District Registrar & 2 vs Federation Of Valsad District Forest ... on 4 August, 2014

[Cites 21, Cited by 2]

Gujarat High Court

District Registrar & 2 vs Federation Of Valsad District Forest ... on 4 August, 2014

Bench: C.L. Soni

        C/SCA/5146/2014                                   JUDGMENT



          IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

             SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5146 of 2014
                                   With
                    CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6896 of 2014
                                    In
             SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5146 of 2014


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:



HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI

================================================================

1   Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see          No
    the judgment ?

2   To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                          Yes

3   Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the         No
    judgment ?

4   Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as No
    to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
    order made thereunder ?

5   Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?              No

================================================================
             DISTRICT REGISTRAR & 2....Petitioner(s)
                              Versus
    FEDERATION OF VALSAD DISTRICT FOREST COOP. SOC. LTD. &
                       13....Respondent(s)
================================================================
Appearance:
MR. RUTVIJ OZA, AGP for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 - 3
MR RK MISHRA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1 - 14
================================================================
        CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.L. SONI

                             Date : 04/08/2014



                                 Page 1 of 27
        C/SCA/5146/2014                            JUDGMENT




                         ORAL JUDGMENT

1. In this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged order dated 30.01.2014 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Valsad below Exh.1 in Regular Civil Appeal No.62 of 2007 ordering to return appeal memo to the petitioners to present it before appropriate forum (High Court) on the ground that since appeal preferred by the petitioners was against the decree passed for recovery of outstanding amount of Rs.11,38,35,862.34 paisa in Special Civil Suit No.205 of 2001, it was not maintainable before the District Court in view of provisions of Section 15(2)(a)(b) of Gujarat Civil Court Act, 2005 ('Civil Court Act' for short).

2. I have heard learned advocates for the parties.

Learned AGP Mr.Rutvij Oza appearing for the petitioner submitted that the suit filed by the respondents was not a money suit for ascertained amount but it was a suit for declaration with consequential relief for payment of outstanding amount whatever found payable towards the salary of the members of the respondents till the date of filing the suit. Mr.Oza submitted Page 2 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT that the suit was valued at Rs.300/ both for the purpose of Court fee and the jurisdiction and therefore as per Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 ('the Valuation Act' for short) the valuation put up by the respondents in the plaint for the purpose of Court fee is to be taken even for the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court. Mr.Oza submitted that neither before the Trial Court, the petitioners defendants raised any objection when the suit was decided as regards the valuation of the subject matter of the suit placed by the plaintiffs nor even the respondents herein raised any objection as regards the jurisdiction of the District Court in appeal. Mr.Oza submitted that in fact, the appeal before the District Court was admitted in the year 2007 and when it was taken up for hearing in 2014, learned Judge himself raised the issue about the jurisdiction and passed the impugned order of returning the appeal memo. Mr.Oza submitted that the learned Judge has no such jurisdiction to return the appeal memo in absence of any order for proper determination of the value of the subject matter of the suit and in absence of any objection from the respondents. Mr.Oza thus urged to Page 3 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT allow the petition. Mr.Oza has relied on the following judgments.

(1) In case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Versus S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, reported in AIR 1958 (SC) 245 (2) In the case of Maliben Kamabhai Harijan V. Jagjivan Nanji (DECD.) through LRS., reported in 2004 (1) GLR 179 (3) In case of Dilipsinh Devubha Zala V. Kishorbhai Ranchhodbhai Thummar and Ors., reported in 2013 (1) GLH 240.

3. As against the above arguments, learned advocate Shri R.K.Mishra appearing for the respondents submitted that learned Additional District Judge passed the impugned order on the basis of provisions of Section 15(2)(a)(b) of the Civil Court Act.

Mr.Mishra submitted that since the respondents have claimed outstanding dues of salary in the suit, learned Judge took the valuation of the subject matter of the suit at Rs.11,38,35,862.34 paisa ordered to be recovered from the petitioners under the decree and thus found that the subject matter of the appeal was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court. Under these circumstances, learned Judge Page 4 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT passed impugned order of returning the appeal memo to the petitioners. Mr.Mishra submitted that learned Judge having considered the provisions of the Civil Court Act for the purpose of deciding the jurisdiction of the District Court against the decree passed by learned Senior Civil Judge in the suit filed by the respondents, no interference is called for in the impugned order in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mr.Mishra thus urged to dismiss the petition.

4. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the copy of the plaint with the impugned order, it appears that the suit is not purely a money suit. The main prayer made in the suit is to declare that the plaintiffs are still in service and their services have not come to an end. The second prayer made in the suit is to pass an order for payment of all outstanding amount of salary with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of suit till its realisation. The respondents have not claimed any ascertained outstanding amount of salary from the petitioners.

Page 5 of 27

C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT

5. The suit is valued at Rs.300 for the purpose of Court fee and the jurisdiction. However, while valuing the suit at Rs.300/, it is mentioned that approximately an amount of Rs.4 Crore is due to be recovered and the plaintiffs undertake to pay sufficient stamp if occasion so arises on disposal of the suit. It is further stated that the plaintiffs since belong to tribal community, they are exempted from the payment of Court fees.

6. It cannot be said that the suit is purely for money. It is not for recovery of the ascertained outstanding sum of salary. The suit is for declaration, wherein, the additional relief prayed is to order the petitioners to pay all amounts found outstanding till filing of suit towards salary of the members of the respondents. Thus for the purpose of Court fees, the suit would fall within Section 6(iv) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 ('the Court Fees Act' for short). The plaintiffs thus, fixed the valuation at Rs.300/ for the purpose of Court fees and the jurisdiction.

7. It is required to be noted that neither the Page 6 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT petitionersthe defendants raised objection against the valuation of the suit made by the plaintiffs nor the Trial Court raised and determined the issue as regards the proper valuation of the subject matter of the suit and payment of the Court fees thereon.

However, when the suit was allowed, the Trial Court passed decree for declaration and recovery of the amount of Rs.11,38,35,862.34 paisa from the petitioners.

8. For the purpose of jurisdiction of the Court, the valuation of subject matter of the suit is to be considered and not the amount ordered to be recovered under the decree.

9. Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act provides that in the suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs No.V, VI and IX and paragraphX Clause (d), Court fees are payable Ad Valorem under the Court Fees Act, the value as determinable for the computation of the Court fees and the value for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be the same. The words and figures "Section 7, paragraphs No.V, VI, and IX and paragraph No.X Clause (d)" stood Page 7 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT substituted under the Gujarat Extension and Amendment Act, 1964 by "clause (d) of paragraph (IV), paragraphs (V), (VI), (VII) and (X) and clause (d) of paragraph (XI) in Section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959".

10. Thus in respect of present suit, the valuation put up by the plaintiffs at Rs.300/ for the purpose of Court fees shall govern the jurisdiction of the Court as per Section 8 of the Valuation Act.

11. The plaintiffs having fixed the valuation of Rs.300/ for court fees and jurisdiction and when such valuation was neither objected to by the defendants, nor even learned Trial Judge passed any order for determination of the valuation of the suit and when the suit is disposed of with such valuation, the said valuation shall continue to be the valuation of the subject matter of the suit even for the purpose of appeal filed against the judgment and decree rendered in the suit. The valuation of the subject matter of the suit for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction will not get increased or decreased on the basis of the decree passed in the suit. Learned Judge Page 8 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT therefore was not justified to order return of the appeal memo by considering the amount ordered to be recovered under the decree as the value of the subject matter of the suit by relying on provisions of Section 15(2)(a)(b) of the Civil Courts Act.

12. Section 11 of the Valuation Act reads as under:

"11. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes : (1) Notwithstanding anything in S.578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an objection that by reason of the overvaluation or undervaluation of a suit or appeal a court of first instance or lower Appellate Court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless

(a) the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that court, or

(b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writ ing, that the suit or appeal was overvalued or undervalued, and that the overvaluation or undervaluation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits.

(2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that subsection and has before it the materials necessary for the Page 9 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeals as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court.

(3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal.

(4) The provisions of the section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 6212 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882) or other enactment for the time being in force.

(5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July, 1887. "

13. As per above provision, objection as regards the jurisdiction by reason of over valuation or under valuation of the suit or appeal is not to be entertained by the Appellate Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed and recorded or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court or the Appellate Court is satisfied for reasons to be Page 10 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT recorded by it in writing that the suit or the appeal was overvalued or under valued and that the over valuation or under valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. Neither of the above two eventualities existed. Therefore, if no objection as regards jurisdiction on valuation was permissible, the valuation in the suit would govern the jurisdiction in appeal under Section 15(2)(a)(b) of Civil Court Act.

Learned Appellate Judge therefore could not have considered the amount of Rs.11,38,35,862.34 paisa as the value of the subject matter of the suit for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction.

14. In the case of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs No.14 to 16 as under:

"14. The question which still remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the appellant to pay court fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the( valuation for Rs. 15,00,000. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that this order is erroneous in law. Section 7, subs. (iv)(b) deals with suits to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property and the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits is Page 11 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT "according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal." Section 7 further provides that in all suits falling under S. 7(iv) the plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value of the relief is sought. If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several subsections of s. 7 is considered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits falling under subs. (iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property. The basis of theclaim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it is property in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff's alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate 1034 share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court fees. It really means that in suits falling under s. 7 (iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court fees payable in respect Page 12 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT of the said relief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief.

15. What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading s.7 (iv) of the Act along with s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Court Fees Act s. 7, para.5, 6 and 9 and para.10 cl.(d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In other words, so far as suits falling under s.7, subs. (iv) of the Act are concerned, s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of s. 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of court fees and that is natural enough. The computation of court fees in suits falling under s. 7 (iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of court fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for court fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at 1035 which the plaintiff has Page 13 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT valued the relief sought for the purposes of court fees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa. Incidentally we may point out that according to the appellant it was really not necessary in the present case to mention Rs.15,00,000 as the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction since on plaints filed on the Original Side of the Madras High Court prior to 1953 there was no need to make any jurisdictional valuation.

16. The plaintiffs failure to state the amount at which he values the relief sought is often due to the fact that in suits for partition the plaintiff attempts to obtain the benefit of Art. 17B of Schedule II in the matter of payment of court fees. Where the plaintiff seeks to pay the fixed court fee as required by the said article, he and his advisers are apt to take the view that it is unnecessary to state the amount for which relief is sought to be claimed for the purposes of court fees and the valuation for jurisdiction purposes alone is, therefore, mentioned. Often enough, it turns out that the plaint does not strictly attract the provisions of Art. 17B of Schedule II and that the court fee has to be paid either under s. 7(iv)(b) or under s. 7(v) of the Act. If the court comes to the conclusion that the case falls under s.7(iv)(b) or s.7(iv)(c) ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to amend his plaint and set out specifically the amount at which he seeks to value his claim for the payment of court fees. It would not be reasonable or proper in such a case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made by him for the purposes of jurisdiction and to infer that the said valuation should be also taken as the valuation for the payment of court fees. In this connection we may point out that this is the view taken by the Full Bench decision of Page 14 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT the Lahore High Court in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir (1). As we have already indicated s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act postulates that the plaintiff should first value his claim for the purpose of court fee and it provides for the determination of the value for jurisdiction on the basis of such claim. In our opinion, therefore, the learned judges (1) A.I.R. (1949) Lah. 116. 1036 of the Madras High Court were in error in holding that the valuation for jurisdiction showed in the plaint should be taken to be the valuation for the payment of court fees on the plaint as well as the memorandum of appeal. In view of their prior decision that the present case fell under s. 7(iv)(b), they should have allowed the appellant to amend his valuation for the payment of court fees not only on the memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint."

15. In the case of Maliben Kamabhai Harijan (supra), Hon'ble Division Bench has held and observed in paragraphs No.6.3 to 6.5 as under:

"6.3. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff can fix his value of the subject matter of the suit in case the relief claimed in the suit is not capable of being valued. However, the question would be whether the jurisdiction to try the suit would be on the basis of valuation fixed for the purpose of court fees would govern the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction or the value fixed by the plaintiff of the property involved in the suit would be taken into consideration for determining the jurisdiction. For that purpose Mr. Shah has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chhagan Karsan v. Bhagwanji (supra). The said decision shows that the Division Bench Page 15 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT was required to consider two questions referred to it by the learned Single Judge of this Court [Coram : M.U. Shah, J. as he then was] as the learned Judge doubted the correctness of the decision rendered by another learned Single Judge [S.H. Sheth, J. as he then was] in the case of Khimji Jiva v. Narendrakumar , (1972) XIII G.L.R. p. 23. The questions are:

"(1) Whether the Civil Judge, Junior Division, has power to deal with and decide the suit wherein the subject mater is incapable of monetary evaluation, having regard to the provisions contained in sec. 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts At, 1869 (Act No. XIV of 1869) ?

(2) If the objection as to jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, under sec. 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869, is not taken at an earlier stage in the Court below, then, whether a plea of want of jurisdiction can be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal?"

The Division Bench of this Court has in detail dealt with the provisions of BCC Act and has explained the scope of various provisions of the said Act. The Division Bench has held that the view of the learned Single Judge in the case of Khimji Jiva (supra) was not legal and sound and it did not lay down the correct law. It may be stated here that the learned Single Judge [ S.H. Sheth, J.] in the decision of Khimji Jiva v. Narendrakumar (supra) had held that the suits wherein the valuation was put by the plaintiff in accordance with the section 6 (iv)(j) of the BCF Act, the Civil Judge [Junior Division] had no jurisdiction to try it but the same was triable by the Civil Judge [Senior Division]. While discussing this aspect the Division bench in the case of Chhagan Karsan (supra) has observed that Page 16 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT the BCC Act provides for the jurisdiction of Civil Judge [J.D.] and Civil Judge [S.D.]. When the valuation of the suit does not exceed Rs.20,000/= (now Rs.50,000/= ), the suit would be triable by the Civil Judge [Junior Division] and other suits i.e. the suit, valuation whereof was above Rs.20,000/= (now Rs.50,000/=) the Civil Judge [S.D.] has the jurisdiction to try them. The Division Bench further observed that when the suits which have been capable of monetary valuation, there would not be any difficulty for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction. It is only in the cases where the subject matter of the suit is incapable of monetary terms, the question would arise to which Court it would lie. The Division Bench has held that the classes of the Civil Judges which have been defined by the BCC Act provide for only two classes i.e. Civil Judge [S.D.] and Civil Judge [J.D.] and they have been acting in their respective jurisdiction which has been stated above. If the suit is incapable of being valued in the terms of money, according to the Division Bench, it has to go before either of the Judges as there is no 3rd category of Civil Judge to be found in the BCC Act and certainly the legislature would not forget to make provision for such type of suits. It has, therefore, permitted the plaintiff to fix his own valuation in respect of the subject matter of the suit as the provisions of section 6 (iv) (j) of the BCF Act entitles the plaintiff to do so subject to, of course, the court's satisfaction to the effect that it has not been valued at unreasonably low value. The Division Bench has also taken into consideration section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 for making above observation. In its opinion, the combined reading of section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act and section 6 (iv)(j) of the BCF Act would show that the suits wherein the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible Page 17 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT of monetary evaluation and when it relates to land or interest in land, the plaintiff may fix his own valuation of the reliefs sought in the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. It, therefore, mainly deals with the right of plaintiff to fix his own valuation of the reliefs sought for the purpose of jurisdiction. Thus, according to the Division Bench, there would always be valuation of the subject matter for the purpose of jurisdiction, every suit or proceedings would necessarily fall within one or other of the two provisions, namely 3rd para. of section 24 or section 25. It has further observed that no category of suit or proceedings would be left out of the purview of either of these provisions. Thus, the Division Bench has merely dealt with the question with regard to the right of the plaintiff to fix his own valuation in certain cases and when such valuation is fixed, it would fall within the purview of the jurisdiction of either the Civil Judge [J.D.] or Civil Judge [S.D.].

6.4. In the present case the plaintiffs have stated that the relief claimed in this suit was not susceptible of monetary evaluation and, therefore, court fee of Rs.30/= was affixed. When that has been determined by the plaintiffs for the purpose of court fees at Rs.30/=, the next question that would arise for consideration is whether it is this valuation which has to be taken into consideration for the purpose of jurisdiction or the valuation fixed of the immovable property involved in the suit. The decision of the Division Bench does not deal with this aspect. However, with a view to appreciate the ratio laid down by the Division Bench, the following observations made by it, are required to be read closely. The observations are:

"It is obvious on a combined reading of sec. 4 and sec. 6 (iv)(j) that where a Page 18 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT suit mentioned in sec. 6(iv)(j) and that would be a suit in which the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation relates to land or interest in land, the plaintiff may value the relief sought in the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction but such valuation shall not exceed the value of the land or interest as determined by rules made under sec. 3. These two provisions read together clearly contemplate that even in a suit in which the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation, the plaintiff may put his own valuation on the relief sought in the suit for purposes of jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied).

It clearly appears that according to the Division Bench the plaintiff has a right to determine the value of the relief which is sought to be claimed by him in the suit and it is that valuation which is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of jurisdiction.

6.5. At this juncture it would be necessary to refer to section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, which is reproduced above. Simple reading of this section makes it evident that the valuation for the purpose of court fees as well as for the jurisdiction is required to be same in certain cases. In the present case, the plaintiffs have valued the court fees under the provisions of section 6

(iv)(j) of the BCF Act and have affixed stamp of Rs.30/=. By virtue of the deeming fiction of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fees has also to be considered as valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. That is precisely the submission of Mr.Kanabar also. In a decision rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Filoma Pathubhai v.

Ambalal D. Bhagat (supra) it has been held Page 19 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT that by virtue of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act deeming fiction comes into operation and because of such deeming provision the valuation for the purpose of court fees automatically governs the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. In the case before the learned Single Judge, the court fees stamp of Rs.30/= was affixed and it was valued for the purpose of court fees u/S. 6 (iv)(j) of the BCF Act. The learned Judge, while deciding this question, has placed reliance on different decisions of this Court mentioned in the said judgment. We do not propose to take a different view in the matter. A conjoint reading of the provisions of BCF Act i.e. section 6(iv)(j) and sections 4 and 8 of the Suits Valuation Act clearly shows that when the plaintiff determines or fixes his own valuation when the relief claimed in the suit is not susceptible of monetary evaluation, valuation fixed by him for the purpose of court fees would be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction also. We are fortified by the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with section 7 of the Court Fees Act i.e. Central Legislation and also the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and it has laid down as under : "15. What would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction in such suits is another question which often arises for decision. This question has to be decided by reading S. 7(iv) of the Act along with S. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits other than those referred to in Courtfees Act, S.7, paras. 5, 6 and 9 and para. 10, Cl.(d), courtfees are payable ad valorem under the Act, the value determinable for the computation of courtfees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall Page 20 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT be the same. In other words so far as suits falling under S. 7 subs (iv) of the Act are concerned, S.8 of the Suits Valuation Act jurisdiction shall be the same. There can be little doubt that the effect of the provisions of S. 8 is to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction dependent upon the value as determinable for computation of courtfees and that is natural enough. The computation of courtfees in suits falling under S. 7(iv) of the Act depends upon the valuation that the plaintiff makes in respect of his claim. Once the plaintiff exercises his option and values his claim for the purpose of courtfees, that determines the value for jurisdiction. The value for courtfees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for courtfees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined. The result is that it is the amount at which the plaintiff has valued the relief sought for the purposes of courtfees that determines the value for jurisdiction in the suit and not vice versa."

It may be noted here that section 7 of the Court Fees Act (Central) is paramateria with section 6 (iv)(j) of the BCF Act. This decision, therefore, with all force applies to the present case. When the plaintiff has valued his suit for the purpose of court fees by paying a court fee of Rs.30/=, it would be the valuation which would decide the question of jurisdiction also."

16. In the case of Dilipsinh Devubha Zala (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paragraphs No.9 to 16 and 20 as under:

Page 21 of 27

C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT "9. In the aforesaid backdrop, the central issue that arises for consideration is as to whether in a suit for partition/share in the suit property, the jurisdiction to try the suit would be on the basis of the valuation fixed by the plaintiff for the purpose of court fees or on the basis of the valuation of the suit property for the purpose of jurisdiction.

10. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it may be germane to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act makes provision for "Fees payable in certain suits". Paragraph

(v) thereof lays down that in case of a suit for possession of lands, houses and gardens, the court fee is required to be determined according to the value of the subject matter and the value is deemed, where the subject matter is a house or garden according to the market value of the house or garden, and in case where the subject matter is land in terms of clauses (a), (b) or (c) thereof. Paragraph (vii) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, provides for computation of fees payable in suits for a share in joint property, and lays down that in suits for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of joint property, or to enforce a right to a share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property or joint property whether or not the plaintiff is in actual or constructive possession of the property of which he claims to be a coparcener or coowner according to the value of the share in respect of which the suit is instituted. The Explanation thereto provides that for the purposes of the said paragraph, if the property in which a share is claimed consists of or includes any land assessed to land revenue for the purpose of agriculture; the value of such land shall be deemed to be the value as determined under paragraph (v) of the said section. Accordingly, the Page 22 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT plaintiffs, while instituting the suit for a share in the joint property, computed the value of the land as determined under paragraph (v) of section 6 of the Act and paid court fees accordingly. However, for the purposes of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs valued the suit at Rs.6 lakhs. It may be noted that on behalf of the appellant, reliance has been placed upon the provisions of section 6(vii) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 which is in pari materia with section 6(15) of the Gujarat Court Fees Act, 2004.

11. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that in the light of the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the jurisdiction to try the suit would be governed by the valuation fixed by the plaintiffs for the purpose of court fees and not on the basis of the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. The crucial question, therefore, would be as to whether in the facts of the present case, the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act would be attracted.

12. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act reads thus:

"8. Courtfee value and jurisdictional value to be the same in certain suits.-- Wherein suits other than those referred to in the Courtfees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix, and paragraph x, clause (d), courtfees are payable ad valorem under the Courtfees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of courtfees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same."

13. However, it may be germane to note that by virtue of section 7 of the Suits Valuation (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1964, in section 8 of the principal Act, for the words, figures, brackets and letter "the Page 23 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT Courtfees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix, and paragraph x, clause (d) Court fees are payable ad valorem under the Courtfees Act, 1870", the following came to be substituted:

"clause (d) of paragraph (iv), paragraphs (v), (vi), (vii) and (x) and clause (d) of paragraph

(xi) in section 6 of the Bombay Courtfees Act, 1959."

14. Thus, in view of the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act as applicable to the State of Gujarat, except for the suits referred to in clause (d) of paragraph (iv), paragraphs (v), (vi), (vii) and (x) and clause (d) of paragraph (xi) in section 6 of the Bombay Courtfees Act, 1959, the value as determinable for the computation of Courtfees and for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be the same. Thus, as to whether or not the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act would be attracted in a particular case would depend on whether or not the case falls within any of the categories mentioned therein. If the case falls within any of the said categories, the provisions of section 8 of the said Act would not be attracted. Putting it differently, in case of a suit which falls within any of the categories mentioned in section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the said section would not be applicable. Whereas in cases which do not fall within any of the excepted categories, by virtue of the provisions of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, the value as determinable for computation of the court fees and for the purpose of jurisdiction would be the same. Accordingly, in such cases, the value for the purpose of computation of court fees would be required to be considered for the purposes of jurisdiction also. Hence, the next step would be to examine as to whether or not the suit in question falls within any of the Page 24 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT categories of cases mentioned in section 8 of the said Act.

15. In the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the suit falls within the ambit of paragraph (vii) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 and the court fees have been valued accordingly. As noted hereinabove, by the Suits Valuation (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act, 1964, certain words have been amended in the Suits Valuation Act, and accordingly, section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act as applicable to the State of Gujarat would read thus:

"8. Court fees valuation and jurisdiction to be the same in certain suits wherein suits other than those referred to in clause (d) of paragraph

(iv), paragraphs (v), (vi), (vii) and

(x) and clause (d) of paragraph (xi) in section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959."

16. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that paragraph

(vii) of section 6 of the Bombay Court Fees Act is mentioned as one of the excepted categories to which section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act does not apply. Under the circumstances, in the facts of the present case, the value as determinable for the purpose of computation of court fees and for the purpose of jurisdiction would not be the same. Therefore, the learned advocate for the respondent is right in contending that the value for the purpose of jurisdiction shall be as valued by the plaintiffs, viz., at rupees six lakhs."

17. In light of the above settled principles of law and having regard to the provisions of Section 6(iv) Page 25 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT of the Court Fees Act read with Section 8 of the Valuation Act and considering the valuation of the subject matter of the suit stated by the plaintiffs in their suit, the impugned order made by learned Appellate Judge cannot stand scrutiny of law and is required to be quashed and set aside.

18. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.01.2014 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Valsad below Exh.1 in Regular Civil Appeal No.62 of 2007 is quashed and set aside. Learned Appellate Judge is directed to hear and decide the appeal filed by the petitioners on its own merits. Since, the appeal filed by the petitioners is of the year 2007, learned Appellate Judge is directed to decide the appeal within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of this order. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

(C.L.SONI, J.) ORAL ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION Since, the main petition is disposed of, no order is required to be made on the Civil Application and Page 26 of 27 C/SCA/5146/2014 JUDGMENT hence, Civil Application stands disposed of.

(C.L.SONI, J.) ANKIT Page 27 of 27

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Gujarat High Court