Madras High Court
'3. Though The Relief Sought For Should ... vs U.O.I. 1998 (4) Scc 409 on 22 November, 2013
Author: S.Rajeswaran
Bench: S.Rajeswaran, C.T.Selvam, A.Arumughaswamy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS (Contempt Jurisdiction) DATED: 22.11.2013 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.RAJESWARAN THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.SELVAM AND THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.ARUMUGHASWAMY Suo Motu Contempt Petition (MD)No.965 of 2013 Peter Ramesh Kumar, Advocate, No.18, Law Chambers, High Court, Madurai. .. Contemnor Suo Motu Contempt proceedings initiated against the contemnor as per order of the Court dated 10.09.2013, made in memorandum of Proceedings recorded by the Hon'ble Mr.Justice C.T.SELVAM for commotion in the Court hall on 04.09.2013. ***** ORDER
Consequent to certain untoward incidents having taken place on 04.09.2013, one of us (C.T.SELVAM, J.) recorded a memorandum of proceedings which reads as follows:
"A section of Advocates practising at the Madurai Bench of this Court observed boycott on 04.09.2013. Other counsel present in Court were willing to part-take in proceedings. Presumably owing to boycott by sections of Advocates, litigants were present in large numbers.
2. I commenced proceedings at 10.30 a.m and upon hearing counsel and a few of the litigants, I passed orders in a few matters. 15 minutes into the proceedings, a group of advocates led by Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar approached the Court raising slogans and upon entering my Court hall, Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar informed that they were observing boycott. Mr.Thangapandiyan, retired Principal of the Madurai Law College, a practising advocate, who was on his legs, continued with his submissions. At such instance, Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar, proceeded to take hold of Mr.Thangapandiyan and sought to drag him out. Mr.Thangapandiyan resisted. Thereafter, Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar, with the help of few others dragged Mr.Thangapandiyan, out of the Court hall. There was commotion in the Court hall, some of the advocates challenging the boycott call and others challenging the resistance thereto. Having raised the question if any counsel wished to proceed with their case and being met with silence, I retired to chambers.
3. Being of the view that the conduct of Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar is gross contempt committed in my presence and hearing, I direct the Registry to initiate suo motu contempt proceedings and pursuant to the Article 215 of the Constitution of India. List the matter before Court on 11.09.2013 at 10.30 a.m."
2. On instructions, the Registry has placed the matter before the Court in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (MD) No.965 of 2013 on 11.09.2013. A further order to the following effect was made "Notice to contemnor Mr.Peter Ramesh Kumar returnable on 25.09.2013. Notice may be effected both at his Chamber address as also his residential address. Considering the seriousness of the matter and the institutional importance, the Registry is directed to place the matter before My Lord the Acting Chief Justice for hearing of the matter by a large bench, of which I may be a part." It needs mention that as against the Judges impression that the matter was to be placed and heard by a 'Large Bench', the Registry's note to the Honourable Chief Justice had read 'Larger Bench'. Honourable Chief Justice passed an administrative order to the following effect.
"Suo motu contempt case is hereby transferred to the Principal seat at Chennai and be placed before the Full Bench of S.Rajeswaran, J, C.T.Selvam, J, and A.Arumughaswamy, J."
3. The matter was posted on 25.09.2013. The contemnor was present. Representations on his behalf were made by A.K.Ramasamy, Advocate, President of the Madurai District Bar Association and Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, with a few others chipping in. While Mr.A.K.Ramasamy's address was in the nature of a requisition against the contempt proceedings, that of Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, we regret to note was confrontationist. In the course of his address, Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, went to the extent of stating that it was not the Judge who had been beaten, it was only an Advocate. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad submitted that the power to punish for contempt was a relic of the British Raj, to be done away with. Mr.Mohan, Advocate assisting Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, submitted that the contempt proceedings was ab initio void since Rule 8 of the High Court Contempt of Rules Act stood violated. Both Mr.A.K.Ramasamy and N.G.R.Prasad further addressed us on the nobility of the Tamil cause that was sought to be espoused through boycott of proceedings. To similar effect were a few remarks of other counsel forming part of the contemnor entourage. We consciously use the word entourage. We are given to understand that a body of Advocates led by Mr.A.K.Ramasamy had travelled from Madurai towards being present whilst the contempt proceedings were on. There was a collective missing of the wood for the trees. The cause before us was the conduct of an Advocate which was found contumacious. We have no quarrel with the cause sought to be espoused by him. That simply is not the issue. The issue, pure and simple, is that recorded in the memorandum of proceedings dated 10.09.2013. Even in the trying circumstances, we thought it not proper to ignore the entreaties of Mr.A.K.Ramasamy and thus we informed him that the apology should come forth from the contemnor. On being advised by Mr.A.K.Ramasamy and others, the contemnor's initial remarks were "if it is wrong to protest the Tamil cause I have wronged". On his being further prompted by others his remarks were "the decision of the Association is my decision" and still thereafter "I will abide by the decision of the President and as the President wanted him to apologise he was apologising." Despite this we wished to refrain from punishing the contemnor and affording him a further opportunity to inform an apology of the heart, we adjourned the proceedings to 28.10.2013.
4. On 28.10.2013 Mr.A.K.Ramasamy, Advocate made submissions of reconciliatory overtures and forwarded an affidavit of the contemnor. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad's submissions on the other hand were such as would give us no option but to punish the contemnor. Again missing the point, a learned member of the Bar raised the question of what this Court had done regards the 19.02.2009 incidents i.e., incidents relating to violent acts of the police force. A few Advocates also would complain of some of the Judges not lending a favourable ear to submissions made in Tamil. Now, to turn to the affidavit filed by the contemnor. The affidavit informs of the contemnor having great respect for courts, of his having conducted himself over 20 years in a most dignified manner and that he never intended to scandalise or lower the dignity of the Court or in any manner interfere with any judicial proceedings or the administration of justice. He states that any contrary impression created is unintended and he sincerely regrets the same. He informs the nobility of the cause pursued and of members of the Bar and general public having been agitated by the affront to the Tamil language perceived as a result of certain proceedings in this Court resulting in Advocates Association in the State resolving to boycott courts on 10.09.2013. The affidavit goes to inform that 'hundreds of Advocates participated in the boycott of Courts. As always people were very emotional as language has been a very emotive issue for Tamils for centuries. Sentiments about the Tamil language were running high in the Court campus. It was in the course of this agitation that it was decided that the Advocates would go to each court and persuade advocates who were attending courts to support the Tamil cause. It was in this context that I along with hundreds of other Advocates entered the court hall of Hon'ble Mr.Justice C.T.Selvam. There were a handful of Advocates attending courts. The atmosphere was already surcharged as Advocates attending courts were seen to be betrayers of the Tamil cause. I realised that matters would go out of control if the Advocates continued to argue matters when the majority was agitating for a public cause. It was under these circumstances, in order to diffuse the situation I requested Mr.Thangapandiyan, Advocate to leave the Court. A few lawyers surrounded him to protect him from the agitated lawyers to prevent untoward incidents. Members of the Bar were solidly behind the Tamil cause. When I led Mr.Thangapandiyan out of the court hall I did not mean the slightest disrespect to the learned Judge or the judiciary and if I have given such an impression I express my deepest regret and apologise for the same.'
5. We may add that paragraph 7 as originally filed also included averments of denial of that which had been recorded by one of us and of his escorting Mr.Thangapandian, Advocate, out of Court towards avoiding him harm. As the denial of the record of proceedings made by the Judge was found highly objectionable and it was realised that we would reject the affidavit outright, such portion was deleted. This is not to say that the rest of the contents, particularly that which try to portray the conduct of the contemnor in good light, are not objectionable. Neither are we to be understood as saying that we would not, could not reject the affidavit even at this stage. Are we to accept the affidavit, seemingly of an apology and of this sort? We will be guided by judicial precedents.
6. We first will lay aside the technical objection raised by Mr.Mohan, Advocate. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads as follows:
'14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court.-(1) When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Curt or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter, shall-
(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged;
(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge;
(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and
(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by some Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the trial thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a person charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under sub-section (2), by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in the case.
(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a person charged with contempt under this section shall be detained in such custody as it may specify:
Provided that he shall be released on bail, if a bond of such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient is executed with or without sureties conditioned that the person charged shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise directed by the Court:
Provided further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance as aforesaid.' Rule 8 of the Contempt of Courts reads as follows:
'8. Where a Judge of the High Court considers that any matter that might have come to his notice in any way requires initiation of proceedings in contempt against any person, the papers relevant thereto together with the direction of the Judge shall be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration as to whether the matter may be forwarded to the Advocate General.'
7. The submission that in initiating present proceedings Rule 8 of the Contempt of Courts stand violated is to be rejected outright. By necessity, Rule 8 which informs of any matter that might have come to the notice of a Judge and wherein he considered it necessary to initiate proceedings in contempt, necessarily cannot apply when contempt has been informed of having been committed in the presence and/or hearing of the Judge. If Rule 8 were applied also to such a case the effect would be,
(i) the power to direct immediate detention of the contemnor in custody provided in Section 14(1) would be rendered nugatory, and (2) the power to decide upon transfer of proceedings to some other Judge upon an application by the contemnor provided for under Section 14(2) would be rendered redundant.
It is also to be remembered that this Court is proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and as long as rules of natural justice are not violated, none can complain about the procedure adopted. Thus, we brush aside the technical objection as one not calling for consideration.
8. In Full Bench decision of this Court in the matter of R.Karuppan (2004 Cri. L.J. 4284) the prior conduct of the contemnor was taken into account. We would have to do so also in the instant case. Under orders in M.P.(MD)No.3 of 2010 in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.5065 of 2010 dated 29.10.2010 this Court had found as follows:
'3. Though the relief sought for should be to expunge the remarks made only against Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar, the first petitioner herein, it is seen that a common affidavit has been filed by the said Advocate along with Mr.B.Muruganandam and Mr.K.Saravanan, as if the court had passed any adverse remarks against the other two advocates also. It is made clear that M/s.B.Muruganandam and K.Saravanan, the other two advocates have not argued the petition and no adverse remarks were passed against them by this Court, by order, dated 22.09.2010. Only Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar had argued the matter in an unpleasant manner, so as to affect the dignity and decoram of this Court, which necessitated this Court in passing adverse remarks against the counsel to protect the high dignity of the judicial institution.
4. Subsequently, the petition in M.P.(MD).No.3 of 2010 on 07.10.2010 was filed by Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar along with M/s.B.Muruganandam and K.Saravanan. On going through the common affidavit, dated 04.10.2010 filed in support of the petition in M.P.(MD).No.3 of 2010, I am of the considered view that the petition was filed with patently false and defamatory allegations with a view to tarnish the image of the Judge of this Court and the judicial institution, which is a clear criminal contempt committed by the petitioners herein.
5. Though the adverse remarks were made by this Court only against Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar in the order, dated 22.09.2010, with a view to create unreasonable support, two other names of his office colleague have been added in the common affidavit, though they are nothing to do with the adverse remarks passed by this Court. However, by filing the common affidavit containing false and defamatory allegations, the two other Advocates have also committed contempt of court.
(i) In the common affidavit, dated 04.10.2010, paragraph number 4, it reads thus :
"We state that further to this Thiru.Mohammed Imranulla, staff reporter, the Hindu, Madurai edition was summoned three times on 23.09.2010 and 24.09.2010 to the chambers of His Lordship S.Tamilvanan and was coerced and forced to bring out an article on sunday against the undersigned."
There is no need for any Judge, especially a Judge of the High Court to call for a reporter of a particular newspaper three times on two days, coerce and force him to print a news item against the petitioners. The aforesaid averment itself would clearly speak that it is an utter false hood, defamatory in nature and which would be a glaring example for the latin maxim "Res ipsa loquitur", the thing speaks for itself, as the averment needs no other proof for establishing it as false.
(ii) It is an admitted fact that the adverse remarks were made by this Court by order, dated 22.09.2010 only against Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar, however, the common affidavit, dated 04.10.2010 reads as if the adverse remarks were made by this Court against the undersigned three advocates therein, which is also a clear false hood, on the very face of the record. It has been deliberately done to make up a case against this Court. The averments would show that it is a clear false hood and a gross criminal contempt of Court.
(iii) The common affidavit reads in paragraph number 5 that the aforesaid Mohammed Imranulla, a reporter of the Hindu newspaper has conveyed and tendered apology on 25.09.2010 to the petitioners, stating that it would come out in the newspaper on the next day. If it is true, atleast the petition could have been filed immediately or atleast on 27.09.2010. Even I could see the publication in the newspaper, Madurai edition, only on 27.09.2010, after reaching Madurai from Chennai by Flight. The averments made by the petitioners would clearly show that the petitioners have attempted to create false evidence against the court with the help of a newspaper reporter close to them.
(iv) The common affidavit filed on 04.10.2010 reads that the petitioners had sent written communication to both the Apex Court and the Madras High Court, seeking enquiry by a sitting Judge of Madurai Bench, which reads as follows :
"Therefore, feeling the ill will and so much love lost, the representation that Crl.O.P.No.5065 of 2010 may be posted before some other Judge was advanced on 22.09.2010 in a very polite and humble way giving all the due respect to the Hon'ble Court. But absolutely the opposite effects are being received, therefore, it was requested through written communication to both the Apex Court and Madras High Court that an enquiry may be ordered by a sitting judge of the Madurai Bench in the interest of Justice and bench bar relationship."
It is clear from the common affidavit that the petitioners had sought enquiry by a sitting Judge of Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, thinking that this Court is a Subordinate Court. From the E.No.134/91 given in this petition, it is seen that Mr.W.Peter Ramesh Kumar has put in 19 years of standing at the Bar, however, he has made a request against law to conduct an enquiry through a sitting Judge of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, as if this Court is a Subordinate Court, which is highly defamatory and also contempt of Court.
(v) In the common affidavit, the name of the Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jothimani has been unnecessarily dragged by the petitioners and they have stated that they complained before the Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jothimani on the same day, i.e., on 22.09.2010 in the open court. The Hon'ble Judge never discussed anything on this, similarly, I never discussed about the contempt committed by the first petitioner with my respected learned Brother till date. However, from the averments made by the petitioners in the common affidavit, it is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioners had made representations against the Judge of this Court before another Judge. The typed set filed by the petitioners contains a copy of the written representation sent by the petitioners to Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jothimani through the Registrar (Judicial), Madurai Bench and also approached the said Hon'ble Judge seeking to expunge the remarks, which itself is a contempt, as per the rulings of the Hon'ble Apex Court. As per Article 121 of the Constitution of India, the conduct of a Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts cannot be discussed even in the Parliament, except on impeachment proceedings. In such circumstances, the petitioners approaching some other Hon'ble Judge of this Court and raising allegations, as per the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to in this order, by way of written representation before another Judge are clear professional misconduct and also contempt of Court.
(vi) As per the written representation, dated 22.09.2010 made by the petitioners before the Hon'ble other Judge, the petitioners have clearly admitted the fact that this Court passed the order, dated 22.09.2010 in the open Court, whereby dismissed the M.P.(MD).No.2 of 2010 and also stating the adverse remarks as disparaging remarks as passed against the undersigned three Advocates with the name of the Judge of this Court. The averments made in the representation before the Hon'ble other Judge, dated 22.09.2010 would clearly falsify the averments made in the common affidavit, dated 04.10.2010 that they came to know about the remarks only on 25.09.2010 through a newspaper reporter known to them. The above facts would clearly establish that the petitioners have violated the fundamental professional ethics and committed professional misconduct and also criminal contempt.
...
20. In the instant case, the petitioners have raised false scandalising, wild allegations, which are highly defamatory as stated in detail in sub-paragraph numbers (i) to (vi) of paragraph number 5 of this order.
21. I am sure that the entire members of the Bar wherever I served as Subordinate Judge and also High Court Judge know that proper integrity and honesty are being maintained by me throughout for the past 24 years from the date of entering into the Judicial service. Though the petitioners have committed criminal contempt, so as to affect the high dignity of this Court instead of taking contempt proceedings against them, I find it just and reasonable to refer the matter to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, the appropriate forum, which is represented by elected members of the Bar for taking appropriate action against the petitioners herein, who committed professional misconduct and contempt of Court.
22. The Registrar (Judicial), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court is directed to send a copy of this order along with the certified copy of the order, dated 22.09.2010 passed by this Court in Crl.O.P.No.5065 of 2010 and M.P.(MD).Nos.1 and 2 of 2010 and a certified copy of the affidavit and petition filed by the petitioners in M.P.(MD).No.3 of 2010 to the Chairman, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, Chennai with a covering letter to take appropriate action against the petitioners for their professional misconduct, by referring the matter to Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council, as ruled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the light of various decisions and the decision reported in 2001 (6) SCC 135 (referred to above).
The matter shall be disposed of by the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu, according to law, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the result be intimated to the Registry of the High Court.' As the consequence and upon proceedings therebefore the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu in proceedings in D.C.C.No.1 of 2011, dated 29.07.2012, directed the suspension of practice of contemnor as an Advocate for a period of two years. The contemnor has moved an appeal before the Bar Council of India and enjoys an order of stay.
9. In Kalyaneshwari v. Union of India and others in Suo Motu Contempt in Writ Petition (Civil) No.260 of 2004 the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:
'There is no doubt that at the very initial stage, the respondents have tendered apology and prayed for dropping of the contempt proceedings. We are not quite certain as to the bona fide and intent of the respondents in tendering such an apology. For a Court to accept the apology in a contempt action, it is required that such apology should be bona fide and in actual repentance of the conduct which invited initiation of contempt proceedings. Furthermore, the conduct should be such which can be ignored without compromising the dignity of the Court. `Contempt' is disorderly conduct of a contemner causing serious damage to the institution of justice administration. Such conduct, with reference to its adverse effects and consequences, can be discernibly classified into two categories: one which has a transient effect on the system and/or the person concerned and is likely to wither away by the passage of time while the other causes permanent damage to the institution and administration of justice. The latter conduct would normally be unforgivable.
Institutional tolerance which the judiciary possesses, keeping in mind the larger interest of the public and administration of justice, should not be misunderstood as weakness of the system. Maintaining the magnanimity of law is the linchpin to the wheels of justice. Therefore, in certain cases, it would be inevitable for the Court to take recourse to rigours of the statute. It is the seriousness of the irresponsible acts of the contemners and the degree of harm caused to the institution and administration of justice which would decisively determine the course which the Court should adopt, i.e. either drop the contempt proceedings or continue proceedings against the contemner in accordance with law.
The apology tendered even at the outset of proceedings has to be bona fide, should demonstrate repentance and sincere regret on the part of the contemner lest the administration of justice is permitted to be crudely hampered with immunity by the persons involved in the process of litigation or otherwise. An apology which lacks bona fides and is intended to truncate the process of law with the ulterior motive of escaping the likely consequences of such flagrant violation of the orders of the Court and disrespect to the administration of justice cannot be accepted. In the case of Prem Surana v. Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate [(2002) 6 SCC 722] this Court sternly reprimanded a contemner who had slapped the Presiding Officer in open court and held that "the slap on the face of the judicial officer is in fact a slap on the face of the justice delivery system in the country and as such question of acceptance of any apology or an undertaking does not and cannot arise, neither can there be any question of any leniency as regards the sentence."
The rule of law has to be maintained whatever be the consequences. The `welfare of people' is the supreme law and this enunciates adequately the ideal of `law'. This could only be achieved when justice is administered lawfully, judiciously, without any fear and without being hampered or throttled by unscrupulous elements. The administration of justice is dependent upon obedience or execution of the orders of the Court. The contemptuous act which interfered with administration of justice on one hand and impinge upon the dignity of institution of justice on the other, bringing down its respect in the eye of the commoner, are acts which may not fall in the category of cases where the Court can accept the apology of the contemner even if it is tendered at the threshold of the proceedings.
The Black's Law Dictionary (8th edn., 1999) defines `Contempt' as, "Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a Court or legislature." It also adds that "Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable." This special jurisdiction has to be unquestionably invoked when the offending acts are intentional by the contemner at the cost of eroding the system of administration of justice which practice is necessarily required to be deprecated at the very initial stage.
In the case of Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union [(1970) 3 SCC 98], this Court said that it is the seriousness of the irresponsible acts of the contemners and the degree of harm caused to the administration of justice which would decisively determine whether the matter should be tried as a criminal contempt or not.
In the case of M.Y. Shareef v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur [AIR 1955 SC 19], this Court while explaining the requirements of genuine apology held as under:
"45.....With regard to apology in proceedings for contempt of court, it is well-settled that an apology is not a weapon of defense to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal, panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness." Similar observations were made by this Court in the case ofL.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P. [(1984) 3 SCC 405], wherein this Court held as under:
"6. We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a "licence" to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity.....'
10. The Delhi High Court in Lalit Madhan v. P.C.Srivastava in C.C.P.(Crl) No.6 of 2007 observed as follows:
'The acts of the contemnor in the present case are certainly one which not only hampered and throttled the administration of justice but also brought the Justice Delivery System into disrepute and disregard. Every indulgence given, every act of magnanimity shown by the Court was taken as a weakness of the judicial system by the contemnor and he committed repeated contemptuous acts of greater gravity with impugnity. Condoning such repeated contemptuous C.C.P.(Crl.)No.6/2007 Page 20 of 22 acts would amount to rewarding the persons with contemptuous behaviour, particularly when they are an integral part of the system, which obviously would have a devastating effect on the faith of the public in the institution of judiciary."
33. In the case of Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. U.O.I. 1998 (4) SCC 409, a Full Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down factors to be considered while awarding punishment for contempt. Paras 36 and 42 reads as under:-
"36. In deciding whether a contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment, the court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice and the culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate.
42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act adversely affects the administration of justice or which tends to impede its course or tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained of adversely affects the majesty of law or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" and it is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration of justice from being maligned. In the general interest of the community it is imperative that the authority of courts should not be imperilled and there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, the majesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice."C.C.P.(Crl.)No.6/2007 Page 21 of 22
34. For the reasons stated in detail in our judgment dated 10.4.2008, the action of the contemnor is serious, we find that the contemnor has interfered with the administration of justice. In plethora of judgments, the Supreme Court has held that in case attempts are made to impair the justice delivery system and to interfere with the administration of justice and lowering the dignity of the Courts, generous approach is likely to be misunderstood as the weakness of the Courts. The case in hand falls under the category to be dealt sternly, so as to strengthen the confidence of public in justice delivery system. We find, in order to maintain rule of law and to ensure that the continued public confidence in the Administration of Justice which is sought to be eroded, this case to be a fit and appropriate one in the facts and circumstances, to impose a punishment.'
11. A Full Bench comprising of 23 Judges of the Delhi High Court in Court of its own motion v. B.D.Kaushik (1993 Cri. L.J. 336) observed as follows:
'(7) In the background of what has been stated above, it will be seen that there is no doubt that the contemners along with hundreds of their colleagues stormed the various court rooms and disrupted their functioning. It goes without saying that they were guilty of the grossest possible contempt of this Court. A very civilized behavior and attitude is expected from the members of the Bar. In fact, they are part and parcel of the administration of justice. The only difference is that while the Judges are on this side of the table, they are on the other. Restraint, tolerance and humility are some of the virtues which need to be reflected in the behavior and attitude of the lawyer community. They must discharge their duties with dignity, decorum and discipline. They are expected to abide by the rule of law and not violate it by participating in violent acts. If lawyers fail in their duty, faith of the people in the Judiciary will be undermined to a large extent.
(8) We are not to forget that lawyers are the pillars and the custodians of liberty of citizens, not only in this country but everywhere in this tiny planet of the charismatic Universe. We need to remind ourselves of the highest traditions set by the stalwarts in the legal profession. In fact, most of our leaders who participated in the struggle for the independence of this great Country were from this noble profession. It is a profession which cannot brook such a defiant attitude and behavior of the lawyer community. The whole edifice and infrastructure of justice and Judiciary is likely to crumble, if this wing of the administration of justice behaves in the manner it did on 26.9.1991. Therefore, keeping in view the entire background of the legal provisions and the nobility which should flow from e legal profession, we have no hesitation in saying that the contemners along with their other brethren indulged in the most reprehensible activity on 26.9.1991. They simply brought down not only the dignity and majesty of this temple of justice but their own profession also and attempted to erode the entire system of administration of justice. In fact, the contempt was so gross and outrageous that we have no hesitation in holding them guilty of the contempt of this Court and convict them accordingly.
(9) We are now left to see as to what would be the appropriate sentence or direction which should issue in such a case. For that purpose, we will have to keep in mind the un-conditional and unqualified apology tendered by all of them. We will do no better than retrained ourselves of the observations made by the Supreme Court in re: S. Mulgaokar . We quote:
"The contempt power, though jurisdictionally large, is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise. Every commission of contempt need not erupt in indignant committal or demand punishment, because Judges are judicious, their valour nonviolent and their wisdom goes into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection -for a wide discretion, range 'of circumspection and rainbow of public considerations benignantly guide that power. Justice is not hubris; power is not petulance and prudence is not pussillanimity, especially when Judges are themselves prospectors and mercy is a mark of strength, not whimper of weakness. Christ and Gandhi shall not be lost on the Judges at a critical time when courts are on trial and the people ("We, the People of India") pronounce the final verdict on all national institutions."
In para 24 it was further observed:
"Poise and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential to the judicial temper that huff,' haywire' or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor, inversions provocation, frivolous persiflage nor terminological inexactitude throw into palpitating tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind' ' (10) At the same time the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., can be quoted advantageously:
''We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allowed him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge fay making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalise him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a' license' to scandalise courts and commit contempt of court with impunity....We firmly believe that considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that we do not allow the appellant to escape with impunity on the mere tendering of apology, which in any case does not wipe out the mischief."
(11) On a consideration of the entire matter, we are of the view that whatever the contemners have done tantamounts to an attempt to erode the majesty and authority of the courts and not of us individually or collectively. The guiding principle before us should be the resurrection of the immense damage inflicted upon the majesty of this symbolic manifestation of democracy and secularism. Just like the chords of a Veena, if loose, will echo discordant notes and if very much tightened, are likely to break, we should on this first occasion endeavor to strike a balance.
(12) We must realise that they are members of the noble profession and in their misguided zeal, ventured upon the defiant course for which they have offered apology. At the same time we must also keep in mind that simply accepting the apology and discharging the rule may not appear to be ' warranted in the circumstances of the gross contempt. Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, including the outrageous incident and unqualified apology, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch their conduct and behavior for a period of one year from today. In case any of them repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if they maintain orderly, good and disciplined behavior and do not indulge themselves in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period.'
12. The above is the view of the majority. We may add some of the Judges of such Bench thought it appropriate to straight away impose sentences.
13. We would hold that the manner in which the contemnor has conducted himself before us, and the tone and tenor of his affidavit do not commend him to us at all. If we are to be carried away by Mr.N.G.R.Prasad's refrain, the same would do the contemnor a member of the Bar, no good at all. While we fully would be justified in rejecting the affidavit of the contemnor as apparently it is not one of the heart, we do not wish to cause him harm. We are conscious that any imposition of punishment would visit him with very serious repercussions, particularly since he already stands once condemned by this Court. We find reason to follow the majority view of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the B.D.Kaushik case cited supra and accordingly, we do not propose to award the sentence at present and defer it as we would like to further watch his conduct and behavior for a period of one year from today. In case he repeats any act which tantamounts to contempt of court or undermining the judiciary, he will be called upon to appear in Court to receive the sentence. But if he maintains orderly, good and disciplined behavior and does not indulge in the repetition of such acts within the stipulated period, then the rule shall stand discharged on the expiry of the period.
14. We would, for now, part with the matter with the observation that the Supreme Court has held illegal calls for boycotts of Courts. To impede the Courts and Advocates who do not pay heed to calls for boycott only makes larger the commission of contempt. When called to answer in contempt, the response certainly cannot be to impress upon the Court, strength in numbers. Numbers only multiply the wrong doing and hardly would impress the Court, much less in favour of the contemnor. Contempt petition is ordered accordingly.
(S.R.,J.) (C.T.S.,J.) (A.A.,J.)
22.11.2013.
Note to Registry:
Registry is directed to place a copy of this
order before the Hon'ble The Chief Justice
towards circulation thereof to all the Hon'ble Judges.
Index : Yes/No
Internet : Yes/No
srm
S.RAJESWARAN, J.
C.T.SELVAM, J.
AND
A.ARUMUGHASWAMY, J.
srm
Suo Motu Contempt Petition (MD)No.965 of 2013
22.11.2013