Amit Kumar Agarwal vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 19 March, 2025

[Cites 67, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Amit Kumar Agarwal vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 19 March, 2025

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                W.P. (Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
                            ----

Amit Kumar Agarwal, aged about 53 years, son of Sri Vijay Kumar Agarwal, resident of HB-165, Salt Lake, Sector-3, P.O.-Vidhan Nagar, P.S.-Vidhan Nagar South, District-24 Parganas North (West Bengal).

... ... ... Petitioner

-Versus-

Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Pee Pee Compound, Kaushalya Chamber, -II, Ranchi Sub Zonal Office, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S. Hindpidhi, District-Ranchi.

......... Respondent

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advocate Md. Imran Beig, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate

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CAV on 11/03/2025 Pronounced on 19/03/2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:

Prayer:

1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for holding the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 07.06.2023 and remand since 09.06.2023 in ECIR Case No. 01 of 2023 (arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022) as void ab initio; and further for quashing/setting aside the remand order dated 09.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi; and in consequence thereof direction for release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR No. 01 of 2023 (arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022).

-1- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

Factual Matrix

2. Brief facts of the case, as per the prosecution version, needs to refer herein, which reads as under:

3. An ECIR bearing No. 18/2022 was recorded, on the basis of the FIR bearing No. 141 of 2022 [Bariyatu P.S.] dated 04.06.2022, lodged at Bariyatu police station, Ranchi Jharkhand under Sections 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, against one Pradeep Bagchi on the basis of complaint made by one Sri Dilip Sharma, Tax Collector, Ranchi Municipal Corporation, for submission of forged papers i.e., Aadhar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession letter for obtaining holding number 0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A5. Investigation revealed that by submitting the forged documents, a holding number was obtained in name of Pradeep Bagchi for property at Morabadi Mouza, Ward No. 21/19, Ranchi having an area of the plot measuring 455.00 decimals approx.

4. Investigation further revealed that the above property belonged to Late B.M. Laxman Rao which was given to the Army and had been in the possession of the Defence/Army since independence. Investigation also reveals that by way of creating a fake owner (Pradeep Bagchi) of the above said property, it was sold to a company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd for which the consideration amount was -2- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 shown to be Rs. 7 crores which was highly under value and out of this amount payment amounting to Rs. 25 lakhs only were made to the account of said Pradeep Bagchi and rest of the money was falsely shown to be paid through cheques in the sale deed being deed no. 6888 of 2021.

5. It has come during investigation that records available at the Circle Officer, Bargain, and Ranchi along with the office of Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata have been altered and records have been modified. The survey of Circle Office Bargain as well as Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata transpires that documents have been tempered to create fictitious owner of the above properties.

6. The Enforcement Directorate, upon completion of investigation, filed the prosecution complaint under Section 45 read with Section 44 of PML Act being ECIR Case no. 01/2023 against the present petitioner and consequently, the trial court vide order dated 19.06.2023 has taken cognizance of the aforesaid offence.

7. The present petitioner was arrested on 07.06.2023 in exercise of power conferred under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as ‗PMLA, 2002']. Thereafter, he preferred Misc. Cri. Application No. 1915 of 2023 for grant of bail, which was dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2023 by learned Special -3- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, Ranchi, against which he moved before this Court by filing bail application being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, which was also dismissed vide order dated 01.03.2024. After dismissal of the bail application, the petitioner moved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn.

8. Thereafter, again the petitioner has renewed his prayer for bail by filing B.A. No. 8321 of 2024, which is pending consideration before this Court.

9. However, after his prayer for bail having been rejected, he moved before this Court by filing the instant writ petition initially challenging the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 07.06.2023 and remand since 09.06.2023 in ECIR Case No. 01 of 2023.

10. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has argued the matter on 4th October, 2024 through video conferencing and in course of argument has confined the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only. For ready reference, the order dated 04.10.2024 is quoted as under:

―The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the instant writ petition has been assigned to the D.B.-II by the administrative order of -4- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, this matter has been listed today before this Court.

2. The writ petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:

(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-

(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA cannot be exercised without issuing summon under Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of persons under Section 18;

(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;

(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must record the reasons why the authorised person considers necessary the attendance of the person to whom Summons are issued.

(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 , 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;

(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022];

(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending learned Court of Sri Yogesh -5- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Kumar, Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum-Special Judge, CBI-cumSpecial Judge under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

3. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel has appeared through Video Conferencing to represent the petitioner. He has referred page 53 of the pleadings, which is the arrest order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India at Ranchi, annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition by which petitioner has been arrested in exercise of power conferred under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Act, 2002.

4. Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vrs. Union of India and others [(2024) 7 SCC 576] and in the case of Prabir Purkayastha Vrs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC 254 and submitted that the arrest order is contrary to the provision of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, as has been settled by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.

5. However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.

6. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel representing the respondent Enforcement Directorate prays for 4 weeks' time to seek instruction and file affidavit in the matter since in the intervening period two consecutive holidays are falling.

7. As such, with consent of both the parties, list this case on 11th November 2024.‖ [Emphasis supplied]

11. However, on subsequent date, the argument has been advanced by Ms. Meenakashi Arora, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, questioning the order of arrest dated -6- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 07.06.2023 as also the order dated 09.06.2023, which as per learned senior counsel is the order of remand.

12. The ground has been taken on behalf of petitioner by challenging the issue of remand that at the time of arrest the condition stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 has not been followed. Further, the ground of arrest has not been provided, in writing, as required to be provided under the provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 coupled with the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors., [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 : (2024) 7 SCC 576]. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. [(2024) 3 SCC 51; Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine 934; and recently in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1703].

13. Further ground has been taken that the order of remand is in utter violation of provision as contained under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002, since, the reasons for ground of remand has never been communicated to the petitioner as per the statutory provision contained therein.

14. Further, submission has been made that the condition precedent for arrest/remand under the PML Act, 2002 is that -7- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 at the time of arrest the reason for arrest is to be communicated to the concerned but herein no such reason has been communicated and hence the very arrest of the petitioner is per se illegal and in consequence thereof, the order of remand is not sustainable in law and is fit to be quashed and set aside and accordingly the writ petitioner may be directed to be released from judicial custody.

15. Submission has been made that the statutory provision, as contained under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, has been clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with PML Act, 2002 in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., [(2022) SCC On Line SC 929]. Further submission has been made that subsequent to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) again on the issue consideration has been given by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors., (supra) followed by judgment rendered in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. (supra) regarding the communication for reason of arrest at the time of arrest itself in writing.

16. While on the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-ED has argued that it is incorrect on the -8- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 part of the petitioner to take the ground that the reason for arrest or remand has not been communicated rather the reason for arrest has been communicated along with the exhaustive grounds, the day when the petitioner was arrested, which would be evident from Annexure R-3 appended with the counter affidavit, wherein the entire details has been furnished regarding the culpability said to be the reason to believe for arrest of the writ petitioner.

17. It has been submitted that in the said communication the writ petitioner has put his signature in each page with date and on the last page, he has noted that ‗read and understand' ‗I have read my ground of arrest completely and also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh.‖ and below therein has put his signature with date i.e., 07.06.2023. In view thereof, submission has been made that the petitioner has been communicated with the reason of arrest, the day when he was taken into custody i.e., on 07.06.2023. Hence, the provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 has fully been complied with.

18. The argument has been advanced that the arrest of the writ petitioner, therefore, is in consonance with the interpretation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra); Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and -9- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Ors. (supra); V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. (supra); Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine SC 934] or in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra), so far as the stipulation made under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 pertaining to communication of reason for ground of arrest is concerned.

19. Further submission has been made has the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) has laid down that the arrest will be said to be illegal if the reason for arrest will not be communicated. However, in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) it has been laid down that written communication is required to be served to the concerned but that has been held to be applicable from the date of judgment since the word ‗henceforth' has been used therein. Here, the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) has come on 03.10.2023 but the arrest of the present writ petitioner was made on 07.06.2023, which is much prior to the pronouncement of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) but even ignoring the same the facts and circumstances of the case, the reason for arrest since has already been served the - 10 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 day when the writ petitioner was arrested i.e., on 07.06.2023, hence, it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take the ground that the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court clarifying the mandate of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 has not been followed.

20. This Court based upon the aforesaid arguments of the learned counsel for the parties reserved the judgment on 5th December, 2024.

21. But subsequently, after taking note of the order dated 4th October, 2024, whereby and whereunder the prayer of the writ petitioner has been confined only to the issue of alleged remand dated 09.06.2023, this Court has posted the matter under the heading for orders on 28th January, 2025, for clarifying the issue i.e., with respect to the issue that when the prayer of the writ petitioner was confined only with respect to the issue of remand order dated 09.06.2023, then where is the question to argue on the issue of the impropriety of order of arrest on the ground of non-fulfillment of the condition stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 and its appreciation by the Court.

22. The parties have appeared on the aforesaid date. The aforesaid fact of confinement of the prayer has not been disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner, rather, it has - 11 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 fairly been submitted that argument has been advanced without taking note of the order dated 4th October, 2024 by which the writ petition has been confined only to the legality of order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be the remand order. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, sought for two weeks' time to file affidavit on the issue and argue the matter further.

23. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has also submitted that in the counter affidavit the fact about order dated 4th October, 2024 has not been taken care of and, as such, he also wants to file affidavit as was required to be filed in pursuance to order dated 4th October, 2024.

24. For ready reference, order dated 28.01.2025 is quoted as under:

―The matter was heard by this Court on 5th December, 2024. After the hearing having been concluded, the order was reserved.

Subsequent thereto, while going through the records, this Court has found that the argument has been advanced on behalf of the parties based upon the pleadings.

The order-sheet shows that the prayer made by the petitioner has been confined only with respect to the issue of legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023, leaving the prayer of validity of order of arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, which would be evident from the order dated 4th October, 2024, for ready reference, the same is being quoted hereunder as :-

- 12 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Amit Kumar Agarwal, aged about 53 years, son of Sri Vijay Kumar Agarwal, resident of HB-165, Salt Lake, Sector-3, P.O. - Vidhan Nagar, P.S.-Vidhan Nagar South, District-24 Parganas North, (West Bengal)

--- --- Petitioner Versus Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Pee Pee Compound, Kaushalya Chambers-II, Ranchi Sub Zonal Office, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S.- Hindpidhi, District- Ranchi

--- --- Respondents .......

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR For the Petitioner: Mr. Kapil Sibbal, Sr. Advocate (through V.C) Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate Mr. Abhishek Agarwal, Advocate Md. Imran Beig, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate (for ED) Order No.0 / Dated 4th October, 2024 The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the instant writ petition has been assigned to the D.B.-II by the administrative order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, this matter has been listed today before this Court.

2. The writ petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:

(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of the Prevention of - 13 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v.

Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-

(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA cannot be exercised without issuing summon under Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of persons under Section 18;

(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;

(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must record the reasons why the authorised person considers necessary the attendance of the person to whom Summons are issued.

(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 , 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;

(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR - 14 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022];

(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending learned Court of Sri Yogesh Kumar, Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum- Special Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

5. However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by - 15 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.

7. As such, with consent of both the parties, list this case on 11th November 2024.‖ The argument has been advanced on behalf of the petitioner in the entirety of issue which is based upon the pleading and without taking into consideration the order dated 04.10.2024 by which prayer has been confined with respect to the legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023 only.

The counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate wherein also the order dated 4th October, 2024 has not been taken care of.

Consequent thereto the argument on behalf of both the sides has been made raising the legality of order of arrest.

But, when the prayer of writ petitioner has only been confined to the issue of remand dated 09.06.2023 passed in ECIR 01/2023, as would appear from the order dated 4th October, 2024, then the question which requires consideration is that what will happen to the confinement of prayer as has been recorded in the order dated 4th October, 2024.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that further hearing is required. As such, the case has been listed today under the heading ―Orders‖.

The aforesaid fact of confinement of prayer has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, rather, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that the argument has been advanced without taking care of the order dated 4th October, 2024 by which the prayer of the writ petition has been confined only to the legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023.

- 16 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has sought for two weeks' time to file affidavit on the issue and to argue the matter further.

Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate, has also submitted that in the counter affidavit the fact about order dated 4 th October, 2024 has not been taken care of and, as such, he also wants to file affidavit as was required to be filed in pursuance to order dated 4 th October, 2025 wherein four weeks' time was sought for to file affidavit after confinement of prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, as referred in paragraph 5 of the said order.

However, he has submitted that better would be, if he may be allowed to file affidavit after the affidavit will be filed on behalf of the petitioner, as per the prayer made by the writ petitioner as above, for which he has sought for one more week time over and above the period of two weeks as has been sought for on behalf of the petitioner.

Considering the aforesaid and with the consent of the parties, the matter is being adjourned for three weeks.

List this matter after three weeks under the heading ―Admission‖.

25. In pursuant thereto, affidavits have been filed, wherein fact about confinement of prayer has not been disputed by the petitioner as also by the learned counsel for the respondent-ED.

26. The matter was posted for hearing on 28th February, 2025.

27. Mrs. Minakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, has appeared through virtual mode and has informed this Court that the petitioner has challenged order dated 28.01.2025 before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP, - 17 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 which has been listed for clarification on the issue of confinement of prayer vide order dated 04.10.2024, and as such prayer for adjournment has been sought for. The S.L.P. being SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 stands disposed of vide order dated 3rd March, 2025. For ready reference, order dated 3rd March, 2025 passed in SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 is quoted as under:

1. Leave granted.

2. The issue before us lies within a very narrow compass.

3. The appellant before us, had approached the High Court by means of a writ petition, challenging the validity of the order of arrest dated 07.06.2023 and the subsequent remand order dated 09.06.2023, passed in ECIR Case No. 1/2023.

4. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court, after reserving the judgment on 05.12.2024, took note of its earlier order dated 04.10.2024, wherein, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant before the High Court had submitted that the challenge would, henceforth, be confined to the validity of the remand order alone. Despite the above-

mentioned submission made on behalf of the appellant, the hearing on subsequent dates proceeded, with the appellant's counsel addressing the Court on other issues as well, beyond the limited scope of the earlier submission. Therefore, the Hon'ble Division Bench, vide the impugned order dated 28.01.2025, held that the matter would be proceeded with afresh.

5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the arguments have been heard on all issues, notwithstanding the earlier submission made restricting the arguments to the order of remand alone. Therefore, there is no requirement for a fresh hearing. A request has also been made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the - 18 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 appellant, that it would be appropriate that the same Bench of the High Court, may rehear the matter.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the findings in the impugned order, were necessitated on account of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant before the High Court and, therefore, it is the appellant who has brought about the said situation. In any case, it is for the High Court to take a further call on the matter.

7. Taking note of the aforesaid submissions, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi to make a request to the very same Bench or any Bench, as per the roster, after ascertaining the convenience of the Bench that dealt with the matter earlier. The High Court is at liberty to pass orders forthwith, or hear the counsels appearing for the parties afresh.

8. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

9. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.‖

28. Accordingly, the present matter has been placed before this Court by the administrative order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, High Court of Jharkhand, in pursuance to the order passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in 3rd March, 2025 in particular at paragraph 7 thereof and thereby the case has been listed on 11.03.2025 and taken up for hearing afresh. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

29. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has again questioned the very validity of the arrest said to be not in consonance with the provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 since the grounds of - 19 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 arrest has not been supplied at the time of arrest of the petitioner in writing, rather, the grounds of arrest were for the first time supplied on 10.11.2024 along with the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent. Submission has been made that the stand of the respondent-ED that the ground of arrest was filed along with remand application is completely incorrect.

30. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the requirement of informing the person arrested the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement.

31. The order of remand said to be order dated 09.06.2024 has been challenged on the ground that the reason for arrest has not been communicated, which was required to be communicated in writing.

32. In support of her argument has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors., [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 : (2024) 7 SCC 576]; V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. [(2024) 3 SCC 51]; Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State ((NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine 934; Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement [2024 SC OnLine 1703] and in addition thereto the judgment rendered in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State of - 20 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 has also been relied upon.

33. On the factual aspect, submission has been made that there is no document/material available on record to implicate the petitioner for forging and manipulating the title deeds being Deed of Sale No. 4369 dated 11.10.1932 of the property in question in the office of Registrar of Assurances at Kolkata. Further, there is no material on record to show that the petitioner was involved in obtaining holding numbers by accused Pradeep Bagchi by submitting the forged documents. Furthermore, there is no material available on record to show, even remotely, that any proceeds of crime have been generated by the petitioner. It has been submitted that even if all the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the prosecution complaint are accepted at its face value and in their entirety and appreciated in their proper perspective in accordance with law settled by Hon'ble Apex Court the same do not make out any case defined under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the PML Act.

34. It has been contended that since the ground of arrest has not been provided and as such the very arrest is illegal. However, learned senior counsel did not deny the fact that the prayer of the writ petitioner has been confined only with respect to the order dated 09.06.2023, said to be the remand - 21 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 order as per the petitioner, but even accepting the same even then at the time of remand the ground of arrest has not been supplied since no document has been annexed with the order of remand. Therefore, the argument has been advanced that in absence of ground of arrest having not been available at the time of remand even if the prayer has been only with respect with respect to the issue of remand, there is no material change in the argument by raising the issue of impropriety committed by the investigating agency at the time of arrest said to be in consonance with Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002. It has been contended that since the ground of arrest has not been provided and as such the very arrest is illegal.

35. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner has also taken the ground of custody and submitted that the writ petitioner is in custody since 07.06.2023 i.e., for more than 22 months.

36. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner on the aforesaid ground has submitted that it is a fit case where the alleged order of remand dated 09.06.2023 is required to be quashed and set aside.

Argument on behalf respondent-ED

37. At the outset, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent-ED has submitted that the prayer of the writ - 22 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner having been confined only to the issue of remand, it is not available for the writ petitioner to question the order of arrest said to be not in consonance with the provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002. Therefore, even if argument has been advanced on behalf the petitioner and, on mis-conception, initially by the respondent-ED on the issue of arrest then also it is not proper for the writ Court, under power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to delve upon this issue which has been chosen by the petitioner not to press, as would be evident from order dated 4th October, 2024. Further, even the order of confinement dated 04.10.2024 has not been challenged by filing recall/review petition at any forum.

38. It has been submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 07.06.2023 and the grounds of arrest were duly communicated to the petitioner upon which he put his signature on each and every page, acknowledging the contents by endorsing that ‗I have read my ground of arrest completely an also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh'. Further, when the petitioner was produced before the Special Judge, PMLA on 08.06.2024, he did not complain regarding non- supply of grounds of arrest or about any ill-treatment against the arrest.

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39. The learned Special Judge has specifically recorded in order dated 08.06.2023 that the information of arrest has been given to their family members and even at the time of passing of order learned counsel for the petitioner, namely, Mr. Bidhyut Chourasia and Mr. Abhishek Agarwal were present in the Court and thereafter, the petitioner was sent to Birsa Munda Central Jail in judicial custody.

40. It has been contended that even the order of remand has not been challenged by the writ petitioner since the order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be the order of remand, cannot be said to be order of remand rather it is the order by which the police custody of the writ petitioner has been given for the purpose of interrogation.

41. It has been submitted that the actual order of remand is 08.06.2023 which was on the basis of application filed by the prosecuting agency, filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C, herein ED and based upon the said application the writ petitioner was remanded and send to the Birsa Munda Central Jail, Ranchi in judicial custody. Therefore, the order dated 08.06.2023 is the actual order of remand and order dated 09.06.2023 is the order by which the police custody of the present writ petitioner has been given to the investigating agency for the purpose of custodial interrogation. - 24 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

42. Further, it has been submitted that earlier the writ petitioner had moved before this Court by filing Bail Application being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, which was rejected vide order dated 01.03.2024, against which, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.05.2024.

43. The argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent-ED that admittedly the order of remand dated 08.06.2023 has not been challenged by the present petitioner at first instance which clarifies that the writ petitioner is not at all aggrieved with the order of remand reason being that when Bail Application of the writ petitioner being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023 was rejected vide order dated 01.03.2024, against which, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024, and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.05.2024, only thereafter the petitioner had moved before this Court and assailed the order of arrest /remand.

44. It has been argued by him that although the prayer of the present writ petition has been confined only to the issue of remand order dated 09.06.2023 but argument has been advanced showing the arrest of the writ petitioner to be improper and as such for the purpose of meting out the - 25 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 ground the argument has been advanced that at the time when the writ petitioner was arrested i.e., on 07.06.2023 the prosecuting agency was to follow the statutory command as provided under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 and on the date of arrest only oral information of ground of arrest was to be given to the accused persons as mandated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002.

45. Learned counsel referring the order dated 04.10.2024 has submitted that once the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has conceded by confining the prayer questioning the order of remand dated 09.06.2023 only and therefore, the question which requires consideration is only the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be order of remand by the writ petitioner.

46. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent-ED has further submitted that due to inadvertence order dated 04.10.2024 could not be pointed out at the relevant stage, however, when the matter was heard on 28.01.2025, the respondent-ED has filed supplementary affidavit and brought to the notice of this Court regarding confinement of prayer in order dated 4th October, 2024. Therefore, submission has been made that the matter is to be adjudicated only on the issue of propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be remand order by the writ petitioner. - 26 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

47. Argument has been advanced that the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court that pertains to issue of arrest but herein the question which requires consideration by this Court is the propriety/impropriety of the order dated 09.06.2023.

48. So far as the fact of said Pankaj Bansal case, as relied upon the petitioner, is concerned, it is quite different since it would be evident from paragraph 21 of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal therein it has been referred that even the procedure which was required to be followed, as provided under the original text of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002, has not been followed. Therefore, the order of remand has been quashed and set aside holding the arrest to be illegal.

49. But, herein in the instant case, that is not the fact rather the correct fact is that the grounds of arrest has been supplied to the petitioner which has been read over by him and not only that he has also endorsed therein that he has gone through the entire content and has shown no complain/objection regarding the same.

50. So far as the period of custody as agitated by learned senior counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it has been submitted that in the matter of challenge of arrest/remand the ground of custody is of no aid to the petitioner. - 27 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

51. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for showing interference in order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be order of remand by the writ petitioner.

Analysis

52. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the argument advanced on behalf of parties and the pleadings available on record as also the documents appended therewith and the judgments relied upon by the parties and other materials available on record.

53. This Court, after having heard learned counsel for the parties, is of the view that for proper adjudication of the lis following issues are required to be answered:

I.Whether after confinement order dated 04.10.2024, on the basis of prayer made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to the effect that ‗he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only, the writ petitioner can be allowed to agitate the issue of propriety/impropriety of order of arrest and if it is agitated/argued/pleaded by the petitioner later on, is it proper for this Court to delve into that issue?

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II.Whether in view of confinement of prayer the writ petition is required to be considered only with respect to the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, which as per the petitioner is said to be the order of remand, on the ground that the grounds for arrest has not been supplied to the petitioner?

III.Whether the petitioner has been able to make out a case for showing interference in order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be order of remand by the petitioner?

54. This Court is framing these issues since learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has argued the matter on the prayer which has once been confined by the petitioner, and as such this Court has formulated these issues as to whether this issue can be allowed to be agitated when the prayer of the writ petition has been confined with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 only, which would be evident from order dated 4.10.2024 passed by this Court, and it needs to refer herein that order dated 4.10.2024 is still operative reason being that the same has not been questioned by filing any review/recall petition or challenging in higher forum rather the said order dated 04.10.2024 is admitted one.

55. For the sake of convenience, this Court is taking up issue no. I first and independently.

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56. Originally, the writ petition was filed for the following relief(s):

(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-

(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA cannot be exercised without issuing summon under Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of persons under Section 18;

(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;

(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must record the reasons why the authorised person considers necessary the attendance of the person to whom Summons are issued.

(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023 - 30 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 , 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;

(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022];

(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending learned Court of Sri Yogesh Kumar, Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum-Special Judge, CBI-cumSpecial Judge under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

57. In course of argument on 04.10.2024, Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner, who has appeared through virtual mode, has confined the prayer of the writ petition only with respect to the issue of propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be remand order, as would which is evident from order dated 04.10.2024, as quoted and referred hereinabove. - 31 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 However, at the cost of repetition, the relevant portion of the order dated 04.10.2024 is quoted hereunder as:

However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.

58. Admittedly, the said order i.e., order dated 04.10.2024 has never been questioned by the writ petitioner and even no application has been filed for recall/review of the said order. It is further evident that the fact about confinement of prayer has rather been admitted, as would be evident from order dated 28.01.2025 whereby and whereunder the learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted the issue of confinement of prayer of the writ petition, and has sought for time to file affidavit.

59. Even the writ petitioner has approached to the Hon'ble Court by filing SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 challenging order dated 28.01.2025 but in the said SLP, it is no issue having been raised questioning order dated 04.10.2024. The said SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 stands disposed of vide order dated 3rd March, 2025 and as per observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 7 of the said order, as quoted hereinabove, the matter has been listed before this Bench.

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60. It requires to refer herein that the supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of writ petitioner in pursuance to order dated 28.01.2025 wherein about confinement of prayer, as per order dated 04.10.2024, has not been disputed but merely because the Court has heard the matter and as such the plea is being taken that the matter is to be heard on the basis of original prayer made in the writ petition that the validity of Section 19(1), the issue of arrest, and order dated 09.06.2023.

61. Further, when the prayer after having been confined by the writ petitioner only to the order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be the order of remand, then this Court has called upon the ED to file affidavit only on the prayer of confinement i.e., the order dated 09.06.2023 but the counter affidavit has been filed by the ED on the issue of arrest also and when this Court has posted the matter on 28.01.2025, it has been admitted by Mr. Das the learned counsel for the ED that it was due to misconception and thereafter he has sought for time to file affidavit in response to the affidavit which has been sought to be filed on behalf of writ petitioner.

62. Accordingly, affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent-ED stating that in spite of the writ petitioner has confined his prayer for quashing of order dated 09.06.2023 only but even then, the argument has been made by the writ - 33 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner by assailing the order of arrest dated 07.06.2023. The statement of the said affidavit has not been denied by filing affidavit by the writ petitioner.

63. Thus, the question arises that when the litigant has approached to the Court and the learned counsel representing such litigant concerned has made submission at Bar by confining the prayer and the same has been taken note by the Court in judicial order, as would be evident from order dated 04.10.2024, but without filing any recall/review petition to that order can it be permissible for the writ petitioner to deal with that prayer merely because the Court has heard the issues, and the Court is duty bound to answer all the issues ignoring the confinement of prayer made by the writ petitioner.

64. In the aforesaid context this Court is of the view that it is the learned counsel of litigant who is to place the case considering the interest of the litigant based upon instruction of the litigant concerned. The Court merely because has heard the matter, the litigant concerned cannot be allowed to dictate the Court to consider contrary to the pleadings and moreover once prayer has been confined, limiting it to the issue of alleged remand dated 09.06.2023 without having order of recall/review of the order dated 04.10.2024 by which - 34 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 prayer has been confined, it would not be proper to delve into the confined prayer.

65. It is bounden duty of the litigant concerned in approaching the Court of law particularly exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with clean hand and to bring all the facts to the notice of the Court. It cannot be acceptable that if anything has been recorded in the order being part of the record and if the Court has heard the litigant concerned even with respect to the other issues prior to the confinement of prayer it will not be proper for the Court to consider the entire issue contrary to the intention shown by the litigant concerned by confining the prayer.

66. It is settled principle of law that the writ jurisdiction is totally based upon the principle of pleading and once the pleading has been made and subsequent thereto confined, the Court will go on the premise of confinement limiting the pleading to the aforesaid extent.

67. Further it needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Bali v. State of U.P., (2004) 10 SCC 598 at paragraph 9 of the said judgment, has held that where the High Court has specifically recorded to the effect that only two points were urged before it, in order to ascertain as to what transpired in the Court, the record in the - 35 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 judgment of the Court should be taken as a conclusive proof and no one should be allowed to contradict such statement on an affidavit or by other evidence. It was further held that if a party wanted to take a stand that what was recorded was erroneous, the party should approach the concerned Court for making any rectification and it is not open to the party to contend contrary to what has been recorded before the Court, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

9. We notice that the High Court specifically records that only two points were urged before it. It has to be noted that the statement of as to what transpired at the hearing, the record in the judgment of the Court are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statement on affidavit or by other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been erroneously recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges who have made the record, to make necessary rectification. That is the only way to have the record corrected. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. [See State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 478] , Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111] and Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani [(2003) 6 SCC 595] .]

68. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, again reiterated at paragraph No.11 that it is not open to a party - 36 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to turn around and take a plea that no concession was given, which would amount to a case of sitting on the fence, which should not be encouraged and if really there was no concession, the only course open to the party was to move the concerned Court and not by approaching the appellate court.

69. Thus, in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law merely because the Court has heard the issue, which has been once confined and judicial order to that effect has been recorded in black and white vide order dated 04.10.2024 and even later on it is not being contradicted by the litigant concerned also and further it has never been challenged by filing review/recall petition before this Court, in such circumstance, this Court is of the view that if the Court has heard the litigant concerned on misconception having not been pointed out about order dated 04.10.2024 it does not mean that the Court will ignore the order already on record i.e., order dated 04.10.2024. Furthermore, there is no statement that any endeavor has been taken for recall/review of the said order.

70. It further needs to refer herein that it was the bounden duty of the litigant concerned either it is writ petitioner or the respondent-ED to point out about order dated 04.10.2024 and if that has not been pointed out and the - 37 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Court has heard the matter it does not mean that ignoring the said order which is already on record and still in subsistence, the said issue is to be delve upon.

71. Further question is that if the contention of the writ petitioner will be accepted then what would happen to order dated 04.10.2024 which is still in operative and hearing the entire prayer of the writ petition on cost of ignoring the said order dated 4.10.2024, will it be improper on the part of the Court.

72. It is evident that in pursuance to order dated 28.01.2025, due affidavits have been filed by the parties and order dated 04.10.2024 having not been assailed or recalled/reviewed, as such in course of such subsistence of the said order it would not be appropriate for this Court to open the issue to consider the argument advanced on behalf of petitioner or pleading available on record, who still insists upon the order of arrest due to non-compliance of the statutory provision as contained under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002.

73. It further appears that the petitioner approached to the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition being S.L.P. (Cr.) No. 2912 of 2025 to challenge order dated 28.01.2025 but therein also no such plea has been taken questioning the order of confinement dated 04.10.2024 - 38 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 that is self-explanatory if the order passed by Hon'ble Apex Court will be taken into consideration as quoted and referred hereinabove.

74. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such a situation of confinement of prayer, this Court if will consider the issue of arrest, then the question will be that what will happen to the order dated 04.10.2024.

75. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since the prayer has been confined only with respect to order 09.06.2023, said to be order of remand by the petitioner, in view of order dated 04.10.2024 confining the prayer leaving the prayer of arrest by not challenging the same, the same cannot be delve upon by this Court.

76. Learned senior counsel has relied upon the catena of judgments rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court, as referred above, mainly to strength her argument on the issue of arrest order dated 07.06.2023, but that is not the issue herein reason being that prayer of the writ petition has been confined and extent limited to the order dated 09.06.2023 only.

77. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid judgments are with respect to the issue of arrest and at that time the requirement as stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 has been held to be mandatorily complied with. - 39 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 But since the issue of arrest has not been intended to be challenged by confining the prayer only with respect to the order of remand said to be passed as per the petitioner on 09.06.2023, hence, there is no requirement of delving upon the said judgment with respect to its applicability in view of subsistence of order dated 04.10.2024.

78. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the writ petition since has been confined and as such it would not be proper to delve upon the issue of arrest, therefore, judgment upon which reliance has been placed is not applicable. Therefore, issue of arrest is not being dealt with herein.

79. In view of discussions made hereinabove, the issue no. I is decided against the writ petitioner taking into consideration that after confinement of prayer by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner limited to the order dated 09.06.2023, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to agitate the issue of propriety/impropriety of order of arrest dated 07.06.2023 and in light of confinement of prayer which would be evident from order dated 04.10.2024 passed by this Court and the said order still in existence as such it will not be proper for this Court to delve into the validity of order of arrest dated 07.06.2023.

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80. Since Issue No. II and Issue No. III are interlinked, as such they are taken up together.

81. Admittedly, in course of argument, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner has confined the prayer only to the issue of remand considering the remand order to be passed on 09.06.2023, as would be evident from order dated 04.10.2024.

82. We have already referred herein clarifying the reason for posting this matter again for hearing the matter under the heading for Admission since the argument has been advanced in entirety on all the prayers, without considering the confinement of prayer only to the extent of order of remand said to be passed on 09.06.2023.

83. The argument has been advanced by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that even if the prayer made by the writ petitioner has been confined only to the extent of order of remand said to be passed on 09.06.2023, there will be no material change since the issue of impropriety committed by the investigating agency at the time of arrest is said to be not in consonance with Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 is still existing.

84. This Court is not in agreement with such submission reason being that the arrest is something different to that of the remand and the remand is the consequence upon the - 41 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 order of arrest of a person facing the accusation. Specific provision has been made under the PML Act, 2002 to be followed at the time of arrest i.e., the ground of arrest is to be informed to the person facing the accusation as soon as possible that is the original text of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002. For ready reference, Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 is quoted as under:

"19. Power to arrest.

(1)If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (that reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.‖

85. The issue of PML Act regarding its validity fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra) wherein also the validity of Section 19(1) has been held to be intra-virus meaning thereby whatever has been stipulated under the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002, the same has been held to be valid in the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court [Larger Bench] rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra).

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86. Further it needs to refer herein the judgment which has come in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. (supra) has been passed on 07.08.2023 wherein consideration has been given with respect to the issue of Section 19(1) holding therein that after firming a reason to believe that the person has been found guilty of an offence punishable under PMLA, 2002 the officer concerned is at liberty to arrest him, while performing his mandatory duty of recording the reasons, and that the said exercise has to be followed by way of an information being served on the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.

87. However, subsequent thereto the issue crept up by taking note of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India as to whether the arrest can be well without being giving any information in writing to the person facing the accusation. That was the issue involved in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra). The fact leading to the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) in narrow compass is being referred herein, which reads as under:

(i) A FIR No. 0006 dated 17-4-2023 was registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Panchkula, Haryana, under Sections 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 120-BIPC for the offences of - 43 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 corruption and bribery along with criminal conspiracy.

(ii) Significantly, prior to this FIR, between the years 2018 and 2020, 13 FIRs were gotten registered by allottees of two residential projects of the IREO Group, alleging illegalities on the part of its management. On the strength of these FIRs, ED recorded Enforcement Case Information Report No. GNZO/10/2021 dated 15-6-2021 (hereinafter ―the first ECIR‖) in connection with the money laundering offences but neither in the FIRs nor in the first ECIR the appellants arrayed as the accused. On 14-1-2022, ED filed Prosecution Complaint No. 01/2022. The number of FIRs had also increased from 13 to 30, as per this complaint.

(iii) The appellant case was numbered as COMA/01/2022, titled ―Enforcement Directorate v. Lalit Goyal and others‖, and at that stage, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Panchkula, received information that the owner of IREO Group, and also to Roop Bansal and his brother, Basant Bansal, the owners of M3M Group has been helped by the court concerned. This led to the registration of FIR No. 0006 dated 17-4-2023. On 12-5-2023, ED issued summons to M3M India Pvt. Ltd., calling upon it to provide information and documents pertaining to transactions with certain companies. Thereafter, on 1-6-

2023, ED raided the properties of M3M Group and effected seizures of assets and bank accounts. Roop - 44 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Bansal was arrested by ED on 8-6-2023 apropos the first ECIR.

(iv) Apprehending that action would be taken against them also in the context of the first ECIR, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal secured interim protection from the Delhi High Court in Bail Applications Nos. 2030 and 2031 of 2023 subject to conditions, till the next date of hearing i.e. 5-7-2023. In the meanwhile, on the basis of FIR No. 0006 dated 17-4-2023, ED recorded another ECIR viz. ECIR/GNZO/17/2023, on 13-6-2023 (hereinafter ―the second ECIR‖) against accused persons.

(v) However, summons were issued by ED to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal on 13-6-2023 and required their compliance with the summons on 14-6-2023 at 11 a.m. While Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal were at the office of ED at Rajokri, New Delhi, in compliance of these summons, Pankaj Bansal was served with fresh summons at 4.52 p.m. on 14-6-2023, requiring him to be present before another investigating officer at 5.00 p.m. on the same day. This summon was in connection with the second ECIR. There is lack of clarity as to when summons in relation to the second ECIR were served on Basant Bansal. According to ED, he was served the summons on 13-6-2023 itself and refused to receive the same. However, it is an admitted fact that Basant Bansal was - 45 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 also present at ED's office at Rajokri, New Delhi, on 14-6- 2023 at 11.00 a.m. It is also not in dispute that, while he was there, Basant Bansal was arrested at 6.00 p.m. on 14-6-2023 and Pankaj Bansal was arrested at 10.30 p.m. on the same day.

(vi) These arrests, made in connection with the second ECIR, were in exercise of power under Section 19(1) PMLA. The arrested persons were then taken to Panchkula, Haryana, and produced before the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula. There, they were served with the remand application filed by ED.

(vii) The learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, initially passed order dated 15-6-2023 holding that custodial interrogation of the arrested persons was required and granted their custody to ED for 5 days with a direction to produce them before the court on 20-6- 2023. By the later orders dated 20-6-2023 and 26-6- 2023, their remand to the custody of ED was extended by 5 more days and thereafter, they were sent to judicial custody.

(viii) Assailing the first remand order dated 15-6-2023, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal approached the Delhi High Court, vide WPs (Crl.) Nos. 1770 and 1771 of 2023. However, by the order dated 16-6-2023 the Delhi High Court opined that the appropriate remedy for them would - 46 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 be to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court and challenge the said order of remand. Aggrieved by the Delhi High Court's order, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal filed SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 7443 and 7444 of 2023 before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The SLPs were disposed of as withdrawn on 4-7-2023 reserving liberty to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court against the remand orders. Thereupon, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal filed the subject writ petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

(ix) It was the specific case of the father and son in their writ petitions before the High Court that their arrest under the provisions of PMLA was a wanton abuse of power/authority and an abuse of process by ED, apart from being blatantly illegal and unconstitutional. They also asserted that ED acted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 19 PMLA. They asserted that the remand orders were passed in a patently routine and mechanical manner without due compliance with the mandate of Section 19 PMLA. In consequence, they prayed for a direction to quash the remand orders as well as the underlying arrest orders and arrest memos, but the said writ petitions came to be dismissed, vide the impugned orders of the Division Bench, thereafter SLP has been preferred before the Hon'ble Apex Court. - 47 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

88. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking note of the aforesaid facts has observed as under:

21. In terms of Section 19(3) PMLA and the law laid down in the above decisions, Section 167CrPC would necessarily have to be complied with once an arrest is made under Section 19 PMLA.

The court seized of the exercise under Section 167CrPC of remanding the person arrested by ED under Section 19(1) PMLA has a duty to verify and ensure that the conditions in Section 19 are duly satisfied and that the arrest is valid and lawful. In the event the court fails to discharge this duty in right earnest and with the proper perspective, as pointed out hereinbefore, the order of remand would have to fail on that ground and the same cannot, by any stretch of imagination, validate an unlawful arrest made under Section 19 PMLA.

23. Viewed in this context, the remand order dated 15-6-2023 passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, reflects total failure on his part in discharging his duty as per the expected standard. The learned Judge did not even record a finding that he perused the grounds of arrest to ascertain whether ED had recorded reasons to believe that the appellants were guilty of an offence under the 2002 Act and that there was proper compliance with the mandate of Section 19 PMLA. He merely stated that, keeping in view the seriousness of the offences and the stage of the investigation, he was convinced that custodial interrogation of the accused persons was required in the present case and remanded them to the custody of ED! The sentence -- ―It is further (sic) that all the necessary mandates of law have been complied with‖ follows -- ―It is the case of the prosecution....‖ and appears to be a continuation thereof, as indicated by the word ―further‖, and is not a recording by the learned Judge of his own satisfaction to that effect.

89. Further this Court has gone through paragraph 42 and 39 of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) and from paragraph 42 - 48 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 of the said judgment that the ED however has claimed that the witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non-compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 :

(2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]. For ready reference, paragraph 42 is quoted as under:

"42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorised officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non- compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] . Such a precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person under - 49 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorised officer.‖

90. Thereafter, paragraph 39 is also required to be seen wherein it has been held by taking into consideration the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 that too give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, it has been held that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the particular case of said Pankaj Bansal has considered the admitted position that the investigating officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants and hence, it has been held that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA, 2002. Accordingly, the appeals before the Hon'ble Apex Court were allowed, setting aside the impugned orders passed by High Court as well as the impugned arrest orders and arrest memos along with the orders of remand passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, and all orders consequential thereto. Accordingly, the appellants were directed to be released forthwith.

- 50 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

91. Further, for ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment i.e.45 to 47 are quoted as under:

45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi [Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12108] and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal [Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9938 : (2017) 1 AIR Bom R (Cri) 929] , which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that ED's investigating officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) PMLA, we have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA. Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of ED in proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.

46.The appeals are accordingly allowed, setting aside the impugned orders [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 2045] , [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 2028] passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court as well as the impugned - 51 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 arrest orders and arrest memos along with the orders of remand passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, and all orders consequential thereto.

47. The appellants shall be released forthwith unless their incarceration is validly required in connection with any other case.‖

92. We are referring these judgments in order to appreciate the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, who has relied upon these judgments in order to consider the requirement which is to be fulfilled at the stage of Section 19(1) of PMLA, 2002 and the remand can be said to be equal that too when the issue of arrest has been declined to be challenged by confining the prayer to challenge only the issue of remand, as would be evident from order dated 04.10.2024 as also the applicability of these judgments on the available facts of the present petition.

93. Subsequent thereto the judgment has come in the case of Ram Kishor Arora Vs. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682 wherein while considering the judgment passed in the case of Pankaj Bansal, (supra) the argument has been advanced on behalf of litigant concerned to apply the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal retrospectively has been disagreed to on the ground of reference of specific word in the case of Pankaj Bansal ‗henceforth'. For ready reference, paragraph 21 to 23 of the said judgment is quoted as under:

- 52 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

21. In view of the above, the expression ―as soon as may be‖ contained in Section 19 PMLA is required to be construed as

-- ―as early as possible without avoidable delay‖ or ―within reasonably convenient‖ or ―reasonably requisite‖ period of time. Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast upon the officer concerned to forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession to the adjudicating authority immediately after the arrest of the person, and to take the person arrested to the court concerned within 24 hours of the arrest, in our opinion, the reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would be twenty-four hours of the arrest.

22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] , it has been categorically held that so long as the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance with mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering.

Therefore, in our opinion the person arrested, if he is informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e. as early as possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] also noticing the inconsistent practice being followed by the officers arresting the persons under Section 19 PMLA, directed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing as a - 53 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 matter of course, ―henceforth‖, meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of the word ―henceforth‖ implied that the said requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said judgment. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi for the appellant that the said judgment was required to be given effect retrospectively cannot be accepted when the judgment itself states that it would be necessary ―henceforth‖ that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. Hence, non- furnishing of grounds of arrest in writing till the date of pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] could neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the officer concerned in not furnishing the same in writing could be faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] .

24. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the appellant was handed over the document containing grounds of arrest when he was arrested, and he also put his signature below the said grounds of arrest, after making an endorsement that ―I have been informed and have also read the abovementioned grounds of arrest.‖ The appellant in the rejoinder filed by him has neither disputed the said endorsement nor his signature below the said endorsement. The only contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi is that he was not furnished a copy of the document containing the grounds of arrest at the time of arrest. Since the appellant was indisputably informed about the grounds of arrest and he having also put his signature and the endorsement on the said document of having been informed, we hold that there - 54 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 was due compliance of the provisions contained in Section 19 PMLA and his arrest could neither be said to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

94. So far as the factual aspect of Ram Kishor Arora Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra) is concerned, it has been held therein that the arrest was made pre-Pankaj Bansal Judgment and as such the arrest of said Ram Kishor Arora has been declined to be interfered with.

95. Thereafter the judgment has come in the case of Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra). So far as the fact of the said case is concerned the officers of PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi carried out extensive raids at the residential and official premises of the appellant and the company, of which the appellant is the Director in connection with FIR No. 224 of 2023 dated 17-8-2023 registered at PS Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi for the offences punishable under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22-C of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with Sections 153-A, 120-B of the Penal Code.

96. The appellant was arrested in connection with the said FIR on 3-10-2023 vide arrest memo. Thereafter, the appellant was presented in the court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-02, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi on 4-10-2023, sometime before 6.00 a.m. which fact is manifested from the - 55 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 remand order and the appellant was remanded to seven days' police custody vide order dated 4-10-2023. The proceedings of remand have been seriously criticised as being manipulated by Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and aspersions of subsequent insertions in the remand order have been made.

97. The appellant promptly questioned his arrest and the police custody remand granted by the learned Remand Judge vide order dated 4-10-2023 by preferring Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7278 of 2023 in the High Court of Delhi which stands rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi vide judgment dated 13-10-2023. The said order is subjected to challenge by special leave before the Hon'ble Apex Court.

98. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken into consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra). The arrest of the said appellant was on 03.10.2023 but the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) has been uploaded on 04.10.2023 and as such the ground was taken not to give any aid of judgment passed in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) even though the written communication regarding the ground of arrest of the appellant has not been furnished but - 56 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 the Hon'ble Apex Court has passed the order that merely because the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) has been uploaded on 04.10.2023 but the said Prabir Purkayastha was arrested on 04.10.2023 while the judgment passed in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) was delivered on 03.10.2023 and as such the case of Prabir Purkayastha has come within the ratio of judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) and since the written communication was not there, hence, he was directed to be released on bail. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.

30. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1) have already been interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] laying down beyond the pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the person arrested of an offence at the earliest. Hence, the fervent plea of the learned ASG that there was no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant-accused is noted - 57 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to be rejected.

99. Again, in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra) the view has been taken for communication of reason of arrest and it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the written ―grounds of arrest‖, though a must, does not in itself satisfy the compliance requirement. The authorized officer's genuine belief and reasoning based on the evidence that establishes the arrestee's guilt is also the legal necessity. As the ―reasons to believe‖ are accorded by the authorised officer, the onus to establish satisfaction of the said condition will be on the DoE and not on the arrestee. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) which is a decision rendered by a three Judge Bench, after formulating the questions of law, has referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:

11. Arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act may occur prior to the filing of the prosecution complaint and before the Special Judge takes cognizance. Till the prosecution complaint is filed, there is no requirement to provide the accused with a copy of the ECIR. The ECIR is not a public document. Thus, to introduce checks and balances, Section 19(1) imposes safeguards to protect the rights and liberty of the arrestee. This is in compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

- 58 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

12. V. Senthil Balaji v. State similarly states that the designated officer can only arrest once they record ―reasons to believe‖ in writing, that the person being arrested is guilty of the offence punishable under the PML Act. It is mandatory to record the ―reasons to believe‖ to arrive at the opinion that the arrestee is guilty of the offence, and to furnish the reasons to the arrestee. This ensures an element of fairness and accountability.

16. Recently, in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court reiterated the aforesaid principles expounded in Pankaj Bansal (supra). The said principles were applied to the pari materia provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Court explained that Section 19(1) of the PML Act is meant to serve a higher purpose, and also to enforce the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The right to life and personal liberty is sacrosanct, a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 and protected by Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution.

Reference was made to the observations of this Court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala that the right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution and any infringement of this fundamental right vitiates the process of arrest and remand. The fact that the chargesheet has been filed in the matter would not validate the otherwise illegality and unconstitutionality committed at the time of arrest and grant of remand custody of the accused. Reference is also made to the principle behind Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Thus, this Court held that not complying with the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate of the UAPA, on the requirement to communicate grounds of arrest or grounds of detention, would lead to the custody or detention being rendered illegal.

28. Providing the written ―grounds of arrest‖, though a must, does not in itself satisfy the compliance requirement. The authorized officer's genuine belief and reasoning based on the evidence that establishes the arrestee's guilt is also the - 59 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 legal necessity. As the ―reasons to believe‖ are accorded by the authorised officer, the onus to establish satisfaction of the said condition will be on the DoE and not on the arrestee.

100. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of V. Senthil Balaji v. Director, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626 has again considered the issue of Section 19(1) of the Act 2002. The factual aspect of the case is like that between 2011 and 2016, the appellant was holding the post of Transport Minister in the Government of Tamil Nadu. Broadly, the allegation against the appellant is that while discharging his duties as a Minister, in connivance with his personal assistant and his brother, he collected large amounts by promising job opportunities to several persons in various positions in the Transport Department. This led to the registering of three First Information Reports against the appellant and others. The said First Information Reports are FIR no. 441 of 2015 dated 29th October 2015 (CC Nos. 22 and 24 of 2021), FIR No. 298 of 2017 registered on 9th September 2017 (CC No. 19 of 2020) and FIR no. 344 dated 13th August 2018 (CC No. 25 of 2020).

101. In the first FIR, six charge sheets have been filed. More than 2000 accused have been named in the charge sheets. 550 witnesses have been named. In the case of the second FIR, there are 14 accused named in the chargesheet. In connection with this FIR, 24 witnesses have been cited. In the - 60 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 third FIR, 24 accused have been named in the charge sheet and 50 prosecution witnesses have been cited. The offences alleged in the aforementioned crimes are mainly under Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 has been invoked.

102. These offences are scheduled offences within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the PMLA. Therefore, relying on the final reports filed in aforementioned scheduled offences, for an offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA punishable under Section 4, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (for short ―ECIR‖) bearing ECIR No. MDSZO/21/2021 on 29th July 2021.

103. Consequently, the appellant was arrested on 14th June 2023 in connection with the said ECIR and was remanded to judicial custody. A complaint was filed for the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA Act, which is punishable under Section 4, on 12th August 2023. The appellant is the only accused named in the complaint. Cognizance has been taken based on the complaint by the Special Court under the PMLA. The scheduled offences cases have been transferred to the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Additional Special Court for Trial of - 61 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Criminal Cases related to Elected Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu (Special MPMLA Court), Chennai.

104. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking note of the settled principle that the stringent provisions regarding the grant of bail, such as Section 45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, cannot become a tool which can be used to incarcerate the accused without trial for an unreasonably long time has allowed the appeal and direction has been passed that the appellant shall be enlarged on bail till the final disposal of the case.

105. Consequent to the aforesaid judgments recently the Hon'ble Apex Court has expressed its view in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (supra) wherein the judgment and order dated 30th August 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court has been assailed. The appellant of the said case was arrested in connection with first information report no. 121 of 2023 dated 25th March 2023 registered for the offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120- B of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‗IPC'). According to the appellant's case, he was arrested on 10th June 2024 at about 10.30 a.m. at his office premises on the 3rd-5th floor of HUDA City Centre, Gurugram, Haryana. He was taken to DLF Police Station, Section 29, Gurugram. He was produced before the - 62 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 learned Judicial Magistrate (in charge) at Gurgaon on 11th June 2024 at 3.30 p.m.

106. It had been contended that there was a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‗CrPC'). The allegation is that neither in the remand report nor in the order dated 11th June 2024 passed by the learned Magistrate was the time of arrest mentioned. The FIR was registered at the instance of the 2nd respondent.

107. Further, in the aforesaid case a vital issue was emerged when the learned counsel appearing for the appellant produced photographs which showed that while he was admitted to the hospital, he was handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed. Therefore, a notice was issued on 4th October 2024 to the Medical Superintendent of PGIMS, calling upon him to file an affidavit stating whether the appellant was handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed. The order dated 21st October 2024 records the admission of the Medical Superintendent of PGIMS that when the appellant was admitted to the hospital, he was handcuffed and chained to the bed.

108. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking in to consideration the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution of India has held that the requirement of informing the person arrested of - 63 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed as under:

15. We have already referred to what is held in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1. This Court has suggested that the proper and ideal course of communicating the grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of arrest in writing. Obviously, before a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in writing. Although there is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, what is stated in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1 are suggestions that merit consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy about the non-compliance will not arise at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person arrested with the interests of the society. Therefore, the police should always scrupulously comply with the requirements of Article 22.

109. It is, thus, evident that in all these judgments the issue at the time of arrest was the primary factor, which was questioned before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the same has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in those judgments.

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110. The applicability of these judgments in the touchstone of remand order dated 09.06.2023 is now being considered by this Court by delving upon the factual aspect involved in the present case.

111. Herein the undisputed fact is that the writ petitioner was arrested on 07.06.2023 where the grounds of arrest was handed over to the petitioner, upon which he put his signature. For ready reference, the ‗Grounds of Arrest' dated 07.06.2023, is quoted as under:

"Grounds of arrest of Amit Kumar Agarwal, S/o Vijay Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh, S/o Nitya Gopal Ghosh, under section 19 of PMLA, 2002 in ECIR/RNZO/18/2022.

1. Brief facts of the case-

1.1 An ECIR No RNZO/18/2022 was recorded on 21.10.2022 based on FIR No. 141 of 2022 dat1ed 04.06.2022, registered by the Bariatu Police Station, Ranchi under section 420, 467 and 471 of IPC against one Pradip Bagchi, Resident of ward no. 21, Lotus Garden Complex Block B, PS Bariatu, Dist. Ranchi based on a complaint of Shri Dilip Sharma, Tax Collector, Ranchi Municipal Corporation. The complainant stated that the said Pradip Bagchi submitted forged papers i.e., Aadhaar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession Letter for obtaining the holding number 0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A5. The abovesaid holding numbers were verified by him and it was found that the Pradip Bagchi has submitted forged and fictitious documents to obtain the holding numbers.

1.2 Since offences under sections 420, 467 and 471 of IPC are scheduled offences under Part A of Schedule of PMLA, 2002 and the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002 which is punishable under section 4 of PMLA, appeared to have been made out, an ECIR bearing No. RNZO/18/2022 was therefore recorded on 21.10.2022 and Investigation under the - 65 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was initiated.

1.3 Investigation revealed that the above stated two holding Nos. 0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A were obtained for property plot no. MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, ward no. 21/19, having an area of 455.00 decimals at Ranchi. It also revealed that the above stated property was later sold by the said Pradeep Bagchi (Aadhaar no. 511337882315, PAN AMBPB1317J) to one company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd (PAN AABCJ3705F, represented by Its Director Dilip Kumar Ghosh having Aadhaar no. 912605787465). This deed for acquiring the property in possession of defence was_executed on 1st October, 2021 and the consideration amount of the property was shown as Rs. 7 crores, the government value/Market Value of the said property as declared in deed was Rs. 20,75,84,200/-. The accused Dilip Ghosh representing M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd paid purported amount of 7 crores by issueing 11 cheques of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 to Pradeep Bagchi to purchase the property in possession of defence. 1.4 On the scrutiny of the bank account statement of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 of M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., it reveals that only one payment amounting to Rs 25,00,000/- was made into the account of Pradip Bagchi by HDFC Cheque No. 461153 and rest of the money was falsely shown to be paid in the deed no. 6888 of 2021 through above sald cheques. Although no further payments were done, the purchasers and sellers mentioned In the sale deed that - "यह भी विवित हो वि प्रवतफल िी िुल रावि मोिवलग 7,00,00, 000/- (सात िरोड़ रूपया) मात्र प्राप्त विये है । विसिी प्राप्तप्त विक्रेता स्वीिार ि समपुष्ट िरते हैं । अब विक्रय संपवि िे मूल्य में विसी भी प्रिार िी प्राप्तप्त विक्रेता िो खरीिार से िेष नहीं रहा ।"

Thus, it is evident that the declaration of payment of full amount of Rs 7 crores by the purchaser and its receipt by the seller was deliberate, thoughtful and planned to give a legitimate appearance to the bogus transactions recorded in the sale deed for acquiring the above property in order to project the acquisition of proceeds of crime in the form of landed property as an untainted property. - 66 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Scrutiny of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 has revealed that during the period from 16.10.2020 to 25.07.2022, an amount of Rs 4,69,80,000/- has been deposited in cash and out of which Rs 4,13,87,000/- is transferred to Rajesh Auto Merchandise Pvt. Ltd.

Dilip Ghosh, the director and accomplice of Amit Kumar Agarwal has its office at FMI House, F3, Block GP, Sector-V, P.S Bidhannagar, Kolkata, West Bengal - 700091 which is the office premises of Amit Agarwal and his companies. 1.5 Statement of Bikash Jana and Dilip Shah, the person depositing cash in the above said bank account was recorded under section 50 of PMLA, 2002. It revealed that they are the employees of Amit Kumar Agarwal. Thus, the above facts and the sequence of the cash deposits in the above bank account of M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estite's Pvt. Ltd shows that Amit Agarwal is the beneficial owner of the company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd and subsequent transfers of the cash deposits into the bank account of M/s Aurora Studio Pvt. Ltd & M/s Rajesh Auto Merchandise Pvt. Ltd testifies that M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd is just a front company of Amit Kumar Agarwal and the company is an instrument for acquiring and laundering his proceeds of crime and Dilip Kumar Ghosh is his associate. 1.6 Investigation has revealed that accused persons namely Afshar Ali, Pradip Bagchi and his accomplices prepared fake deed of the above mentioned Morabadi property of 4.55 acres from the office of the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata in name of Prafulla Bagchi F/o Pradip Bagchi. It was projected that his father Prafulla Bagchi had given the land orally to the Army and as on day Pradeep Bagchi Is the rightful claimant of the property. These persons contacted one Prem Prakash. Prem Prakash, Chhavi Ranjan, the Ex-DC Ranchi, Dilip Ghosh and Arnit Kumar Agarwal hatched conspiracy to acquire property in name of accused company Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. In connivance with Prem Prakash and Amit Kumar Agarwal, Mr. Chavi Ranjan influenced the officials of Circle office and District Sub Registrar, Ranchi and managed to procure favorable report for Pradeep Bagchi and the property was subsequently acquired in a - 67 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 dishonest manner in the name of Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. The property worth several crores of rupees was acquired by paying only Rs 25 lakhs commission.

2. Investigation reveals that the company M/s. Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. has no such business which can justify such huge deposits in its account.

3. Investigation has revealed that Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh both are the part of conspiracy to acquire the land in possession of defence. Amit Kumar Agarwal Is the beneficial owner of the company M/s Jagatbandhu tea Estates Pvt. Ltd and he is actually involved in the activity connected with acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property measuring 4.55 acres (455 decimals) at MS Plot no. 557, Mauja Morabadi on strength of fake deed prepared by the accused persons earlier arrested by this office. Dilip Ghish assisted Amit Kumar Agarwal and both were knowingly party with accused Afshar Ali, Chaavi Ranjan and Pradeep Bagchi to acquire the above said proceeds of crime. Amit Kumar Agarwal managed the business activities of the company Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt Ltd and he acquired the land in name of this beneficially owned company by paying only a commission of Rs. 25 lacs to Pradeep Bagchi. The market value of the land was Rs. 20,75,84,200 but the consideration amount was shown as 7 crores in the deed. The accused persons Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh attempted to conceal the non- payment of Rs. 6.75 crores in the deed no. 6888 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021. and acquired the proceeds of crime in name of Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. which was a criminal activity relating to schedule offences under PMLA, 2002.

4. The above discussions, lead to a reasonable belief that an offence of Money Laundering under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 has been committed by the accused persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh as stated above. As per Section 3 of PMLA, 2002, whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use - 68 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 and projecting or iaiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering.

5. The above said persons are hand in gloves with each other and with the accused persons earlier arrested by this office in this case who were collectively indulged in acquiring and disposing the landed properties in illegal manner. I have reasons to believe that Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh are actually and knowingly Involved in the process and activity connected with the acquisition, concealment, possession and use and projecting proceeds of crime as untainted property, and as such both are guilty of the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA and they are liable to be arrested under section 19 of PMLA, 2002 to cause their custodial interrogation for the purpose of Investigation and taking further actions as warranted under the provisions of PMLA, 2002.

As such, I Deovrat Jha, Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, am arresting the above two persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh under section 19 of PMLA, 2002.

112. Thereafter, the petitioner was produced before the Court on 08.06.2023 within 24 hours. The writ petitioner was remanded to the judicial custody on 08.06.2023. For ready reference, order dated 08.06.2023 is quoted as under:

―I.O.-cum-Assistant Director Deovrat Jha has arrested the accused persons namely 1) Amit Kumar Agarwal, S/o Vijay Kumar Agarwal, R/o- HB-165, Sector-III, Salt Lake, Kolkata, PIN-700106 and 2)Dilip Ghosh, S/o Nitya Gopal Ghosh, R/o- P-162, C.I.T. Road, Scheme-VII M, Kankurgachi, Kolkata, West Bengal- 700054 for the offence u/s 3 PML Act punishable u/s 4 PML Act and produced before the court today. He has filed (1) arrest memo (2) order of arrest vide case no.- ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022 issued by L.O. cum Assistant Director Deovrat Jha (3) Ground of arrest (4) Medical report with COVID-ve and (5) Search Memo (u/s 51 Cr.P.C.).

- 69 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

Para-2 to 13 of the application filed u/s 167 Cr.P.C. r/w section 65 and 19(3) of PML Act reveals that the huge amount of proceeds of crime is involved with larger conspiracy to illegally sale the Army land, area-4.55 acre by manipulation of official record and thereafter they acquiring the said land on meager price. Various incriminating documents are seized during search. It shows that accused persons are the members of a racket which involved in transfer of land illegally.

Accused persons have no complaint about any ill- treatment against arresting escort parties and information of arrest has been given to their family also. Ld. Lawyers on behalf of the accused persons namely Bidhyut Chourasia and Abhishek Agarwal were also present at the time of remand. They are taken into the judicial custody and remanded in this case and send to B.M.C. Jail Hotwar, Ranchi. O/c is directed to issue custody warrant at once. Produce the accused persons through video conferencing on 19.06.2023.

Put up the record on 09.06.2023 for hearing on application filed u/s 167 Cr.P.C by investigating Officer ED to give him on remand to the accused persons for interrogation.‖

113. Thereafter, on the application filed on behalf of respondent-ED, the investigating agency, under Section 167 Cr.P.C to give the accused persons on remand for interrogation, the concerned Court has passed order on 09.06.2023 based upon that the custody of writ petitioner was handed over to the investigating agency for the purpose of custodial interrogation. The relevant portion of order dated 09.06.2023 is quoted as under:

".....The petition filed on behalf of the L.O. (ED) is within first 15 days from the date of remand of accused persons hence - 70 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 well within time. The investigating agency has also succeeded to make out a strong case that without the custodial interrogation, further investigation is not possible.

Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts for proper and just investigation of this case, the accused persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh are given in custody of ED for total period of 72 hours, the time period will be started when the accused persons handed over to custody in ED by the Jail authority.

It is hereby made clear that prior to taking the accused persons in custody, they shall be medically examined and further will not be subjected to force/violence and before returning the above named accused persons to judicial custody, they will be again medically examined. Investigating officer of this case is further directed to intimate this court about medical examination of accused at the time of sending them to judicial custody. Further, the above named accused persons may be permitted to meet their lawyer once a day -If they so wish during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. Accordingly, in the light of discussion made herein above, the petition filed on behalf of LO. (ED) is hereby allowed.

Let an extract copy of this order be given to Investigating Officer (ED) and Jall Superintendent, BMC, Jail Hotwar, Ranchi for information and needful. ―

114. This Court has scrutinized order dated 09.06.2023 in order to consider as to whether the order dated 09.06.2023 is the actual order of remand immediately after arrest or it is different to that.

115. It needs to refer herein that this Court in the aforesaid backdrop of the facts has examined the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‗Code') related to remand thoroughly. Sections 167, 209 and - 71 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 309 of the Code deal with the remand of an accused. The relevant clauses contained in those sections are quoted below:--

Sec. 167 ........

―(2) The magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that--

(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding:--

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten days.

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence.

Sec. 209--........ (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of, the trial.‖ Sec. 309--........ (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offfence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody; Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person - 72 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time.‖

116. The provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code deals with both types of remand i.e. ―judicial remand‖ and ―police remand‖. The police have been given a right to apply before the Magistrate concerned for giving the accused in police custody and on being satisfied of adequate grounds the Magistrate may grant police remand of the accused for a specific period not beyond first fifteen days and later on, he can authorise only judicial detention of the accused till 90 to 60 days, as the case may be. Sections 209 and 309 of the Code deal with judicial custody during inquiry and trial.

117. So far as authorisation of police custody of accused under Section 167(2) is concerned it is legislative mandate that in no way the detention of the accused in police custody can be authorised for any time after expiry of the period of first fifteen days' remand. The Magistrate may allow detention other than custody in police till 90/60 days, as the case may be.

118. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, special investigation cell-I Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992 Cri LJ 2768) has observed that the Magistrate is competent to authorise detention of any accused in police custody for a specific period on - 73 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 adequate grounds only for the first fifteen days and that detention in police custody or judicial custody or vice versa can be authorised only within first fifteen days. After fifteen days' detention the accused cannot be sent to police custody at all except in other cases in which remand of first fifteen days has not yet started. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case approved the rule laid down by the Delhi High Court in the case of the State (Delhi Administration) v. Dharam Pal, reported in 1982 Cri LJ 1103 that the words ―from time to time‖ occurring in section show that several orders can be passed under Section 167(2) and that the nature of custody can be altered from ―judicial custody‖ to ―police custody‖ and vice versa during the first period of 15 days mentioned in Section 167(2) of the Code and that after fifteen days the accused could only be kept in judicial custody or in any other custody as ordered by the Magistrate but not in the custody of the police.

119. Further this Court is conscious with the fact that the act of directing remand of an accused is fundamentally a judicial function. The Magistrate does not act in executive capacity while ordering the detention of an accused. While exercising this judicial act, it is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether the materials - 74 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 placed before him justify such a remand or, to put it differently, whether there exist reasonable grounds to commit the accused to custody and extend his remand.

120. The purpose of remand as postulated under Section 167 is that investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. It enables the Magistrate to see that the remand is really necessary. This requires the investigating agency to send the case diary along with the remand report so that the Magistrate can appreciate the factual scenario and apply his mind whether there is a warrant for police remand or justification for judicial remand or there is no need for any remand at all. It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to apply his mind and not to pass an order of remand automatically or in a mechanical manner, reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 314 .

121. Now adverting to the facts of the instant case it appears from order dated 09.06.2023 that by virtue of said order the remand of the present writ petitioner has been given to the police for interrogation. If both the order dated 08.06.2023 and 09.06.2023 will be considered together then it would be evident that the arrest is dated 07.06.2023 and thereafter within 24 hours the writ - 75 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner was produced before the concerned Court for the purpose of remand and he was remanded vide order dated 08.06.2023 as referred and quoted herein above, by sending him to the Birsa Munda Central Jail, to remain in judicial custody. While order dated 09.06.2023 is on the application filed under Section 167(1) Cr. P.C. by the investigating agency seeking police custody for taking remand of the writ petitioner for interrogation.

122. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has challenged order dated 09.06.2023 but has not questioned the illegality and propriety of order dated 08.06.2023 meaning thereby the writ petitioner is having no grievance with respect to the issue of remand dated 08.06.2023 otherwise said order would have been challenged by the writ petitioner. It means, the writ petitioner has accepted the remand order and has not challenged the order of remand rather he has chosen to prefer application under Sections 439 and 440 Cr.P.C before the Court of Sessions on merit by denying the allegation as referred in the ECIR by filing Misc. Cri. Application No. 1915 of 2023 for grant of bail, which was dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2023 by learned Special Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, Ranchi.

123. Submission has been made on behalf of petitioner that the ground of arrest ought to have been supplied along - 76 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 with the document at the time of remand and according to the petitioner the same having not been supplied hence the order of remand is illegal and as such not sustainable in the eye of law.

124. We have also referred hereinabove that the applicability of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 is not available at the time of remand it is obvious for the reason that at the time of arrest it is the police who has to arrest and as such keeping the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and in order to have the abundant precaution that the person who is going to be taken into custody by the investigator, then such person must know the reason for arrest since it is the curtailment of the personal liberty and that is the reason the provision of Section 19(1) has been considered to be a power which has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the series of judgments right from the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal (Supra).

125. But there is no stipulation of fulfilment of condition, as required to be fulfilled at the time of arrest as per the mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 said to be applicable at the time of remand. There cannot be any dispute that at the time of remand also the application which is filed for the purpose of seeking remand must - 77 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 contain the specific reason along with the grounds of arrest and reasonable materials warranting the person concerned to be remanded at the appropriate stage i.e., after arrest.

126. We have considered the grounds of arrest dated 07.06.2023, as has been appended as Annexure R-3 to the counter affidavit and found therefrom that on each and every page the writ petitioner has put his signature with date and endorsed to the effect that ‗Read and under understand' ... ‗I have read my ground of arrest completely and also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh.' and below therein has put his full signature with date as 07.06.2023.

127. It is, thus, evident that the moment the petitioner has shown no grievance with respect to any of the issues even the issue of arrest by raising the ground that he is not knowing as to on what ground he has been arrested rather he in each and every page has endorsed by putting his signature and gave note that he read over the content of the ground of arrest and did not shown any dissatisfaction.

128. It is apparent from the record that separate arrest Order was passed vide order dated 07.06.2023 and the writ petitioner was arrested and at the time of arrest he was served with the grounds of arrest upon which he put his signature on each and every page with date and endorsed that he read over the matter. Immediately, within 24 hours - 78 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 of arrest, the writ petitioner-accused was produced before the concerned Court and accordingly remanded in this case and he shown no complaint whatsoever. For ready reference, the relevant portion of order dated 08.06.2023 passed by the learned Court is quoted as under:

―Accused persons have no complaint about any ill- treatment against arresting escort parties and information of arrest has been given to the their family also. Ld. Lawyers on behalf of the accused persons namely Bidhiyut Chourasia and Abhishek Agarwal were also present at the time of remand. They are taken into the judicial custody and remanded in this case and sent to B.M.C Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi. O/C is directed to issue custody warrant at once.‖

129. Therefore, this Court is not hesitant in coming to the conclusion that the writ petitioner was having no grievance with respect to the issue of remand order dated 08.06.2023. Had the remand order dated 08.06.2023 have any infirmities, the writ petitioner would have made objection to that effect showing his dissatisfaction in the application which was filed before the Court having the jurisdiction for the purpose of remand of the present petitioner but admittedly that has not been done.

130. Further herein the writ petitioner has shown his satisfaction with respect to the issue of remand, which is very much evident from the face of the order passed by the - 79 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Court vide order dated 08.06.2023, whereby the petitioner has been sent for remand to the Birsa Munda Jail.

131. It is evident from order dated 08.06.2023 that the accused persons were directed to be produced through video conferencing on 19.06.2023, however, the record was directed to be put up on 09.06.2023 for hearing on application filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C by the investigating officer to give the accused persons on remand for interrogation.

132. Accordingly, the concerned Court has taken up the matter on 09.06.2023 to pass order on the petition dated 08.06.2023 filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C by the investigating agency- ED and after hearing the parties the learned Court has passed order on 09.06.2023 based upon that the custody of writ petitioner was handed over to the investigating agency for the purpose of interrogation.

133. From the content of order dated 08.06.2023 and 09.06.2023 it appears that the original order of remand is dated 08.06.2023 but the same is not under challenge.

134. The same could not have been challenged reason being that the writ petitioner has gone through the ground of arrest which was supplied to him on the same dated i.e., on 07.06.2023, bearing the signature of the writ - 80 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner endorsing that he is having no dissatisfaction of the impugned order of arrest. The moment the writ petitioner has shown no dissatisfaction after going through the grounds of arrest and therefore, he has chosen not to challenge the order of remand dated 08.06.2023.

135. It is evident from material available on record and also it has been contended by the learned counsel for the ED that learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner has chosen not to challenge order dated 08.06.2023 which is actually the order of remand and confined his prayer limited to the order dated 09.06.2023 by which the court has allowed the investigating agency-ED to remand the petitioner for custodial interrogation.

136. Although, during course of argument, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has said it to be a hyper- technical ground.

137. We are not impressed with such argument of writ petitioner reason being that when we are exercising the power conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the principle which is applicable is of strict principle of pleading along with specific prayer and in absence thereof no direction can be - 81 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 passed even by moulding the prayer in absence of any pleading to that effect.

138. It needs to refer herein that the writ petitioner has not chosen to challenge order of remand at its inception rather he has approached to the competent Court for the purpose of consideration of prayer for regular bail by filing application before the learned Special Judge, the same having been rejected, thereafter the bail application has been filed before this Court by filing B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, which was dismissed on 01.03.2024. After dismissal of the bail application of the petitioner, he moved before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn.

139. Thereafter, again the petitioner has renewed his prayer for bail by filing B.A. No. 8321 of 2024, which is pending consideration before this Court.

140. However, after his prayer for bail having been rejected, in B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, he moved before this Court by filing the instant writ petition and while argument the learned confining the prayer to challenge the order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be order of remand.

141. The issue has also been raised showing the innocence of the writ petitioner by carving out the ground as noted in the written note of argument. The same has - 82 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 seriously been disputed by learned counsel for the ED on the ground that when order dated 09.06.2023, by which the court has allowed the investigating agency-ED to remand the petitioner for custodial interrogation, is under challenge then where is the question to raise the issue showing the writ petitioner to be innocent said to not commit any culpability.

142. We are in agreement with the submission advanced by learned counsel for the respondent-ED since while considering the issue of legality or propriety of the order dated 09.06.2023 there is no question of taking in to consideration the culpability said to be committed by the accused person(s) at the stage of remand.

143. Furthermore, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has also taken the ground of long incarceration of the writ petitioner of about 22 months. But we are of view that the issue of period of custody is not proper to be considered at the time of consideration of propriety of order of remand.

144. This Court in the entirety of the facts and circumstances, as has been discussed herein above, is of the view that in view of confinement of prayer, the writ petition is required to be considered only with respect to the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023 and - 83 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 in view of discussions made hereinabove we are further of the view that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for showing interference in order dated 09.06.2023.

145. Accordingly, Issue Nos. II and III are answered and decided against the writ petitioner.

146. In the result, the present writ petition lacks merit and accordingly dismissed.

147. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

       I Agree                         (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)


(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)     (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)


  Alankar/-


  A.F.R.




                                  - 84 -     W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024

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