Bombay High Court
Amar Bahadursingh S/O Girijasingh ... vs V.P.D. Wasnik And Others on 13 September, 1993
Equivalent citations: (1994)96BOMLR414, 1994CRILJ1359
ORDER
1. This is a Rule for contempt issued by my learned brother Mr. Justice Dudhat, J. calling upon the respondents to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of Court for having violated the order passed by the civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara on 18-12-1991 restraining the defendants/contemners from giving operation to the order of the respondent No. 1 dt. 25-10-1991 which was also confirmed by the learned Additional district Judge, Bhandara on 13-3-1992 in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1992 and in wilful disobedience of the orders passed by both the learned Courts below, issued a communication on 7-12-92, addressed to Management directing to continue Shri R. B. Deshmukh as In-charge Head Master during the pendency of petitioner's case.
2. Where the contempt does not occur in the presence and hearing of the Court, it must be brought to the attention of the Court by affidavits or sworn statements of the facts by the persons who witnessed them or have knowledge of the events. From the sworn facts, it must be shown prima facie that the contemner committed the contempt. After satisfying, the Rule came to be issued to the contemners directing to show cause why he should not be punished for the alleged contempt. This Court issued the Rule on 8-1-1993. Similarly, the interim relief as prayed vide clause (ii) was also granted.
3. The facts leading to the Rule are chequered but can be put in a short compass :
The petitioner Amar Bahadur Singh - a teacher working in Lokmanaya Tilak Rashtriya Vidyalaya. Tumsar run by the Education Society, has filed the instant contempt petition against the respondents. However, according to the prayer, the petitioner sought action against the respondent No. 1 (Shri T. D. Wasnik), who was the Education Officer (Secondary) at the relevant time.
4. The petitioner Shri A. B. Singh, since 1960 working as a teacher in Lokmanaya Tilak Rashtriya Vidyalaya, Tumsar. He was promoted as a Head Master in 1968. Thus, since 1968, he is working as Head Master of the said School, run by the Education Society, Tumsar, i.e. the respondent No. 4. According to the petitioner the respondent No. 1, the Education Officer has passed an order on 25th of October 1991 determining the date of birth of the present petitioner on the basis that he was born on 21-9-1930 and conveyed the same to the Managing Committee of the School, accepting the contents of Shri Kisan s/o Sitaram Karemore of Tumsar vide his complaint dt. 12-9-91. By his communication the respondent No. 1, resulted in the premature retirement of the petitioner w.e.f. 30-9-90. According to the petitioner his real date of birth is 30-6-34. The respondent No. 1, Education Officer, further directed the Head Master/Secretary as also to the President and Vice-President of the said School and Education Society to deduct or/and recover the payment and other emoluments paid to Mr. Singh with effect from 1-10-1990 and also directed to send compliance report accordingly.
5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Education Officer i.e. the respondent No. 1 the petitioner filed Civil Suit No. 342/1991 in the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara challenging the order dt. 25-10-91 passed by the respondent No. 1. The petitioner also moved an application under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction restraining the defendants i.e. the State of Maharashtra and Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Bhandara from giving operation to the order passed by the respondent No. 1. The defendants being the Government Officers, no ex parte order was passed on the application presented under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The management filed an application through its President Kisan Karemore, before the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara as intervenor and he was allowed to join as deft. No. 4. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Judge, passed the following order on 18-12-1991.
"The plaintiff's application Exh. 5 under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is hereby allowed and the defendants are hereby temporarily restrained till the disposal of the suit to give operation to the order passed by the Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad, Bhandara vide its order No. 2614/91 dt. 25-10-1991."
6. Shri Karemore the defendant No. 4 preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Bhandara vide Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4/92. After hearing the parties, the order dt. 18-12-1991 passed by the learned trial Judge was confirmed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Bhandara. The order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Dn. and the judgment and order of the learned Asstt. District Judge, Bhandara are exhaustive and reasoned by dealing the submissions of the rival parties.
7. Admittedly, the respondent No. 1 did not prefer any appeal or revision against the order dt. 18-12-1991 passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara. So also he did not challenge the judgment and order passed by the Addl. District Judge, Bhandara in Misc. Appeal No. 4/92. Thus, the orders of the learned Courts below became final.
8. On 30th April 1992, the respondent No. 1 issued a letter to the Secretary/President of the Education Society, Tumsar directing them to abide by the order of the Addl. District Judge, Bhandara in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1992 and report accordingly to him. It appears that as there was no compliance of the directions issued by the respondent No. 1 to the Secretary/President of the Education Society, Tumsar, the respondent No. 1 has sent another letter dt. 24-7-1992 to the President of the Education Society, Tumsar apprising that the Society has not complied with the order passed by the Addl. District Judge, Bhandara and in case there is no compliance then they have to face the consequences. The President of the Education Society, Tumsar sent the compliance report to the respondent No. 1 vide his letter dt. 28-9-92 wherein it is specifically mentioned that Mr. A. B. Singh is allowed to work as a Head Master since 28-9-92 having all the financial and administrative powers. There is an endorsement that this letter was received in the office of the respondent No. 1 on 29-9-1992. The copies of these letters were also forwarded to the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur, Chief Officer, Zilla Parishad, Bhandara, Shri A. B. Singh Kushwaha and Shri R. B. Deshmukh.
9. After resuming as Head Master, Mr. A. B. Singh has submitted the pay bills of the teaching and non-teaching staff to the respondent No. 1 for the month of November 1992. The copy of the pay bills is annexed with the contempt petition. The name of A. B. Singh has been shown at Sr. No. 1. However, his name is scored. Similarly, his signatures are found scored and pay bills are signed by Shri Deshmukh the In-charge Head Master which clearly goes to show that the petitioner was restrained from exercising administrative and financial powers vested in him. It is stated at Bar by the learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 that the name of Shri Singh and his signature were scored out and Shri R. B. Deshmukh put initials and signed the bill on his directions. Further, the respondent No. 1 issued a communication to the Management on 7-12-1992 directing Management to continue Shri R. B. Deshmukh as In-charge Head Master overlooking the facts that Shri Singh was allowed to work as Head Master w.e.f. 28-9-92 at his direction. The actions of the respondent No. 1 clearly depicts disregard to Court's orders and this action being deliberate and in wilful disobedience of the orders of the learned Courts below, the respondent No. 1 is liable to be punished for having committed contempt of court.
10. At the outset, Shri Paliwal the learned counsel for the petitioner as also Shri Jibhakate, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, the Education Officer, submitted that there is a compliance of the orders of the Courts below and, therefore, the matter is settled. The learned counsel of the parties, therefore, further submitted that the proceeding be dropped. Shri Jibhakate, the learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 further submitted that the respondent No. 1 has submitted unconditional apology which may kindly be accepted and the proceeding be dropped.
11. The law on the contempt of Court is founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and to maintain honour and dignity and prevent insults to the Courts/Judges - the members of the Temple of Justice. It should be emphasized that the proceedings in contempt by very nature are not nor can be permitted to be initiated nor our jurisdiction involved to settle or satisfy the sense of private injury. From this follows that once this court is seized of the matter with regard to contempt and the rule is issued, it must be made clear for all purposes that desire of the private party to continue or not to continue such proceedings is insignificant and is totally irrelevant. Thus, the process once began cannot be recalled by private arrangements and settlement. After initiation, the matter is between the Court and the contemner. Purpose of proceeding in contempt is mainly to uphold the dignity of the Court and instil confidence in the mind of the people about the sanctity of orders by the Courts of Justice. Accepting the private settlement between the parties after the contempt notice is issued to the parties and thereby to drop the contempt proceeding, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would be nugatory and the object would stand defeated and frustrated if the private negotiations of such settlements and eventual withdrawals of the petitions are permitted. There exists clearly high principle of public policy behind the initiation of such proceedings involving public interest in the matters of administration of justice.
On this aspect the Hon'ble D.B. of this court observed in para 8 of its judgment in a case of Bhalchandra Gangadhar Ghate v. Pralhad Saduji Raghute reported in 1977 Cri LJ 1490 (DB) as under :
"The supremacy and the majesty of the Court of justice should, of necessity, be scrupulously guarded. Similarly the foundations of the public faith and of the parties to the cause should not be impaired by any prejudicial steps concerning the matters pending adjudication before the Court. Further if a party brings to the notice of the Court any remiss, transgression or attack on these principles that affect or un-sully the clear flow of administration of justice, it is the Court which gets concerned with the matter and private interest should of necessity cannot affect proceedings in contempt. It should be emphasized that the proceedings in contempt by very nature are not nor can be permitted to be initiated nor our jurisdiction involved to settle or satisfy the sense of private injury. From this follows that the process once begun cannot be recalled by private arrangements and acceptance of apologies privately out of the Court by the applicant."
12. The respondent No. 1 has submitted unconditional apology and I have nothing to doubt his bona fides at this juncture. However, considering the seriousness of the matter, the question arose in this case as to whether tendering unconditional apology at the beginning of the hearing would be sufficient to drop the proceedings. It must be remembered that the apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt under all circumstances nor can it be allowed to operate as a universal penacea. Unconditional apology would be a circumstance for showing leniency in quantum of punishment.
There cannot be any rigid rule that every contempt proceeding should be dropped as soon as an unconditional apology is tendered. The very nature of the judicial function makes Judges sympathetic and responsive. However, every thing will depend upon the facts of each case. If the contempt is of a technical type or if the contempt can be termed as not serious or grave, the court is likely to accept the apology. In other cases, mere apology would not do. So, before considering the various circumstances, the court should consider and scrutinise the nature of contempt.
13. Keeping the object in view, I have to consider from the facts and circumstance, whether the contempt committed by the respondent No. 1 is technical or a minor one ? Whether it is grave or serious ? What would be its impact on the society ? All these aspects are relevant along with the various other circumstances to accept or not to accept apology. In certain cases the court should accept apology if the matter is such where acceptance of apology would be in the interest of justice. Similarly, the court will be failing in its duty if necessary punishment is not awarded if the matter deserves any such punishment.
14. Mr. Jibhakate, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 tried to justify the action of the respondent No. 1 of issuing the communication dt. 7-12-1992 to the Management of the Society directing them to continue Shri R. B. Deshmukh-in-charge-Head Master with financial and administrative powers, during the pendency of the case, revoking his earlier orders or communication and resultant compliance by the Management vide letter dt. 28-9-92, referring the letter dt. 31-10-1992 alleged to have been sent by the Vice-President. In spite of the compliance report dt. 28-9-92, it appears that the respondent No. 1 was not satisfied and therefore, he directed Mr. A. B. Singh to supply the copy of the Schedule 1 under the Bombay Public Trust Act. Consequently the Society supplied certified copies to the Education Officer. Meanwhile, the Superintendent, office of the Bombay Public Trust, Registration, Bhandara issued a letter on 20-10-92 to the respondent No. 1 that the certified copy supplied has some mistakes and, therefore, the parties be directed to supply the another certified copy. Similarly, the respondent No. 1 sent a letter on 22-10-92 to Mr. Singh directing him to supply the copy of the Schedule I. At the end of this letter there are scorings and overwritings and interpolations. At this stage it must be noted that the copy placed on record was not readable and, therefore, this Court directed the learned counsel to read out the copy particularly the last lines of the letter and the learned counsel was also not in a position to read the same. Therefore, I remind a proverb "Aap Likhe Khuda Bache". As the copy placed on record was not readable at all, the carbon copy from the file of the respondent No. 1 was perused. It is difficult from that letter too to make head and tale of the last lines.
Fresh certified copy of Schedule I was supplied to the respondent No. 1. No substantial charge was there except some clerical mistakes.
14-A. Mr. Jibhakate, the learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 took me through the various letters issued earlier to the letter dt. 22-10-92 between the parties. There is no whisper at all, about any resolution passed by the Society. In spite of this, it is difficult to understand why respondent No. 1 directed the petitioner Shri Singh to produce the "resolution"? Therefore, query was made to the learned counsel, why the Education Officer directed Mr. Sing to produce the "resolution". However, the learned counsel could not justify the action of the respondent No. 1.
15. Regarding the scoring and obtaining the initials and signatures of Mr. Deshmukh on the pay bills of November 1992, it is submitted attracting my attention to the letter dt. 31-10-1992, alleged to have been sent by the Vice-President of the Society, that the action of the respondent No. 1 was just and proper. The contents of this letter are vague. In this letter there is a reference of meeting and the resolution but no details have been given in this letter as to when meeting was held and what is the nature and substance of resolution. The query was made as to why he directed Shri Deshmukh to score the name of Singh and to put his initials and signatures on the pay bills. The reply was that because there was a complaint by Vice-President and there being disputes between the members and the Management he was constrained to direct Shri Deshmukh to send the pay bills under his signatures. It is, thus, clear that the pay bills which were placed before the Education Officer for attesting the signature of the Head Master, at the behest of the writer of the letter dt. 31-10-1992 he directed Shri Deshmukh to score the name of Shri Singh and put his initials and signatures on the pay bills. This action is patently illegal in view of the orders of the learned Courts below, and contrary to his own directions twice i.e. on 30-4-92 and 24-7-92 to Management to comply with court's orders and compliance letter dt. 28-9-92. Such action cannot be said as bona fide by any stretch of imagination. Mala fides are write large i.e. to deprive Shri Singh of his legal right and help Shri Deshmukh.
16. During the course of arguments Shri Jibhakate the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed one letter dt. 10-9-1991 sent by the President, the Education Society, Tumsar to Shri A. B. Singh. By this letter he tried to show that the services of Mr. A. B. Singh came to an end by 30-9-90 as he completed 60 years of his age on 20-9-90. In the second para, it is stated that Shri A. B. Singh's services is dismissed from today i.e. 10-9-91 and Shri Singh was directed to deliver the charge to his successor Shri V. D. Shirke, the Vice-Principal of the School. Again it is a interesting letter. This letter ends with copy to ...... and on the next page para 2 has been typed and below that para, again copy forwarded to for information and necessary action is typed. Mere on perusal one gets an impression that the next page has been subsequently typed to suit purpose. Para 2 states that Shri V. D. Shirke, Vice-Principal, Lokmanaya Tilak Rashtriya Vidyalaya, Tumsar is hereby ordered to take the charge of A. B. Singh. This letter indicates that he is appointed as a Head Master/Principal of the School. He is also ordered by this letter to take the charge of Secretary of the Educational Society, Tumsar. However, no document has been placed or shown during arguments to substantiate that this letter, in fact, was served on Shri A. B. Singh. Neither acknowledgment nor any other document has been filed to show that at any time subsequent to letter dt. 10-9-91 Shri A. B. Singh handed over the charge to Shri V. D. Shirke. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to consider such letter.
17. Shri Jibhakate, the learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 placed another letter dt. 22-11-1991 on record during argument, issued by the Education Officer to Shri N. S. Madavi, the Science visitor, Zilla Parishad, Bhandara directing him to visit the school and see that the charge of the Head Master is handed over to Shirke from Shri A. B. Singh. It is, thus, clear from this letter that Shri Singh had not handed over the charge of the post of Head Master to Shri Shirke on 10-9-1991 of subsequently. If he would have handed over the charge earlier to this, there was no propriety for the respondent No. 1 to depute his subordinate for taking over the charge from A. B. Singh.
18. Shri Jibhakate, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that whatever actions the respondent No. 1 has taken, were taken bona fidely and in the interest of the Society and its employees. He has no malice either for any member of the Society or the employees much less for Mr. A. B. Singh, the Head Master. There being disputes in the Management, in spite of the compliance report dt. 28-9-1992, considering the fresh complaint dt. 31-10-1992 lodged by the Vice-President of the Society, he acted upon the complaint in the interest of the Society. As the powers of the resp. No. 1 are challenged by the learned counsel for petitioner, at the outset the question was put to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that under what provisions the respondent No. 1 has issued the letter dt. 25-10-91 giving his verdict to the effect that the date of birth of Shri A. B. Singh be taken as 21-9-1930 and not 30-6-1934. The learned counsel placed reliance on S. 67.6 (Annexure 53) page 188, appendix 24 of the Secondary School Code which deals with duties of the officers. Perusal of S. 67.6, Annexure 53 and appendix 24, does show nowhere the duty is cast upon the respondent No. 1, the Education Officer to look into the matter concerning the date of birth of the teaching staff. S. 67. 6 of the Secondary School Code is reproduced as under :
"The entries in the service book especially those relating to date of birth educational and professional qualifications, etc., should be verified by the Head of the school personally from the original record. A remark "the entry is in accordance with the original certificates" should be made in the respective columns and signed and dated by the Head after verification. The date of birth should be verified from the original school leaving certificate, or S.S.C. Examination certificate. The educational and/or professional qualifications should be verified from the original certificates/diplomas/degrees of the examinations passed by the candidate."
19. In appendix 24, the duties of the Education Officer/Educational Inspector/Deputy Director of Education have been defined. However, out of so many provisions, the learned counsel could not lay his finger on any of the provision to show that the Education Officer i.e. the respondent No. 1 was empowered to look into the complaint alleged to have been lodged by Shri Kisan Karemore the President of the Education Society, Tumsar regarding the date of birth of Shri A. B. Singh. I could lay may hands on the notification issued by the Educational Secretary, Maharashtra-Pune, No. 1083-19-D, dt. 25-11-1983 wherein the duties and powers of the Education Officer (Secondary) have been shown. However, regarding the matter in dispute, the Education Officer is not at all empowered to entertain the complaint/complaints of such nature and as such the question of adjudication does not arise.
20. It is, thus, crystal clear from the facts and circumstances that the respondent No. 1 usurps the power upon himself to do and not to do anything according to his will and wish. It is sheer misuse of his powers and status to oblige some one and particularly Shri Kisan Karemore, on whose complaint dt. 13-10-1992 he took decision and issued letter dt. 25-10-91 at the behest of the President of the Society. The respondent No. 1, thus, misused his powers in spite of orders of the learned courts below and thereby not only humiliated Shri A. B. Singh but deprived him of his legal right to work as the Head Master. The respondent No. 1 entertained the complaint dt. 31-10-1992 of the Vice-president also. In fact, the Vice-president has no powers during the existence of the President. In spite of this, the respondent No. 1 unduly relied and again misused his powers instead issuing orders directing the President to allow Mr. A. B. Singh to sign the pay bills of teaching and non-teaching staff.
21. It is pertinent to note that the order dt. 25-10-91 issued by the respondent No. 1 was stayed by the learned Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara vide order dt. 18-12-91. The respondent No. 1 did not challenge the same by preferring an appeal, and therefore, the order is final. The President of the Society was joined as defendant in the proceedings before the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara at his request. He approached the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court confirmed the order passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Bhandara dt. 18-12-1991. The learned lower courts stayed the order of respondent No. 1 dt. 25-10-1991. But, the respondent No. 1 deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the orders passed by the Courts below and directed the Management vide letter dt. 7-12-1992 to allow Shri Deshmukh to function as Head Master, having financial and administrative powers though vide letter dt. 28-9-92, the Management complied with Courts order.
22. The orders are passed to comply and not to flout. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court; not only in order to protect the dignity of the Court against the insult or injury or wilful disobedience as the expression 'contempt of court' may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudicial, obsctructed or interefered with. The law should not seen (sic) to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hopes. This has been observed in the case of Jennison v. Baker, (1972) 1 All ER 997 at page 1006, reproduced in the case of The Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, .
23. It is further submitted by learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 1 passed the order due to inadvertence and without any mala fides. I do not agree with the learned counsel. I have already held that the respondent No. 1 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the orders being determined to help the Management and, therefore, he danced on the tunes of the Management, particularly Shri Kisan Karemore and members of his group.
24. At this stage, one letter placed on record by Shri Paliwal, the learned counsel of the petitioner needs mention. It is a Government Circular issued by the Government of Maharashtra on 23rd of November 1968, which pertains to Shri Kisan Karemore a resident of Tumsar, Dist. Bhandara. The contents of this circular indicates that Shri Kisan Karemore is in the habit of making allegations against the local officers. It is observed that the allegations made by him are generally false and baseless. In fact, the applicant is in habit of making false complaints. The activities of Shri Kisan Karemore are anti-social and anti-Government and result in obstruction to the moral functions by the Government Officers concerned. Shri Kisan Karemore was also convicted in two riot cases of Tumsar. Government has, therefore, decided that the applications received from Shri Kisan Karemore, Tumsar, Distt. Bhandara should be filed straightway without taking any action thereon.
The copy of this circular was sent to all other Heads of Departments and Heads of Offices under the several Departments of Secretariat except those belonging to the judicial Department. This circular was shown to the learned counsel of the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 1 expressed his ignorance about the circular. Assuming that the respondent No. 1 had no knowledge about this circular, still as discussed in the preceding paras, the respondent No. 1 has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the orders of the courts below and passed the contrary orders and thereby there is not a semblance of doubt in my mind to hold that the respondent No. 1 is guilty of contempt of court.
25. In the case of Tapan Kumar Mukherjee v. Heromoni Mondal in para 9 it is observed that :
"We should like to emphasise that officers of Government should exercise utmost vigilance in compliance of court's orders, particularly where they deal with vital issues such as cultivation rights of land-holders. Luckily, in the present case, the appellant himself withdrew his letter dt. 3-8-87 and police protection was provided to the respondents. But such lapses, even during a short interval can sometimes cause irreparable damage and injury. In the circumstances of this case we have though with a certain degree of reservation, extended to the appellant the benefit of doubt but we should like to put out a warning that where a case of wilful disobedience is made out, the courts will not hesitate and will convict the delinquent officer and that no lenience in the court's attitude should be expected from the Court as a matter of course merely on the ground that an order of conviction would damage the service career of the concerned officer."
26 No doubt, the respondent No. 1 has tendered unconditional apology. The apology must be one coming from a sincere heart and not as a matter of mere formality. An apology to be genuine must be tendered at the earliest opportunity. In the instant case, as per office endorsement notices were served on respondents 1 to 5 on merits before certifying the case for final hearing i.e. on 19-4-1993. This court on 29-7-93 directed Assistant Government Pleader to keep the respondents 1 and 2 present in this Court on 3-8-1993 along with their replies. Our record shows that even to secure the attendance of respondents in the petition, this Court was compelled to issue bailable warrants against them which shows that respondents have no regard to the order of this Court. The respondent No. 1 filed reply and stated in last para of his reply as under :
"The entire act of the respondent No. 1 is bona fide and law-abiding. If there is any act which gives cause to disobedience of court's order, it is due to inadvertence and without any mala fides. The respondent No. 1 hereby tenders unconditional apology."
The words used are not indicative of remorse and contrition. Defence set up found false. All the while, the respondent No. 1 was justifying his conduct. According to me, the apology appears to be a 'paper apology'. Expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not pen. I feel the respondent No. 1 tendered apology to avoid rigour of law. Considering the gravity and seriousness of the contempt, I do not accept apology tendered.
27. Contempt is an offence of the Court and not to the person who sits as a Judge. Ergo, an insult to the Court if not punished will create a general dissatisfication in the minds of the public as to the dignity, solemnity and efficacy of the Courts of justice. Proceedings under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are summary and quick mode of meting out punishment to contemner if he is found guilty. Provisions are very efficacious in inspiring confidence in public as to the institution of justice. Without such protection, Courts will loose their image and dignity and go down in public respect as also maintenance of law and order will be in jeopardy.
28. Heard Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned counsel of the intervenor at length. The submissions were directed only to safeguard the interest of Shri R. B. Deshmukh. This being not the subject-matter of adjudication in the contempt proceedings no discussion is required. As the intervenor was allowed to join as the party, I have heard Shri Dharmadhikari, the learned counsel.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the Rules framed by the High Court do not provide for intervention by the third parties. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to addition of parties do not arise in the contempt matter which is entirely between the Court and the contemner. If other persons or third parties are allowed to intervene in the proceedings, then it will seriously affect the contempt proceedings. The presence of the intervenors in a given situation may lead to the generation of heat as well as arming for and the against the contemners with lethal weapons which would make the Court involved more than what it is necessary in exercise of its jurisdiction under the contempt Courts Act.
29. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel and apology tendered by the respondent No. 1, he deserves punishment. However, I do not intend to be too harsh considering his long service. But, at the same time I do not propose to be too lenient. I think, the ends of justice would be met if the respondent No. 1 is sentenced to suffer imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. The respondent No. 1 has to pay the fine from his own pocket and not from the Government Exchequer because the lapses or the disobedience of the court's orders are committed by the respondent No. 1 misusing his power and position.
30. In the result, the respondent No. 1 Shri T. D. Wasnik is sentenced to suffer imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- within a week, in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The rule is made absolute in respect of resp. No. 1.
31. Petition allowed.