Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal
Kopertek Metals Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner, Cgst-Delhi West on 25 November, 2024
CUSTOMS, EXCISE & SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
NEW DELHI
PRINCIPAL BENCH, COURT NO. I
EXCISE APPEAL NO. 52178 OF 2022
(Arising out of Order-in-Original No. 42/2022-CE dated 14.06.2022 passed by the
Additional Director General (Adjudication)
M/s Kopertek Metals Pvt. Ltd. ......Appellant
SP-238, Kahrani
Bhiwadi Extension, Industrial Area,
Bhiwadi, Rajasthan
VERSUS
Commissioner of CGST (West) ......Respondent
4TH & 5TH Floor, EIL Annexe Building
Plot 2B, Bhikaji Cama Place,
New Delhi - 110066
WITH
55711/2023 55741/2023 52207/2022 52208/2022 52209/2022 52210/2022
52179/2022 53917/2023 53916/2023 51826/2021 51794/2021 55710/2023
55520/2023 50267/2024 50269/2024 55776/2023 55492/2023 55777/2023
55104/2023 50457/2024 50553/2024 50554/2024 55167/2023 55713/2023
50173/2024 55567/2023 55493/2023 54810/2023 55564/2023 50084/2024
54854/2023 50271/2024 50273/2024 50547/2024 55486/2023 54696/2023
55769/2023 55315/2023 55568/2023 55595/2023 55407/2023 55565/2023
55522/2023 55316/2023 55226/2023 50178/2024 55705/2023 55707/2023
55669/2023 50217/2024 55523/2023 50067/2024 50274/2024 50275/2024
55158/2023 50458/2024 55521/2023 55570/2023 55517/2023 50034/2024
50035/2024 55235/2023 55665/2023 50177/2024 50097/2024 50102/2024
50546/2024 55518/2023 50281/2024 50268/2024 55679/2023 50164/2024
50570/2024 55188/2023 50284/2024 50283/2024 55678/2023 55410/2023
55558/2023 55412/2023 53972/2023 55571/2023 55411/2023 55067/2023
55069/2023 55680/2023 55555/2023 54690/2023 54693/2023 54872/2023
55563/2023 55682/2023 55515/2023 54783/2023 55272/2023 55163/2023
55513/2023 50265/2024 50266/2024 55557/2023 55519/2023 54870/2023
55566/2023 50594/2024 55559/2023 55677/2023 55246/2023 55270/2023
55269/2023 50184/2024 50185/2024 50183/2024 50069/2024 55443/2023
50068/2024 50066/2024 50063/2024 50065/2024 55314/2023 50171/2024
55385/2023 55386/2023 50441/2024 50187/2024 50193/2024 50078/2024
55472/2023 50005/2024 50212/2024 50174/2024 55165/2023 55166/2023
55282/2023 55286/2023 55298/2023 55283/2023 55155/2023 55213/2023
55287/2023 55297/2023 55284/2023 55277/2023 55237/2023 55252/2023
55243/2023 55279/2023 55666/2023 50278/2024 50279/2024 55278/2023
55225/2023 55421/2023 55420/2023 55238/2023 55280/2023 55244/2023
55245/2023 55236/2023 55234/2023 50135/2020 50134/2020 50614/2020
50615/2020 50136/2020 52290/2022 52289/2022 50186/2024 55681/2023
50085/2024 50277/2024 50276/2024 55543/2023 50076/2024 50077/2024
55859/2023 55858/2023 55539/2023 50222/2024 50309/2024 50226/2024
50264/2024 50272/2024 50223/2024 50225/2024 50359/2024 50294/2024
50270/2024 50369/2024 50280/2024 50282/2024 50356/2024 50360/2024
50362/2024 50363/2024 50290/2024 50365/2024 50291/2024 50357/2024
50361/2024 50364/2024 51535/2022 52117/2022 52014/2024 52015/2024
52016/2024 52017/2024 52018/2024 52019/2024 55811/2023
2
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
APPEARANCE :
Shri Ashish Bhatt, Shri Piyush Kumar, Shri Sharad Srivastav, Ms. Reena
Rawat, Shri Naveen Mullick, Shri Parth Mullick, Shri V.S. Negi, Shri V.K.
Gupta, Ms. Sangeeta Rani, Ms. Gunjan Tanwar, Shri Abhishek Jaju, Shri S.
Sunil, Shri Devesh Tripathi, Shri Ashish Parashar, Shri Ajay Kumar,
Advocates and Shri P. Pathak, Consultant of the appellants
Shri Rakesh Agarwal, Shri Ratnesh Kumar Mishra and Shri S.K. Ray,
authorized representatives for the department
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA, PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. P.V. SUBBA RAO, MEMBER (TECHNICAL)
DATE OF HEARING : 15.10.2024
DATE OF DECISION: 25.11.2024
FINAL ORDER NO's. 59511-59720/2024
JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA :
Excise Appeal No. 52178 of 2022 has been filed by M/s.
Kopertek Metals Pvt. Ltd. 1 to assail the common order dated
14.06.2022 passed by the Additional Director General (Adjudication) 2
disallowing CENVAT credit and confirming the demand under the
provisions of rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 3 read with
section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 4 with interest and
penalty.
2. At the time of hearing of the appeals, learned counsel
appearing for Kopertek raised three issues and submitted that in the
event these issues are decided against Kopertek, they will make
submissions on merit. Learned counsel appearing for other appellants
also made submissions on these three issues.
1. Kopertek
2. the Adjudicating Authority
3. the Credit Rules
4. the Central Excise Act
3
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
3. The three issues that arise for consideration in these appeals,
basis the provisions of the Central Excise Act will, therefore, be dealt
with at this stage and they are:
(i) The order impugned deserves to be set aside for the
reason that the Central Excise Officer determined the
amount of duty under sub-section (10) of section
11A of the Central Excise Act beyond the period
prescribed under sub-section (11) of section 11A of
the Central Excise Act;
(ii) The provisions of section 36B of the Central Excise
Act were not adhered to for admissibility of electronic
evidence; and
(iii) The provisions of section 9D of the Central Excise Act
relating to relevance of statements under certain
circumstances were not complied with.
4. The first issue that has been raised by the learned counsel for
Kopertek and the learned counsel appearing for the other appellants
that the impugned orders deserve to be set aside for the sole reason
that the Central Excise Officer did not determine the amount of duty
of excise under sub-section (10) of section 11A within the period
stipulated in sub-section (11) of section 11A shall be examined first,
because in the event this issue is decided in favour of the appellants,
it may not be necessary to examine the other two issues that have
been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants.
5. To examine this issue, it would be appropriate to reproduce
sub-sections (10) and (11) of section 11A.
6. Sub-section (10) of section 11A is as follows:
4
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
"11A(10) The Central Excise Officer shall, after
allowing the concerned person an opportunity of being
heard, and after considering the representation, if any,
made by such person, determine the amount of duty of
excise due from such person not being in excess of the
amount specified in the notice."
7. Sub-section (11) of section 11A, was thrice amended, and is
reproduced, as it stood during the relevant period:
From 28.04.15 to 13.05.2015
11A(11) The Central Excise Officer shall determine the
amount of duty of excise under sub-section (10) -
(a) within six months from the date of notice where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (1);
(b) within one year from the date of notice, where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5).
From 14.05.2015 to 13.05.2016
11A(11) The Central Excise Officer shall determine the
amount of duty of excise under sub-section (10) -
(a) within six months from the date of notice where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (1);
(b) within one year from the date of notice, where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (4).
From 14.05.2016 upto 29.03.2018
11A(11) The Central Excise Officer shall determine the
amount of duty of excise under sub-section (10) -
(a) within six months from the date of notice where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (1);
(b) within two years from the date of notice, where it
is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (4).
5
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
8. The facts relating to the Excise Appeal filed by Kopertek shall
be referred to, as the facts of this appeal were placed at length by the
learned counsel for Kopertek and the learned authorized
representative for the department.
9. The show cause notice in this appeal was issued on
28.04.2015 by the Principal Additional Director General. It was
adjudicated on 14.06.2022 by the Adjudicating Authority. As the
notice was issued on 28.04.2015, it would be governed by the
provisions of sub-section (11) of section 11A, as it stood during the
period from 28.04.2015 to 13.05.2015. Sub-section (11) of section
11A, as it stood during this period, provided that the Central Excise
Officer shall determine the amount of duty within six months from the
date of notice, where it was possible to do so, in respect of cases
falling under sub-section (1). However, in respect of cases falling
under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5), the Central Excise Officer
shall determine the amount of duty within one year from the date of
notice, where it is possible to do so. The show cause notice in this
appeal was issued under sub-section (4) of section 11A. Thus, the
Central Excise Officer had to determine the amount of duty within one
year from the date of notice, where it was possible to do so.
10. The learned authorized representative appearing for the
department has, in the written submissions, provided a date and
event chart regarding the proceedings undertaken by the Adjudicating
Authority pursuant to the issuance of the show cause notice. It is
reproduced below:
6
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
Date Event
28.04.2015 Show cause notice issued requiring the noticee to show cause within
30 days, failing which the case would be decided ex parte without
any further communication.
07.09.2016 1st personal hearing fixed. Only M/s. Arihant Trading and Metals
requested for supply of Relied Upon Documents
22.02.2018 Cross-examination allowed. However, none of the witness appeared
10.04.2018 Cross-examination allowed
11.04.2018 Cross-examination allowed
17.04.2018 Cross-examination allowed
20.09.2018 Cross-examination allowed
04.04.2019 Cross-examination allowed
17.06.2019 Cross-examination allowed
17.10.2019 Cross-examination allowed
20.10.2019 Cross-examination adjournment
12.01.2021 Cross-examination allowed
22.03.2021 Cross-examination allowed. Counsel was not available
26.07.2021 2nd Personal Hearing. Counsel requested for postponement
24.08.2021 3rd Personal Hearing. Counsel requested for adjournment
24.09.2021 4th Personal Hearing. KMPL and others filed written submission
14.06.2022 Impugned order was issued
11. What is important to note is that the show cause notice that
was issued on 28.04.2015 was required to be adjudicated latest by
27.04.2016; the first personal hearing was fixed by the Adjudicating
Authority almost after five months from 27.04.2016 on 07.09.2016;
dates for cross-examination were fixed from 22.02.2018 to
22.03.2021; personal hearings were held on 26.07.2021, 24.08.2021
and 24.09.2021; and the order was passed by the Adjudicating
Authority on 14.06.2022.
12. It was incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority to
determine the amount of duty within one year from 28.04.2015,
where it was possible to do so. The discussion and findings in the
impugned order start from paragraph 117 but no reason has been
given in the impugned order by the Adjudicating Authority for not
7
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
being able to determine the duty within the stipulated period of one
year from the date of issuance of the show cause notice.
13. Learned authorized representative appearing for the
department has, however, submitted that the adjudication was
completed within nine months from the completion of the last hearing
on 24.09.2021. Prior to this hearing, it was incumbent upon the
Adjudicating Authority to "scrupulously adhere to the principles of
natural justice by giving ample opportunities to the noticees to make
their written submissions, allow cross-examination and opportunities
for personal hearing" as contemplated in section 33A of the Central
Excise Act. Learned authorized representative submitted that if the
adjudication was completed without providing the aforesaid
opportunities, Koperek could have raised an issue relating to violation
of principles of natural justice. Learned authorized representative also
submitted that the time limit of one year specified in sub-section (11)
of section 11A is not mandatory in nature, but is merely directory
which is explicit from the use of the words "where it is possible to do
so". Learned authorized representative also placed reliance upon
certain decisions, to which reference shall be made at the appropriate
stage.
14. Learned counsel for Kopertek, however, submitted that the
department has not been able to substantiate that the Adjudicating
Authority was prevented by "such circumstances or insurmountable
exigencies" from concluding the adjudication proceedings within the
stipulated period contemplated under sub-section (11) of section 11A.
In this connection, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment
of the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union
8
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
of India 5, wherein the provisions of section 28(9) of the Customs
Act, 1962 6, which also require the proper officer to determine the
amount of duty within a specified period, when it was possible to do
so. Learned counsel placed reliance upon certain other decisions of
High Courts, to which reference shall be made at the appropriate
stage.
15. The said submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant and the learned authorized representative appearing for the
department have been considered.
16. The provisions of sub-section (11) of section 11A of the
Central Excise Act have been reproduced above. Sub-section (9) of
section 28 of the Customs Act which came up for consideration before
the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group, therefore, requires to be
reproduced. It was amended on 29.03.2018. The said sub-section, as
it stood prior to amendment, is reproduced below:
"28(9) The proper officer shall determine the
amount of duty or interest under sub-section (8), -
(a) within six months from the date of notice,
where it is possible to do so, in respect of
case falling under clause (a) of sub- section
(1);
(b) within one year from the date of notice,
where it is possible to do so in respect of
cases falling under sub-section (4)"
(emphasis supplied)
17. Section 28(9) and (9A) of the Customs Act, after the said
amendment, read as under:
5. 2023 (386) E.L.T. 356 (Del.)
6. the Customs Act
9
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
"28(9) The proper officer shall determine the amount
of duty or interest under sub-section (8), --
(a) within six months from the date of notice, in
respect of case falling under clause (a) of sub-
section (1);
(b) within one year from the date of notice, [xxx]
in respect of cases falling under sub-section
(4):
Provided that where the proper officer fails to do so
determine within the specified period, any officer senior
in rank to the proper officer may, having regard to the
circumstances under which the proper officer was
prevented from determining the amount of duty or
interest under sub-section (8), extend the period
specified in clause (a) to a further period of six months
and the period specified in clause (b) to a further period
of one year:
Provided further that where the proper officer fails to
determine within such extended period, such
proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded as if no
notice had been issued.
28(9A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (9), where the proper officer is unable to
determine the amount of duty or interest under sub-
section (8) for the reason that --
(a) an appeal in a similar matter of the same
person or any other person is pending before
the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court or the
Supreme Court; or
(b) an interim order of stay has been issued by the
Appellate Tribunal or the High Court or the
Supreme Court; or
(c) the Board has, in a similar matter, issued
specific direction or order to keep such matter
pending; or
(d) the Settlement Commission has admitted an
application made by the person concerned,
the proper officer shall inform the person
concerned the reason for non-determination of
10
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
the amount of duty or interest under sub-
section (8) and in such case, the time specified
in sub-section (9) shall apply not from the date
of notice, but from the date when such reason
ceases to exist"
18. In the context of the un-amended provisions of section 28(9)
of the Customs Act, which are pari materia to sub-section (11) of
section 11A of the Central Excise Act, the Delhi High Court made the
following observations:
"31. Therefore, the question, which requires
consideration now is whether in terms of
erstwhile Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, the
impugned SCN dated 14-2-2018 has lapsed
having not been adjudicated within the period of
12 months. In other words, whether in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, it was not
possible for the Revenue to adjudicate the
impugned SCN within the period of 12 months
from the date of issuance.
32. The unamended Section 28(9) of the Customs Act,
specifically provides that the proper officer 'shall'
determine the amount of duty within six months or
within one year, as the case may be, from the date of
notice. It only provides certain degree of inbuilt
flexibility by incorporating the words 'where it is
possible to do so'.
33. The phrases "as far as possible" and "as far
as practicable" appear in other statutes as well
came up for consideration before the Apex Court
in C.N. Paramasivam and Another v. Sunrise Plaza
: (2013) 9 SCC 460/[2013] 30 taxmann.com 320
(SC). It is observed that the words "possible" and
"practicable" are more or less interchangeable along
with the other words such as feasible, performable etc.
The incorporation of such words gives certain
degree of flexibility to the Department such as if
some circumstances or insurmountable
exigencies arise, which makes the recourse
unpracticable or not possible, the authorities can
11
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
deviate from what was required to be done in
terms of the statute. When the challenge is laid to
the act of the authorities deviating from the rule, the
onus shifts on the authority to prove that it was not
practicable or possible to follow the rule. The same is to
be adjudicated on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
34. The flexibility, at the same time, in our
opinion, cannot be equated with the lethargy of
the Department or its officers. The Legislature
has mandated the show cause notices to be
adjudicated within six months or one year as the
case may be; it has provided flexibility only to the
extent that if the same is not practicable/possible
the period can be extended. The phrase 'where it
is possible to do so' would only mean that
wherever it is not practicable/possible to do
certain act, the period can be extended. The
same, however, cannot be an endless period
without any plausible justification."
(emphasis supplied)
19. The Delhi High Court then relied upon an earlier decision of
the Delhi High Court in Sundar System Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of
India 7 and observed:
"40. It is apparent from the documents and the
timelines reflects by them that no sincere efforts
have been made by the Department for
adjudicating the impugned SCN. Despite being
aware of the provisions of the Customs Act, admittedly,
no steps were taken by the Department from 29-4-
2019 that is the date, the Adjudicating Officer sent a
letter to DRI seeking certain clarifications of the
documents, and 15-10-2020 when they issued another
letter granting personal hearing to the petitioners. It
is, thus, admitted that the Department for almost
a period of 17 months slept over the matter
despite the specific mandate of even the
unamended Section 28(9) of the Customs Act that
7. 2020 (33) G.S.T.L. 621 (Del.)
12
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
the duty shall be levied within a period of 12
months from the date of issuance of the notice.
41. It is also significant to note that the record of
personal hearing dated 9-2-2021 specifically notes that
the advocate appearing for the noticee had reiterated
its written submissions dated February, 2019. The
impugned SCN is stated to have been kept in abeyance
thereafter pursuant to the circular dated 17-3-2021.
42. The respondent has merely produced various
letters received from the petitioner, DRI, and others,
and has contended that some adjournments were
asked for by the petitioners. Admittedly, the matter
was listed from time to time for a personal hearing.
However, no justification has been provided as to why
it was not possible for the Department to determine the
amount of Customs duty within the prescribed period of
time.
43. We have perused the documents and letters
produced by the Department as referred above. It
is seen that for a period of almost three years,
various letters were exchanged. The matter was
fixed for personal hearing on more than five
occasions. No reason has been provided as to why
the hearings were not concluded on the said
dates and the duties payable, if any, were not
determined.
****
46. In our view, there is no material to show that it was not possible for the proper officer to determine the amount of duty within the prescribed period. The mention of the words, "where it is not possible to do so", in our opinion, does not enable the Department to defer the determination of the notices for an indeterminate period of time. The Legislature in its wisdom has provided a specific period for the authority to discharge its functions. The indifference of the concerned officer to complete the adjudication within the time period as mandated, cannot be condoned to the detriment of the assessee. Such indifference is 13 E/52178/22 & 209 ors not only detrimental to the interest of the taxpayer but also to the exchequer.
47. In the absence of any ground that it was not possible for the officer to determine the amount of duty within the prescribed period, the impugned SCN has lapsed and cannot be adjudicated."
(emphasis supplied)
20. It would be seen from the aforesaid judgment of the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group that the High Court made it amply clear that the incorporation of words like "where it is possible to do so"
merely give a certain degree of flexibility to the department where there are circumstances or insurmountable exigencies which make it impracticable or not possible for the authorities to adjudicate, and in such cases the authorities can deviate from the time limit provided in the Statute. The High Court further held that when the legislature has specifically provided flexibility only to the extent that it was not practicable/possible to adjudicate within the stipulated time, the period can be extended only on satisfaction of such circumstances.
The Delhi High Court specifically observed that the phrase "where it is possible to do so" would only mean wherever it is not practicable/possible to do a certain act, the period can be extended but the same cannot provide endless time limit to the department without any plausible justification.
21. The provisions of sub-section (11) of section 11A of the Central Excise Act also came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in GPI Textiles 14 E/52178/22 & 209 ors Limited vs. Union of India 8 and the relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:
"17. Section 11A(11) of the Act provides that Central Excise Officer shall determine the amount of duty within six months in case notice has been under sub- section 1 thereof, whereas in the case of fraud, collusion, etc., the period prescribed is one year. No doubt, the words 'where it is possible to do so' have been used, however, that will not stretch the period to decades as is in the cases in hand.
18. In Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk P. Union Limited's case (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court upheld a Division Bench judgment of this Court where opinion expressed was that where no period of limitation is provided for exercise of any power, any notice issued more than five years thereafter was held to be unreasonable.
19. For the reasons mentioned above, we find that the notices in the present cases having been issued more than decade back and the proceedings having not been concluded within reasonable time, the same deserves to be quashed."
22. The Delhi High Court in Nanu Ram Goyal vs. Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise, Delhi 9 considered the provisions of section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 10. At the relevant time, this section did not provide for determination of the amount of service tax by the Central Excise Officer within a certain period, since sub-section (4B) of section 73 was introduced in the Finance Act w.e.f. 06.08.2014. Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act provides that the Central Excise Officer shall determine the amount of service tax within six months from the date of notice where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under sub-section (1) of section 73 and
8. 2018 (362) E.L.T. 388 (P & H)
9. 2023 (74) G.S.T.L. 17 (Del.)
10. the Finance Act 15 E/52178/22 & 209 ors within one year from the date of notice where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub-section (1) or the proviso to sub-section (4A) of section 73 of the Finance Act. It is in this context that the Delhi High Court, after referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Government of India vs. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras & ors. 11 and State of Punjab & ors. vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. 12, observed:
"16. As noticed at the outset, the principal controversy to be addressed is whether the respondents are precluded from proceeding with the impugned show cause notice on the ground of inordinate delay.
17. Section 73 of the Act, as in force at the material time, did not stipulate any time period. However, by virtue of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014, sub-section (4B) was introduced in Section 73 of the Act which stipulates that where it is possible to pass an order, the Central Excise Officer would determine the amount of service tax within a period of one year in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub-section (1) or the proviso to sub-section (4A), and within a period of six months from the date of notice in cases falling under Section 73(1) of the Act.
*****
19. It is settled law that where there is no period stipulated for exercising jurisdiction, the same must be done within a reasonable period. In Government of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras & Ors. [(1989) 3 SCC 483 = 1989 (42) E.L.T. 515 (S.C.) = 1989 taxmann.com 618 (SC)], the Supreme Court had observed as under :
"6. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents urged that Rule 12 is unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it
11. 1989 (42) E.L.T. 515 (S.C.)
12. 2007 (217) E.L.T. 325 (S.C.) 16 E/52178/22 & 209 ors does not provide for any period of limitation for the recovery of duty. He urged that in the absence of any prescribed period for recovery of the duty as contemplated by Rule 12, the officer may act arbitrarily in recovering the amount after lapse of long period of time. We find no substance in the submission. While it is true that Rule 12 does not prescribe any period within which recovery of any duty as contemplated by the Rule is to be made, but that by itself does not render the Rule unreasonable or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the absence of any period of limitation it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period, would depend upon the facts of each case. Whenever a question regarding the inordinate delay in issuance of notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the assessee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the relevant officer to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case notice or demand for recovery was made within reasonable period. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case."
20. In a later decision in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. [(2007) 11 SCC 363 = 2007 (217) E.L.T. 325 (S.C.)], the Supreme Court had reiterated the aforesaid principle in the following words :
"18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors."
21. As noted above, Section 73 of the Act, as in force at the material time, did not stipulate any period within which the show cause notice was required to be adjudicated. It merely stipulated the period within which the show cause notice was required to be issued. However, there is no cavil that the authority conferred with the jurisdiction is required to exercise the same within a reasonable period. *****"
(emphasis supplied) 17 E/52178/22 & 209 ors
23. In UPL Ltd. vs. Union of India 13, the Bombay High Court also examined a case where a show cause notice was issued on 21.10.2010 before the insertion of sub-section (4B) to section 73 of the Finance Act but was not adjudicated for a long period of thirteen years and in this context observed:
"4. We were constrained to make the above observations as we take judicial notice of series of petitions reaching this Court on the ground that the concerned jurisdictional officers exercising such enormous powers not only under the Finance Act, 1994, but also under the other Central Acts, for reasons which are totally ill- conceived and contrary to law, have not adjudicated and/or taken forward the show cause notice for unduly long periods and in some case about 10 years. In our opinion, a serious view in this regard is required to be taken by the Ministry of Finance in regard to the officers who are not diligently discharging such vital duties and who in fact are playing with the public revenue. In such context, in our decision in Coventry Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner CGST and Central Excise & Anr. [Writ Petition No. 4082 of 2022, decided on 25 July, 2023] [(2023) 10 Centax 38 (Bom.)] which concerned delayed adjudication of a show cause notice, considering the binding statutory provisions, we have observed that such lethargic approach of the concerned officer not to adjudicate show cause notice within the time-frame as prescribed by law, would be an action on the part of the concerned officer contrary to law, who cannot be expected to violate the mandate of law. As such issues vitally affect the public revenue, we also observed that such inaction on the part of such officers would adversely affect the interest of the revenue. We also observed that if prompt adjudication of the show cause notice is not undertaken, such lapse of time and certainly a long lapse of time is likely to
13. 2023 (79) G.S.T.L. 225 (Bom.) 18 E/52178/22 & 209 ors cause irreversible changes frustrating the whole adjudication.***** *****
17. In our opinion, even in absence of the provisions of sub-section (4)(B) of Section 73, respondent No. 2 could not have acted oblivious to the settled principle of law, that a show cause notice would be required to be adjudicated within a reasonable time depending the facts of each case. However, as observed by us in our decision in Coventry Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise & Anr. (supra), reasonable time would not be an egregious, unjustified and unexplained inordinate delay. Having perused the reply affidavit, we find that no justification whatsoever is given by the Deputy Commissioner in Commissioner not adjudicating the show cause notice. We are thus of the opinion that the present case is clearly covered by our decision in Coventry Estates Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner CGST and Central Excise & Anr. (supra) in regard to the legal position we have set out.
18. In the light of the above discussion, we are certain that this petition is required to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b)."
(emphasis supplied)
24. It would also be useful to refer to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Coventry Estates Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Joint Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise 14, which judgment was followed by the Bombay High Court in UPL. The show cause notice was issued on 16.03.2012, but it was not adjudicated for a long period of more than ten years. The relevant observations of the Bombay High Court are as follows:
"8. The primary contention as canvassed by Mr. Raichandani, learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no warrant for the adjudicating
14. (2023) 10 Centax 38 (Bom.) 19 E/52178/22 & 209 ors authority to adjudicate the show cause notice, after such long and unreasonable delay of more than 10 years, as the adjudication of the show cause notice after such inordinate delay is severely prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner. In support of such contention, Mr. Raichandani has drawn our attention to the provisions of Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act, 1994, which according to him in clause (a) thereof provides a time frame for the Central Excise Officer to determine the amount of service tax due under sub-section (2), within six months from the date of notice, where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under sub-section (1) and as per the provisions of clause (b) of subsection (4B), within one year from the date of notice where it is possible to do so in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub- section (1) or the proviso to sub-section (4A). ***** It is hence submitted that by no stretch of imagination, in the absence of any justifiable reason, the show cause notice can be adjudicated after a long delay of 10 years. In support of such contention, Mr. Raichandani has placed reliance on the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in ATA Freight Line (I) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 3671 of 2022] , against which Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 828 of 2023 filed by the Union of India came to be dismissed; in CMA-CGM Agencies (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 1313 of 2021]; decision of this Court in Shreenathji Logistics vs. Union of India & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 540 of 2020]; in Sushitex Exports (India) Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr. [2022 SCC Online Bom 191]; in Sanghvi Reconditioners Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, through the Secretary, Department of Revenue & Ors. [2017 SCC Online Bom 9781]; in Reliance Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India [2019 (368) E.L.T. 854 (Bom.)] and in Parle International Ltd. vs. Union of India [2021 (375) E.L.T. 633 (Bom.)].
9. Mr. Raichandani would submit that all these decisions would show a consistent view being taken by the Court that the show cause notice cannot be adjudicated after inordinate delay and the same would be required to be dropped, 20 E/52178/22 & 209 ors accepting the well-settled principles of law, that not only the proceedings are required to be initiated within a reasonable period but they are required to be adjudicated within a reasonable period. It is his submission that in the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the delay in any manner could be justified by the department. *****
15. Considering the plain consequences, Section 73(4B)(a) and (b) would bring about, it would be an obligation on the Central Excise Officer to determine the amount of service tax due under sub-section (2), within six months from the date of notice or within a period of one year from the date of notice, where it is possible to do so, in respect of cases falling under the proviso to sub-section (1) or the proviso to sub-section (4A). Thus, the statute itself prescribes for such period within which the service tax would be required to be determined. Sub-section (1) of Section 73 would also be relevant when it restricts the liability to service tax, to the period of five years under the situations falling below the proviso to sub-section (4) in cases of fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement, suppression of facts, contravention of any of the provisions of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994.
16. We are thus of the opinion that there has to be a holistic approach and reading of the provisions of Section 73, when it concerns the obligation and repository of the power to be exercised by the concerned officer to recover service tax, in adjudicating any show cause notice, issued against an assessee considering the raison d'etre of the provision. It is hence expected that the approach and expectation from the officer adjudicating the show cause notice would be to strictly adhere to the timelines prescribed by provisions of the Act, as there is a definite purpose and intention of the legislature to prescribe such time limits, either under Section 73(4B) of six months and one year respectively or of five years under Section 73(1).
17. In our opinion, in the facts of the present case, such requirement and obligation the law would 21 E/52178/22 & 209 ors mandate is completely overlooked by the officer responsible for adjudicating the show cause notice. We are not shown any provision, which in any manner would permit any authority to condone such inordinate delay on the part of the adjudicating officer to adjudicate show cause notice. There can be none, as the legislature has clearly intended to avoid uncertainty, which otherwise can emerge. Thus, what would become applicable are the settled principles of law as laid down in catena of judgments, that the period within which such adjudication should happen is as mandated by law and in any case it needs to be done within a reasonable period from the issuance of the show cause notice. Further, whether such period is a reasonable period would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
18. An inordinate delay is seriously prejudicial to the assessee and the law itself would manifest to weed out any uncertainty on adjudication of a show cause notice, and that too keeping the same pending for such a long period itself is not what is conducive.
19. It is well said that time and tide wait for none. It cannot be overlooked that the pendency of show cause notice not only weighs against the legal rights and interest of the assessee, but also, in a given situation, it may adversely affect the interest of the revenue, if prompt adjudication of the show cause notice is not undertaken, the reason being a lapse of time and certainly a long lapse of time is likely to cause irreversible changes frustrating the whole adjudication.
20. We are also of the clear opinion that a substantial delay and inaction on the part of the department to adjudicate the show cause notice would seriously nullify the noticee's rights casuing irreparable harm and prejudice to the noticee. A protracted administrative delay would not only prejudicially affect but also defeat substantive rights of the noticee. In certain circumstances, even a short delay can be intolerable not only to the department but also to the noticee. In such cases, the measure and test of delay would be 22 E/52178/22 & 209 ors required to be considered in the facts of the case. This would however not mean that an egregions delay can at all be justified. This apart, delay would also have a cascading effect on the effectiveness and/or may cause an abridgement of a right of appeal, which the assessee may have. Thus, for all these reasons, delay in adjudication of show cause notice would amount to denying fairness, judiciousness, non-
arbitrariness and fulfillment of an expectation of meaningfully applying the principles of natural justice. We are also of the clear opinion that arbitrary and capricious administrative behaviour in adjudication of show cause notice would be an antithesis to the norms of a lawful, fair and effective quasi judicial adjudication. In our opinion, these are also the principles which are implicit in the latin maxim "lex dilationes abhorret", i.e., law abhors delay."
(emphasis supplied)
25. It transpires from the aforesaid decisions that:
(i) The phrases " as far as possible" and "as far as practicable"
are more or less inter-changeable along with the word "feasible";
(ii) Only when circumstances or insurmountable exigencies make it impracticable or not possible for the adjudication to take place within the stipulated period that the authorities may deviate from the time limit prescribed under the Statute;
(iii) The mandate of the legislature that the show cause notice should be adjudicated within six months or one year, as the case may be, only provides flexibility for extension of the period when it is not practicable or possible to adjudicate it within the said time limit. The time limit period cannot be extended endlessly without any plausible justification;23
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
(iv) The indifference of the Adjudicating Authority to complete the adjudicating process within the statutory time limit cannot be condoned to the detriment of the assessee or detrimental to the interest of the exchequer;
(v) There is a definite purpose and intention of the legislature to prescribe such time limit. The legislature has clearly intended to avoid uncertainly, which otherwise can emerge; and
(vi) Even if no time limit is prescribed for adjudication of a show cause notice, then too the adjudication has to be done within a reasonable period. However, what would be a reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the Statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
26. It is in the light of the aforesaid principles that the facts of the appeal would have to be examined.
27. The show cause notice, in the present case, was issued on 28.04.2015. It called upon the noticees to show cause within thirty days from the date of receipt of notice, failing which it was specifically provided that the matter would be adjudicated ex parte without any further communication. It is seen that the period one year from 28.04.2015 expired on 27.04.2016. Even if cause was not shown by the noticees to the said notice, the Adjudicating Authority should have proceeded to decide the matter ex parte, but what is seen is that the Adjudicating Authority even let this statutory time limit of one year pass without even adhering to the stipulation contained in the show cause notice that the matter would be decided ex parte even if no cause is shown within thirty days. It appears that it is only on 07.09.2016 i.e. almost after a period of five months after the expiry of one year that the first hearing was fixed by 24 E/52178/22 & 209 ors the Adjudicating Authority on 07.09.2016. The chart submitted by the department further shows that after the first hearing was fixed on 07.09.2016, the matter was taken up on 22.02.2018 for cross- examination which period is itself after more than one year, and this cross-examination continued from 22.02.2018 to 22.03.2021 and though five dates for cross-examination were fixed in 2018, four dates were fixed in 2019 and thereafter two dates for cross-examination were fixed in 2021. There is absolutely no reason assigned in the written submissions or in the date and event chart as to why the cross-examination process continued for almost three years from 2018 upto 2021, when the adjudication itself was required to be completed within one year. Three dates for personal hearing were fixed in 2021 at an interval of almost one month and thereafter the show cause notice was adjudicated after nine months from the last date of personal hearing on 14.06.2022.
28. A clear statutory time limit of one year is provided in sub-section (11) of section 11A for the Adjudicating Authority to adjudicate the show cause notice but no reason has been given in the impugned order as to why it was not feasible or practicable for the Adjudicating Authority to adjudicate the show cause notice. It was incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority to have clearly spelt out the "insurmountable exigencies"
leading to delayed adjudication but none has been pointed out in the impugned order. The Adjudicating Authority has to record reasons in the order adjudicating the show cause notice and not leave it to the department to speculate why the Adjudicating Authority could not adhere to the time limit provided to it under a Statute to adjudicate the show cause notice.25
E/52178/22 & 209 ors
29. Learned authorized representative appearing for the department only submitted that the delay occurred on account of the appellant as the appellant did not file a reply to the show cause notice within the period of one month stipulated in the show cause notice and, in fact, no reply was filed till 07.09.2016, which was the date fixed for hearing by the Adjudicating Authority. In this connection, learned authorized representative appearing for the department not only placed reliance upon section 33A of the Central Excise Act, but also contended that since the Adjudicating Authority is required to strictly adhere to the principles of natural justice that require adequate opportunities to be given to the noticees before the adjudicating the show cause notice the Adjudicating Authority was justified in granting time to the noticees to cross-examine and also provide adequate personal hearing.
30. It is not possible to accept this contention of the learned authorized representative appearing for the department.
31. The principles of natural justice do not admit of such delayed adjudication where time limit is fixed under a Statute to adjudicate the matter. The Adjudicating Authority cannot endlessly wait and has to utilize its discretion in a fair and reasonable manner so as to balance between the principles of natural justice and the time set out in the Statute for adjudication of the show cause notice. The show cause notice required the noticees to file a reply within thirty days, failing which it was mentioned that the matter would be adjudicated ex parte. Assuming that no reply was filed by the noticees, still the Adjudicating Authority should have proceeded to adjudicate the show cause notice ex parte as it was bound to adjudicate in show cause notice within one year, unless there were strong and compelling reasons for it not to adjudicate the show cause notice 26 E/52178/22 & 209 ors within the stipulated time. Learned authorized representative appearing for the department is, therefore, not justified in making this submission. Nothing has been shown which can even remotely demonstrate that there were circumstances, much less insurmountable exigencies, which prevented the Adjudicating Authority from completing the adjudication process within the stipulated term.
32. Learned authorized representative appearing for the department placed reliance upon the following decisions to support his contention:
(a) Principal Commr. of Cus. (General), Mumbai vs. Unison Clearing P. Ltd. 15;
(b) Conybio Healthcare (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, Chennai 16;
(c) Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi vs. Bhagsons Paint Industry (India) 17; and
(d) M/s. Maggie Marketing Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Commissioner, Customs-Patparganj 18
33. In Unison Clearing, the issue that arose for consideration before the Bombay High Court was whether the time limit prescribed in regulation 20 of the Customs Brokers Licence Regulations, 2013 is directory or mandatory in nature. This is not the situation in the present case. In view of the judgments of the High Courts referred to above, it was incumbent upon the Adjudicating Authority to adjudicate the show cause notice within the time limit of one year fixed under sub-section (11) of section 11A, unless it was not possible to do so which phrase has also been explained in detail in these judgments.
34. In Conybio Healthcare, the Madras High Court held that the time limit prescribed under sub-section (9) of section 28 of the Customs Act is
15. 2018 (361) E.L.T. 321 (Bom.)
16. (2022) 1 Centax 97 (Mad.)
17. 2003 (158) E.L.T. 129 (S.C.)
18. Customs Appeals No. 50025 of 2022 decided on 21.08.2024 27 E/52178/22 & 209 ors elastic and not rigid. This decision would have to be examined in the light of the limitations placed upon extension of the time period by various decisions of the High Courts referred to above.
35. In Bhagsons Paint, the Supreme Court held that there is no statutory bar to adjudicate the matter even after nine lapse of nine years after issue of the show cause notice. In a subsequent judgment rendered in Citedal Fine and Bhatinda District, the Supreme Court held that even when no time limit is prescribed, it does not mean that the show cause notice has not to be adjudicated within a reasonable period of time. These two judgments of the Supreme Court have been followed by the Delhi High Court in Nanu Ram. The Bombay High Court in UPL and Coventry Estates also held that even when no time period is prescribed for adjudication of a show cause notice, the same has to be adjudicated within a reasonable period of time.
36. In Maggie Marketing, the main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant was regarding retrospective application of the amendment made on 29.03.2018 in section 28(9) of the Customs Act. It was contended that though the show cause notice was issued on 17.10.2017, but still section 28(9) of the Customs Act, as amended on 29.03.2018, would be applicable. This is evident from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision of the Tribunal and the relevant portions are reproduced below:
"9. The records indicate that in response to the show cause notice dated 17.10.2017, the appellant submitted an interim reply dated 07.04.2021 and contended that though section 28 (9) was amended on 29.03.2018, but it will also be applicable to show cause notices issued prior to this date and so in view of the amended provisions of section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 28 E/52178/22 & 209 ors such proceedings shall be deemed to have been concluded as if no notice has been issued since the show cause notice was not adjudicated within the stipulated time. *****
10. Thus, in effect, what was sought to be contended by the appellant in response to the show cause notice was that even though the show cause notice was issued on 17.10.2017, it would still be governed by the amended provisions of section 28(9) of the Customs Act and, therefore, the proceeding should be concluded as the show cause notice had not been issued within the stipulated time."
(emphasis supplied)
37. This contention of the appellant was not accepted by the Division Bench of the Tribunal in Maggie Marketing and the relevant portions of the order contained in paragraphs 16 and 17 are reproduced below:
"16. It needs to be noted that unamended and amended sections 28(9) of the Customs Act were examined at length by the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group India Pvt Ltd. vs. Union of India [2023 (386) ELT 356 (Del.)]. The Delhi High Court considered the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Harkaran Dass Vedpal and also the substituted Explanation 4 added on 27.02.2020 and rejected the contention about retrospectively application of the amended section 28(9) of the Customs Act. *****
17. It has therefore, to be held, in view of the aforesaid discussion, that the show cause notice dated 17.10.2017 issued to the appellant would be governed by the unamended provisions of section 28(9) of the Customs Act."
(emphasis supplied)
38. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group was examined in connection with this contention advanced on behalf of the 29 E/52178/22 & 209 ors appellant regarding retrospective amendment of section 28(9) of the Customs Act.
39. In respect of the unamended provision of section 28(9) of the Customs Act, the Division Bench found that due to Covid restrictions and the fact that the show cause notice was not served that it was not possible to adjudicate the show cause notice within the time stipulated.
40. The facts of each case have to examined to find out whether there were circumstances or insurmountable exigencies which made it impracticable for the adjudication to take place, as has been held by the Delhi High Court in Swatch Group.
41. The decisions relied upon by learned authorized representative appearing for the department, therefore, do not help the department.
42. The aforesaid discussion would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the impugned order would have to be set aside only for the reason that the adjudication was not completed within the time limit prescribed under sub-section (11) of section 11A of the Central Excise Act.
43. It would, therefore, not be necessary to examine the other two contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants.
44. The first issue that has been decided also arises for consideration in all the remaining 209 appeals that have been filed by the assessees for setting aside the impugned order. This would be apparent from the chart annexed as "Annexure A" to this order wherein details of the Excise Appeals, date of show cause notice, and the date of order has been provided.
45. It is evident that in all the 209 cases, the adjudication has taken place beyond the period stipulated in sub-section (11) of section 11A of the Central Excise Act and there is no plausible explanation as to why it 30 E/52178/22 & 209 ors was not possible for the Adjudicating Authority to complete the adjudication process within the stipulated time.
46. Thus, the impugned orders that have been assailed in all the 210 Excise Appeals would have to be set aside and are set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed with consequential relief(s), if any to the appellant.
(Order pronounced on 25.11.2024) (JUSTICE DILIP GUPTA) PRESIDENT (P.V. SUBBA RAO) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) Golay, Shreya 31 E/52178/22 & 209 ors Annexure A S. Excise Appeal No. Date of show cause Date of Order No. notice 1 E/50267/2024 19.05.2017 31.05.2022 2 E/50271/2024 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 3 E/50274/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 4 E/50281/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2024 5 E/50284/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 6 E/50265/2024 31.03.2017 26.04.2022 7 E/55283/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 8 E/55277/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 9 E/50278/2024 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 10 E/50277/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 11 E/50264/2024 30.03.2017 17.10.2022 12 E/50270/2024 19.05.2017 30.11.2022 13 E/50282/2024 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 14 E/50269/2024 19.05.2017 31.05.2022 15 E/50273/2024 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 16 E/50275/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 17 E/50268/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2024 18 E/50283/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 19 E/50266/2024 31.03.2017 26.04.2022 20 E/55282/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 21 E/55284/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 22 E/50279/2024 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 23 E/50276/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 24 E/50272/2024 30.03.2017 17.10.2022 25 E/50280/2024 19.05.2017 30.06.2022 26 E/55104/2023 29.06.2016 03.06.2022 27 E/55167/2023 27.05.2016 25.04.2022 28 E/55567/2023 11.11.2016 28.03.2022 29 E/55564/2023 30.05.2016 30.03.2022 30 E/55315/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 31 E/55565/2023 25.04.2017 28.04.2022 32 E/55316/2023 09.02.2016 30.06.2022 33 E/55669/2023 31.03.2017 29.04.2022 34 E/55570/2023 25.04.2017 30.06.2022 35 E/55235/2023 30.03.2016 28.06.2022 36 E/55679/2023 31.03.2016 11.05.2022 37 E/55678/2023 29.06.2016 30.05.2022 38 E/55558/2023 31.10.2016 31.03.2022 39 E/55571/2023 17.02.2017 31.05.2022 40 E/55680/2023 30.11.2016 27.06.2022 41 E/55682/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 42 E/55557/2023 30.03.2017 07.07.2022 43 E/55566/2023 08.04.2016 20.04.2022 44 E/55677/2023 31.05.2017 30.03.2022 45 E/50185/2024 30.03.2017 18.07.2022 46 E/50069/2024 17.02.2017 31.08.2022 47 E/50063/2024 11.11.2016 31.05.2022 48 E/55314/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 49 E/50187/2024 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 32 E/52178/22 & 209 ors 50 E/55237/2023 30.11.2016 30.06.2022 51 E/55278/2023 27.12.2016 29.06.2022 52 E/55238/2023 29.03.2017 21.07.2022 53 E/55236/2023 01.05.2017 20.06.2022 54 E/55681/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 55 E/50076/2024 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 56 E/50294/2024 27.12.2016 30.11.2022 57 E/50369/2024 19.05.2017 30.11.2022 58 E/50360/2024 27.12.2016 16.01.2023 59 E/50362/2024 30.11.2016 31.01.2023 60 E/50290/2024 29.07.2016 16.01.2023 61 E/50291/2024 10.11.2016 30.11.2022 62 E/50361/2024 17.02.2017 30.11.2022 63 E/55741/2023 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 64 E/53916/2023 01.03.2016 13.06.2019 65 E/55520/2023 19.05.2017 31.05.2022 66 E/55492/2023 31.03.2017 28.02.2022 67 E/50457/2024 29.06.2016 03.06.2022 68 E/55713/2023 27.05.2016 25.04.2022 69 E/55493/2023 11.11.2016 28.03.2022 70 E/50084/2024 30.05.2016 30.03.2022 71 E/55486/2023 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 72 E/55568/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 73 E/55522/2023 25.04.2017 28.04.2022 74 E/55226/2023 09.02.2016 30.06.2022 75 E/55523/2023 31.03.2017 29.04.2022 76 E/50067/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 77 E/50458/2024 25.04.2017 29.04.2022 78 E/55521/2023 31.03.2017 31.03.2022 79 E/55517/2023 25.04.2017 30.06.2022 80 E/55665/2023 31.03.2016 28.06.2022 81 E/55518/2023 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 82 E/50570/2024 31.03.2016 11.05.2022 83 E/55188/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 84 E/55410/2023 29.06.2016 30.05.2022 85 E/55412/2023 31.10.2016 31.03.2022 86 E/55411/2023 17.02.2017 31.05.2022 87 E/55555/2023 30.11.2016 27.06.2022 88 E/55563/2023 22.04.2017 28.02.2022 89 E/55515/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 90 E/55513/2023 31.03.2017 26.04.2022 91 E/55519/2023 30.03.2017 07.07.2022 92 E/55559/2023 08.04.2016 20.04.2022 93 E/55246/2023 31.05.2017 30.03.2022 94 E/50183/2024 30.03.2017 18.07.2022 95 E/50066/2024 17.02.2017 31.08.2022 96 E/50065/2024 30.11.2016 30.06.2022 97 E/50171/2024 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 98 E/50078/2024 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 99 E/50174/2024 01.05.2017 31.05.2022 100 E/55298/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 101 E/55213/2023 29.03.2017 28.02.2022 102 E/55297/2023 30.03.2017 28.06.2022 103 E/55666/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 33 E/52178/22 & 209 ors 104 E/55225/2023 27.12.2016 29.06.2022 105 E/55280/2023 29.03.2017 21.07.2022 106 E/55234/2023 01.05.2017 20.06.2022 107 E/50085/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 108 E/50077/2024 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 109 E/50222/2024 30.03.2017 30.09.2022 110 E/50226/2024 17.02.2017 30.11.2022 111 E/50223/2024 27.12.2016 30.11.2022 112 E/50225/2024 27.12.2016 30.11.2022 113 E/50356/2024 27.12.2016 16.01.2023 114 E/50217/2024 31.03.2017 29.04.2022 115 E/55158/2023 25.04.2017 29.04.2022 116 E/50164/2024 31.03.2016 11.05.2022 117 E/55443/2023 17.02.2017 31.08.2022 118 E/50212/2024 01.05.2017 31.05.2022 119 E/50359/2024 27.12.2016 30.11.2022 120 E/50363/2024 14.12.2016 10.02.2023 121 E/50365/2024 27.12.2016 30.11.2022 122 E/50357/2024 10.05.2016 16.01.2023 123 E/50364/2024 30.11.2016 31.01.2023 124 E/55710/2023 19.05.2017 31.05.2022 124 E/50173/2024 11.11.2016 28.03.2022 126 E/50547/2024 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 127 E/50546/2024 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 128 E/55163/2023 31.03.2017 26.04.2022 129 E/50594/2024 08.04.2016 20.04.2022 130 E/50184/2024 30.03.2017 18.07.2022 131 E/50068/2024 17.02.2017 31.08.2022 132 E/50193/2024 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 133 E/55286/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 134 E/55287/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 135 E/55279/2023 30.03.2017 30.06.2022 163 E/50186/2024 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 137 E/52178/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 138 E/52210/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 139 E/52179/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 140 E/52207/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 141 E/52208/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 142 E/52209/2022 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 143 E/50554/2024 26.09.2016 03.06.2022 144 E/50553/2024 26.09.2016 03.06.2022 145 E/55711/2023 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 146 E/53917/2023 01.03.2016 13.06.2019 147 E/51826/2021 01.03.2016 13.06.2019 148 E/51794/2021 01.03.2016 13.06.2019 149 E/55776/2023 31.03.2017 28.02.2022 150 E/55777/2023 31.03.2017 28.02.2022 151 E/54810/2023 11.11.2016 28.03.2022 152 E/54854/2023 30.05.2016 30.03.2022 153 E/54696/2023 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 154 E/55769/2023 30.03.2017 31.03.2022 155 E/55595/2023 28.12.2016 30.06.2022 156 E/55407/2023 28.12.2016 30.06.2022 157 E/50178/2024 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 34 E/52178/22 & 209 ors 158 E/55705/2023 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 159 E/55707/2023 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 160 E/50177/2024 31.03.2016 29.06.2022 161 E/50097/2024 31.03.2016 29.06.2022 162 E/50102/2024 25.04.2017 28.04.2022 163 E/50034/2024 25.04.2017 30.06.2022 164 E/50035/2024 25.04.2017 30.06.2022 165 E/53972/2023 31.10.2016 31.03.2022 166 E/55067/2023 17.02.2017 31.05.2022 167 E/55069/2023 17.02.2017 31.05.2015 168 E/54690/2023 30.11.2016 24.06.2022 169 E/54693/2023 30.11.2016 24.06.2022 170 E/54872/2023 30.11.2016 24.06.2022 171 E/54783/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 172 E/55272/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 173 E/54870/2023 30.03.2017 07.07.2022 174 E/55270/2023 31.03.2017 30.03.2022 175 E/55269/2023 31.03.2017 30.03.2022 176 E/55385/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 177 E/55386/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 178 E/50441/2024 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 179 E/55472/2023 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 180 E/50005/2024 10.02.2016 30.06.2022 181 E/55165/2023 01.05.2017 31.03.2022 182 E/55166/2023 01.05.2017 31.03.2022 183 E/55155/2023 30.03.2017 07.07.2022 184 E/55252/2023 30.11.2016 30.06.2022 185 E/55243/2023 30.11.2016 30.06.2022 186 E/55421/2023 27.12.2016 29.06.2022 187 E/55420/2023 27.12.2016 29.06.2022 188 E/55244/2023 29.03.2017 31.07.2022 189 E/55245/2023 30.03.2017 21.07.2022 190 E/52290/2022 09.01.2020 23.03.2022 191 E/52289/2022 09.01.2020 24.03.2022 192 E/55859/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 193 E/55858/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 194 E/55539/2023 27.12.2016 30.06.2022 195 E/55543/2023 30.03.2017 31.05.2022 196 E/50309/2024 30.03.2017 17.02.2022 197 E/51535/2022 16.03.2015 25.02.2022 198 E/52117/2022 16.03.2015 25.02.2022 199 E/52018/2024 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 200 E/52019/2024 30.03.2017 17.10.2022 201 E/50135/2020 27.04.2016 10.01.2019 202 E/50134/2020 04.08.2016 09.01.2019 203 E/50614/2020 04.08.2016 11.01.2019 204 E/50615/2020 27.04.2016 24.01.2019 205 E/50136/2020 09.09.2016 22.01.2019 206 E/55811/2023 05.04.2017 29.04.2022 207 E/52014/2024 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 208 E/52015/2024 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 209 E/52016/2024 28.04.2015 14.06.2022 210 E/52017/2024 28.04.2015 14.06.2022