Delhi District Court
Satish Kumar vs Praveen @ Kala on 29 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF CIVIL JUDGE-01, CENTRAL
DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
PRESIDED OVER BY MS. HALA QUAMAR
CNR No:-DLCT030000202007
CS SCJ No.593308/2016
1. Sh. Satish Kumar
S/o Sh. Ram Pat,
R/o 11709, Gali No.3,
Sat Nagar, Karol Bagh,
New Delhi-110005.
2. Sh. Sunil Kumar,
S/o Sh. Ram Pat,
R/o B-1/177, New Moti Nagar,
New Delhi-110015. ....Plaintiffs
Versus
1. Sh. Praveen @ Kala
2. Sh. Rajesh
3. Sh. Rakesh
All sons of late Sh. Inder Singh,
All residents of Village-Sannoth,
P.O. Narela, New Delhi.
4. Smt. Sunita
W/o Sh. Dharam Pal
R/o 16/1120-E, Khalsa Nagar,
Tank Road, Karol Bagh, HALA
New Delhi-110005. ....Defendants
QUAMAR
Digitally signed by
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.1 of 36
HALA QUAMAR
Date: 2026.05.29
16:51:30 +0530
Date of institution of suit 30.08.2007
Date on which reserved for judgment 16.05.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment 29.05.2026
Decision Partly Decreed
SUIT FOR DECLARATION, POSSESSION, MANDATORY
AND PERPETUAL INJUNCTION
JUDGMENT
BRIEF FACTS
1. The case of the plaintiffs, as set out in the plaint, is that they are joint tenants in respect of shop bearing No. E-16/1121, situated at Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 (hereinafter referred to as the "suit property"), admeasuring approximately 19 ft. × 17 ft. on the ground floor. It is averred that the suit property was initially let out to the plaintiffs in the year 1991 at a monthly rent of ₹500/-, which was subsequently enhanced to ₹700/- per month in the year 1998. It is further stated that the plaintiffs have been jointly carrying on the business of ready-made garments from the suit property under the name and style of M/s Topper Garments.
1.1 The plaintiffs have further averred that disputes arose between them around the year 1998, leading to serious differences inter se. It is stated that plaintiff No.1 instituted a suit for permanent injunction against the erstwhile landlords, namely Sh. Inder Singh and Sh. Praveen, wherein a settlement was arrived at and plaintiff No.1 agreed to vacate the suit premises within a period of five years from the date of compromise, i.e., 16.12.1998.
HALA According to the plaintiffs, the said compromise further QUAMAR Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.2 of 36 Date: 2026.05.29 16:51:35 +0530 aggravated the family dispute, particularly as the tenancy in respect of the suit property was a joint tenancy.
1.2 It is further the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No.2 thereafter instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Smt. Sudesh Devi @ Suresh Devi, wife of Sh. Inder Singh, and her three sons, who are arrayed as defendant Nos.1 to 3 in the present suit, seeking a declaration that the compromise dated 16.12.1998 entered into in Suit No.79/1998 titled Satish Kumar vs. Inder Singh was null and void, not binding upon him, and void ab initio. Plaintiff No.2 also sought a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from dispossessing him from the suit premises on the basis of the said compromise.
1.3 It is stated that in the said suit bearing No.773/03 (588/06/03), an interim injunction was granted in favour of plaintiff No.2/Sh. Sunil Kumar vide order dated 15.12.2003, whereby the defendants were restrained from dispossessing him from the suit property except in accordance with due process of law, and the said order has never been vacated.
1.4 The plaintiffs have further alleged that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit, a fire broke out in the suit premises on 12.10.2004 causing extensive damage thereto, including collapse of the roof. According to the plaintiffs, the incident was a result of mischief committed by late Smt. Sudesh Devi and her three sons. It is further alleged that defendant Nos.1 to 3 had earlier attempted to murder plaintiff No.1 in August, 2004, HALA pursuant to which FIR No.215/2004 under Sections 307/34 IPC QUAMAR Digitally signed CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.3 of 36 by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:51:40 +0530 was registered at PS Prasad Nagar on 20.08.2004 and a charge- sheet was filed against defendant Nos.1 to 3. It is also stated that FIR No.251/2004 under Section 436 IPC was registered in relation to the fire incident.
1.5 The plaintiffs have further stated that subsequently they reconciled their differences inter se and a settlement was arrived at between the plaintiffs and late Smt. Sudesh Devi along with her three sons by way of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007. In furtherance thereof, a rent note dated 30.04.2007 was also executed between the parties. It is averred that, in terms of the said Memorandum of Understanding, the plaintiffs paid a sum of ₹1.5 lakhs vide cheque No.117903 dated 30.04.2007 drawn on Punjab National Bank, Dev Nagar, New Delhi, in favour of Smt. Sudesh Devi to enable reconstruction of the tenanted premises within a period of two months.
1.6 It is further stated that the said cheque was handed over at the time of recording of the compromise before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Delhi, on 01.05.2007. Thereafter, an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC was filed before the said Court and statements of the parties were recorded, culminating in disposal of the suit in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007.
1.7 According to the plaintiffs, when they visited the suit premises about a week after the compromise, they were confronted by defendant No.4, namely Smt. Sunita Devi, and her HALA husband Dharam Pal, who claimed themselves to be the owners QUAMAR of the suit property having purchased the same from late Smt. Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.4 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:51:44 +0530Sudesh Devi. It is alleged that defendant No.4 and her husband further asserted that they would neither permit any repair or reconstruction in the suit property nor allow the plaintiffs to enter the same.
1.8 The plaintiffs have stated that upon confronting late Smt. Sudesh Devi regarding the aforesaid claims, she initially evaded the matter but subsequently informed them that defendant No.4 and her husband, who were related to her and residing adjacent to the suit property, had fraudulently obtained her signatures on certain documents on the false pretext of helping her and her sons in the criminal proceedings pending against them and in facilitating compromise with the plaintiffs. It is further alleged that she later discovered that documents pertaining to transfer of the suit property had been got executed from her by practising fraud.
1.9 The plaintiffs have further averred that they learnt that late Smt. Sudesh Devi had instituted a suit for declaration and injunction against the concerned persons and that, prior thereto, a General Power of Attorney dated 23.11.2006 had been executed by her in favour of one Smt. Seema and duly registered before the Sub-Registrar-III, New Delhi. It is further stated that late Smt. Sudesh Devi had also executed an Agreement to Sell, Receipt and GPA, all dated 23.11.2006, in favour of Smt. Seema, and that thereafter Smt. Seema, acting as GPA holder of Smt. Sudesh Devi, executed a registered sale deed dated 27.11.2006 in favour of HALA defendant No.4/Smt. Sunita Devi. QUAMAR Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.5 of 36 16:51:48 +0530 1.10 It is the further case of the plaintiffs that late Smt. Sudesh Devi assured them that she had been defrauded and sought their assistance in the litigation initiated by her, while also assuring them that the understanding recorded before the learned Civil Judge on 01.05.2007 would be honoured. It is stated that she furnished photocopies of the pleadings and transfer documents executed in favour of Smt. Seema and subsequently in favour of defendant No.4.
1.11 The plaintiffs have further stated that late Smt. Sudesh Devi expired in a fatal accident on 15.05.2007. Thereafter, when the plaintiffs approached defendant Nos.1 to 3 requesting them to honour the undertaking given before the Court on 01.05.2007, the said defendants allegedly refused to do so on the ground that the undertaking had been given by their deceased mother, who alone was the owner of the suit property. Hence, the present suit came to be instituted.
2. Summons of the suit have been served on the defendants, upon which defendants appeared through their respective counsels and the matter was listed for filing of written statement on behalf of defendants.
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT NO.1, 2 & 3
3. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 have filed a joint written statement wherein they have admitted that the plaintiffs are tenants in respect of shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005. The said defendants have also admitted that a HALA compromise was arrived at between the parties and the same was QUAMAR Digitally signed by HALA CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.6 of 36 QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:51:52 +0530 reduced into writing by way of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007.
3.1 The said defendants have further admitted that certain documents pertaining to the suit property were got executed from their mother, late Smt. Sudesh Devi @ Suresh Devi, by defendant No.4 through fraudulent means and misrepresentation on the pretext of execution of a compromise between the plaintiffs and late Smt. Sudesh Devi along with defendant Nos.1 to 3. It is also admitted that defendant No.4 and her husband had assured assistance to defendant Nos.1 to 3 and that late Smt. Sudesh Devi was an illiterate lady.
3.2 Defendant Nos.1 to 3 have further admitted the death of late Smt. Sudesh Devi in an accident on 15.05.2007 as well as the proceedings initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C.
3.3 However, a preliminary objection has been taken that the present suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, inasmuch as the plaintiffs are, in effect, seeking a decree of declaration under the garb of a suit for partition and are therefore required to seek appropriate relief in terms of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act.
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT NO.4
4. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No.4, preliminary objections have been raised regarding the maintainability of the present suit. It is contended that the alleged HALA tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs came to an end upon destruction QUAMAR of the tenanted premises in the fire incident dated 12.10.2004.
Digitally signed by HALA QUAMARCS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.7 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:51:57 +0530According to defendant No.4, since the tenancy pertained to a premises which no longer exists, the rights claimed by the plaintiffs also stood extinguished with the destruction of the suit property.
4.1 It is further contended that a tenancy or lease being a transfer of property for its enjoyment, such tenancy cannot survive once the subject property itself has ceased to exist. Defendant No.4 has thus asserted that, admittedly, the premises which had been let out to the plaintiffs is no longer in existence and, therefore, no subsisting tenancy can be claimed by them.
4.2 It is also stated that the alleged tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs was governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the rate of rent being admittedly less than ₹3,500/-
per month. On the aforesaid grounds, it has been contended that the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
4.3 Defendant No.4 has further pleaded that the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties, inasmuch as neither the allegations made in the plaint nor the reliefs claimed therein can legally be maintained against defendant No.4, who claims to be the lawful owner of the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed.
5. A joint Replication has been filed on behalf of plaintiffs to the WS of defendant No.1 to 3 and separate replication has been filed to the WS of defendant no:4.
6. Thereafter, it is pertinent to note that vide order dated 02.01.2008 following issues were framed: HALA QUAMAR Digitally signed CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.8 of 36 by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:52:01 +0530
(i) Whether if the superstructure is destroyed, as admitted by either side, the plaintiff can claim any tenancy rights or not?
(ii) If point number 1 is decided in favour of the plaintiffs, then as to what relief the plaintiff is entitled to I.e. either court can order for reconstruction or for any other equitable relief?
(iii) What is the effect of the fact that the earlier alleged tenancy of the plaintiffs was covered under the Delhi rent control act 1958?
7. Thereafter, vide order dated 20.05.2010, the aforesaid issues were held to be triable issues.
8. Subsequently, vide order dated 07.12.2011, the following additional issues were framed.
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of declaration as prayed for?OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of mandatory injunction, as prayed for?OPP
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of possession, as prayed for?OPP
4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction, as prayed for?OPP
5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred in view of the provision u/s 50 DRC Act?OPD
6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to the rejected u.o 7 Rule 11 CPC for want of cause of action?OPD HALA QUAMAR
7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for misjoinder/non joinder of the parties?OPD Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
2026.05.29 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.9 of 36 16:52:05 +0530
8. Relief.
PLAINTIFF EVIDENCE
9. In plaintiff evidence, the daughter of plaintiff has been examined as a witness PW-1. PW-1 tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.PW1/A and relied on the following documents:-
Ex.PW1/1(colly) Certified copy of memo of parties and order sheets of plaint of suit No.79/98.
Ex.PW1/3(colly) Certified copy of plaint of old Suit No.773/03 new Suit No.588/03.
Ex.PW1/4 True copy of order dated 15.12.2003 in suit No.773/03.
Mark F FIR No.251 dated 12.10.2004, PS Prasad Nagar Ex.PW1/6(colly) Certified copy of order on sentence in FIR No.215/04 vide dated 25.09.2009.
Ex.PW1/7 Certified copy of memo of understanding dated 03.04.2007.
Mark G Certified copy of rent note dated 30.04.2007. Ex.PW1/9 Certified copy of application u/O 23 CPC in Suit No.588/06.
Ex.PW1/10 Certified copy of statement of plaintiff in suit No.588/06 dated 01.05.2007.
Ex.PW1/11 Certified copy of statement of defendant No.2 in Suit No.588/06 dated 01.05.2007.
Ex.PW1/12 Certified copy of Order dated 01.05.2007. Ex.PW1/14 Order in SDM/KB/2008/ dated 09.06.2008 passed by Ld. SDM, Karol Bagh, Daryaganj, New Delhi.
Ex.PW1/15 Certified copy of order passed in Criminal Revision No.45/08 vide dated 02.03.2009.
Ex.PW1/16 Site plan.
Ex.PW1/17 Certified copy of Sale Deed dated 27.11.2006
in favour of defendant No.4.
Mark A GPA dated 23.11.2006.
Mark B Sale Deed dated 23.11.2006.
Mark C Possession Letter dated 23.11.2006. HALA Mark D Special Power of Attorney dated 23.11.2006. QUAMAR Digitally signed CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.10 of 36 by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:52:10 +0530 Mark E Affidavit dated 23.11.2006.
9.1 PW-1 was subjected to detailed cross-examination on behalf of defendant No.4, whereas defendant Nos.1 to 3 chose not to cross-examine the witness despite opportunity having been granted.
9.2 In his cross-examination, PW-1 reiterated that the present suit had been instituted to protect his tenancy rights in respect of the suit shop which had been destroyed in a fire in the year 2004.
He stated that no reconstruction had been carried out by him in the suit property and voluntarily added that unauthorized construction had instead been raised by defendant No.4 and her husband Dharam Pal. PW-1 admitted that there was no tenancy agreement between himself and defendant No.4. However, he clarified that the tenancy had originally been created by late Sh. Inderjeet Singh and, after his demise, continued under Smt. Sudesh Devi, wife of late Sh. Inderjeet Singh. He further deposed that he was in possession of a Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 and a Rent Deed dated 30.04.2007 executed between the plaintiffs and late Smt. Sudesh Devi along with her sons. He admitted that defendant No.4 was not a party to either of the said documents. PW-1 further admitted that the registered Sale Deed dated 27.11.2006 (Ex.PW1/17) in respect of the suit property stood in favour of defendant No.4. He stated that he later came to know that prior to the execution of the said sale deed, late Smt. Sudesh Devi had executed documents dated 23.11.2006 in favour of one HALA Smt. Seema, which documents had already been marked as Mark QUAMAR A to E. According to PW-1, the plaintiffs came to know about the transfer in favour of defendant No.4 only after execution of the Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.11 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:52:14 +0530 Memorandum of Understanding and Rent Agreement in April, 2007, when they found defendant No.4 and her husband in possession of the property. PW-1 further deposed that upon questioning late Smt. Sudesh Devi regarding the apparent contradiction in first transferring the property in November, 2006 and thereafter executing the Memorandum of Understanding and Rent Agreement in April, 2007, she informed him that defendant No.4 had played fraud upon her and had procured execution of the documents despite there being no intention to sell the property. He also stated that late Smt. Sudesh Devi had filed a suit seeking declaration/cancellation of the sale deed dated 27.11.2006 executed in favour of defendant No.4. In response to a specific question, PW-1 admitted that late Smt. Sudesh Devi had instituted Suit No.96/2007 on 24.02.2007, i.e., prior to execution of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 and Rent Agreement dated 30.04.2007, though he stated that he did not remember the exact date of institution. He further admitted that the said suit filed by late Smt. Sudesh Devi had subsequently been dismissed and, to his knowledge, no further proceedings challenging the said dismissal were pending before any Court. PW-1 further stated that the disputed property was situated at a distance of approximately 200 meters from the premises presently occupied by him. He admitted that after purchase of the property, defendant No.4 had constructed a boundary wall and toilet thereon, though he volunteered that the original structure had already been destroyed in the fire and that the construction raised HALA QUAMAR thereafter was unauthorized. He also admitted that the sealing order passed by the learned SDM had been quashed by the Hon'ble Digitally High Court of Delhi and that the challenge preferred against the signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.12 of 36 2026.05.29 16:52:18 +0530 said order before the Hon'ble Supreme Court had been dismissed at the notice stage itself. PW-1 further admitted that no written tenancy agreement had ever been executed either by late Inder Singh or by Smt. Sudesh Devi in respect of the suit property and voluntarily stated that the tenancy was oral in nature. He also stated that he did not remember whether in Suit No.79/1998 any specific pleading had been made regarding the tenancy being oral or written. He denied the suggestion that no relationship of landlord and tenant existed between him and the erstwhile owners/landladies. PW-1 admitted that he did not possess any rent receipts in respect of the alleged tenancy and explained that the same had been destroyed in the fire incident. He further stated that he did not remember whether any rent receipts had been filed in Suit No.79/1998. During further cross-examination, PW-1 initially stated that the sale deed in favour of defendant No.4 had been executed by late Smt. Sudesh Devi, butfurther said that, in fact, the sale deed had been executed by Smt. Seema in favour of defendant No.4. He admitted that Smt. Seema had not been impleaded as a party to the present suit. PW-1 also admitted that in the earlier litigations instituted against late Inder Singh and subsequently against his legal heirs, he had not filed any rent agreement or rent receipts. He stated that apart from the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 and Rent Agreement dated 30.04.2007 executed by Smt. Sudesh Devi and her sons, he possessed no other documentary proof of tenancy in respect of the suit property. He further admitted that in the civil suit for HALA QUAMAR declaration and injunction instituted by Smt. Sudesh Devi against Smt. Seema and defendant No.4, he had neither been impleaded as Digitally signed by HALA a party nor had he moved any application for impleadment. He, QUAMAR Date:
2026.05.29 16:52:23 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.13 of 36 +0530 however, volunteered that he was not aware about the pendency of the said suit at the relevant time and came to know about it only during pendency of the present proceedings. He denied the suggestion that he had deliberately refrained from seeking impleadment because the Memorandum of Understanding and Rent Agreement had been executed subsequent to the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant No.4. PW-1 further admitted that no formal notice or intimation regarding execution of the Memorandum of Understanding and Rent Agreement had been issued to defendant No.4. However, he voluntarily stated that the plaintiffs had met defendant No.4 at the site and informed her about their previous tenancy and the subsequent settlement documents, though he could not recall the exact date of such meeting. He denied the suggestion that he had never informed defendant No.4 regarding his tenancy rights or the execution of the aforesaid documents. PW-1 also stated that the Court dealing with Suit No.588/06/03 had not been informed about the prior transfer of the suit property at the time when the suit was withdrawn in view of the compromise with Smt. Sudesh Devi and her sons, as according to him the plaintiffs were not then aware of the earlier transaction. He denied the suggestion that he was aware of the transfer and had intentionally concealed the said fact from the Court. To a specific suggestion that the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 and Rent Agreement dated HALA 30.04.2007, having been executed only between the plaintiffs and QUAMAR late Smt. Sudesh Devi, were not binding upon defendant No.4, Digitally signed PW-1 replied that the same were binding upon defendant No.4 as by HALA QUAMAR Date: well. 2026.05.29 16:52:28 +0530 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.14 of 36 9.3 PW-1 denied the suggestion that there had never existed any landlord-tenant relationship between his father and late Inder Singh or that his father had merely been inducted as a licensee for a limited period. He stated that he had instituted proceedings against Inder Singh as the latter had attempted to forcibly evict them from the tenanted premises. He further admitted having lodged criminal complaints alleging theft against the son of Inder Singh and also alleging that the legal heirs of Inder Singh had set the tenanted premises on fire with the intention of dispossessing the plaintiffs. He admitted that after the fire incident the suit property was never again put to use by the plaintiffs. Lastly, he denied the suggestion that the present suit against defendant No.4 was false, without cause of action, or that he was deposing falsely.
9.4 Thereafter plaintiff evidence was closed on separate statement of plaintiff and the matter was fixed for defence evidence.
DEFENDANT EVIDENCE
10. It is pertinent to mention that since no evidence has been led on behalf of defendant No.1 to 3 despite opportunity being provided, therefore, right of defendant No.1 to 3 to lead defence evidence stood closed vide order dated 18.08.2023.
11. In defence evidence, defendant No.4 led her evidence and got examined herself as a witness D4W-1 and tendered her evidence by way of affidavit Ex.D4W1/A and relied on the HALA following documents:- QUAMAR Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.15 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:52:34 +0530Ex.D4W1/1 Certified copy of registered Sale Deed dated 27.11.2006.
Ex.D4W1/2 and Original house tax receipt for the year
Ex.D4W1/3 2006-07 and 2007-08.
Ex.D4W1/4 Certified copy of Order dated 20.04.2011
of Ld. ASCJ, Central in CS No.107/09/07.
11.1 D4W1 was duly cross-examined by learned counsel for the plaintiffs. During her cross-examination, D4W1 deposed that she was aware about the present case, though she initially stated that she did not know who had instructed preparation of her affidavit of evidence. She stated that she was educated up to 12th standard and had married Sh. Dharampal in the year 1988. After marriage, she resided at her matrimonial home situated at Village Sanauth, Narela, and thereafter shifted to Karol Bagh in the year 1992, where she had been residing at property bearing No. E-16/1120, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, Delhi.She further deposed regarding the family arrangement amongst the five brothers, namely Sh. Jai Chand, Sh. Hem Chander, Sh. Ram Phal, Sh. Om Prakash and Sh.
Inder Singh. According to her, property bearing No. E-16/1120 fell to the share of Sh. Jai Chand and Sh. Om Prakash, whereas property bearing No. E-16/1121 fell to the share of Sh. Ram Phal and Sh. Inder Singh. She further stated that the two properties were adjoining and both had access from the main road. D4W1 admitted that late Sh. Inder Singh was the real uncle of her husband and that Smt. Sudesh Devi @ Suresh Devi was her husband's aunt ("chachiji"). She further deposed that Smt. Seema, who had executed the sale deed in favour of defendant No.4, was the real HALA QUAMAR sister-in-law ("sali") of her brother. She stated that she had been Digitally signed by HALA CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.16 of 36 QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:52:39 +0530 filing income tax returns since about 1996-1998 and maintained a bank account. She further stated that the purchase of the suit property had been reflected in her income tax returns.
11.2 D4W1 stated that she had not raised any construction upon the suit property. She admitted that plaintiff Satish Kumar had filed Writ Petition No.5824/2018 and connected proceedings against the North Delhi Municipal Corporation and further admitted that due to complaints made by the plaintiffs, proceedings had been initiated by the MCD against their property, against which an appeal bearing No.298/2019 titled Dharampal & Anr. vs. North DMC had been filed. She further stated that damaged portions existing on the second and third floors had been removed by them voluntarily and not by the MCD. She volunteered that applications had been moved before the MCD for removal of the damaged portions as the same posed danger to adjoining properties and passersby. D4W1 denied the existence of any landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiffs and late Sh. Inder Singh or Smt. Sudesh Devi. According to her, the plaintiffs had merely been permitted to carry on business in the property owing to cordial family relations and were never tenants therein. She further stated that, being close relatives, it was always understood that the plaintiffs had been allowed to use the premises only on account of goodwill and family relations. D4W1 further deposed that it was not within her knowledge whether the plaintiffs had ever surrendered any alleged tenancy rights in favour of late Sh. Inder HALA Singh or Smt. Sudesh Devi, or whether any Court had ever QUAMAR terminated such alleged tenancy rights. She clarified that in her Digitally signed affidavit she had stated that the plaintiffs had no legal right in the by HALA QUAMAR Date: CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.17 of 36 2026.05.29 16:52:44 +0530 suit premises since no tenancy agreement existed in their favour. She also stated that at the time of the fire incident dated 12.10.2004, she along with her family was residing at Dev Nagar. She expressed lack of knowledge regarding the interim injunction order allegedly passed on 15.12.2003 in Suit No.773/02 restraining Smt. Sudesh Devi and her sons from dispossessing plaintiff No.2 from the suit shop. She also stated that she was unaware whether the said injunction order had ever been vacated. D4W1 denied the suggestion that she and her husband were acting in collusion with late Sh. Inder Singh, late Smt. Sudesh Devi, their sons, or Smt. Seema. She also denied the suggestions that the plaintiffs possessed lawful tenancy rights in the suit property or that defendant No.4 and her husband had intentionally obstructed or harassed the plaintiffs from exercising any such rights. Lastly, she denied the suggestion that she was deposing falsely or that the plaintiffs were entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit.
11.3 In her re-examination conducted by learned counsel for defendant No.4, D4W1 clarified that her affidavit of evidence had been prepared by her counsel, Mr. S.P. Jha, on the basis of her instructions. She further affirmed that she had signed the affidavit after fully understanding its contents.
11.4 Thereafter, defence evidence was closed on separate statement of Ld. Counsel for defendant and the matter was fixed for final arguments.
12. have heard the counsels for the parties and perused the HALA QUAMAR record of the case meticulously.
Digitally signed by HALA QUAMARCS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.18 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:52:49 +0530FINDINGS ON ISSUE Issue No.1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of declaration as prayed for?OPP Whether if the superstructure is destroyed, as admitted by either side, the plaintiff can claim any tenancy rights or not? (framed vide order dated: 02.01.2008)
13. Both these issues are taken up together as they are mutually dependent on each other. The plaintiffs have sought a decree of declaration to the effect that they are lawful tenants in respect of the suit premises, i.e., shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005, admeasuring approximately 19 ft. × 17 ft. on the ground floor, as shown in red colour in the site plan annexed with the plaint. They have further prayed for a declaration that the defendants are bound to honour the undertaking given before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Delhi in Suit No.773/03, decided on 01.05.2007, and that the plaintiffs' rights as joint tenants in the suit property are not affected by the alleged transfer of the property by late Smt. Sudesh Devi in favour of defendant No.4. It is further prayed that defendant No.4 is also bound by the judgment and decree passed in Suit No.773/03 titled Sunil Kumar vs. Suresh Devi & Ors., and is consequently liable to respect the plaintiffs' tenancy and their rights in the suit property.
14. Onus to prove this issue is on the plaintiff. As regards the initial tenancy, the same stands clearly admitted by all the HALA QUAMAR defendants in their respective pleadings. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 Digitally signed by HALA CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.19 of 36 QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:52:54 +0530 have categorically stated in their written statement that the plaintiffs were joint tenants in respect of the suit property. Defendant No.4 has also not disputed the existence of tenancy; however, she has contended that the same came to an end upon destruction of the tenanted premises in the fire incident dated 12.10.2004.
15. In view of the aforesaid stand of the parties, the next question that arises for consideration is whether the tenancy of the plaintiffs stood determined merely on account of destruction of the tenanted premises by fire. In this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the settled legal position laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M/S Shaha Ratansi Khimji & Sons vs Proposed Kumbhar Sons Hotel P.Ltd. on 10 July, 2014 wherein the court decided upon the inconsistency in the view taken by the Court in Vannattankandy Ibrayi Vs. Kunhabdulla Hajee [(2001) 1 SCC 564] and T.Lakshmipathi & Ors. Vs. R.Nithyananda Reddy & Ors. [(2003) 5 SCC 150]. Relevant excerpts from the judgement are as follows:
"4. In Lakshmipathi & Ors. Vs. R.Nithyananda Reddy & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 150, this Court held that lease of a building includes, the land on which the building stands. So even if the building is destroyed or demolished, the lease is not determined as long as the land beneath it continues to exist. Doctrine of frustration cannot be invoked on destruction or demolition of a building under lease where not only privity of contract but privity of estate is also created.
.....................................
26. Subsequently, another two-Judge Bench of this Court considered the same question in T. Laxmipathi(Supra). In the said case this Court noticed the decision of Bombay High Court in Hind Rubber Industries (supra) and other High HALA Courts and observed as under: QUAMAR Digitally signed CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.20 of 36 by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:52:59 +0530 "20. The tenancy cannot be said to have been determined by attracting applicability of the doctrine of frustration consequent upon demolishing of the tenancy premises. Doctrine of frustration belongs to the realm of law of contracts; it does not apply to a transaction where not only a privity of contract but a privity of estate has also been created inasmuch as lease is the transfer of an interest in immovable property within the meaning of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act (wherein the phrase "the transfer of property" has been defined), read with Section 105, which defines a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property. (See observations of this Court in this regard in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh6.) It is neither the case of the appellants nor of Respondents 2 and 3 that the subject- matter of lease was the building and the building alone, excluding land whereon the building forming the subject-matter of tenancy stood at the time of creation of lease.
22. A lease of a house or of a shop is a lease not only of the superstructure but also of its site. It would be different if not only the site but also the land beneath ceases to exist by an act of nature. In the present case the appellants who are the successors of the tenancy right have demolished the superstructure but the land beneath continues to exist. The entire tenancy premises have not been lost. Moreover, the appellants cannot be permitted to take shelter behind their own act prejudicial to the interest of Respondent 1 under whom Respondents 2 and 3 were holding as tenants and then inducted the appellants.
24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the event of the tenancy having been created in respect of a building standing on the land, it is the building and the land which are both components of the subject-matter of demise and the destruction of the building alone does not determine the tenancy when the land which was the site of the building continues to exist; more so when the building has been destroyed or demolished neither by the landlord nor by an act of nature but solely by the act of the tenant or the person claiming under him. Ample judicial authority is available in support of this proposition and illustratively we refer to George J. Ovungal v. Peter [AIR 1991 Ker 55], Rahim Bux v. Mohd. Shafi [AIR 1971 All 16], Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) and Jiwanlal & Co. v. Manot & Co. Ltd.[(1960)64 CWN 932]. The Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in V. Sidharthan (Dr) v. HALA Pattiori Ramadasan appears to take a view to the contrary. QUAMAR But that was a case where the building was totally destroyed by fire by negligence of the tenant. It is a case which proceeds on very peculiar facts of its own and was rightly dissented from by Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
2026.05.29 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.21 of 36 16:53:03 +0530 the Bombay High Court in Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. v. Tayebhai Mohammedbhai Bagasarwalla."
........................................
It has been further opined that once a tenancy is created in respect of a building standing on the land it is the build- ing and the land which are both components of the subject-mat- ter of demise and the destruction of the building alone does not determine the tenancy when the land which is the site of the building continues to exist. This interpretation, as we find, is in accord with Section 108 of the Act. It is re- flectible that in Vannattankandy Ibrayi's case, the two-Judge Bench observed that the rights stand extinguished as on the distinction of the demise, for there is destruction of the superstructure and in its non-existence there is no subject mat- ter. Thus, the land has been kept out of the concept of sub- ject matter. In our considered opinion, the Court in the said case failed to appreciate that there are two categories of subject-matters, combined in a singular capsule, which is the essence of provision under the Transfer of Property Act and not restricted to a singular one, that is, the superstructure. In T. Lakshmipathi (supra) the Court took note of the fact that the land and superstructure standing on it as a singular component for the purpose of tenancy. It is in tune with the statutory provision. Therefore, we agree with the proposition stated therein to the affect that "in the event of the tenancy having been created in respect of a building standing on the land, it is the building and the land which are both compo- nents of the subject-matter of demise and the destruction of the building alone does not determine the tenancy when the land which was the site of the building continues to exist". On the touchstone of this analysis, we respectfully opine that the decision rendered in Vannattankandy Ibrayi (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and it is, accordingly, over- ruled."
16. In view of the aforementioned judgement, it is clear that mere destruction of the tenanted premises does not, by itself, automatically bring the tenancy to an end, unless the tenancy is shown to have been validly determined in accordance with law.
17. In view of the aforesaid legal position, it becomes clear that the tenancy of the plaintiffs cannot be said to have been HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.22 of 36 Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:53:08 +0530 terminated solely on the ground that the suit property was damaged or destroyed in the fire incident dated 12.10.2004.
18. The next question that arises for consideration is whether defendant No.4 is bound by the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 executed between Smt. Sudesh Devi and her sons on one hand and the plaintiffs on the other hand, wherein certain rights and obligations were recorded and mutually acknowledged before the Court in relation to the suit property, in Suit No.773/03. To prove the same plaintiff has placed on record the certified copy of the MOU dated 03.04.2007 which is EX. PW1/7. Even otherwise, the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 is not disputed by defendant Nos.1 to 3. However, defendant No.4 has taken a specific stand in her written statement that the said alleged settlement is not binding upon her, as she was not a party to the said document and, therefore, neither the contents thereof can be admitted nor can they be enforced against her. It is further the case of defendant No.4 that by the time the alleged Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 came into existence, late Smt. Sudesh Devi had already divested herself of all rights, title and interest in the suit property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 23.11.2006 executed in favour of Smt. Seema, who thereafter, in turn, transferred the property in favour of defendant No.4 by way of a registered sale deed dated 27.11.2006. It is stated that defendant No.4 is in settled possession and enjoyment of the suit property HALA and her name has also been mutated in the records of the Municipal QUAMAR Corporation of Delhi. On the aforesaid basis, it is contended that the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007 does not Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.23 of 36 Date: 2026.05.29 16:53:15 +0530 confer any right, title or interest in favour of the plaintiffs and does not give rise to any enforceable or actionable cause of action against defendant No.4. It is further contended that a bare reading of the terms of the said Memorandum of Understanding shows that it is contingent in nature, and since contingent agreements cannot be enforced unless the stipulated contingency occurs, the same is not capable of being enforced against defendant No.4.
19. It is pertinent to note that the Memorandum of Understanding was arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 to 3 on 03.04.2007. It is an admitted position between the parties that defendant No.4 had purchased the property from Smt. Seema through a registered sale deed, who in turn had purchased the same from Smt. Sudesh Devi by virtue of a registered sale deed executed in the year 2006. It is further borne out from the record, particularly the certified copies placed on record as Ex. PW1/3, that the earlier suit was instituted in the year 2003. It is also an admitted position between the parties that in Suit No.773/03, an interim injunction was granted in favour of plaintiff No.2 restraining the defendants therein from dispossessing him from the suit property except in accordance with due process of law. The said injunction order was passed on 15.12.2003 and, as per the record, has not been shown to have been vacated. Although defendant No.4 has neither specifically admitted nor denied the said injunction order, having taken the plea of want of knowledge, the existence of the said order otherwise stands borne out from the HALA judicial record. In view of the aforesaid factual matrix, it is evident QUAMAR that the dispute pertaining to the suit property was sub judice as early as in the year 2003 and an interim protection in favour of the Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.24 of 36 2026.05.29 16:53:21 +0530 plaintiffs had already been granted by a competent Court. The alleged subsequent fire incident in 2004, as already discussed, does not, by itself, extinguish the subsisting claim of the plaintiffs, particularly when their possession/tenancy rights were protected by an order of injunction which continued to operate.
20. It is also an admitted position that during the pendency of the said proceedings instituted in 2003, the suit property was transferred first in favour of Smt. Seema in the year 2006 and thereafter in favour of defendant No.4 by way of a registered sale deed in the year 2006 itself. Thus, the transfers were effected during the pendency of litigation in respect of the suit property.
21. In these circumstances, the doctrine of lis pendens would clearly be attracted, inasmuch as the property in dispute was alienated during the pendency of the suit proceedings. Consequently, any transfer of rights in respect of the suit property would be subject to the outcome of the pending litigation and cannot prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs as were being adjudicated in the said suit.
22. It is relevant to refer to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in this regard which reads as under :-
"52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.--
HALA During the [pendency] in any Court having authority QUAMAR [[within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir] or established beyond such limits] by [the Digitally signed Central Government] of [any] suit or proceedings by HALA QUAMAR [which is not collusive and] in which any right to Date:
2026.05.29 16:53:26 +0530 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.25 of 36 immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.
[Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.]"
23. It is apposite to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd vs Nanak Builders & Investrs.P.Ltd & Ors AIR 2013 SC 2389 held:
"26. The aforesaid Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act again came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Rajender Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors. AIR 1973 SC 2537 and Their Lordship with HALA QUAMAR approval of the principles laid down in 1973 (1) SCR 139 reiterated:Digitally signed
"The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to by HALA strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to QUAMAR Date:
2026.05.29 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.26 of 36 16:53:30 +0530 circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a dispute on rights or interests in immovable property is pending, by private dealings which may remove the subject matter of litigation from the ambit of the court's power to decide a pending dispute of frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any immovable property during a litigation over it are held to be bound, by an application of the doctrine, by the decree passed in the suit even though they may not have been impleaded in it. The whole object of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire rights in immovable property which are the subject matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of the Court so as to prevent the object of a pending action from being defeated."
24. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shinghara Singh vs. Daljit Singh and Anr 2024 INSC 77 has held:
"12. This Court in Sanjay Verma vs. Manik Roy was dealing with a suit for specific performance. During pendency of the suit, a temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff and different portions of the suit land were sold whereafter the purchasers applied for impleadment, which was rejected by the Trial Court but allowed by the High Court against which special leave to appeal was filed. In the above background, this Court observed the following in para 12:
"12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the TP Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the TP Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from HALA dealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of QUAMAR the suit. The section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit Digitally signed unless the property was alienated with the permission of the by HALA court." QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:53:35 +0530 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.27 of 36
25. On the basis of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it is abundantly clear that the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, embodying the doctrine of lis pendens, are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, wherein the suit property was transferred during the pendency of the litigation. Consequently, the subsequent purchasers are equally bound by the outcome of the said proceedings and cannot claim protection under the guise of being bona fide purchasers for value without notice.
26. Even otherwise, the material on record, particularly the cross-examination of DW4/1, clearly establishes that the transactions relating to the suit property lack bona fides. It stands admitted that all the parties involved in the chain of transfers, including Smt. Seema, are closely related to each other, and the property was first transferred in her favour and thereafter within few days transferred to defendant No.4. DW4/W1 herself has admitted her long-standing residence in the adjoining property bearing No. E-16/1120, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, and has categorically deposed that she and her husband are carrying on business from the said premises. She has further admitted the family arrangement and the inter se relationship between the parties, including that late Sh. Inder Singh was the real uncle of her husband and Smt. Sudesh Devi was her husband's aunt. She has also admitted that Smt. Seema, through whom the property was transferred, is closely related to her family. These admissions, read together, clearly demonstrate that DW4W1 was fully aware HALA of the suit property being adjoining and the proximity of QUAMAR relationship coupled with the rapid chain of transfers strongly indicates that the transactions were not bona fide but were Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.28 of 36 2026.05.29 16:53:40 +0530 executed in a pre-arranged manner to create an ostensible change of title.
27. Defendant No.4 has further contended that the Memorandum of Understanding was subject to the decision that may be rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding the validity of the Master Plan and, therefore, the said MOU was contingent in nature and incapable of enforcement. However, the said contention is also not tenable. A bare reading of the Memorandum of Understanding shows that the essential understanding between the parties regarding recognition of the plaintiffs' tenancy rights and restoration of the suit premises had already been arrived at and acted upon by the parties. The compromise was also recorded before the competent Court and culminated into a decree in Suit No.773/03. Thus, the MOU was not a mere contingent arrangement dependent entirely upon an uncertain future event so as to render the entire agreement unenforceable. Moreover, the condition relating to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding the Master Plan was only incidental to the manner or feasibility of reconstruction/repairs and did not affect the core obligations and admissions contained in the settlement. The primary rights acknowledged under the MOU, particularly the tenancy rights of the plaintiffs, were independent and unequivocally recognized by defendant Nos.1 to 3. Accordingly, merely because certain ancillary obligations under HALA the MOU were dependent upon future developments, the entire QUAMAR settlement cannot be termed as a contingent contract incapable of Digitally signed enforcement. by HALA QUAMAR Date: 2026.05.29 16:53:44 +0530 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.29 of 36
28. In view of the aforesaid discussions, both the above mentioned issues are decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The plaintiffs are held entitled to a declaration that they are lawful joint tenants in respect of the suit premises, i.e., shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi- 110005 and further declaration that the defendants are bound to honour the undertaking given before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Delhi in Suit No.773/03 decided on 01.05.2007, and that the rights of the plaintiffs as joint tenants in the suit property remain unaffected by the alleged transfer of the suit property by late Smt. Sudesh Devi in favour of defendant No.4. It is also held that defendant No.4 is bound by the judgment and decree passed in Suit No.773/03.
Issue No.2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of mandatory injunction, as prayed for?OPP
29. The onus to prove this issues is upon the plaintiffs. In prayer clause (ii) of the suit, the plaintiffs had sought a decree of mandatory injunction directing defendant Nos.1 to 4 to carry out necessary repairs and reconstruction in the suit property. However, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has fairly submitted that the said relief is no longer pressed, as defendant No.4 has already carried out construction/repairs over the suit property. In view of the said statement, the relief sought under this head has rendered infructuous. The plaintiffs have also HALA relied upon photographs placed on record along with the written QUAMAR synopsis in support of their submissions. In view of the categorical statement made on behalf of the plaintiffs and the subsequent Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.30 of 36 2026.05.29 16:53:49 +0530 developments, the present issue does not survive for adjudication. Accordingly, this issue is disposed of as having become infructuous.
Issue No.3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of possession, as prayed for?OPP
30. The plaintiffs have sought a decree of possession, thereby praying for a direction against defendant Nos.1 to 4 to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises, i.e., shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi- 110005, measuring approximately 19 ft. × 17 ft. on the ground floor, as shown in red colour in the site plan, after carrying out necessary repairs and reconstruction, if required.
31. The onus to prove this issue is on the plaintiffs. As has already been discussed and decided herein above, the tenancy in favour of the plaintiffs is held to have subsisted throughout, and further, defendant No.4 is also held to be bound by the principles of lis pendens. In view of the aforesaid findings, it would be unjust not to grant relief of possession in favour of the plaintiffs.
32. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The plaintiffs are held entitled to a decree of possession.
Issue No.4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction, as prayed for?OPP HALA QUAMAR
33. The onus to prove this issue is on the plaintiffs. In relief
(iv), the plaintiffs have sought a decree of permanent injunction Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.31 of 36 Date:
2026.05.29 16:53:54 +0530 restraining the defendants from transferring, alienating, or creating any third-party interest in the suit property. It is a settled principle of law that a decree of perpetual injunction restraining transfer or creation of third-party interest cannot ordinarily be granted against a party who is the true owner of the property. Although in the present case the question of ownership has not been finally adjudicated, and the plaintiffs have been held to be joint tenants in respect of the suit property, the relief as claimed is not maintainable in its present form. Even otherwise, learned counsel for the plaintiffs has, during the course of arguments, stated that the said relief is not being pressed. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
Issue No.5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred in view of the provision u/s 50 DRC Act?OPD What is the effect of the fact that the earlier alleged tenancy of the plaintiffs was covered under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958? (framed vide Order dated 02.01.2008)
34. Both these issues are taken up together as they are one and the same.
35. The onus to prove this issue is on the defendants.
HALA However, the defendants have failed to place on record any QUAMAR material or cogent evidence to substantiate their plea that the present suit is barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Act. No documentary evidence has been led to show that the Date:
2026.05.29 16:53:58 +0530 CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.32 of 36 jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly barred in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
36. Even otherwise, as per Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only in respect of matters relating to fixation of standard rent, eviction of a tenant, or any other matter which the Ld. Controller is empowered to decide under the said Act. In the present case, the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs do not fall within the ambit of any of the matters exclusively triable by the Ld. Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
37. In view of the nature of the reliefs claimed in the present suit, this Court is of the considered view that the suit is not barred by Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Issue No.6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to the rejected u.o 7 Rule 11 CPC for want of cause of action?OPD
38. The onus to prove this issue is on the defendants. However, the defendants have failed to place on record any material or cogent evidence to substantiate their plea that the plaint discloses no cause of action. A bare perusal of the plaint shows that the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded their tenancy rights, the subsisting dispute regarding the suit property, the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 03.04.2007, and the HALA subsequent alleged interference by the defendants, thereby clearly QUAMAR disclosing a cause of action for filing the present suit. Therefore, Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.33 of 36 Date: 2026.05.29 16:54:02 +0530 the present issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
Issue No.7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for misjoinder/non joinder of the parties?OPD
39. Onus to prove this issue is on the defendants. However, the defendants have failed to place on record any material or cogent evidence to substantiate their plea that the suit is bad for misjoinder or non-joinder of necessary parties. No specific party has been shown to be a necessary or proper party whose absence would render the suit defective or not maintainable.
40. It is well settled that a suit cannot be dismissed on the ground of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties unless the party alleged to be necessary is shown to be indispensable for effective adjudication of the controversy involved. In the present case, all necessary parties against whom relief has been sought have already been impleaded, and the defendants have failed to demonstrate as to how any other party is necessary for the adjudication of the present dispute.
41. Accordingly, this issue is decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs.
Issue no:8 Relief If point number 1 (qua tenancy when super structure is destroys can tenancy rights be claimed) decided in favour of the HALA plaintiffs, then as to what relief the plaintiff is entitled to i.e. QUAMAR either court can order for reconstruction or for any other Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.34 of 36 Date: 2026.05.29 16:54:07 +0530 equitable relief? (framed vide order dated 02.01.2008)
42. As already discussed under the issue no:2 qua mandatory injunction, the relief of reconstruction is now infructuous. For the aforementioned reasons, the present suit stands partly decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
43. The plaintiffs are held entitled to a declaration that they are lawful joint tenants in respect of the suit premises, i.e., shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 and further declaration that the defendants are bound to honour the undertaking given before the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Delhi in Suit No.773/03 decided on 01.05.2007, and that the rights of the plaintiffs as joint tenants in the suit property remain unaffected by the alleged transfer of the suit property by late Smt. Sudesh Devi in favour of defendant No.4. It is also held that defendant No.4 is bound by the judgment and decree passed in Suit No.773/03.The plaintiffs are also held entitled to a decree of possession in the suit property, i.e.shop bearing No. E-16/1121, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 having an area measuring 19 feet × 17 feet on the ground floor, as shown in red colour in the site plan.
44. However, relief of mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction is declined in view of the reasons already discussed.
HALA
45. Cost of the suit is also awarded in favour of the plaintiff QUAMAR and against the defendants.
Digitally signed by HALA QUAMAR Date:CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.35 of 36 2026.05.29 16:54:12 +0530
46. The Plaintiff is directed to deposit the deficient Court Fee, if any, within 7 days from this order. A report to that effect be prepared by the Reader of this Court from 2 days thereafter. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly and upon deposit of deficient court fee, if any.
47. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.
Announced in the open Digitally
signed by
court today on 29.05.2026 HALA
HALA QUAMAR
QUAMAR Date:
2026.05.29
16:54:16
+0530
(HALA QUAMAR)
Civil Judge-1, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
CS SCJ No.593308/2016 Page No.36 of 36