Madras High Court
K.Chellapandian vs The Government Of India on 29 January, 2019
Author: G.R.Swaminathan
Bench: G.R.Swaminathan
1
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Date of Reservation : 29.01.2019
Date of Pronouncement : 04.02.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN
WP(MD)No.21961 of 2018
&
WMP(MD)Nos.19909, 19910 & 21989 of 2018
K.Chellapandian ... Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Government of India, Rep.by its Secretary,
Ministry of Rural Development,
Krishi Bhavan, Dr.Rajdnraprasad Road, New Delhi.
2.The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways,
Transport Bhavan, No.1, Parliament, New Delhi.
3.The District Collector,
Madurai District, Madurai. ... Respondents
Prayer : This Writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records relating to the
impugned order issued by the first respondent dated 28.08.2015 published
in Gazette of India (Extraordinary) No.1834, SO.No.2368 (E) Part II Section
3 (ii) published on 28.08.2015 and quash the same.
For Petitioner : Mr.M.Ajmalkhan, Senior Counsel
for Mr.Mahaboob Athiff
For Respondents : Mr.Rajagopal,
Additional Solicitor General of India
assisted by Mr.R.Karthikeya
Venkatasalapathy for R1
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
Mr.Arulvadivel @ Sekar for R2
Mr.M.Rajarajan, Government Advocate
for R3
ORDER
The writ petitioner owns lands in Manthikulam Village, Madurai North Taluk, Madurai District. Their lands face the prospect of acquisition. A notification under Section 3(A) (1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 was issued on 17.04.2018 for developing a part of NH 44A between 0.00 Km to 29.6 km in Madurai District. The petitioner's land are covered by the aforesaid notification.
2.According to the petitioner, the parliament had enacted a comprehensive legislation namely, The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Central Act 30 of 2013) (hereinafter called as “the Act”) covering all forms of acquisition. While it is true that the said Act had initially exempted its applicability to National Highways Act, 1956 by including it along with a few other enactments in its 4th http://www.judis.nic.in 3 Schedule, on account of the failure of the Central Government to issue a notification as contemplated by Section 105(3) of the Act, there has been an implied repeal of the National Highways Act, 1956 making all the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 applicable even in the case of acquisition for National Highways. In order to overcome the said situation, the Government had issued the impugned notification making the provisions of Central Act No.30 of 2013 pertaining to compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement to apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the 4th Schedule. According to the petitioner, this notification is unconstitutional and illegal and ultra vires the parent Act. Hence, he has mounted a challenge to the impugned notification. A learned Judge of this Court granted interim stay of the impugned notification on 26.10.2018. The respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit.
3.Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner and the learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the first respondent and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the second respondent.
http://www.judis.nic.in 4 Contentions of the writ petitioner :
4.Shri.M.Ajmal Khan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that Central Act 30 of 2013 is a comprehensive legislation which would cover acquisition of all kinds including one for infrastructural development. The entire field of law regarding acquisition was thus intended to be occupied by the said statute that came into force on 01.01.2014. However, taking note of the existence of other prior legislations, the parliament devised a mechanism vide Section 105 of the Act providing a conditional exemption. Section 105 of the said Act reads as under :
105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications.–(1) Subject to sub-section (3),the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2)Subject to sub-section (2)of section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(3)The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the http://www.judis.nic.in 5 Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.
(4)A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section(3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.
5.A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that the enactments included in the 4th schedule would stand exempted from the applicability of the Act provided the central government issued an appropriate notification under Section 105(3) of the Act within the specified period. Section 105 is a piece of conditional legislation. The parliament after covering entire field had deliberately http://www.judis.nic.in 6 left to the executive to decide whether the law so enacted is to be complied or extended in respect of certain cases. The central government had to issue a notification under Section 105(3) of the Act extending the provisions as to determination of compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation to the legislation exempted under Section 105(1). If such notification is not issued, the exemption as provided under Section 105(1) ceases to separate. The implication of the statutory scheme is that the central government is required to issue a notification under Section 105(3) of the Act within 01.01.2015. Failing which all the provisions of the Central Act No.30 of 2013 would be required to be complied with for any acquisition of land covered by the enactments setout in the 4th schedule.
6.The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2006) 12 SCC 753 (Vasu Dev Singh vs. Union of India) wherein the court explained the nature of a conditional legislation and he also placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1998) 1 SCC 318 (State of T.N vs. Sabanayanagam). The learned Senior Counsel laid http://www.judis.nic.in 7 considerable stress on the expression “subject to sub-section (3)” occurring in Section 105(1) of the Act. According to him, this highlighted the primary intention to make the exemption not unqualified or absolute but conditional. The condition is that the central government must fulfill the requirement laid down under sub-section (3). By employing the expression “subject to”, the parliament had made it clear that sub-section 3 will prevail over sub- section 1 of Section 105. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 4 SCC 463 (Union of India vs. Brigadier P.S.Gill).
7.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also sharply attacked the action of the executive in taking recourse to Section 113 of the Act. The said provision enables the central government to issue a notification to remove the difficulties which may arise while implementing the law. But then, such a power can never be used so as to subvert the statutory scheme. The said power can be deployed only to round off the angularities and remove certain http://www.judis.nic.in 8 difficulties so as to make the Act workable. But, in the guise of invoking the said power, the executive cannot do violence to the basic structure and primary features of the Act. His submission is that the very issuance of the impugned notification runs counter to the statutory scheme set out in Section 105 of the Act.
8.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1975) 3 SCC 765 (Madeva Upendra Sinai vs. Union of India) to indicate the contours “the statutory power to remove difficulties”. According to the learned Senior Counsel, Section 105(3) had prescribed an outer time limit for issuing a notification therein. The said time limit expired on 01.01.2015. Thus, the power got exhausted. The resultant situation cannot be overcome by issuing a notification under Section 113 of the Act which only confers the power to remove difficulties. In other words, a notification under Section 113 of the Act cannot be in lieu of a notification under Section 105(3) of the Act. http://www.judis.nic.in 9
9.The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the impugned notification is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Right to equality is a basic feature of our Constitution. He submitted that if the impugned order is sustained, it would mean that the Central Act 30 of 2013 will operate along with 13 enactments included in the National Highways Act, 1956. He cited the hypothetical cases of two persons (A) and (B) holding land adjacent to each other. A's land is acquired under Central Act 30 of 2013 while B's land is acquired under National Highways Act, 1956. While A would be enjoying greater protection under the Central Act 30 of 2013, B would be treated differently. Thus, two similarly placed persons would be unequally treated. There would be no justification in such differential treatment. The learned Senior Counsel in his reply also dealt with the submissions made by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India and the learned standing counsel appearing for the NHAI. He also filed detailed written arguments along with compilation of case laws.
http://www.judis.nic.in 10 Contentions of the respondents :
10.The learned Additional Solicitor General of India submitted that the arguments of the writ petitioner are misconceived. He would submit that Central Act 30 of 2013 was in addition to other existing laws and that it does not displace the National Highways Act, 1956. It is true that the central government did not issue a notification within one year as mandated by Section 105(3) of the Act. But then, the consequence will not be the implied repeal of the National Highways Act, 1956. The only result is that the provisions relating to compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation set out in Central Act 30 of 2013 would become applicable even in the case of acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956. In order to clarify this position, the impugned notification has been issued. The learned Additional Solicitor General of India pointedly contended that the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court had already answered the issue in the decision reported in 2018-5-L.W.13 (G.Sundarrajan vs. Union of India). He also referred to the decisions reported in (2011) 8 SCC 737 and (2015) 1 SCC 166.
http://www.judis.nic.in 11
11.This Court bestowed its anxious consideration to the rival contentions. The issue that arises for the consideration of this Court is whether on account of the failure of the central government to issue a notification under Section 105(3) of the Central Act 30 of 2013 within one year from the date of commencement of the Act, the exemption provided to the enactments specified in the 4th schedule stood withdrawn.
12.It is not in dispute that as per Section 105(1) of the Act, the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the 4th schedule. The National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956) figures at Serial No.7 in the 4th schedule. But, as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, this exemption is not unqualified or absolute. Section 105(1) of the Act commences with the expression “subject to sub-section 3”. Therefore, Section 105(1) of the Act will have to necessarily yield to Section 105(3) of the Act. Otherwise, the expression “subject to sub-section 3” will lose its meaning [vide Paragraph Nos.17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the decision http://www.judis.nic.in 12 reported in (2012) 4 SCC 463 (Union of India vs. Brigadier P.S.Gill)]. Therefore, this Court would necessarily read Section 105(1) of the Act as a grant of exemption for the enactments specified in the 4th schedule as conditional upon the notification to be issued under Section 105(3) of the Act. In other words, Section 105(1) of the Act will have to yield place to Section 105(3) to which it has been made subject.
13.However, this Court cannot agree with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioners that failure to notify in terms of Section 105(3) of the Act would lead to an implied repeal of National Highways Act, 1956 and making all the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 applicable to the case of land acquisition covered by the National Highways Act, 1956. This is for more than one reason.
14.As rightly contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India and the learned standing counsel for NHAI, the Central Act 30 of 2013 provides for repeal of the Land Acquisition http://www.judis.nic.in 13 Act, 1894 alone. Section 103 of the Act categorically states that the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. In fact, clause 22 of the statement of objects and reasons of Central Act 30 of 2013 reads as follows :
“22.Certain Central Acts dealing with the land acquisition have been enlisted in the Bill. The provisions of the Bill are in addition to and not in derogation of these Acts. The provisions of this Act can be applied to these existing enactments by a notification of the Central Government.”
15.Of course, a question may arise as to whether it would be proper for this Court to refer to statement of objects and reasons.
The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1781 (Jai Lal vs. Delhi Administration) held that the statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the history of the legislation. It is merely an expression of what according to the mover of the bill are the scope and purpose of the legislation. But it is undeniable that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India of late has been consistently using “statement of objects and http://www.judis.nic.in 14 reasons” as an internal aid while interpreting statutory provisions. [(2018) 10 SCC 443, (2018) 9 SCC 351-para 26, (2018) 8 SCC 501- para 186]
16.A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2018) 7 SCC 1 (Kalpana Mehta vs. Union of India) was called upon to answer the reference as to whether the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee can be taken as an aid for the purpose of interpretation of a statutory provision. The Hon'ble Constitution Bench answered the reference in the affirmative. Paragraph Nos.127, 130 and 131 of the said decision read as under :
“127.In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, this Court, after referring to Crawford on Statutory Construction, observed that the rule of exclusion followed in the British courts has been criticized by jurists as artificial and there is a strong case for whittling down the said rule. The Court was of the view that the trend of academic opinion and practice in the European system suggests that the interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible which implies that although such http://www.judis.nic.in 15 extrinsic materials shall not be decisive, yet they should at least be admissible. Further, the Court took note of the fact that there is authority to suggest that resort should be had to these extrinsic materials only in case of incongruities and ambiguities. Where the meaning of the words in a statute is plain, then the language prevails, but in case of obscurity or lack of harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances, it may be legitimate to take external assistance to determine the object of the provisions, the mischief sought to be remedied, the social context, the words of the authors and other allied matters.
130.In Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, delivering the main speech, set out the test as follows: (AC p. 640) “I therefore reach the conclusion, subject to any question of Parliamentary privilege, that the exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit reference to Parliamentary materials where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more statements by a Minister or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as is necessary to understand http://www.judis.nic.in 16 such statements and their effect; (c) the statements relied upon are clear.”
131.The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Vasil relied on parliamentary materials to interpret the phrase “unlawful object” in Section 212(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code. Speaking for the majority, Lamer, J. (as he then was) said: (SCC OnLine Can SC) “Reference to Hansard is not usually advisable.
However, as Canada has, at the time of codification, subject to few changes, adopted the English Draft Code of 1878, it is relevant to know whether Canada did so in relation to the various sections for the reasons advanced by the English Commissioners or for reasons of its own.
Indeed, a reading of Sir John Thompson’s comments in Hansard of 12-4-1892, (House of Commons Debates, Dominion of Canada, Session 1892, Vol. I at pp. 1378-85) very clearly confirms that all that relates to murder was taken directly from the English Draft Code of 1878. Sir John Thompson explained the proposed murder sections by frequently quoting verbatim the reasons given by the Royal Commissioners in Great Britain, and it is evident that Canada adopted not only the British Commissioners’ http://www.judis.nic.in 17 proposed sections but also their reasons.” The Canadian authorities, as is noticeable from Anti- Inflation Act, In re, have relaxed the exclusionary rule.”
17.I am therefore fully justified in taking note of clause 22 of the statement of objects and reasons of Central Act 30 of 2013. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 alone was repealed vide Section 114. Section 103 states that this Act shall be in addition and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. In the light of Clause 22 of the statement of objects and reasons, one can safely conclude conclude namely that Parliament did not intend to displace the National Highways Act,, 1956.
18.The next question is whether on account of non issuance of a notification under Section 105(3) of the Act, there has been an implied repeal of the National Highways Act, 1956. Principles relating to the doctrine of implied repeal have been set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2018) 14 SCC 537 (State of Uttarakhand vs. Kumaon Stone Crushor – Paragraph Nos.94, 95, 96, 97 and 98. Section 105(1) of the Act states that the http://www.judis.nic.in 18 provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 shall not apply to the enactments relating to Land Acquisition Act specified in the 4th schedule. But this sub-section is made subject to sub-section 3. Therefore, as already held, Section 105 will have to yield place to Section 105 (3). But, Section 105(3) of the Act deals only with determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families. Section 105(3) does not deal with the procedure relating to acquisition of land. Therefore, a proper construction of Section 105 of the Act leads one to the inference that if the central government fails to issue a notification as contemplated by sub-section 3 of Section 105, the resultant position would be that all the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 relating to determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement would apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the 4th schedule.
19.I am of the view that there was no necessity for the central government to have issued the impugned notification under Section 113 of the Act. The aforesaid conclusion is fortified by a reading of the title of the Act. Central Act 30 of 2013 bears the following title :
http://www.judis.nic.in 19 “THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013 (30 of 2013)” One can note that it has four components namely, acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement. Of course, emphasis is more on fair compensation. In fact, compensation is a fall out of acquisition. In the Preamble portion also these four aspects are elaborated. Sub-section 3 of Section 105 talks only about compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement. It is conspicuously silent on acquisition. That is why, when this Court holds that 105(1) will have to yield place to Section 105(3) of the Act, this Court has to also hold that it will yield only in respect of matters provided for in Section 105(3) of the Act. Section 113 of the Act reads as under :
“113.Power to remove difficulties.–(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Part, the Central Government may, by order, make such provisions or give such directions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as may appear to it to be necessary or expedient for the removal of the difficulty:
Provided that no such power shall be exercised after the expiry of a period of two years from the commencement http://www.judis.nic.in 20 of this Act.
(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament.” “Removal of difficulty” clause is used for making minor changes which do not alter the statutory policy.
20.As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, if any is order issued pursuant to removal of difficulty clause exceeds such limits it would be held ultra vires (vide the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1975) 3 SCC 765 (Madeva Upendra Sinai and others vs. Union of India). But then, what this Court must see is whether by the impugned notification, the statutory policy and the scheme laid down in Section 105 of the Act have been subverted. This Court has already held that parliament intended to repeal only the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) in toto. But, as regards the enactments included in the 4th schedule, the parliament intended that the persons affected by land acquisition by virtue of the said enactments should be granted more benefit than what has already been laid down in those enactments. http://www.judis.nic.in 21
21.The parliament was of the view that while the power of eminent domain to acquire the land by invoking the provisions set out in the enactments specified in the 4th schedule would remain intact, the benefit that must go to the affected persons should meet a minimum bench mark, the same being the standard already laid down in the provisions relating to determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement. It was open to the government to make appropriate modifications also. But then, such a notification must be issued within one year from the date of commencement of Central Act 30 of 2013. If such notification is omitted to be issued, all the provisions of Central Act 30 of 2013 other than the provisions pertaining to acquisition would apply even to those enactments specified in the 4th schedule.
22.The Central Act 30 of 2013 has as many as 13 chapters. Sections 23 to 30 occurring in Chapter IV, Chapter IX and X of the Act pertaining to determination of compensation. Chapter V, VI, VII and VIII pertaining to rehabilitation and resettlement. These provisions will automatically become applicable, if no notification http://www.judis.nic.in 22 under Section 105 of the Act is issued by the central government. However, the central government thought it fit to make an express declaration in this regard. That is why, the power set out in Section 113 of the Act was invoked. By doing so not only the policy laid down in the Act has not been violated but on the other hand expressly effectuated.
23.The contentions with regard to infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioner stand repelled by the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court reported in 2018-5-L.W-13 (G.Sundarrajan vs. Union of India). The petitioner therein prayed for issuance of the writ of declaration to declare Section 105 of Central Act 30 of 2013 and the 4th schedule of the Act as well as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the National Highways Act, 1956 in respect of the proposed Green Field Chennai-Salem Highway is unconstitutional, null and void. While dismissing the said writ petition, the Hon'ble Division Bench held as follows :
http://www.judis.nic.in 23 “21.The land acquisition for the subject project is under the provisions of the NH Act, which is a Central enactment. Thus, the acquisition has to be in terms of the provisions of the said Act. The petitioner has not alleged that the land owners are deprived of their property without authority of law. The endeavour of the petitioner is to state that the RFCT Act, having been enacted in the year 2013 and having come into force on 01.01.2014 is a comprehensive legislation with an avowed object involving a participatory approach, land owner friendly and the provisions of the Act cannot be made inapplicable to a chosen few enactments, which have been listed in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCT Act and one such enactment being the NH Act. The question would be as to whether on the grounds raised, Section 105 can be struck down as being unconstitutional. ......
22.The Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, by order dated 28.08.2015 in SO 2368(E) in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the RFCT Act, has ordered that the provisions of the RFCT Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with First Schedule, Rehabilitation and Resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified http://www.judis.nic.in 24 in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCT Act. This order has been passed in exercise of the powers of the Central Government to remove difficulties and provides for applicability of the procedure for determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement and infrastructural amenities as contained in the RFCT Act to acquisition under the NH Act or for that matter, all acquisitions under 13 enactments listed in the Fourth Schedule. Thus, so far as the interest of the land owners is concerned, the procedure for determination of compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement and provision of infrastructural amenities as envisaged under the RFCT Act has been made applicable mutandis mutandis to the acquisition under the NH Act. There is no quarrel on this aspect, but the petitioner's case is that provision of Chapter II, III & IV of the RFCT Act should be made applicable. According to Mr.M.Radhakrishnan, non-
applicability of these chapters is discriminatory and there is no reasonable classification nor any intelligible differentia to include 13 enactments in the Fourth Schedule and make these three Chapters inapplicable. The question would be whether Section 105 of the Act, can be struck down as being unconstitutional on the aforementioned ground.
http://www.judis.nic.in 25
23.The learned Additional Solicitor General of India and the learned Advocate General are right in their submission that if the prayer sought for by the petitioner to declare Section 105 as unconstitutional is granted, the land owners would be gravely prejudiced. This is so because, the manner of determination of compensation is more advantageous to the land owner under the RFCT Act. The NH Act does not provide for the procedure for rehabilitation and resettlement nor setting up of infrastructural facilities as envisaged in Schedule 1, 2 & 3 of the RFCT Act. Thus, if Section 105 is struck down, the NH Act will govern the field and the acquisition will proceed under the NH Act and the compensation will have to be determined under the said Act. This undoubtedly would be prejudicial to the interest of the land owners. Therefore, we fail to understand as to what benefit would accrue to the land owners by declaring Section 105 as unconstitutional. Parallelly, the important question would be, can this being a ground to declare Section 105 as ultra vires, irrational with no intelligible differentia. At this stage, we may point out that the petitioner in this Writ Petition is not a land owner/land loser.
32.Thus, when the Government of India had issued the order dated 28.08.2015 in SO No.2368 extending the procedures for determination of compensation, http://www.judis.nic.in 26 rehabilitation and resettlement to the acquisition under the National Highways Act, we find that there is no discrimination meted out to the land loser. Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the State from denying any person's equality before any law or equal protection of laws within the territory of India. What the law prohibits is class legislation. If the legislature takes care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes, so long as the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which lays down a perceptible differentiation between two groups and the differentiation has a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved, such classification cannot be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
41.As mentioned by us above, Section 105 of the RFCT Act has integrated the thirteen enactments listed in the Fourth Schedule, and if it were to be struck down, the benefits extended with the applicability of the RFCT Act to those 13 enactments will go away and each of the thirteen enactments would operate separately thereby defeating the need and purpose of enacting RFCT Act to bring about an uniform procedure for compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement. To be noted the NH Act has been in force since 1956; similarly the other 12 enactments have been in force for considerable length of time. The NH Act was enacted much after the 1894 Land http://www.judis.nic.in 27 Acquisition Act and acquisitions under the NH Act were outside the purview of the 1894 Act, so also the other 12 enactments. Thus, by introducing sub-section (3) to Section 105 of the RFCT Act, the 13 enactments have been brought under the umbrella of RFCT Act by extending the benefits of adequate compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement.
42.Thus, for the above reasons, we hold that Section 105 and Fourth Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, is neither unconstitutional nor null and void and are held to be valid piece of legislation.”
24.The learned Additional Solicitor General of India pointedly contended that the Hon'ble Division Bench had specifically considered the notification dated 28.08.2015 impugned in this writ petition while repelling the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 105 and 4th schedule of the RFCT Act. Even though the validity of the impugned notification was not specifically put to challenge in G.Sundarrajan case, I am of the view that the Hon'ble Division Bench had impliedly sustained this validity.
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25.For all the above reasons, I find no merit in this writ petition. These writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions also dismissed.
04.02.2019 Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No Skm Note : Issue order copy by 06.02.2019.
To
1.The Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, Krishi Bhavan, Dr.Rajendraprasad Road, New Delhi.
2.The Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Transport Bhavan, No.1, Parliament, New Delhi.
3.The District Collector, Madurai District, Madurai.
http://www.judis.nic.in 29 G.R.SWAMINATHAN, J.
Skm WP(MD)No.21961 of 2018 and WMP(MD)Nos.19909, 19910 & 21989 of 2018 04.02.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in