Madras High Court
The Land Acquisition ... vs Swaminatha Mudaliar And Ors. on 24 October, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)1MLJ459
Author: Ar. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
ORDER AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The matter arises under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Land Acquisition Officercum-Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirunelveli, is the revision petitioner. Both the revisions have been filed against the orders of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, in I.A. Nos. 219 and 231 of 1992 in L.A.O. No. 46 of 1988. Those two applications were filed by the respondents/claimants under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure wherein the respondents have prayed for the grant of leave to amend the judgment and decree in respect of interest at the rate of 15% instead of at 9% based under Section 28 of the Act, which provides for interest on solatium, and to grant leave to amend the judgment and decree in respect of the increased amount under Section 23(l-A) of the Act and interest thereon under Section 28 of the Act. The trial court allowed both the applications against which the present revisions have been filed by the State.
2. The lands in question were acquired by the state at the rate of Rs. 1,303 per acre and on a reference to the Sub Court, Tirunelveli, the same was raised to Rs. 20,000 per acre, with solatium of 30% and inter-est at 12% per annum from 15.8.1979 till 20.1.1988 and thereafter at 9% per annum till the date of depos-iting the amount. Against the award of the Sub Court, Tirunelveli, the state has preferred A.S. No. 657 of 1989 on the file of this Court and as per the interim order passed, the State was directed to deposit the entire compensation amount into this Court and on such deposit, the respondents/claimants were permitted to withdraw 50% of the same. Thereafter, the respondents have preferred I.A. No. 219 of 1992 in the trial court stating that they would be entitled to inter-est at 15% per annum on the enhanced compensation amount as the same has not been deposited into court within one year from the date of order along with interest at 2%. This prayer has been ordered by the impugned order against which C.R.P. No. 408 of 1994 has been preferred. The respondents have also filed I.A. No. 231 of 1992 in the trial court stating that they are entitled to get additional increase amount at 12% from the date of possession to the date of passing of the award. The learned Subordinate Judge has awarded the same against which C.R.P. No. 794 of 1994 has been preferred by the State.
3. The points that arise for consideration in both the revisions are:
(a) Whether the respondents/claimants are entitled to interest on solatium under Section 28 of the Act?
(b) whether the respondents/claimants are entitled to increased amount under Section 23(l-A) of the Act?
(c) Whether the respondents/claimants are entitled to interest under Section 28 of the Act on the increased amount awarded under Section 23(l-A) of the Act?
4. Points: The learned Advocate General submitted that the relief sought for by the respondents are not to be granted. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to be granted the relief based on the earlier judgments between interparties.
5. The earlier inter-party proceedings are,
(i) Judgment of this Court rendered by E.J. BelIie,J., in C.R.P. No. 1828 of 1991 dated 22.11.1991 reported in G. Swaminatha Mudaliar v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Tirunelveli .
(ii) Judgment of K.A. Thanikkachalam, J., as he then was, in C.R.P. No. 8 of 1992, dated 16.7.1992.
(iii) Judgment of M. Srinivasan, J., as he then was, and S.M. Abdul Wahab,J., in Appeal Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989, etc., dated 15.2.1996.
6. I shall now refer to the judgment of E.J. Bellie, J., in C.R.P. No. 1828 of 1991 reported in G. Swaminatha Mudaliar v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Tirunelveli . The said revision was filed by the respondents herein against the dismissal of an application for amendment by the trial court. The award was passed by the Collector under the Act for acquisition of the land of the respondents and dissatisfied with the amount granted by the Collector, the respondents herein have filed L.A.O.P. No. 46 of 1988 for enhancement of compensation. The trial court passed an order enhancing the compensation. Opposing that order, the state has preferred an appeal to this Court. In the stay petition, this Court passed a conditional order to the effect that stay is granted on condition of the state depositing 50% of the enhanced compensation amount which the claim-ants/respondents will be entitled to receive. The respondents raised an objection stating that the amount deposited by the State is less than the amount ordered to be deposited, that the State is liable to pay interest on the solatium amount also but the state has not deposited that interest and that they must be directed to deposit that amount also. The respondents thereupon filed C.M.P. No. 1259 of 1991 for modifying the stay order passed by this Court so as to enable the respondents to file an amendment petition. this Court passed an order stating that the stay granted will not bar the respondents/claimants from filing a petition for amendment of the decree.
7. After the above modification of the stay order, the respondents filed I.A. No. 174 of 1990 in the trial court for amendment of the decree. In that application, the trial court ordered that the stay has been lifted only for filing a petition for amendment of the decree but the decree cannot be amended without amending the judgment. The trial court further held that the amendment sought for is not a clerical or an arithmetical mistake in the judgment and decree or error arising therein from any accidental slip or omission and therefore, the petition filed under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be entertained. On these findings, the trial court dismissed the petition. As against the said order, C.R.P. No. 1828 of 1991 has been preferred.
8. In the above revision, E.J. Bellie, J., was concerned only with the question whether the amendment petition filed under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Proce-dure is not maintainable as held by the trial court. The learned Judge, after referring to the decision reported in Periyar and Pareekenni Rubbers Ltd. v State of Kerala A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2192, held that the respondents herein are entitled to interest on solatium. The learned Judge has observed that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court there is no gainsaying that the respondents are entitled to interest on solatium. While considering the question whether the amendment petition is maintainable under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not, the learned Judge, after referring to the decisions reported in Jayakrishna Mangaraj Mohapatra v. State of Orissa Nand Ram v. State of Punjab , held that the respondents herein are entitled in law to interest on the compensation awarded, that interest must be directed to be paid to them in the order of the court, and if there is no such direction, that will be indeed an accidental-slip or omission, and that therefore, a petition under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable as it comes within the purview of that section. The learned Judge has also ob-served from the passage in , that an omission to award statutory interest on the compensation constitutes an accidental slip within the meaning of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure and can be rectified at any time. The learned Judge has also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Shree Vijay Cotton and Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat , wherein the Supreme Court held that the Court is bound to order payment of interest at least under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the costs and interest under the Act, if not awarded by the lower court, can always be awarded by higher courts in any proceedings under the Act and to any party entitled to the same under the Act. In this view of the matter, Bellie, J., has allowed the revision and ordered amendment of the order and decree passed by the trial court. It is pertinent to notice that this order of E.J. Bellie, J., was not appealed against before the Apex Court and therefore, it has become final and conclusive.
9. The next judgment which is worthwhile to refer is the judgment of K.A. Thanikkachalam,J., as he then was, in C.R.P. No. 8 of 1992 dated 16.7.1992. The respondents herein have preferred the above revision against the order of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, dated 11.12.1991 in E.P. No. 103 of 1991 in L.A.O.P. No. 46 of 1988. In column 8 of the said execution petition, the respondents herein have claimed interest on Rs. 18,37,700 at 12% per annum from 15.8.1979 to 20.1.1988. The Government filed a counter stating that in the decree no increased amount was awarded as per Section 23(1) of the Act, and therefore, the executing court cannot go beyond the decree and the respondents herein also cannot ask for the increased amount under Section 23(1) of the Act in the execution proceedings. The learned Judge in the concluding portion of the order has observed as follows:
There, it remains to be seen that what was deposited by the Government was only the interest awarded under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act and not the increased amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act, since that was not awarded by the court. Now, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners herein requested that this Court should permit the claimants to approach the execution court for amending the decree so as to enable them to get the increased amount as contemplated under Section 23(l-A) of the Act. In the proceedings, such permission cannot be granted. But, however, it is open to the claimants/petitioners herein to approach the appropriate court for suitable remedy get their statutory benefit as contemplated under Section 23(l-A) of the Land Acquisition Act. With these observations, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the execution court in E.P. No. 103 of 1991, since the order passed by the execution court is in order. In that view of the matter, this revision is dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.
10. The third in the series equally important to be referred to is the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989, etc. dated 15.2.1996 batch. The petitioner herein and the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board are the appellants therein while the respondents herein are the respondents therein. The learned Judges, on a consideration of the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that there is no justification to grant the compensation at the rate of Rs. 200 per cent as has been done by the Subordinate Judge, nor is there any justification for fixing the compensation at a low figure of Rs. 10 per cent as has been done by the Land Acquisition Officer. Taking into consideration of all the circumstances, the Bench was of the opinion that a sum of Rs. 125 per cent will be the reasonable compensation for the acquired land. In paragraph 20 of the judgment, the Bench has observed as follows:
In our opinion, the rate of Rs. 125 per cent is quite reasonable and just on the evidence on record. Consequently, in all these cases, the compensation is fixed at the rate of Rs. 125 per cent. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge are modified accordingly and the appeals are allowed to that extent. The compensation fixed by the Subordinate Judge for the well situated in Survey No. 115/1-A is confirmed. The memoranda of cross objection are dismissed. It is made clear that the claimants are entitled to a solatium at the rate of 30% as fixed by the Subordinate Judge and also the interest, etc., and all other benefits as are available under the provisions of the Act. No order as to costs.
It is also pertinent to notice that against the judgment in A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989, the state preferred S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 14639 to 14641 of 1996 to the Supreme Court of India and the same was dismissed on 7.8.1996.
11. Thus, the above three judgments have become final and conclusive and these three judgments hold the field even to-day between the petitioner and the respondents herein. It is pertinent to notice that the Division Bench in A.S. Nos. 657 to 659 of 1989 has categorically held that the respondents/claimants are entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% as fixed by the Sub Court, interest, etc., and all other benefits as available under the provisions of the Act, which judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. l4639to 14641 of 1996 dated 7.8.1996. Hence, this judgment also binds the parties. Likewise, the judgment rendered by K. A,Thanikkachalam, J., as he then was, in C.R.P. No. 8 of 1992 wherein the learned Judge had permitted the claimants to approach the appropriate court for suitable remedy as they may be advised in regard to their statutory benefit as contemplated under Section 23(1 A) of the Act, which is also a judgment inter-parties, has become final and conclusive and not appealed against. Hence, the rights of the parties, have to be determined only based on these judgments which have become final and conclusive between the parties.
12. While arguing C.R.P. No. 408 of 1994, the learned Advocate General submitted that the learned Subordinate Judge had failed to see that the additional 12% of the land value is payable only from the date of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and not from an early date and that the finding that the said additional value is payable from the date of taking possession of the property, which is much earlier to Section 4(1) Notification, is against law and therefore, he submitted, that the learned Subordinate Judge has exercised the jurisdiction erroneously and as such, the said order is liable to be set aside. He further submitted that the court below has failed to see that the interest at 9% and 12% referred to in Section 28 of the Act has been wrongly ordered and that the court below has no jurisdiction to pass such orders. It is then submitted that the land acquisition process in question was made under the Amended Act 68 of 1984, which came into force only in 1988, and there was no provision to pay such interest, as awarded by the court below, in the previous Act. The learned Advocate General further contended that the question of amendment to the judgment and decree does not arise as it is not a simple error and therefore, the respondents are not entitled to claim interest as now claimed. Concluding his argument, the learned Advocate General submitted that if the amendment is ordered, the Government will be put to great monetary loss and therefore he prays that the revision filed by the State should be allowed and the order of the court below should be set aside.
13. Arguing contra, Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, after referring to the earlier inter-party judgments, submitted that in the present case possession of the acquired land was taken as early as 15.8.1979, that the award was passeid on 21.1.1988, and as per Section 28 of the Act, the court should direct payment of interest at 15% when the excess compensation awarded by the, court is not paid within one year from the date on which possession of the acquired land was taken. He submitted that in the present case, 9% interest has to be charged from 15.8.1979 to 15.8.1980 and thereafter, interest should be charged at the rate of 15%. The respondents are entitled to claim 15% interest from 16.8.1980 upto the date of payment. Obviously, the court below has not taken into consideration the provisions of Section 28 of the Act while passing the judgment, which is an error apparent on the face of the record, and the same has to be rectified.
14. Insofar as C.R.P. No. 794 of 1994 is concerned, the learned Advocate General submitted the same argument as in the other revision. Per contra, Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel submitted that the court below has failed to award what is called "increase" and this amount is mentioned in Section 23(l-A) of the Act. The Jearned senior counsel submitted that this is a statutory amount which the respondents are entitled in law to get. The court below has inadvertently omitted to include this amount in the judgment and decree and therefore, the respondents are entitled to come forward with the present application. As submitted earlier, the error on the part of the court below to include the statutory benefit under Section 23(l-A) of the Act is a clerical one and the same has occurred due to over sight and inadvertence. Therefore, the respondents filed I.A. No. 231 of 1992 in the trial court to suitably amend the judgment and decree by including a clause directing the state to pay the increased amount under Section 23(l-A) of the Act with interest thereon under Section 28 of the Act from 15.8.1979 till date of payment.
15. Mr. G. Subramaniam relied upon some judgments which are to the effect that judgment inter-parties will operate as res judicata. The first decision is reported in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee , wherein the Supreme Court has held that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it and that the correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operate as res judicata.
16. The next decision cited by Mr. G. Subramaniam is reported in Satyadhydn Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi , wherein the Supreme Court has held that when a matter--whether on a question of fact or a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in'relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation and that the result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.
17. In this context, we may also refer to the recent Bench judgment of this Court in Manonmaniam University case, W.A. No. 321 of 1994, dated 11.7.1997 by AR. Lakshmanan and S.M. Sidickk,JJ. In that case, the Bench held that the parties to the proceedings are bound by the earlier judgments which have become final between the parties and the lis, and the present relief sought for by the respondents is to be determined only based on the judgments which have become final between the parties.
18. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the judgment reported in Periyar and Pareekenni Rubbers Ltd. v State of Kerala, AIR. 1990 S.C. 2192 was overruled by the subsequent judgment reported in Yadavrao P. Pathade Vs. State of Maharashtra (1996) 2 S. CC. 570 and that it has no relevance at all. I am unable to accept the said contention. E.J. Bellie, J., while disposing of C.R.P. No. 1828 of 1991 followed the law which was then prevailing. The learned Judge followed the decision reported in A.I.R. 1990 S. C 2192. Therefore, the subsequent change in law will not nullify the judgment which was rendered between the parties earlier. In this context, the judgment rendered in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, is again directly on the point. Since the judgment of E.J. Bellie, J., in C.R.P. No. 1828 of 1991 (reported in G. Swaminatha Mudaliar v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Tirunelveli had become final, it is only that decision will have to be considered while deciding the lis between the parties and not the subsequent change of law with retrospective effect.
19. In the instant case, the relief sought for by the respondents under Sections 28 and 23(1-A) of the Act is to be awarded because the award was passed in this case after the Amended Act 68 of 1984, which came into force on 24.9.1984, whereas the award in the instant case was passed on 21.1 1988. Therefore, the judgment relied on by the learned Advocate General, reported in Union of India v. Swaran Singh cannot be pressed into service to the facts and circumstances of the ease on hand as in the case before the Supreme Court the award was passed on 28.8.1978, which was before the Amendment of Act 6? of 1984.
20. The decision reported in Rafiq Mohammedv. State Government ofMadhya Pradesh, IT. (1996) 5 S.C. 457 : was relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, which in turn followed Union of India v. Raghubir Singh . The Supreme Court in (T996)8 S.C.C. 482 has held that the claimants are entitled to the benefits of solatium and interest under the amended provision.
21. The decision reported^ in Rangaswami alias Govindaram y. The Deputy Collector (Revenuecum-Land Acquisition Officer), Pondicherry (1997) 2 C.T.C. 97, cited by the learned senior counsel for the respondents can also be relied on in support of the respondents' case. In that case, a Division Bench of this Court gave liberty to the land owners to lay their claim regarding solatium and interest as per the provisions of the Amended Act, 15(84, depending upon the decision of the Supreme Court since the issue was pending before a larger Bench of the Supreme Court on the date of disposal of the appeal by the Bench of this Court. The land owners filed review petition before the District Judge after the Supreme Court laid down the law in Union of India ^ Raghubir Singh, AJ.R. 1989 S.C. 1933. The District Judge dismissed the review petition as being barred by limitation. The land owners filed revisions undei; Sdc. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this Court. A learned single Judge referred the matter to a Divislion Bench as the first appeal was decided by a Division Bench originally on a point of limitation. Speaking for the Bench D. Raju, J., has observed that if at all the benefit has to be obtained and if it is permissible according to law, it should be by seeking for the review of the judgment of the court below so as to alter the compensation payable. The Bench was of the view that the application filed before the lower court is maintainable and there was no need or justification to file such review application before the High Court in the first appeal disposed of by the learned Judges of the Division Bench. Consequently, the Bench answers quesrtion No. 1 holding that the application filed before the court below for review, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the liberties granted in paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Division Bench, is quite in accordance with law and justified and on question No. 2 referred to the Bench, they hold that the period of Limitation applicable to the case on hand being the one provided for under Article 2262 of the French Civil Code, viz., thirty years of limitation, the applications filed are not barred by limitation, the applications filed are not barred by limitation and. there was no need to file any application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation.
22. The decision reported in, Assistant Commissioner, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavaneeswwa, is the direct answer to the argument of the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General submitted that the respondents are entitled to the additional 12% of the land value only from the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and not from an early date and that the finding of the court below that the said additional value is payable from, the date of taking possession of the property, which was much earlier to the notification under Section 4(lj of the Act, is against law. In this case, the possession of the lands of an extent of 92 acres out of 183.77 acres was taken by consent on 15.8.1979 itself i.e., long prior to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, which was made on 21.1.1986. The respondents claimed payment of additional amount, etc., as compensation from the date of taking over possession. The court below has rightly ordered so. this is approved by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2492, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the object of introducing Section 23(l-A) of the Act is to mitigate the hardship caused to the owner of the land, who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the land by taking possession from him and using it for the public purpose, because of considerable delay in making the award and offering payment thereof. To obviate such hardship, Section 23(l-A) of the Act was introduced and the Legislature envisaged that the owner of the land is entitled to 12% per annum additional amount on the market value for a period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in respect of such land up to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever, is earlier. The additional amount at 12% per annum was intended to be paid as compensation from the date of taking possession.
23, Therefore, in the instant case, since possession was taken on 15.8.1979, i.e., long prior to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the respondents are entitled to the additional amount at 12% per annum, which was intended to be paid as compensation, from the date of taking possession. The Supreme Court, in the above case, has further held that if the possession is taken earlier and notification is issued later, but the award is subsequently made, the owner or the claimant is entitled to the compensation from the date of taking possession till date of the award, though possession was taken before the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published. The expression 'whichever is earlier' in jSection 23(-1-A) of the Act has to be construed in that backdrop and the claimant would be entitled to additional amount from the date of taking possession.
24. The learned Advocate General contended that injustice has been done by the trial court in awarding the claims now made by the respondents. I am unable to countenance the said contention for the simple reason that no injustice has been done by the trial court. Discretionary jurisdiction should not be exercised where order of Subordinate Court renders justice and the order directs payment purely in accordance with law. It is settled law by catena of decisions that the exercise of the revisionary power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is purely discretionary and this Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and ever improper, if such interference will produce hardships or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction, as pointed out by M.M. Ismail, J., as he then was, in the decision reported in Chennichi alias Parikkal v. D.A. Srinivasan Chettiar (1970) 1 M.L.J. 234, is intended to secure and subserve the ends of justice and not to deny or defect it, and that if interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to-be one without jurisdiction. But, in the instant case, the order of the court below granting the relief is well within its jurisdiction and is justifiable on its merits arid therefore, it is not proper for this Court to interfere with the said order as it would result in injustice to the claimants/respondents.
25. In this case, the arguments were heard on 13.8.1997 and 10.9.1997 and I reserved orders in the above two revisions. The case was re-opened at the instance of the state on26.9.1997 since the state filed C.M.P. N0.13274 of 1997 to re-open the case and post the same for further arguments. Accordingly, the said petition was ordered and the case was re-opened and posted again for arguments on 15.10.1997. On that date, the learned Special Government Pleader (C.S.) appeared on behalf of the state. He cited three decisions reported in Tehri Hydro Development Corporation v. S.P. Singh , Yadavrao P. Pdthade v. State of Maharashtra, : and PremNath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India .
26. In Tehri Hydro Development Corporation v. S.P. Singh , the Supreme Court held that the claimants are not entitled to interest on solatium and on additional amount under Section 23(l-A) of the Act. In that case, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 11.9.1982 for acquiring certain lands. The award came to be passed by the officer on 3.3.1984 in respect of some extent of land and in respect of certain other lands, the award was passed on 21.9.1986 and 3.12.1994. On appeal, the High Court has reduced the compensation and has awarded separate compensation for the building, factory, machinery, etc. An S.L.P. was filed by the appellant-Corporation. Before the Supreme Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India was cited by the appellant wherein it was held that the claimants are not entitled to solatium on additional amount awarded under Section 23 (l-A) of the Act, and that they are not entitled to interest on the solatium. The counsel for the respondent has also conceded that as per the decree of the High Court, there was no specific mention that the claimants are entitled to the above reliefs. It mentions only that the statutory benefits wdiild be granted as per law. Under these circumstainces, the Supreme Court clarified that the claimants are not entitled to interest on solatium and on additional amount awarded under Section 23(l-A) of the Act and accordingly allowed the appeal to the above extent.
27. The above judgment, in my view, is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand because in the above cited case, the facts are different. As rightly pointed out by Mr. G. Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/claimants, there had been no judgment inter-parties conferring the benefits on the respondents as has been done in the case on hand. Moreover, the judgrnent reported in that case is not applicable to the case on hand as in that case award was passed on 3.3.1984, i.e., before the Amendment of Act 68 of 1984, which came into force on 24.9.1984. Hence, I am of the view, that this judgment will be of no assistance to the and is distinguishable on facts.
28. The decision reported in Yadavrao P. Pathade (Dead) by L. Rs. v. State of Maharasira was next cited by the learned Special Government Pleader, The question arose before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant before it was entitled to payment of interest on solatium payment under Section 23(2) of me Land Acquisition Act. The additional amount was awarded by the reference court on December 15,1979 enhancing the compensation. TheHigh Couitfoy its judgment dated 4.12.1995 has further enhanced the compensation. The appellant claimed interest on solatium which Was disallowed by the High Court. The interest on solatium was calculated from 1.1.1967 to 31.12.1971. The appellant placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala contending that interest on solatium is a part of the component under Section 23( 1) of the Act and that therefore, they are entitled to payment of the interest. The Supreme Court held as follows:
Section 28 gives power to the court to award interest when the court enhances the compensation in excess of amount awarded by the Collector at the rate specified therein, namely, preceding the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, at 6% per annum under the Central Act or at the rates as per the appropriate Act amended by the local amendments to the Act. After the Amendment Act coming into force w. e. f. September 24,1984 the claimants would be entitled to interest at 9% p. a. for one year from the date of talcing possession and expiry thereof, at 15% p. a. till the ate of the deposit into the court.
Section 23(2) provides that "in additiori'"to the market value of the land as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum at 15% preceding the Amendment Act and after the Amendment Act, 30% p. a. on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. The legislature, therefore, made a distinction between compensation under Section 23(1) and the additional amount on such market value as solatium in consideration of compulsory nature of acquisition, tn other words, Section 28 does not comprehend payment of interest on solatium when it expressly mentions payment of interest on compensation under Section 28 referable to Section 23(1) of the Act., Thus the High Court was right in not awarding interest on solatium. Similar view was taken by this Court after Periyar and Pareekenni Rubbers Ltd. v State of Kerala by three Judge Bench in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corporation of India .
It is true that in Periyars case, this Court had held that interest dnsolatium is part of the component under Section 23( 1). Unfortunately, neither the provisionsWere Considered nor the distinction of the above provisions had been brought to the notice of this Court at that time. Therefore, mistaken view was taken to hold that interest on solatium is part of the component of compensation under Section 23(1) Of the Act, It is needless to mention that under Section 28 the claimants will entitled to the interest on enhance compensation from the date of the award of the the court under Section 26 and on appeal under Section 54 on the respective compensation, if enhanced, till date of deposit in the court. Therefore, the state is required to deposit the balance of interest on the enhanced compensation till date of deposit into the court.
The above case also is distinguishable on facts, as in that case also award was also passes on 15.12.79 which is prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 which came into force with effect from September 24,1984. Similarly the judgments relied on by the State through Special Government Pleader (1996) 2 S.C. C 71 is not applicable to the facts of the case as in that case also the award was passed by the collector oh 9.10.75 which is prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984.
29. Thus, viewed from any angle, the order of the trial court is Well within its jurisdiction and does not call for any interference in this revision.
30. This apart, in this Court batch of appeals were filed challenging the award of the sub-Court under Section 18 reference. A.S. Nos. 658 and 659 of 1989 were filed in respect of other sharers, wherein the claimants in those appeals have been awarded further interest at 12% p. a; as per Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and also benefits were conferred to those claimants under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act; The present claimants have filed applications before the trial court claiming the benefits under Section 23(l-A) and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, as has been given to the other sharers in the above referred to two appeals A.S. Nos. 658 and 659 of 1989. We have already noticed that the judgment and decree passed m the above appeals have become final and conclusive and in these circumstances, the other sharers out of the same acquisition proceedings are also equally entitled to get the benefits available under Sections 28 and 23(1)(A) of the Act as has been govern to the other sharers.
31. In view of the earlier order of Bellie, J,, dated 22; 11.1991 and reported in G. Swaminatha Mudqliar v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Tirunelveli and the order of K.A. Thanikkachalam, J., (as he then was) dated 8.1.1992 dated 7.7.1993 and of the judgment and the decree of the Division Bench in A.S. No. 657 of 1989 etc., the present order allowing the applications for amendment of the decree granting relief under Sections 23 and 28(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, is perfectly Legal.
32. As rightly pointed out that the earlier orders or orders passed in between interparties are not questioned in a manner known to law. That will operate as resjudicata though in an earlier stage of the same proceedings. I have already referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Mohaplal Goenka v. BenoyKishnaMukherjee and also of the Divisionbench Judgment of our High Court (AR. Lakshmanan and Sidickk, JJ.) in W.A. No. 321 of 1994 dated 11.7.1997 that the parties to the proceedings are "bound by the earlier judgments which have become final between the parties and the Us and the present relief sought for by the claimants are to be determined only based on the judgments which had become final between the parties. Even an erroneous order inter parties will attract Section 11 of C.P.C.
33. In the decision reported in Prahlad Singh v. SukhedevSingh , the Supreme Court held that the decision given by a court on an earlier stage though interlocutory judgments are open for adjudication Jjy an appellate authority in an appeal against the final judgment. Where the ex parte decree passed in the petition for eviction based on ground of default in payment of rent was set aside on finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw the petition and accept rent from the tenant, the continuance of the eviction petition thereafter by disregarding the finding recorded in the proceedings for setting aside the ex parte decree was illegal. The finding that the landlord had agreed to withdraw the suit and receive the rent from the tenant was a finding which was binding on the landlord at later stages of the proceeding. The eviction petition was therefore liable to be dismissed.
34. This has been followed by a learned single Judge (S.S. Subramani, J.,) in the decision reported in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. K.M. Yakub and Ors. (1996)2L.W. 817.
35,, For all the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the orders passed by the Qurt,of Low which are the subject-matter of the, above tyoi revisions are just and and proper and there, is np warrant for any interference with the said orders. There are absolutely no merits in these revisions and they are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed., However there will be no order as to costs.