State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Diwan Housing Finance Corporation Now ... vs Anit Sharma on 24 May, 2024
ADDITIONAL BENCH
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH
Misc. Application No.537 of 2024
In/and
Revision Petition No.33 of 2024
Date of Institution : 05.04.2024
Date of Reserve : 20.05.2024
Date of Decision : 24.05.2024
Diwan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (Now Piramal Capital
Housing Finance Limited) through its Managing Director and other
Directors, A-301 & 302, 3rd Floor, Elante Office Complex, Ram
Darbar, Phase-1, Industrial Area Phase-1, Chandigarh-160002.
Present Revision Petition is being filed through Sh.Ritin Vatrana
aged 39 years, Manager (Legal), Piramal Capital Housing Finance
Limited (erstwhile Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd.), 6-8,
Raksha Business Centre, Ambala- Chandigarh Highway, Zirakpur,
SAS Nagar, Punjab.
.....Revisionist/Opposite party No.1
Versus
1. Anit Sharma son of Sh.O.P.Sharma, Resident of Air Force
Station, Mullanpur Garibdas, Mohali, Punjab.
....Respondent/complainant
2. Mr.Kapil Wadhawan Chairman & Managing Director, DHFL,
Corporate Office, 6th Floor, HDIL Tower, Anant Kanekar Marg
Bandra (East) Mumbai, Regd. Office : Warden House, 2nd
Floor, Sir P.M. Road, Fort, Mumbai-400001.
....Performa respondent/opposite party No.2
Revision Petition under Section 47(1)(b) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against the
order dated 15.11.2022 and 13.03.2024 of the
District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, SAS Nagar, Mohali.
M.A. No.537 of 2024 2
In/and
Revision Petition No 33 of 2024
Quorum:-
Mr.Harinderpal Singh Mahal, Presiding Judicial Member
Mrs.Kiran Sibal, Member Present:-
For the Revisionist : Sh.Vivek Sethi, Advocate HARINDERPAL SINGH MAHAL, PRESIDING JUDICIAL MEMBER This appeal has been preferred by the revisionist - Diwan Housing Finance Corporation Limited against the orders dated 15.11.2022 and 13.03.2024 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, SAS Nagar, Mohali whereby the right to file the written reply of the revisionist/opposite party No.1 has been closed and vide order dated 13.03.2024 the review application has been dismissed.
It would be apposite to mention that hereinafter the parties will be referred, as have been arrayed before the District Commission.
M.A. No.537 of 2024 (Delay)
2. This order will dispose of the application filed with Revision Petition No.33 of 2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 416 days in filing of the appeal.
3. This application is filed by the revisionist/opposite party No.1 on the ground that on 10.06.2022, since the change of name of subsequent concern i.e. Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Ltd. was supposed to be brought on record and was to be included in array of parties, the revisionist-company filed application for change the name of opposite parties/respondents from Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Ltd. to Piramal Capital & Housing M.A. No.537 of 2024 3 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 Finance Ltd. but the said application was not adjudicated till the filing of the appeal. Further submitted that the delay occurred due to non-appearance of the counsel of the appellant/opposite party on various dates and the delay is not intentional and deliberate on the part of the revisionist/opposite party No.1. It is prayed to condone the delay of 416 days in filing of the revision petition.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist at the admission stage and have carefully gone through the documents and record. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to the same.
5. Before proceeding further, it is important to have a look into the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue of condonation of delay in the case reported AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 titled "Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited'. The careful perusal of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been amply clear that in the courts, the condonation of delay should not be taken it lightly and court should see the reasons given by the parties for condoning the delay. As per this law, each and every day has to be explained that why the delay has occurred and there was no mala fide intention of the party for delaying in the proceedings.
6. The facts in the present case reveals that the revisionist/opposite party No.1 has challenged the impugned order dated 15.11.2022, vide which no further opportunity was granted to the revisionist/opposite party No.1 to file the written reply as the ample opportunities were given to them to file the written reply as M.A. No.537 of 2024 4 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 per the time prescribed in the Consumer Protection Act, i.e. 45 days.
7. The case history reveals that firstly the appellants delayed the matter before the District Commission by not filing the written reply within the specified period then when the District Commission declined their request to grant further date they filed the review petition before the District Commission, which was dismissed, vide order dated 13.03.2024. In the review petition also, they challenged the order, vide which the defence of the revisionist/ opposite party was struck off. The review petition was filed by the revisionist/opposite party No.1 despite knowing very well that there is no power with the District Commission to review its own order and as per Section 40 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019, any order can be reviewed where there is an error apparent on the face of it. All the proceedings before the District Commission reflects that the intention of the revisionist/opposite party No.1 is just to prolonging the proceedings of the case and nothing else. Even in the present revision petition, they have come after 416 days and alleged that the delay was not intentional by taking the shelter of the proceedings pending before National Company Law Tribunal (in short 'NCLT') Mumbai in some company petition, which has no relevancy in the case in hand. They have also referred to Section 14 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in their grounds of revision and alleging that no action can be taken against the Corporate Debtor DHFL, which is totally unwarranted and uncalled for because in the complaint filed before the District Commission is M.A. No.537 of 2024 5 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 only qua the refund or adjust the penalty amount, refund/adjust excessive interest charged on the principal amount, settlement of loan account and to charge interest as per RBI guidelines, compensation to the tune of Rs.5,00,000/- and litigation expenses of Rs.1,00,000/-.
8. The above mentioned reliefs apparently shows that this is definitely a consumer dispute of the respondent/complainant with the revisionist/opposite party No.1 which can only be resolved at the Consumer Forum and it has nothing to do anything if any proceedings are pending before the NCLT.
9. From the perusal of the application as well as record we found that there is no sufficient or reasonable ground has been mentioned that why and how such a huge delay of 416 days occurred in filing of the appeal.
10. The law is very clear that in the condonation of delay a party who is seeking relief has to explain the delay of each and every day with plausible reasons with proof and also to prove that the delay is not caused just to frustrate the claim of the respondent/complainant. As per Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, 45 days period has been granted for filing the appeal/revision, provided, if any, sufficient cause is given for not filing the appeal/revision within the prescribed period, though the sufficient cause has not been defined in the Act because it would vary from the facts and circumstances of each and every case. Even the limitation period for filing the civil suit for recovery is three years, whereas under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, it is two M.A. No.537 of 2024 6 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 years and the complaint can be entertained beyond the period of limitation if sufficient cause is shown. Similarly, the prescribed period for filing the revision is 90 days and the proviso, permits the State Commission to entertain an appeal/revision after the expiry of the limitation period if it has a sufficient ground. This time limit has been prescribed in the Act itself just to expedite the matter in granting the relief to the aggrieved consumers and this cannot be taken as a matter of right and the courts can exercise its powers with discretion to condone the delay with proper explanation.
11. It is so held in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 titled "Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited', as under:
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."
12. We also fortify the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in "Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority", 2011(14) SCC 578 whereby it has been held that while deciding an application for condonation of delay in the cases under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Court has M.A. No.537 of 2024 7 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Act for filing the appeal and revision in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated, if the highly belated petitions are to be entertained.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in another case "Lanka Venkateshwarlu (D) By LRs. Vs. State of A.P. & Others", 2011 (2) RCR Civil -880 (SC), after considering the entire case law on the point of delay, in Para -26 observed as under:-
"Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly".
14. Learned counsel for the revisionist/opposite party No.1 cut a lame excuse that as per Section 14 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 no proceedings can be initiated against the company despite of the fact that the revisionist/opposite party No.1 is appearing before the District Commission to defend their case. This clearly shows that the revisionist/opposite party No. 1 has no sufficient ground to produce to condone the delay.
15. In the application the revisionist/opposite party No.1 has not given any reason with regard to the delay occurred. In our view, the explanation for above delay is not sufficient for condoning the delay. The Consumer Protection Act is a special Act providing M.A. No.537 of 2024 8 In/and Revision Petition No 33 of 2024 special period of limitation to file the appeals/revision. The very purpose of the Act would be defeated in case the delay is condoned without any sufficient ground. Consequently, we find no ground is made out to condone the inordinate delay of 416 days in filing the revision in this case. A legal right is already vested in the OPs by efflux of time, which can be taken away on proof of sufficient ground only. Consequently, there is no merit in the application in condonation of delay and the same is hereby dismissed.
Main Revision
16. Since, the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, hence the revision is barred by time and is ordered to be dismissed as time barred.
(HARINDERPAL SINGH MAHAL) PRESIDING JUDICIAL MEMBER (KIRAN SIBAL) MEMBER May 24th,2024 parmod