Karnataka High Court
Bangalore Timber Corporation vs State Of Karnataka on 20 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: ILR1991KAR4013
ORDER Kedambady Jagannatha Shetty, J.
1. The Petitioners have filed these two Writ Petitions for an order declaring Section 21(1)(l) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACT') as ultravires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it vividly discriminates the class of tenants, who come under Clause (I) with those tenants, who come under Clause (j).
2. The facts in this case are few and simple. The first petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on business of Timber and timber products, and the Second Petitioner is its Partner. The suit schedule property bearing site No. 16 is an open plot comes within the residential zone in C.D.P. which was taken on lease by the petitioners on a monthly rental of Rs. 190/- for a commercial purpose. It is alleged that the petitioners had put up structure in the site.
3. The Second Respondent, who is the landlord of the premises filed an eviction petition on 31-8-1988 in HRC No. 2124 of 1988 for eviction of the first petitioner from the premises. The schedule to the petition describes as hereunder: Premises bearing Nos. New 135 (Old No. 14) and 16 (Old No. 17) comprising of vacant sites situated back to back with temporary structures put up if any, by the Second Respondent situated at First Main Road, Seshadripuram, Bangalore-20 known as Sripuram and measuring 140' x 45' and bounded on the East by: Sripuram Road, No. 1 and Private property, West by: First Main Road, Seshadripuram, North by: Old No. 15 New No. 134 and thereafter property belonging to Shri C.N. Badarinath; and South by: Old No. 18, New No. 136 and thereafter property of Shri C.N. Seetharam.
4. The said petition for eviction has been filed under Section 21(1)(l) of the Act.
5. The landlord in the petition before the Rent Control Court has specifically pleaded that he had decided to put up a commercial complex in the schedule premises after evicting the Respondent-tenant in order to augment his income by way of rent leasing the said commercial complex to such of those prospective tenants at prevailing market rent. In the eviction petition, the petitioner-landlord has also alleged that Corporation of City of Bangalore has sanctioned the plan for construction of Commercial Complex on 18-09-1988.
6. The petitioner-tenant has resisted the claim of the landlord by filing his objection statement. He has also filed an additional statement in which it was averred by him that the petition for eviction under Section 21(1)(l) of the Act is misconceived as it is applicable only to vacant site and not to a site containing buildings. It was his case that after the premises the open land leased out to him by the landlord, he had put up the buildings sheds in it. As such the premises in question cannot be considered as open site attracting the provisions of Section 21 (1)(l) of the Act, as such the landlord's petition under Section 21(1)(l) of the Act is not maintainable.
7. When the matter was pending before the Rent Control Court, the petitioner-tenant has preferred this Writ Petition challenging the petition for eviction under Section 21(1)(l) of the Act as ultra vires being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He has also urged the ground that the petition of the landlord for eviction under the provisions of Section 21 (1)(l) of the Act is misconceived in view of his putting up the structure shed in the lease open site.
8. The question whether the premises leased to the tenant is open site and has ceased to become open site due to the structure put up by the tenant, whether with the consent of the landlord or not or whether there was an acquiscence by the landlord are all matters required to establish by adducing evidence before the Rent Control Court. This Court will not take evidence and give finding in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As such the petitioner is at liberty to raise that question before the Rent Control Court.
9. The learned Counsel Sri K.R.D. Karanth appearing for the petitioner has submitted that Section 21 (1)(l) of the Act is ultra-vires of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it discriminates the class of tenants, who come under Clause (I) with those tenants, who come under Clause (j) while the statute provides the safeguards in keeping with the object of the Act, it has not done so, in respect of the former, for the purpose of eviction viz., putting up a new structure and letting it out.
10. Mr. Karanth has further submitted that when the purpose of eviction of tenants both coming under Section 21(1)(j) and (I) are the same as putting up building and letting out, in the case of tenant coming under Clause (j) has a right of re-occupation as provided under Sections 27, 28 and 29 while the tenant coming under Clause (I) has none. Therefore, there is clear discrimination made between tenant of premises, who are similarly situate in the matter of petition for eviction and in both of which the tenants are statutory tenants. The fact that in Clause (j) the building was originally put up and leased by the owner cannot constitute a reason for classification. It is further argued that Section 21 (1)(l) has no nexus to the object of the Act viz., protection of a tenant from arbitrary eviction and safeguarding the rights of persons even where landlord wants to put up a new construction. The Clause does not serve the object of the Act and is therefore, wholly arbitrary and capricious.
11. Elaborating his argument, Mr. K.R.D. Karanth relied on two Decisions reported in MOTOR GENERAL TRADERS AND ANR. v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AIR 1984 SC 121 and in RATTAN ARYA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU, ILR 1986 KAR 2069.
12. The State of Karnataka is represented by Mr. B.J. Somayaji, the learned High Court Government Pleader and he has submitted that there is a clear cut intelligible difference which formed the basis of classification. Tenant of open space of land is different from tenant of building. The Legislature in its Wisdom keeping in mind the object of the Rent Act has maintained the rational basis for the classification. The classification is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory and does not involve hardship or inequality of burdens. Mr. Somayaji in support of his argument, relied on the Decisions reported in 1) BACHAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB, ; 2) PRABHAKARAN NAIR v. STATE OF TAMILNADU, ; 3) MANGHARAM CHUBARMAL v. B.C. PATEL, 73 BLR 140 and 4) BADRIPRASAD KAGARWAL AND ANR. v. PREMIER GARAGE AND ORS., 1980(1)AIRCJ 385 Mr. Somayaji, the learned Government Pleader has pointed out various features of the impugned legislation which go to show that it does not conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
13. The object of the Act more fully delineated into the Preamble to the Act which read as follows:
"An Act to provide for the control of rents and evictions for leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters. There the Act was enhanced with the avoided object of controlling rents leasing of buildings, evictions rates and of hotels and for certain other matters in the State of Karnataka. Earlier Act of 1957 was not applicable to land, but the present Act is made applicable to lands other than Agricultural lands."
14. The State of Karnataka which was formerly known as 'State of Mysore' the first Legislation which was known the Mysore House and Rent & Accommodation Control Order, 1948, which was followed by the Mysore Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951. It was amended by Mysore Act XXII of 1954. Thereafter, the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 came to be enacted and came into force with effect from 31-12-1961. It underwent several amendments from 1969 to 1983. The Principal Act of 1961 which was a temporary statute (SIC) in force upto and inclusive of 31st December 1982. The Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1982 was promulgated by the Governor on 31-12-1982 substituting the figures 1992 for the figures 1982 in Sub-section (4) of Section 1 on 28-2-1983 a fresh ordinance i.e., Karnataka Ordinance No. 4 of 1983 to the same effect was promulgated by the Governor. The Legislature later on 10-9-1983 enacted the Amending Act No. 17 of 1983. The President assent was accorded on 15-7-1983. The Amending Act No. 17 of 1983 was made retrospective which came to be challenged before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court in MOHAMMED HAYATH v. ADINARAYANA ASSOCIATES, 1984(1) KLJ 113 has upheld the validity of Amending Act. According to Sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act, the Act shall remain in force up to inclusive of 31-12-1982 and upon the lapsing by virtue of Section 8 of Karnataka General Clauses Act 1989 the Act shall be deemed to be the permanent Act.
15. Before I consider the question of unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions of the Act, it would be better to enumerate the recognised tests laid down by Supreme Court. It is well settled law, that Article 14 of the Constitution secures equal protection of the laws, forbids class legislation as not reasonable classification. Differentiation is not discrimination.
16. The Supreme Court in RAMAKRISHNA DALMIA v. JUSTICE TENDOLKAR, has enunciated the following principles:
"(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him whom attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;
(c) that it must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times, and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation."
in KEDAR NATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
"Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete."
In HAMDARD DAWAKHANA AND ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA, the Supreme Court has held that in considering the constitutionality of a statute, the Court has regard to substance and not mere matters of form, and the statute must be decided by its operations. In yet another case JILARN TRADING CO. v. MILL. MAZDOOR SABHA, the Supreme Court has observed thus:
"If the classification is not patently arbitrary, the Court will not rule it discriminatory merely because it involves hardship or inequality of burden. With a view to secure particular objects a scheme may be selected by the legislature, wisdom whereof may be open to debate; it may even be demonstrated that he scheme is not the best in the circumstances and the choice of the legislature may be shown to be erroneous, but unless the enactment fails to satisfy the dual test of intelligible classification and rationality of the relation with the object of the law, it will not be subject to judicial interference under Article 14."
In Prabhakaran Nair's case cited above, the Supreme Court has pronounced principles which can be usefully followed in testing the validity of the impugned classification, which read as follows:
"When we are confronted with the problem of a legislation being violative of Article 14, we are not concerned of the wisdom or lack of legislative enactment but we are concerned with the illegality of the legislation. There may be more than one view about the appropriateness or effectiveness or extent of the restrictions. There may be also more than one view about the relaxation of the restrictions on the landlord's right of eviction....that there can be no fixed and inflexible criteria or grounds governing imposition of restrictions on the landlord's right or for relaxation of those restrictions in certain cases. Ultimately it is a matter of legislative policy and Judgment."
Yet another principle which has to be borne in mind, as observed by the Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, is:
"In examining the constitutionality of a statute it must be assumed that the legislature understands and appreciates the need of the people and the laws it enacts are directed to problems which are made manifest by experience and that the elected representatives assembled in a legislature enacts laws which they consider to be reasonable for the purpose for which they are enacted. Therefore, presumption is, in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment."
17. The main ground of attack of Sri K.R.D. Karanth in nutshell against the constitutional validity of Section 21 (1 )(l) is as follows:
That in the case of eviction of a tenant corning under Section 21(1)(J) on demolition of the building and re-construction, permit and direct that after reconstruction, the tenant should be inducted as a tenant or given the opportunity to have the space in the reconstructed building, whereas in the instant case, when the tenant comes under the provision of Section 21(1)(l) no such obligation could be imposed upon the landlord and as such the impugned provision of Section 21(1)(l) is illegal as being discreminatory and against the law.
18. Mr. Karanth argued that the Karnataka Rent Act seeks to protect tenants from eviction of premises whether they occupy building or the premises with structures or open land. There is no reasonable reason why there should be any discrimination in the matter of eviction of tenant occupying the open land or in the matter of eviction clause. Section 21(1)(j) and 21(1)(l) of the Act when so considered and compared each other, dearly demonstrates that this classification in respect of Section 21 (1)(l) is arbitrary and suffers from want of intelligible differentiation.
19. In order to examine the various contentions and aspects of the case in depth, it is necessary to refer to the relevant Provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act. As already noticed there was an Act passed, amended and consolidated the law relating to the regulations of lifting of residential and non-residential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings including the open land and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State of Karnataka:
"Section 21 - Protection of tenants against eviction (J) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant;' Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-
xxx xxx xxx
(j) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in place of the premises sought to be demolished; or xxx xxx xxx (I) That where the premises are land, such land is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the erection of a new building which a local authority or other competent authority has approved or permitted him to build thereon; or"
20. Under Clause 21(1)(j) the Landlord can seek recovery of possession when, he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing the existing building for the purpose of erecting a new building in its place. The tenant who is so evicted will be entitled to a premises of similar space in the re-constructed building.
21. Under Clause (I) the premises which is leased out to the tenant is premises as defined under Sub-clause (n) of Section 3 of the Act. The word 'premises' means any land not used for agricultural purpose. That pre-requisite to invoke this Clause (I) are that the demised premises is not an agricultural land but a vacant land, (2) the requirement of landlord is reasonable -and bona fide and obtain permission from local authorities for purpose of erecting a new building:
"Section 26. Recovery of possession for demolishing building and re-entry: (1) Where a decree for eviction has been passed by the Court on the ground specified in Clause (j) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the work of demolishing the premises has not been commenced by the landlord within the period specified in the decree, the tenant may give the landlord a notice of his intention to occupy the premises from which he has been evicted and if the landlord does not forthwith deliver to him vacant possession of the premises on the same terms and conditions on which he occupied them immediately before the eviction, the tenant may make an application to the Court within six weeks from the date of expiry of the period specified in the decree.
(2) If the Court is satisfied that the landlord has not substantially commenced the work of demolishing the premises within the period of one month in accordance with his undertaking, the Court shall order the landlord to deliver to the tenant vacant possession of the premises on the terms and conditions on which he occupied it immediately before the eviction. On such order being made, the landlord shall forthwith deliver vacant possession of the premises to the tenant. Such order shall be deemed to be an order within the meaning of Clause (14) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(3) Any landlord who recovers possession on the ground specified in Clause (j) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and fails to demolish and construct a new building without any reasonable excuse, or fails to comply with the order of the Court under Sub-section (2), shall, without prejudice to his liability in execution of the order under Sub-section (2), on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.
Section 27: Tenant's right to give notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy tenement in new building:- Where decree for eviction has been passed by a Court on the ground specified in Clause (j) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the work of demolishing the premises and of the erection of a new building has been commenced by the landlord, the tenant may, within six months from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the premises to the landlord, give notice to the landlord of his intention to occupy the new building on its completion on the following conditions, namely:-
(a) That he shall pay to the landlord the fair rent in respect of the buildings:
Provided that in respect of a residential building the tenant shall not be required to pay rent in relation to the area at more than double the rate at which he paid rent for his former building immediately before his eviction unless the landlord obtains an order of the controller fixing the fair rent in respect of the building at a higher rate;
(b) that his occupation of the building shall, save as provided in condition (a), be on the same terms and conditions as the terms and conditions on which he occupied the building immediately before the eviction.
Section 28. Landlord to intimate the tenant, date of completion and tenant's right to occupy the new building:- (1) On receipt of notice from the tenant under Section 27, the landlord shall, not less than three months, before the date on which the erection of the new building is likely to be completed, intimate the tenant the date on which the said erection shall be completed. On the said date, the tenant shall be entitled to occupy the building.
(2) (a) If the tenant fails to occupy the building within a period of one month from the date on which he is entitled to occupy it under Sub-section (1), the tenant's right to occupy the said building under the said sub-section shall terminate and the landlord shall be entitled to recover from the tenant, a sum equal to three times the amount of the monthly fair rent in respect of the building.
(b) If the landlord fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the provisions of Sub-section (1), or to place the tenant in occupation of the building he shall, without prejudice to his liability to place the tenant in vacant possession of the building, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees."
22. These provisions made it clear that the tenant, who was evicted under Clause 21(1)(j) of the Act is entitled to re-entry or occupy the premises in re-constructed building of similar space on fair rent. Whereas under the provisions under Clause 21(1)(I) of the Act when the tenant of open land is evicted he is not entitled to re-entry or occupy the premises on construction of a new building in the open land. It is obvious from the very nature of the premises, open land, is leased to the tenant, if tenant is evicted and the landlord puts up the building or complex in it, the question of reinduction of the evicted tenant to the similar open land does not arise.
23. Mr. Karanth's criticism overlooks important factors in the classification and arrangements of the two provisions of Rent Act under Section 21(1)(j) and (I). It is true that the Rent Act protects tenants against unreasonable eviction from the demised premises. It may be either open land or building, but they are not the same and identical. In the case of building the eviction of tenant would be effected by the landlord for reconstruction. Whereas in the case of open land, the landlord puts up a construction of building or buildings. Thus, equal protection of laws cannot be claimed under unequal circumstances. The difference in legislative protection which is founded on a rational basis is consistent with the known enactment. Even if there is some difference, it cannot in any manner affect the validity of the classification. The Supreme Court in the Decision reported in Kedar Nath Bajura v. State of West Bengal has held thus:
"Article 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically complete."
24. Mr. Somayaji, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State is right, when he says that there is clear cut intelligible differential which formed the basis of classification, tenants of buildings are different from tenants of open pieces of lands. The Legislature in its wisdom for good reasons prescribed different conditions precedent in various Clauses in Section 21 of the Act, for passing order of eviction against tenants.
25. the Decisions relied upon by Mr. Somayaji in support of his submission in Mangharam Chubarmal and Prabhakaran Nair's cases are apposite to the facts of this case.
26. In the Bombay High Court Decision, it is observed as follows:
"There is a clear cut intelligible differential which formed the basis of classification tenants of buildings are different from tenants of open pieces of lands. When we consider the object of the Rent Act, it is also evident that there is rational basis for the above mentioned classification for good reasons different conditions are prescribed by the various clauses of Section 13 as condition precedent for passing an order of eviction against tenants."
27. In the Supreme Court Decision , it is observed as follows:
"It is to be borne in mind that it is not practicable and would be anamalous to expect a landlord to take back a tenant after a long lapse of time during which time the tenant must necessarily have found some suitable accommodation elsewhere. This is true purpose behind Section 14(1) read with Section 14(2)(h). In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are unable to accept the submission that in providing for re-induction of the tenant in case of repairs and not providing for such reinduction in case of re-construction there is any unreasonable and irrational classification without any pains."
28. At para 27, the Supreme Court has observed thus:
"The rationale of these restrictions on the landlord's right is the acute shortage of accommodation and the consequent need to give protection to the tenants against unrestricted eviction. The nature, the form and the extent of the restrictions to be imposed on the landlord's right and the consequent extent of protection to be given to the tenants is a matter of legislative policy and Judgment.
When we are confronted with the problem of a legislation being violative of Article 14 we are not concerned of the wisdom or lack of legislative enactment but we are concerned with the illegality of the legislation. There may be more than one view about the appropriateness or effectiveness or extent of the restrictions- There may be also more than one view about the relaxation of the restrictions on the landlord's right of eviction. This fact is reflected in the different provisions made in different Acts about the grounds for eviction."
29. At para 28 of the said Judgment it is observed that In re THE SPECIAL COURTS BILL, 1978, where Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for the Court at pages 534 to 537 laid down the provisions guiding Article 14 and emphasise that the classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion nor insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. Classification, therefore, is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary.
30. The Decision relied on by Mr. Karanth in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P. is of no help to him. That is the Decision on the question of exemption of certain building constructed after August 26, 1957 from the purview of Hyderabad Rent Act without prescribing the period of limitation - say 5 years, 7 years or 10 years and covering all the buildings constructed prior to that date, as to amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has held thus:-
"We are confronted in these cases with the position, say, in Hyderabad City that there are a large number of buildings which are more than 26 years old which are governed by the Act and quite a large number of buildings which are constructed subsequent to August 26, 1957 which are exempted from it. Many of the exempted buildings are more than 10 years old. While it may be that there is some justification for exempting new buildings say which are five, seven or ten years old from the Act, in order to provide an incentive to builders of new buildings, there is hardly any justification to allow buildings which were constructed more than ten years ago to remain outside the scope of the Act. The landlords of such buildings must have realised a large part of investment made on such buildings by way of rents during all these years. The Court cannot fail to take into account that owing to continuous influx of population into urban areas in recent years the rates of rents have gone up every where and that the landlords of such buildings 'have been able to take advantage of the situation created by the shortage of urban housing accommodation which is now a universal phenomenon. In the case of these buildings there is no longer any need to continue the exemption. There cannot be any valid justification to apply the Act to a building which is 27 years old and not to apply it in the case of a building within 26 years old. The anomaly that is brought about by Section 32(b) of the Act would be more pronounced when the State Government by a notification brings the Act into force now in any part of the State for the first time. On such extension of the Act, only buildings constructed prior to August 26, 1957 in that part of the State would become subject to the Act and later buildings would still be exempt from its operation. This is a wholly insupportable classification. The classification of buildings into two classes for purposes of Section 32(b) of the Act, therefore, does not any longer bear any relationship to the object, since the buildings which are exempted have already come into existence and their owners have realised a major part of their investment."
The instant case is distinguishable on facts. The principle laid down in the above Decision, I adhere; but it has no application to the facts of this case.
31. The other Decision Mr. Karanth has relied in support of his submission reported in Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu. That was a case in which the question raised was whether Section 30(ii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 is constitutionally valid. The said provision exempts from application of the Act "any residential building or part thereof occupied by any one tenant if the monthly rent paid by him in respect of that building or part exceeds four hundred rupees." It was argued that though the Act is designed to apply generally to all residential and non-residential buildings, residential buildings fetching rent of more than Rs. 400/- are singled out and taken out of the purview of the Act arbitrarily and without any reason. It is said that the classification of tenants of residential buildings fetching a rent of over Rupees Four Hundred per month into a distinct class for the purpose of depriving them of the benefits of the Act by excepting such buildings from the operation of the Act has no reasonable nexus to the three-fold object of the Act, namely, the regulation of the letting of residential as well as non-residential buildings, the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom. The Supreme Court has stated that whatever justification there may have been in 1973 when Section 30(ii) was amended by imposing a ceiling of Rs. 400/- on rent payable by tenants of residential buildings to entitle them to seek the protection of the Act, the passage of time has made the ceiling utterly unreal. Further it was observed that in these days of universal, day to day escalation of rentals any ceiling such as that imposed by Section 30(ii) in 1973 can only be considered to be totally artificial and irrelevant today. Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has been held as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The principles laid down in the above decision, I adhere to, but it is inapplicable to the facts of this case. In the instant case, the classification has been made between the tenant of the building and the tenant of the pieces of open land, for they are not equal.
32. The different type of premises which are in possession of the tenant and the different grounds on the basis of which the landlord could recover possession under the provisions of Section 21 of the Rent Act. The tenant on open pieces of lands are not similarly situated as those occupying constructed premises.
33. I am of the opinion that Section 21(1)(l) does not suffer from vice of hostile discrimination against the tenants of open pieces of lands, and the validity of the Section cannot be challenged on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
34. I have no hesitation in holding that the challenge of the petitioner to the provisions of Section 21 (1)(l) as unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is wholly misconceived.
35. In the result, the Rule issued is discharged. Writ Petitions fail and are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.