to the respondent (landlord) prior to the deposit of the said rent in the court. It is also clear that the said amounts of rent were not remitted by money order within the time as specified under Section 19A(1) of the Act. As such these deposits cannot be said to be valid deposits. The provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Act are fully attracted in the case.
29. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Sub-section (4) of Section 19A of the Act runs as under:
(4) For the purpose of clause (a) of Sub-section (I) of Section 13: a tenant shall be deemed paid or tendered the amount of any rent due from him, if he has paid, remitted or deposited the amount of rent by any of the methods specified in Sub-section (3).
30. Sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act runs as follows:
(6) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by Sub-section (4) no decree for eviction on the ground specified in clause (a) or sub-Section (I) shall be passed by the court against him ;
Provided that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under this Sub-section, if having obtained such benefit or benefits under Section 13-A in respect of any such accommodation if he again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months.
Their comparative examination shows that Sub-section (4) of Section 19-A is not applicable to the proviso of Sub-section (6) of Section 13. There is no reference of remittance by money order deposit with the court in this proviso. In both these cases, the defendants got benefits under Section 13(b)/13A(b) of the Act in the previous suits and therefore, the proviso of Sub-section (7) of Section 13 of the Act is applicable.
31. Even taking into consideration the amounts of rent remitted by money orders to the landlord-plaintiff and/or deposited in the courts they do not go to help the appellants as the same were not remitted to the landlord and/or deposited in the Court within 15 days of the date of their accrual as required under Section 19A(1) of the Act. Their details are as follows:
Appeal No. 151 of 1986 Appeal No. 29 of 1987
(Suit filed in October, 1978) (Suit filed in 1977)
Date of Date of
Rent of the Last date for Deposit Rent of the Last date for Deposit
month of payment Remittance in Court month of payment Remmittance in court
October 1978 15-11-1978 March 1979 31-3-1979 November 1975 15-12-1975 20-3-1976 27-4-1976
November 1978 15-12-1978 " " December 1975 15-1-1976 24-1-1976 "
December 1979 15-1-1979 " " January 1976 15-1-1976 20-3-1976 "
January 1979 15-2-1979 " " February 1976 15-3-1976 20-3-1976 "
February 1979 15-3-1979 " " March 1976 15-4-1976 " "
March 1979 15-4-1979 " " April 1976 15-5-1976 " 14-5-1976
April 1979 15-5-1979 " 30-5-1979 May 1976 15-6-1976 " 15-9-1976
May 1979 15-6-1979 " " June 1976 15-7-1976 " "
June 1979 15-7-1979 " " July 1976 15-8-1976 " "
July 1979 15-8-1979 " " August 1976 15-9-1976 " "
August 1979 15-9-1979 " " September1976 15-10-1976 " "
September1979 15-10-1979 " " October 1976 15-11-1976 " "
Thus, the defaults have been made in remitting and depositing the rent of the months of October, November and December, 1978 and January, February, April, August and September, 1979 in the suit out of which the appeal No. 151 of 1986 has arisen. Similarly, defaults in the remittance and deposit of rent of the months November and December, 1975 and January, February, March, May, June and July, 1976 have been made in the other suit giving rise to the appeal No. 29 of 1987.
32. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.