Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Abyudaya Educational Society Rep. By ... vs Kanumalla Gram Panchayat Rep. By ... on 17 August, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(6)ALD1, 2006(5)ALT767
Author: Bilal Nazki
Bench: Bilal Nazki
ORDER Bilal Nazki, J.
1. These three writ petitions are being disposed of by this common order as they raise common questions of law and fact. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and also learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents.
2. These matters have come to the Full Bench on a reference made by a Division Bench. The Division Bench, while hearing the matters on 26-12-2005, by noting a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in Vasishta English Medium School v. Basinikonda Gram Panchayat and Anr. , expressed the view that the matters are required to be heard by a Full Bench. Therefore, the matters have been placed before this Full Bench.
3. It is a short controversy as to whether Rules framed under Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964') were still in force and could be applied even after enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Panchayat Raj Act of 1994') and Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner-institutions are educational institutions and admittedly they were exempt from paying property tax in terms of the Rules framed under the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964. The Rules framed under the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964 contained a rule being Rule 5, under which a class of houses was exempt from the house tax. The contention of the petitioners is that even after the repeal of the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964, the Rules framed under that Act are still operative and in this connection, they relied on a judgment of this Court in Vasishta English Medium School, to which a reference has been made hereinabove (1st supra). But in that judgment, the learned Judges of the Division Bench did not consider the question whether after repeal of an Act, the Rules framed under the repealed Act would still continue to remain operative. It only noted. "It is not in dispute that the above said rules framed under the repealed Act continue to apply. Therefore, the learned Judges of the Division Bench applied Rule 5 framed under the repealed Act and granted relief to the petitioners in that case.
4. Section 69 of the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964 mentions the taxes which could be levied by Gram Panchayats. Section 70 lays down the basis on which house tax could be levied by the Gram Panchayats and Sub-section (4) of Section 70 gave power to the Government to make Rules providing for exemption of specified classes of houses from the tax. It also gave certain powers to the Government. Therefore, under Section 70(4)(i), the Government issued Rules and Rule 5 gave exemptions to certain institutions including the educational institutions. The position, however, changed after the Panchayat Raj Act of 1994 came into operation. This Act came into force on 26th of April 1994. Section 60 of this Act gave powers to the Gram Panchayats to levy house tax and other taxes. Section 61 prescribed the mode and the basis on which the taxes could be collected and Section 61(4) gave powers to the Government, providing with the power, inter alia, of the exemption of special classes of houses from the tax. Virtually, the provisions n the old Act and new Act as far as powers of the Government relating to grant of exemptions are concerned, remained same. But Rules framed under the new Act did not give any exemption to any special classes of houses from the taxes. This is settled law that once an Act is repealed, the Rules framed thereunder or regulations made thereunder, or any other notifications issued thereunder, also stand repealed. However, the case of the petitioners as projected by learned Counsel is that immediately after the new Act came into being, G.O. Ms. No. 378 was issued by the Government on 28-6-1994. It is stated that this G.O. was issued by the Government in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 268 of the new Act read with Section 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891 (hereinafter referred to as 'the General Clauses Act). This G.O. merely states that the Rules framed under the earlier Act i.e., the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964 would remain in force till new rules were framed. Admittedly, the new rules were framed by G.O. Ms. No. 30, dated 20-1 -1995. There is no dispute that from 26th of April 1994 till 20th of January 1995, the rules framed under the Gram Panchayats Act of 1964 continued to apply even after the Act had been repealed by virtue of this G.O. But after the new rules came into being, the old rules could not be applied. The learned Counsel for petitioners referred to Sections 8 and 18 of the General Clauses Act, which are para materia to Sections 6 and 24 of the Central Act. In our view, Section 8 has no application to the present controversy. But the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners specially emphasized that Section 8(c) and (d) of the General Clauses Act would apply. Section 8(c) and (d) lay down-
8. Effect of repealing an Act: Where any Act, to which this Chapter applies, repeals any other enactment, then the repeal shall not-
(a)...
(b)...
(c) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed.
A perusal of both these provisions i.e., (c) and (d) of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act would make it clear that these provisions would apply to the acts done prior to repeal of the Act. In the present case, there is no controversy with regard to any acts done or any charges made prior to repeal of the Act. Therefore, in our view, Section 8 of the General Clauses Act has no application to the present controversy.
5. Similarly, on Section 18 of the General Clauses Act, law is settled that once the Act is repealed, the regulations made or rules or bye-laws framed also stand repealed unless the repealing Act itself says otherwise. In this connection, reference can be made to a judgment of Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. The State of Madhya Pradesh . In para 18 of this judgment, the Court held-
18. Mr. Agarwala next referred us to Section 24 of the General Clauses Act No. X of 1897 and urged that the notification would be a bye-law that would have continued notwithstanding the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act runs thus:
24. Where any Central Act or Regulation, is after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under he provisions so re-enacted and when any Central Act or Regulation, which, by a notification under Section 5 or 5-A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, or any like law, has been extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn from and re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section.
We consider that this submission is entirely with out force. Mr. Agarwala fairly conceded that the language of Section 24 would not cover a repeal of the Madhya Bharat Scrap Order by the introduction into the Madhya Bharat territory of the Indian Scrap Order, 1943 but he suggested that even though the section was in terms inapplicable, he could invoke the principle underlying it. But this argument, however, proceeds on assuming that Section 24 was declaratory of the common rule of interpretation and that even in the absence of Section 24 the same principle of law would apply. The position apart from a statutory provision such as is found in Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, is thus summarized in Craies on Statute Law 6th Edn. 334:
If the statute under which bye-laws are made is repealed, those bye-laws are impliedly repealed and cease to have any validity unless the repealing statute contains some provision preserving the validity of the bye-law notwithstanding the repeal. This follows from the rule... when an Act of Parliament is repealed it must be considered (except to transactions passed and closed) as if it had never existed". This submission has, therefore, no merit and must be rejected.
6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for petitioners have relied on the judgments in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh AIR 1955 SC84. and Duroflex Coir Industries Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) of Sales Tax 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 568. If analyzed, both these judgments lay down the same law that once an Act is repealed, everything relating to that Act gets extinguished as if that Act never existed on the Statute Book, unless the repealing Act provides otherwise. However, the acts done under the Act are saved under the provisions of the General Clauses Act, and in any case, even if there was no General Clauses Act, such acts would be saved.
7. For these reasons, we do not find that the petitioners are entitled to any exemption under the Pancahyat Raj Act of 1994, because, admittedly the assessments pertain to Post-1995 period. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed and it is clarified that the judgment by the Division Bench in Vasishta English Medium School (1 supra) is a judgment in per incuriam.