Jharkhand High Court
The Union Of India Through The Executive ... vs R.P. Singh on 14 August, 2023
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
M.A. No. 175 of 1997(R)
The Union of India through the Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division
(C.P.W.D.), Ranchi ...... Appellant
Versus
R.P. Singh ...... Respondent
With
M.A. No. 176 of 1997(R)
The Union of India through the Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division
(C.P.W.D.), Ranchi ...... Appellant
Versus
Anil Kumar ...... Respondent
With
M.A. No. 177 of 1997(R)
The Union of India through the Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division
(C.P.W.D.), Ranchi ...... Appellant
Versus
C.C. Virmani ...... Respondent
With
M.A. No. 178 of 1997(R)
The Union of India through the Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division
(C.P.W.D.), Ranchi ...... Appellant
Versus
R.P. Singh ...... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
---------
For the Appellants : Mr. Pratyush Kumar, Advocate
(In all cases)
For the Respondents : Mr. Pradeep Kumar Deomani, Advocate.
( In all cases.)
.................
23/Dated: 14/08/2023
In all these appeals common question of law and facts are involved that is why all the appeals are heard together with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties.
2. Heard Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Pradeep Kumar Deomani, learned counsel for the respondents. M.A. No. 175 of 1997 (R)
3. M.A. No. 175 of 1997 (R) has been filed against the judgement/order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 31 of 2 1996. This case is arising out of a contract bearing Agreement No. 19/RCD/92-93 which was entered into between Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division, C.P.W.D., Ranchi on behalf of the President of India and M/s R. P. Singh for construction of temporary shed and bulk services and development of site for Reserve Battalion for Central Industrial Security Force at Ranchi. The work was to be commenced from 30.07.1992 and to be completed on 29.01.1993. The work was allowed to close on 31.08.1992. By letter dated 11.05.1993 clause 13 of the Agreement was invoked and by the impugned judgment the objection of the appellant under section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was turned down and the award was made rule of the court. M.A. No. 176 of 1997 (R)
4. M.A. No. 176 of 1997 (R) has been filed against the judgement/order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 26 of 1996. This case is arising out of contract bearing Agreement No. 29/RCD/91-92 which was entered into between Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division, C.P.W.D., Ranchi on behalf of the President of India and M/s Anil Kumar for construction of temporary shed and bulk services and development of site for Reserve Battalion for Central Industrial Security Force at Ranchi. The work was to be commenced from 15.02.1992 and ending on 14.11.1992 and to complete the work within nine months. The work was allowed to close on 11.05.1993. By letter dated 11.05.1993 clause 13 of the Agreement was invoked and by the impugned judgment the objection of the appellant under section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was turned down and it was made rule of the court.
M.A. No. 177 of 1997 (R)
5. M.A. No. 177 of 1997 (R) has been filed against the judgement/order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 33 of 1996. This case was arising out of contract Agreement No. 30/RCD/91-92 which was entered into between Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division, C.P.W.D., Ranchi on behalf of the President of India and M/s C.C. Virmani for construction of temporary shed and bulk services and development of site for Reserve Battalion for Central Industrial Security Force at Ranchi. The work was to be commenced on 22.02.1992 3 and to be completed on 21.01.1993. The work was allowed to be closed on 13.08.1992. By letter dated 11.05.1993 clause 13 of the Agreement was invoked and by the impugned judgment the objection of the appellant under section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was turned down and it was made rule of the court. M.A. No. 178 of 1997 (R)
6. M.A. No. 178 of 1997 (R) has been filed against the judgement/order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the learned Sub-Judge, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 32 of 1996. This case is arising out of Agreement No. 28/RCD/91-92 which was entered into between Executive Engineer, Ranchi Central Division, C.P.W.D., Ranchi on behalf of the President of India and M/s R.P. Singh for construction of temporary shed and bulk services and development of site for Reserve Battalion for Central Industrial Security Force at Ranchi. The work was to be commenced from 15.02.1992 and to be completed by 14.02.1993. The work was to be allowed to close on 13.08.1992. By letter dated 11.05.1993 clause 13 of the Agreement was invoked and by the impugned judgment the objection of the appellant under section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was turned down and it was made rule of the court.
7. Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the said work was already commenced by way of mobilization and by letter dated 11.05.1993 clause 13 of the agreement was invoked in view of fact that notice was received by the Forest Department disclosing that land in question is of the forest department and without permission that cannot be allowed. He submits that Clause 13 of Agreement provides power to stop the work at any stage and that clause 13 was invoked in view of Forest Department Letter. He submits that learned arbitrator only on the ground of not issuing the said notice on signature of the President of India has turned down the objection and allowed the award in favour of the respondents. He further submits that is wrong interpretation of the learned arbitrator which has been affirmed by the learned court. He submits that in view of Article 299 of the Constitution of India the President of India acts on aid and advice of the cabinet or the Government of India and the said executive engineer was competent person to sign the agreement and the agreement was signed by the said executive 4 engineer and contractors and in view of that he has rightly issued notice in the light of Clause 13 of the said Agreement. By way of referring Section 56 of the Contract Act, he submits that a contract to an act which, after the contract is made and not possible to implement it is invalid. By way of relying the said section he submits that in view of the circumstances, the said clause was rightly invoked. He submits that in view of section 56 of the Contract Act 1872 the finding of the learned arbitrator as well as of the learned court is erroneous. He submits that in view of Article 299 of the Constitution of India if the acceptance of the person duly authorized by the President of India is there that is valid in law. To buttress his argument he relied in the case of "Union of India & Others Vs. N.K. Private Limited and Another" (1973) 3 SCC 388. He relied para 8 of the said judgment which is quoted here-in-below:-
" 8. The crucial question which arises for determination is whether there was a concluded contract, and if there was one, whether the mandatory requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution for entering into a valid and binding contract have been satisfied? It is now settled by this Court that though the words "expressed" and "executed" in Article 299(1) might suggest that it should be by a deed or by a formal written contract, a binding contract by tender and acceptance can also come into existence if the acceptance is by a person duly authorised on this behalf by the President of India. A contract whether by a formal deed or otherwise by persons not authorised by the President cannot be binding and is absolutely void ."
8. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that apparent error is there and the award is improper on incorrect finding and the award can be set aside. To buttress this argument, he relied in the case of " State of Rajasthan Vs. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. and Another" (1994) 6 SCC 485. He refers to para 31 of the said judgment which is quoted here-in-below:-
" 31. A court of competent jurisdiction has both right and duty to decide the lis presented before it for adjudication according to the best understanding of law and facts involved in the lis by the judge presiding over the court. Such decision even if erroneous either in factual determination or application of law correctly, is a valid one and binding inter partes. It does not, therefore, stand to reason that the arbitrator's award will be per se invalid and inoperative for the simple reason that the arbitrator has failed to appreciate the facts and has committed error in appreciating correct legal principle in basing the award. An erroneous decision of a court of law is open to judicial review by way of appeal or revision in accordance with the provisions of law. Similarly, an award rendered by an arbitrator is open to challenge within the parameters of several provisions of the Arbitration Act. Since the arbitrator is a judge by choice of the parties, and more often than not, a person with little or no legal background, the adjudication of disputes by an arbitration by way of an award can be challenged only within the limited scope of several provisions of the Arbitration Act and the legislature in its wisdom has limited the scope and ambit of challenge to an award in the Arbitration Act. Over the decades, judicial decisions have indicated the parameters of such challenge consistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. By and large the courts have disfavoured interference with arbitration award on account of error of law and fact on the score of misappreciation and misreading of the materials on record and have shown definite inclination to preserve the award as far as possible. As reference to arbitration of disputes in commercial and other transactions involving substantial amount has increased in recent times, the courts were impelled to have fresh look on the ambit of challenge to an award by the arbitrator so that the award does not get undesirable immunity. In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not 5 been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of "legal misconduct" of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid. It is necessary, however, to put a note of caution that in the anxiety to render justice to the party to arbitration, the court should not reappraise the evidences intrinsically with a close scrutiny for finding out that the conclusion drawn from some facts, by the arbitrator is, according to the understanding of the court, erroneous. Such exercise of power which can be exercised by an appellate court with power to reverse the finding of fact, is alien to the scope and ambit of challenge of an award under the Arbitration Act. Where the error of finding of facts having a bearing on the award is patent and is easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various possible viewpoints, the interference with award based on erroneous finding of fact is permissible. Similarly, if an award is based by applying a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. In ultimate analysis, it is a question of delicate balancing between the permissible limit of error of law and fact and patently erroneous finding easily demonstrable from the materials on record and application of principle of law forming the basis of the award which is patently erroneous. It may be indicated here that however objectively the problem may be viewed, the subjective element inherent in the judge deciding the problem, is bound to creep in and influence the decision. By long training in the art of dispassionate analysis, such subjective element is, however, reduced to minimum. Keeping the aforesaid principle in mind, the challenge to the validity of the impugned award is to be considered with reference to judicial decisions on the subject."
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that identical issue of section 56 of the Contract Act was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kenneth Builders and Developers Private Limited and Others" (2016) 13 SCC 561 wherein SLP was dismissed. He refers to paras 28 to 31 of the said judgment which is quoted here-in-below:-
"28. Be that as it may, it appears to us that Kenneth Builders did take all necessary steps to commence the construction activity on the project land but due to the impasse created by the governmental agencies, it could not proceed in the development activity. We agree with the learned counsel for Kenneth Builders that under these circumstances, the provisions of Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872 (the Contract Act) would be attracted to the facts of the case.
29. Section 56 of the Contract Act reads as follows:
"56. Agreement to do impossible act.-- An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.
Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful.-- A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful.-- Where one person has promised to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promisee for any loss which such promisee sustains through the non-performance of the promise."
30. The interpretation of Section 56 of the Contract Act came up for consideration in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. [Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44 : 1954 SCR 310] It was held by this Court that the word "impossible" used in Section 56 of the Contract Act has not been used in the sense of physical or literal impossibility. It ought to be interpreted as impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose that the parties had in view when they entered into the contract. This impracticability or uselessness could arise due to some intervening or supervening circumstance which the parties had not contemplated. However, if the intervening circumstance was contemplated by the parties, then the contract would stand despite the occurrence of such circumstance. In such an event, "there can be no case of 6 frustration because the basis of the contract being to demand performance despite the happening of a particular event, it cannot disappear when that event happens". This is what this Court had to say: (AIR pp. 46-49, paras 9-10 & 17) "9. The first paragraph of the section lays down the law in the same way as in England. It speaks of something which is impossible inherently or by its very nature, and no one can obviously be directed to perform such an act. The second paragraph enunciates the law relating to discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done. The wording of this paragraph is quite general, and though the illustrations attached to it are not at all happy, they cannot derogate from the general words used in the enactment.
This much is clear that the word "impossible" has not been used here in the sense of physical or literal impossibility. The performance of an act may not be literally impossible but it may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose which the parties had in view; and if an untoward event or change of circumstances totally upsets the very foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, it can very well be said that the promisor finds it impossible to do the act which he promised to do.
10. Although various theories have been propounded by the Judges and jurists in England regarding the juridical basis of the doctrine of frustration, yet the essential idea upon which the doctrine is based is that of impossibility of performance of the contract; in fact impossibility and frustration are often used as interchangeable expressions. The changed circumstances, it is said, make the performance of the contract impossible and the parties are absolved from the further performance of it as they did not promise to perform an impossibility.
The parties shall be excused, as Lord Loreburn says [F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. Ltd., (1916) 2 AC 397 (HL)] : (Tamplin case [F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. Ltd., (1916) 2 AC 397 (HL)] , AC p. 406) '... If substantially the whole contract becomes impossible of performance or in other words impracticable by some cause for which neither was responsible.' ***
17. It must be pointed out here that if the parties do contemplate the possibility of an intervening circumstance which might affect the performance of the contract, but expressly stipulate that the contract would stand despite such circumstance, there can be no case of frustration because the basis of the contract being to demand performance despite the happening of a particular event, it cannot disappear when that event happens. As Lord Atkinson said in Matthey v. Curling [Matthey v. Curling, (1922) 2 AC 180 (HL)] : (AC p.
234) '... a person who expressly contracts absolutely to do a thing not naturally impossible is not excused for non-performance because of being prevented by the act of God or the King's enemies ... or vis major.' This being the legal position, a contention in the extreme form that the doctrine of frustration as recognised in English law does not come at all within the purview of Section 56 of the Contract Act cannot be accepted."(emphasis supplied).
31. Insofar as the present case is concerned, DDA certainly did not contemplate a prohibition on construction activity on the project land which would fall within the Ridge or had morphological similarity to the Ridge. It is this circumstance that frustrated the performance of the contract in the sense of making it impracticable of performance."
10. On the other hand, Mr. P.K. Deomani learned counsel for the respondents appearing in all the appeals submits that in M.A. No. 175/1997 (R) the agreement was entered on 30.07.1992, date of commencement was 30.07.1992 and date of completion was 29.01.1993. He further submits that in M.A. No. 176/1997 (R) the agreement was entered on 15.02.1992, date of commencement was 15.02.1992 and date of completion was 14.11.1992. He further submits that in M.A. No. 177/1997 (R) the agreement was entered on 22.02.1992, date of commencement was 22.02.1992 and date of completion was 21.01.1993. He further submits that in M.A. No. 178/1997(R) the agreement was entered on 15.02.1992, date of commencement 7 was 15.02.1992 and date of completion was 14.02.1993. He submits that on 11.08.1992 the Divisional Forest Officer issued letter about the forest land and the executive engineer issued the letter dated 13/31.08.1992 in all the respective cases for stopping the work. He submits that by way of letter dated 11.05.1993, the executive engineer invoking clause 13 of the agreement notified about the closure of the work. He submits that the learned arbitrator as well as learned court rightly interpreted clause 13 of the agreement and held that after date of completion the clause 13 was invoked. The said Clause 13 was not invoked by the President of India and the clause 13 of agreement speaks of invoking the same after commencement of the work. He submits that work was not started in that view of the matter the learned arbitrator as well as learned court has rightly interpreted clause 13 of the agreement. He submits that in this background at this stage, the court may not interfere with the case as the apparent error is not there. To buttress this argument he relied in the case of "State of Orissa and Another Vs. Kalinga Construction Co. (P) Ltd." (1970) 2 SCC 861. He relied para 9 and 10 of the said judgment which is quoted hereinbelow:-
"9. A bare perusal of the judgment of Misra, J., would show that he decided the matter as if he was entertaining an appeal against the award itself. He re-examined and re-appraised the evidence which had been considered by the arbitrator and held that the arbitrator was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the work was contemplated by the contract to be done by manual labour alone. According to him under the agreement payment for machine leads was contemplated from the very beginning or at any rate was not excluded. He examined a large volume of evidence, including Ext. P-6 as also the oral evidence of the Chief Engineer, Shri Kanwar Sain, and held that from the course of correspondence it was clear that in dealing with the contractor or the Executive Engineer almost all the letters on behalf of the Chief Engineer were being dealt with by the Superintending Engineer. Once Ext. P-6 was admitted to be genuine and was issued by the Superintending Engineer in the ordinary course of correspondence it was for the appellant to establish by production of the relevant records that that letter had been issued without authority of the Chief Engineer. Misra, J., had no hesitation in holding that Ext. P-6 was written under the authority of the Chief Engineer and was binding between the parties. Here again what Misra, J., did was to appreciate the evidence which had been considered by the arbitrator, in particular, the testimony of the Chief Engineer. The arbitrator had believed the statement of the Chief Engineer that Ext. P-6 had neither been issued under his authority nor with his approval. Once this part of his statement was believed by the arbitrator it was not open to Misra, J., to sit in appeal over the conclusion of the arbitrator in proceedings for setting aside the award.
10. The other serious error into which Misra, J., fell was to record a finding on the payment for extra leads beyond 10″ in reversal of the conclusion of the arbitrator. This is what the learned Judge proceeded to say:
"The next point for consideration is whether the payments for extra leads beyond 10" are to be rejected because the Chief Engineer's order in writing had not been obtained before the work involving additional leads was executed. Both under Ext. P-2 and Ext. P-69 this term had been incorporated. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, it must be taken that the condition had been fulfilled even though there was no order in writing. It was for the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer, who were getting the work done by the company, to obtain the order in writing or not to allow the company, to work beyond 10″ leads, including lifts, without obtaining the order of the Chief Engineer in writing."
Once it was found that under the terms of the contract the order of the Chief Engineer in 8 writing had to be obtained before the work involving additional leads was executed and in the absence of any such written order it was not open to the court to hold that the appellant -- Union of India -- was liable for payment of extra leads beyond 10″ by applying some principle or rule analogous to estoppel. It is no doubt true that the company had been writing to the Engineering Department in the matter and that the latter did not, for a considerable time, send any reply but the company was debarred from asking for any additional payment in the absence of the Chief Engineer's order in writing. If the arbitrator came to that conclusion it could not be said that there was any error apparent in his award which would justify setting it aside"
11. On these grounds he submits that these appeals may be dismissed.
12. In view of above submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the court has gone through the judgment of the learned arbitrator as well as learned court. Admittedly, in all these cases agreements were entered into between the Executive Engineer CPWD, Ranchi as well as respective contractors who are respondents in the present appeals. The date of commencement of the work of the respective cases contracts are disclosed as noted hereinabove and the completion of time was also there in view of contracts. Admittedly the work was stopped by the Executive Engineer in view of letter issued by the Divisional Forest Officer, Ranchi stating that the land in question was forest land that is why the said works were stopped. The entire case is based on Clause 13 of the said agreement. For correct appreciation of the case Clause 13 of the Agreement is quoted here-in-below:-
" If at any time after the commencement of the work the President of India shall for any reason whatsoever not require the whole work thereof as specific in the tender to be carried out the Engineer-in-Charge shall give notice in writing of the fact to the contractor who shall have do claim to any payment of compensation whatsoever on account of any profit or advantange which he might have derive in consequence of the full amount of the work not having been carried out, neither shall have any claim for compensation by reason of any alteration having been made in the original specifications drawings and instructions which shall involve any curtailment of the work as originally contemplated. Provided that the contractor shall be paid the charges on the carriage only of materials actually and bonafidely brought to the site of the work by the contractor and rendered surplus as a result of abandonment recurtailment of the work of any partition thereof and then tkane back by the contractor, provided, however, that the Engineer-in-Charge shall have in such cases the opinion of taking over all or any such materials at their purchase price of at a local current rates whichever may be less."
13. Looking into the said clause, it appears that power is there of stopping the whole work if the circumstances is there. In the case in hand the letter of the D.F.O., Ranchi is the reason for stopping the work and the said clause was invoked by the executive engineer by letter dated 11.05.1993. Thus, it is clear that it was beyond the control of the executive engineer to go ahead with the work as in terms of the agreement and he has invoked clause 13 of the agreement. Further the agreement was entered into between the executive engineer and the respective contractors and if 9 the said execution of the agreement is not in dispute which has been accepted by the respondent on the ground of not issuing the same by the President of India, is not tenable as the officers authorized act on behalf of President of India. Thus, the finding of the learned arbitrator as well as learned court is not based on the correct appreciation of the Article 299 of the Constitution of India. The case of the appellants is strengthen in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.K. Private Limited (supra). In the case in hand the work was not completed which was beyond the control of the appellants and in view of that Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872 comes into play. Section 56 of the Contract Act, 1872 is quoted here-in-below:-
"56. Agreement to do impossible act.-An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.
Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful.-A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful", Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful.-Where one person has promised to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, might have own, and such which the promise did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promisee for any loss promisee sustains through the non-performance of the promise."
14. Looking into the said section it transpires that if a contract has become impossible even after entering into the contract it can be held void and this aspect of the matter has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Keneeth Builders" (supra) . If there is apparent error and finding is erroneous and applied principle of law which is patently erroneous, the award can be interfered with as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Puri Construction Co. Ltd. (supra). Thus the Court finds that the learned arbitrator as well as learned court has not interpreted Clause 13 of the said agreement in its correct perspective and clause 13 was invoked which was beyond the control of the appellants as in view of law of the letter of the Forest Department and a party cannot be allowed to probate of a contract according to his own convenience that is well settled principle of law. The judgment relied of Mr. Deomani in the case of 'Kalinga Construction Co. (P.) Ltd. (supra) in not in dispute. In the facts and circumstances of that case that order was passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and said judgment was diluted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of "Puri 10 Construction Co. Ltd. (supra). Thus, this judgment is not helping the respondents.
15. In view of above facts, reasons and analysis the judgment and award needs interfered with since the Court finds that to remand the matter at this stage will unnecessarily amount due harassment of both sides. Further, the respondent herein has mobilized the work and has brought material at site and in view of that respondents are entitled at least for that in terms of the agreement and the awarded amounts are very meagre. Accordingly, the awarded amount shall be paid to the respondents in respective cases without interest as has been directed by the learned arbitrator as well as the court. Accordingly, the judgment and award of the learned arbitrator as well as learned court is modified to the above extent.
16. The awarded amount of Rs. 2,53,551/- (in M.A. No. 175/1997), Rs. 2,04,349/- (in M.A. No. 176/1997), Rs. 2,65,562/- (in M.A. No. 177/1997) and Rs. 1,92,617/- (in M.A. No. 178/1997) shall be released in favour of the respondents within three months without interest.
17. These appeals are allowed and disposed of. Pending, I.A, if any, stands disposed of.
18. Let L.C.R. be sent to the concerned court forthwith.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/