Punjab-Haryana High Court
Satish Kumar Soni Through His Lrs vs Dimpy Malhotra And Anr on 23 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735
CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M)
CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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Reserved on: 12.09.2024
Pronounced on: 23.09.2024
1. CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M)
Sa.sh Kumar Soni through his LRs .....Pe..oners
Vs.
Dimpy Malhotra and another .....Respondents
2. CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M)
Sudarshan Sharma @ Komal .....Pe..oner
Vs.
Dimpy Malhotra .....Respondent
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Present:- Ms. Jigyasa Tanwar, Advocate for the pe oner
in CR-3388 of 2024.
Mr. N.C. Kinra and Mr. Harsh Kinra, Advocates
for the pe oner in CR No.3415 of 2024.
Mr. Ashish Aggarwal, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Ni n Kaushal, Mr. Vishal Pundir and
Ms. Aashna Aggarwal, Advocates for the
respondent(s).
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DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
Two different tenants, namely, Sa sh Kumar Soni and Sudarshan Sharma (pe oners herein) of two adjoining shops forming part of the same property, owned by same landlord Smt. Dimpi Malhotra (respondent herein), have approached this Court by way of the present revisions, assailing the ejectment orders passed against them by learned Rent Controller, Ludhiana, and as affirmed by the Appellate Authority.
2. None of the counsels have any objec on to hear and decide Page No.1 out of 19 pages 1 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:35 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) both these pe ons together, as similar evidence has been produced in both the cases.
3. In order to avoid confusion, par es shall be referred as per their original status i.e. 'landlord' or 'tenant'.
4. In the two ejectment pe ons filed by landlord - Dimpi Malhotra on the same date in March, 2010, it was pleaded that Sardar Didar Singh and Sardar Shamsher Singh used to be owners of the property No.B-XIX/392 Maharani Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana. They had rented out one shop each (tenanted/demised shops) to the two respondents on monthly rent of ₹700/- each, as per details given in para No.1 of the two pe ons. The en re property i.e. B-XIX/392 Maharani Jhansi Road, Ghumar Mandi, Civil Lines, Ludhiana, was purchased by the pe oner from the previous owners by virtue of two registered sale deeds dated 17.08.1995 and this way, the pe oner became owner/ landlady of the property and the respondents became tenants under her on the same terms and condi ons.
5. Ejectment of the two tenants was sought on the similar grounds i.e. non-payment of rent, the premises having become unfit & unsafe for human habita on, change of user and bonafide necessity of the pe oner. Same facts and circumstances have been pleaded so as to seek the ejectment. The Rent Controller has allowed the ejectment only on the ground of bonafide necessity of the landlord and that finding has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, which is assailed before this Court.
6. One of the grounds to assail the impugned orders, raised by learned counsel for the pe oners is that landlady has put forth his necessity for the demised shops for commercial use in order to open a departmental store, whereas the property in ques on is a residen al property and that such a change of use is not permissible.
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7. The Appellate Authority aGer considering this conten on, has rightly rejected the same. It is not in dispute that demised shops are being used by both the tenants for commercial purposes, as they are running shops therein. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nand Kishore Vs. Yashpal Singh, 2009 (16) SCC 634 that where residen al building is given on rent for commercial purpose with mutual consent, then landlord thereof can seek evic on of the property on the ground that this residen al building is needed for the commercial purpose. Moreover, once the appellant/ tenant himself is running a commercial ac vity at the spot, he cannot complaint at least on this ground.
8. Similarly, in Jarnail Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar, 2018 (4) PLR 700, it had been held by this Court that if a building is used for non-residen al purposes, landlord cannot be deprived of possession thereof for being used for the same purpose. This Court observed further that it would be totally inequitable, if the landlord is deprived of an opportunity to use the building being used for non-residen al purpose by the tenant. Same view was also taken by this Court in M/s Bharat Electricals Vs. Dr. Sukhdev Raj Goyal, 2012 (4) RCR (Civil) 26.
9. In view of the legal posi on as above, the conten on raised by learned counsel for the pe oners is hereby rejected.
10. Another conten on raised by learned counsel for the pe oners - tenants is that earlier ejectment pe ons filed by the landlady in 2001 were dismissed in 2005 and even the appeals of the landlady were dismissed by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the present pe ons are not maintainable being barred by the principle of res-judicata.
11. This Court does not find any merit in the conten on and learned Appellate Authority, aGer considering the submissions of both the sides, has rightly rejected the same.
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12. As per the evidence on record, earlier ejectment pe ons were filed by the landlady in September, 2001 on the ground of non-payment of rent, the premises having become unfit & unsafe for human habita on and bonafide necessity. However, the landlady did not lead any evidence to support the conten ons and so, her evidence was closed under Order 17 Rule 3 CPC. The pe ons were dismissed in March 2005. The appeal filed by the landlady against these orders was dismissed by the Appellate Authority in December, 2005. The present pe ons have been filed in March 2010 i.e. more than four years from the dismissal of the appeals arising out of the earlier ejectment pe ons and aGer more than 8 years of the earlier pe ons.
13. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Sundaraju Che3ar Vs. M.R. Ramchandra Naidu, AIR 1994 SC 2129 that bonafide requirement is a recurring cause of ac on and even if the existence of such a cause of ac on had not been found in the previous proceedings for evic on, the same cannot be discarded, if such a claim is established by the cogent evidence adduced by the landlord in the subsequent proceedings. Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that subsequent applica on can be filed by the landlord seeking ejectment by jus fying a case of bonafide requirement.
14. Similarly, in N.R. Narayan Swamy Vs. B. Francis Jagan (SC) Law Finder doc Id #3610, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that where earlier evic on pe on is dismissed on the ground of bonafide requirement, fresh evic on pe on can s ll be filed when genuine new necessity arises in future. In evic on pe on, the ground of bonafide requirement and non-payment of rent are recurring causes and that landlord is not precluded from ins tu ng fresh proceedings.
15. Same view has been taken by co-ordinate Benches of this Court Page No.4 out of 19 pages 4 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) in Darshana Devi Vs. Kewal Krishan, 2015 (4) RCR (Civil) 230; Amrit Lal Walia Vs. Bhagwant Singh, 1989 (2) RCR (Rent) 238 and Ranjit Singh Vs. Narinder Kaur, 2008(1) RCR (Civil) 239.
16. In view of the afore-said seKled legal posi on, the conten on of learned counsel for the pe oners - tenants is not tenable at all. Merely because the earlier ejectment pe ons filed in 2001 were dismissed in 2005, cannot be ground to reject the subsequent pe ons, which have been filed in March, 2010 i.e. more than 08 years from the date of filing of the earlier ejectment pe ons, though of course, it is required to be seen that landlord has been able to make out a case for ejectment in the subsequent proceedings.
17. Another conten on raised by learned counsel for the pe oners- tenants is that landlady is guilty of concealing her other proper es. Learned counsel has drawn aKen on towards a leKer dated 23.11.2015 (Ex.R5), which was received by the tenant from the Returning Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Vidhan Sabha, Halqa Faridkot, which shows that the tenant Sudarshan Sharma had sought the informa on about the proper es held by the landlady Smt. Dimpi Malhotra and her husband Deep Malhotra qua Vidhan Sabha Elec ons 2012 under RTI Act, 2005. As per this leKer, since it was a third party informa on under the RTI Act, 2005, therefore, Deep Malhotra was asked in wri ng to provide the informa on but said Deep Malhotra gave in wri ng that since this informa on was personal and private, therefore, the informa on may not be supplied to anyone. Learned counsel contends that the mere fact that the husband of the pe oner inten onally did not disclose his other proper es, so inference should be drawn that pe oner owned other proper es in Ludhiana.
18. This Court does not find any merit in this conten on. As per Page No.5 out of 19 pages 5 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) the tes mony of the pe oner - landlady, she does not own or possess any other non-residen al or commercial building within the urban limits of Municipal Corpora on Ludhiana nor had vacated any such other building aGer coming into force of the Rent Act, 1949. There is no evidence on the part of the tenants so as to rebut the above-said tes mony of the landlady.
19. It has been held by this Court in Kanwaljit Singh Walia Vs. Gurcharan Kaur, Law Finder doc Id#1667239 that landlord is not obliged to disclose premises, which are not in his occupa on. It has also been held in Bombay Kashmir Goods Carrier Vs. Charanjit Singh, Law Finder Doc Id#2040602 that property not in occupa on of the landlord must be dis nguished from the owned proper es and that if the property is not in occupa on, no disclosure is necessary. In yet another case tled Shammi Kapur Vs. Raghbir Kaur (P&H), Law Finder Doc Id# 933634, it has been held by this Court that mere ownership of other proper es does not make any difference. Sec on 13 of the Act uses the terms "Use and Occupa on" and not words "the ownership". Therefore, on this ground alone, no concealment can be alleged.
20. In the present case, the tenants- pe oners have failed to bring on record any details regarding the other proper es in occupa on of the landlady. As such, both the Courts below have rightly rejected the conten on of the tenants to the effect that the landlord did not disclose about the other proper es and so, any inference should be drawn against her. Said conten on has no merit.
21. Coming to the case put forth by the landlady regarding her bonafide requirement, first of all, let us see the legal posi on in this regard. What is the criteria to judge the need of the landlord to be bonafide and as to what does the term 'bonafide need' means, has been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of authori es.
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22. Reliance can be placed upon Paramjit Singh Vs. Jagat Singh 2014 (2) RCR (Civil) 774, wherein this court referred to various authori es of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as of High Court and then held in para No.9 as under:
"9. Though the terminology of `bonafide requirement' has not been defined in the Act but in Raghunath G. Panhale v. M/s Chagan Lal Sudarji and Company, 1999(2) RCR(Rent) 485, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enumerated the following guidelines:-
1. Requirement of landlord must be both reasonable and bonafide.
2. The word "reasonable" connotes that requirement is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be mere desire.
3. The word requirement coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity.
4. A reasonable and bonafide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand that a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. 5. It may not be need in praesen or within reasonable proximity in the future. The word bona fide means that need must be honest and not be trained with any oblique mo ve.
6. Language of provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible for landlord get possession. Construc on of relevant statutory provision must strike a balance between right of landlord and right of tenant.
7. Court should not proceed on assump on that requirement of landlord was not bona fide and that tenant could not dictate to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself without geJng possession of tenant premises.
23. This Court then further held in paras No.10 & 11 as under:
"10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in various pronouncements had laid down guiding principles to be followed by a court while adjudica ng the Page No.7 out of 19 pages 7 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) bonafide requirement of a landlord, which should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. In M/s Rahabhar Produc?ons Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon, 1998(1) Rent Control Reporters 482, it has been observed as under:-
"The phrase "bona fide need" or "bona fide requirement" occurs not only in the Delhi Rent Control Act but in the Rent Control legisla on of other States also. What is the meaning of this phrase has been considered innumerable mes by various High Courts as also by this Court and requires no cita ons to explain its legal implica ons. Even then reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander and others, 1988(1) RCR(Rent) 625, in which it was indicated that "bona fide need"
should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has, inevitably, a subjec ve element in it. The "desire" to become "requirement" must have the objec ve element of a "need" which can be decided only by taking all relevant circumstances into considera on so that the protec on afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whiKled down. These observa ons were made in respect of the provisions contained in E.P. Urban Rent Restric on Act, 1949."
11. The bonafide requirement of a landlord depends upon facts and circumstances of each case and there cannot be a strait jacket formula for this purpose. The burden lies upon the landlord to establish that the accommoda on is bonafide required by him for personal use. While adjudica ng whether the requirement is bonafide or not, it is to be seen objec vely and not subjec vely by the Court though, the landlord is the best judge of his requirement. The need of the landlord must exist so as to dis nguish it from mere wish or desire."
24. In Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. 1998 Page No.8 out of 19 pages 8 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) (2) Apex Court Journal 704, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that when landlord asserts that he requires building for his own occupa on, Rent Controller shall not proceed on presump on that requirement is not bona fide. Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupa on the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presump on that the requirement is not bona fide. When other condi ons of the clause are sa sfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presump on that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is oGen said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without geSng possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the ques on of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."
25. In the light of aforesaid legal posi on, it is required to be seen as to whether landlady in the present case has been able to prove her bonafide need for the tenanted premises so as to order the ejectment of the respondents - tenants.
26. When in the light of aforesaid legal posi on, the evidence on file is considered, it is found that the tenants were unable to rebut the evidence of the landlady regarding her bonafide need. It is the specific case of the landlady supported by evidence that family of her husband was originally seKled in Faridkot. When the terrorism was at peak in Punjab and the State was disturbed, Faridkot became unsafe for living and therefore, the family shiGed to New Delhi. The landlady started business of bou que there-at. However, the business could not run successfully in New Delhi, as she was new to the City and with the restora on of normalcy in Punjab, she decided to seKle at Ludhiana, it being a centrally located city and Page No.9 out of 19 pages 9 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) commercially developed. It is further tes fied by the landlady that when the property N: B-XIX/392 was purchased, of which the demised shops are the part, the same was old construc on. Most of the property except the shops on the Ghumar Mandi roadside were unoccupied. The unoccupied por on was not being used for last several years and with the passage of me, this por on became dilapidated and unfit and unsafe for human habita on. The property was purchased by the pe oner -landlady for construc ng a suitable building for her business as well as her residence. All the shop-keepers were requested to vacate the premises. Though two shop-keepers vacated the shops in their possession but the present two tenants i.e. Sudarshan and Sunil kept on delaying the maKer. AGer giving details about the unsafety of the premises and the previous li ga on, the landlady tes fied further that she requires the tenanted premises for her bonafide need. The en re rear por on behind the shops had already fallen. Malba thereof has since been removed. The landlady had earlier temporarily allowed M/s Oasis Dis lleries Pvt. Ltd., a company in which her husband and sons are Directors to occupy the other shops for running a liquor vend at the me of filing of the present pe ons. As of now, those vacant shops are given to M/s Om Sons Marke ng Pvt. Ltd., in which son of landlord is Director on temporary basis. A temporary structure has been raised on the rear side for storing the stocks, which can be removed at any me and the building material could be re-used as the said structure is purely temporary one. It is tes fied by the landlord further that she intends to demolish the tenanted - demised shops along with the other shops already vacated by the tenants and will get the property developed and construct a Mul -Purpose Self Service Departmental Store. It is also tes fied that she and her family have sufficient funds for raising such type of Departmental Store and that property being situated in the commercial hub of the city, is fully suitable for the said purpose. The property shall be used for business purpose for her own use. It has also been tes fied by the Page No.10 out of 19 pages 10 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) landlady that her husband Shri Deep Malhotra was elected MLA from Faridkot during the pendency of this evic on pe on and that in the course of his official func ons, he has to con nuously travel between Faridkot and Chandigarh. Ludhiana falls in between the two places and therefore it is the most suitable place for the landlady to seKle down at Ludhiana, as demised premises being situated in Ghumar Mandi Main Chowk, which is a commercial hub, is most suitable for seSng up a Self Service Mul -Storeyed Departmental Store. She has also tes fied that presently, she is maintaining her residence at 225-B-Rajguru Nagar, Ludhiana.
27. The tenants, i.e. pe oners herein could not refute the afore- said evidence produced by the landlady by producing any cogent evidence.
28. The conten on raised by the learned counsel for the pe oners is that landlady has not produced any evidence to have taken any step for construc ng a departmental store i.e. the projected necessity. It is also the conten on that landlady is an old lady and she belongs to a very affluent family, poli cally as well as financially, and that her projected need is fanciful, as it is not necessary that she will start any business in Ludhiana or that she requires to start any such business there-at. It is also the conten on that the two shops earlier got vacated by the landlady are now in possession of the family of the landlady and therefore, the bonafide necessity has come to an end.
29. There is no merit in the conten on and the same has been rightly rejected by the Courts below. It is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord about her/ his bonafide necessity. If a landlord asserts that he requires the tenanted premises to expand the business, his need must be presumed as bonafide.
30. In Balbir Kaur Vs. Roop Lal, 2012 (1) RCR (Civil) 279, the landlord was a reputed businessman having business in various countries.
Page No.11 out of 19 pages 11 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) The landlord sought evic on of the tenant from the ground floor of the shop-cum-office at Chandigarh to start a big departmental store of world repute, for which the landlord had the financial capacity. It was held by this Court that the need was bonafide and that it is the preroga ve of the landlord to expand his business. If the landlord asserts that he requires a tenanted premises to expand his business, his need must be presumed as bonafide. Rent Controller shall not proceed to presume that alleged need is not bonafide. It is not open to the Rent Controller to say that landlords are already having business in different countries and ci es and are well seKled in their lives and hence they do not require demised premises for seSng up departmental store of world repute in Chandigarh.
31. Similar view was taken by this Court in M/s Satpal Vijay Kumar Vs. Sushil Kumar, 2011 (2) RCR (Civil ) 82. In Madho Ram Garg Vs. Baldev Singh Bath and another, 2008(3) RCR (Civil) 286, the landlord wanted shop for business. This Court went to the extent in holding that it is not part of the Court's duty to examine as to whether the business to be set up would be successful or not in the tenanted premises. The success or otherwise of a proposed business lies in the realm of specula on and the Courts abjure specula ve conclusions. The choice of the premises, the nature or the extent thereof rest solely with the landlord.
32. Further, simply because the landlady - respondent has grown old, as is contended by learned counsel for the pe oners, cannot be a ground to reject the ejectment pe ons, once she has proved her bonafide necessity.
33. Apart from the above, it is most important to no ce that the finding of the Courts below regarding the bonafide necessity of the landlady is a concurrent finding of fact. Whether this Court exercising in its revisional jurisdic on can interfere in the said finding or not, is to be seen.
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34. In Daya Rani vs. Shabber Ahmed, 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) 365, an ejectment pe on was allowed by the Rent Controller. The appeal of the tenant was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. The revision was allowed by High Court while exercising its power under Sec on 15 (6) of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Evic on Act, 1973, thus, seSng aside the concurrent findings of the courts below and dismissing the ejectment pe on. The landlord approached Supreme Court. SeSng aside the order of the High Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
"10. The provisions rela ng to revisional powers of the High Court in other Rent Legisla ons came up for considera on before the Cons tu on Bench of this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpora?on Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh 2014(4) RCR (Civil) 162: 2014(2) RCR (Rent) 210" (2014) 9 SCC 78. The maKer was referred to the larger Bench because of two lines of decisions which were somewhat inconsistent as is apparent from the referral order quoted in para 3 of the decision.
"3. The two-Judge Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corpora?on Ltd. Case (2014) 9 SCC 102 felt that there was conflict in the two decisions and for its resolu on referred the maKer to the larger Bench. In the reference order Hindustan Petroleum Corpn Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh 2014(9) SCC 102 (dated 27.8.2009), the two-Judge Bench observed, thus:
"The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana, wherein Sec on 20 of the Kerala Rent was in ques on. It was held in the said decision that though Sec on 20 of the said Act provided that the Revisional Court can go into the 'propriety' of the order but it does not en tle the Revisional Court to reappreciate the evidence. A similar view was taken by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ubaiba vs. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC 645.
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From the above, it is clear that there are conflic ng views of coordinate three-Judge Benches of this Court as to the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression 'legality and propriety' and whether in revisional jurisdic on the High Court can reappreciate the evidence. Hence, we are of the view that the maKer needs to be considered by a larger Bench since this ques on arises in a large number of cases as similar provisions conferring power of revision exists in various rent control and other legisla ons, e.g. Sec on 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we direct that the papers be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Jus ce for cons tu ng a larger Bench."
"11. While approving the law laid down by a Bench of three Judges in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 499], the Cons tu on Bench in para 43 of its judgment observed:-
"43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts en tles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on re- apprecia on of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The considera on or examina on of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdic on under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from Page No.14 out of 19 pages 14 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without considera on of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand it would result in gross miscarriage of jus ce, is open to correc on because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdic on under the above Rent Control Acts shall be en tled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is en tled to sa sfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to sa sfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsidera on of all ques ons of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be sa sfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity."
12. It would, therefore, be relevant to consider the view taken by this Court in the Rukmini Amma Saradamma' case (supra). That maKer arose from the exercise of Revisional Power by the High Court under Sec on 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, which is in pari materia with Sec on 15(6) of the Act and empowers the High Court to call for and examine the record rela ng to any order passed as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceeding. Para 20 of the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma was to the following effect:
"20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Sec on 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the Page No.15 out of 19 pages 15 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) dis nc on between appellate and revisional jurisdic on will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re- apprecia ng the en re evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report (Ext. C1 and C2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdic on. Even by the presence of the word "propriety" it cannot mean that there could be a re- apprecia on of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-apprecia on of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdic on."
13. In Ram Dass [(1988) 3 SCC 131] and Mo? Ram [AIR 1960 SC 655], the scope of revisional power of the High Court under Sec on 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restric on Act, 1949 was in issue. Said Sec on 15(5) is in pari materia with Sec on 15(6) of the Act.
14. The law is thus well seKled that while exercising revisional power, the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on record: both oral or documentary. Further the considera on while exercising revisional jurisdic on is confined to find out whether the findings of fact rendered by the Court or Authority below were according to law and did not suffer from any error of law."
35. In another case tled Vaneet Jain Vs. Jagjeet Singh, 2000(5) SCC 1, Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of the revisional power of the High Court. The maKer had arisen out of the ejectment pe on filed under Sec on 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Evic on Act, 1973. Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to sub-Sec on (6) of Sec on 15 of the Act which confers the revisional jurisdic on upon the High Court and which reads as under:-
"4. Sub-sec on (6) of Sec on 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to Page No.16 out of 19 pages 16 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) exercise its revisional jurisdic on for the purpose of sa sfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The ques on that arises for considera on is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdic on can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta ( 1999 (6) SCC 222 ) held, that the High Court cannot enter into apprecia on or reapprecia on of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be jus fied in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 (8) SCC 119, it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdic on can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
5. A perusal of sub-sec on (6) of Sec on 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Sec on 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be jus fied in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below.........."
[underlined por on emphasised by this court]
36. Yet another case tled Ajit Singh and another Vs. Jeet Ram and another, 2008(4) RCR (Civil) 390, reached before Hon'ble Supreme Court out of the proceedings of evic on filed under East Punjab Urban Rent Page No.17 out of 19 pages 17 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) Restric on Act, 1949 (like the present case), wherein also it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that a finding of fact as recorded by the Appellate Authority on the ques on of bonafide requirement of the demised shop cannot be interfered with by the High Court. The High Court under its revisional jurisdic on could have interfered with such findings of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority only if the High Court had found that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the ques on of bonafide requirement was either perverse or arbitrary.
37. The legal posi on as explained above make it clear that:
x The revisional power of the High Court under Sec on 15(6) of the Rent Act is not appellate power and so, the high court cannot re- appreciate the evidence on record, whether oral or documentary only because it is inclined to take a different view of facts as it were a court of facts.
x The High Court can interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller/ Appellate Authority, only if it finds that the said finding on the ques on of bonafide requirement is either perverse or arbitrary, or there is illegality or perversity of such a nature that it demands interference.
38. On account of en re discussion as above, it is held that none of these pe ons have any merit. The Courts below have rightly appreciated the en re evidence on record. There is no scope for interference in the well-reasoned findings as recorded by the Courts below. This Court does not find any illegality or perversity so as to interfere in the impugned orders. Both the pe ons are hereby accordingly dismissed.
39. Both the pe oners-tenants are hereby directed to vacate their respec ve demised shops on or before 30.11.2024 posi vely. This me is Page No.18 out of 19 pages 18 of 19 ::: Downloaded on - 24-09-2024 10:40:36 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:125735 CR No.3388 of 2024 (O&M) CR No.3415 of 2024 (O&M) granted to them subject to clearance of all the arrears at the rate last agreed between the par es. They will also make payment of user charges up to 30.11.2024 in advance. It is further made clear that in case the tenants-pe oners herein fail to vacate the demised shops ll 30.11.2024 and the pe oner - landlady is compelled to file the execu on to get the actual physical possession of the same, the defaul ng tenant will have to pay the mesne profits/ usual charges @ ₹1 lakh per month to be effec ve from 01.12.2024 onwards ll the shop (s) is/are actually vacated. Ordered accordingly.
40. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.
September 23, 2024 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Renu JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether Reportable Yes
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