Madras High Court
An.Vairavan vs Dr.Gnanasekaran on 3 August, 2009
Author: M.M.Sundresh
Bench: M.M.Sundresh
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED:03/08/2009 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.M.SUNDRESH A.S.No.65 of 1998 and C.M.P. No.2209 of 1998 and M.P. No.1 of 2007 1.An.Vairavan 2.An.Arunachalam @ Arun 3.Ve.Annamalai 4.Ve.Mithu Natarajan ... Appellants vs. 1.Dr.Gnanasekaran 2.K.Santhanan 3.Ve A Ve.Annamalai Chettiar 4.Rama Vairavan 5.Rama Chidambaram 6.Ve A Ve Arunachalam Chettiar 7.Ve A Ve Muthaiya ... Respondents PRAYER Appeal Suit has been filed under Section 96 of Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated 25.07.1996 made in O.S.No.449 of 1987 on the file of the Principal Sub Court, Trichy. !For Appellants ... Mrs.Hema Sampath for Mr.R.Subramanian ^For Respondents R1 ... Mr.S.V.Jayaraman R4 & R5 ... Mr.C.P.Sivamohan * * * * * :JUDGMENT
The appeal has been preferred by the defendants 3,4,5 and 6 in the suit. The suit has been filed by the plaintiff against the defendants seeking relief of specific performance of the contract dated 20.06.1983 or in the alternative for the return of a sum of Rs.4 lakhs with future interest.
2. The case of the plaintiff in a nut shell is as follows:
The suit property is a house situated in Colony Road, Thillainagar, Trichy-18. It originally belonged to one VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi wife of Vairavan Chettiar. The said VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi in a sound disposing state of mind executed a will dated 15.01.1977. In the said will, she appointed her husband as the Executor and Trustee. Under the will the Executor was directed to take possession and obtained probate letter. The said Executor shall have the power to dispose of any of the properties mentioned and any such action by him shall not be liable to be questioned by any person claiming under the will. The Executor is also under no obligation to render any accounts to anyone. If the Executor dies before carrying out the directions mentioned under the will, then the Trustees and Executors appointed by him under his will in respect of his properties shall "IPSO FACTO" become the Trustees and Executors of the will of VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi. The said VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi dies on 12.02.1977. The husband Vairavan Chettiar applied for grant of probate in O.P No.122 of 1977 on the file of District Court, Trichy and pending the said proceeding, he died. Thereafter, the defendants 1 and 2 who are the Executors-Trustees under the will of Vairavan Chettiar got themselves impleaded as parties and got the probate of the will on 15.04.1978.
3. The said Executors appointed under the will took possession of estate of VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi. In the will, the deceased VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi has bequeathed the properties equally to be shared among her grandchildren. The house which is one of the property mentioned in the will was taken possession by the Executors. Thereafter, the executors entered into an agreement on 20.06.1983 with the plaintiff. The Executors entered into such an agreement, since it is advantageous to the defendants as it would get more income than the rent, the sum of the beneficiaries are away and the house is not capable of division.
4. Apart from the executors, the defendants 1,2,3,5,9 & 10 have signed the agreement. The 4th defendant has been represented by the mother , 6th defendant by his father and the defendants 7 & 8 also by their father who executed the agreement. Thereafter, the executors sought permission from the District Court, Trichy for the sale of the house. However the said application filed in O.P. No.122 of 1985 for the grant of permission was withdrawn by the defendants 1 and 2 in view of the objection by the other defendants. In the meanwhile in pursuant to the agreement the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.4 lakhs. The defendants 2 to 10 have received their respective shares out of Rs.4 lakhs. Since in view of the refusal of the defendants to execute the sale deed, a notice was given on 26.12.1986 expressing the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff and seeking the defendants to execute the sale deed.
5. Again on 17.03.1987, another notice was given, but no reply has been given by the defendants to the subsequent notice. Hence, alleging that the plaintiff is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the suit has been filed seeking the relief of specific performance with the alternative plea of return of amount paid.
6. The third defendant has filed a written statement alleging that the agreement dated 20.06.1983 cannot be specifically enforced against the third respondent and the same is not valid and binding. It is further stated that the property is worth about Rs.15 lakhs and the permission of the Pre-Court has not been obtained. It is further stated that the permission of the Court for selling the minor's share has not been obtained and the suit is barred by limitation.
7. The 4th defendant has filed a written statement stating that the agreement is not binding on him and his mother was not competent to represent him in agreeing to sell his share. It is also stated that the agreement is void, invalid, not binding and unenforceable against the minor. It is also stated that no permission has been obtained for selling the minor's share and the suit property is divisible. It is further stated that the price fixed is very low and the defendants 1 & 2 have no power to enter into such an agreement.
8. The defendants 7 & 8 have filed a written statement stating that the property of the minors cannot be sold and they are not bound by the terms of the agreement. It is further stated that the defendants 1 & 2 and the guardian did not have the power to effect any transaction without permission of the Court.
9. The 10th defendant has filed a written statement stating that the permission of the Court has not been obtained and the Executors have no right to sell the suit properties.
10. Based upon the above said pleadings, the following issues have been framed.
(1) Agreement dated 20.06.1983 is enforceable? Such Agreement binds all the defendants?
(2) Is the plaintiff entitled to relief of specific performance?
(3) Is the suit maintainable?
(4) Is the suit barred by limitation?
(5) What other relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
11. On behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Ex.A1 to A7. Ex.A1 is the probate proceeding in which the will dated 15.01.1977 forms part. Ex.A3 is the agreement between the parties. Ex.A4 and A7 are the notice issued by the plaintiff. Ex.A5 is the receipt given by the defendants and Ex.A6 is the copy of the petition filed in O.P.No.122 of 1977 seeking permission to sell the suit property before the District Court, Trichy. On behalf of the defendants, two witness have been examined. The defendants 4 & 7 examined themselves. Only one document has been marked in Ex.B1 on behalf of the defendants.
12. The Court below on a appreciation of the evidence both oral and documentary on the side of the plaintiff and defendants as well as the arguments made by both the sides has decreed the suit for specific performance. Challenging the same the present appeal has been filed by the defendants 3,4,5 & 6 in the suit.
13. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the will dated 15.01.1977 does not give the power of alienation to the Executors, since they are only Trustees of the properties covered under the will. It is the further case of the learned senior counsel that, what is given under the will is only the power of administrative and there is no power to sell the suit properties. It is further submitted that the power of alienation under the will is given only to the husband of the testator namely Vairavan Chettiar and not to the defendants 1 & 2. The learned senior counsel submitted that the judgment and decree of the Court below is contrary to Section 8 of the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act, since the permission has not been obtained. The learned senior counsel has also submitted that in view of the failure of the defendants 1 & 2 to get the permission from the Court as required under Section 307 of Hindu Succession Act, 1925, the suit is liable to be dismissed.
14. According to the learned senior counsel, the readiness and willingness has not been proved by the plaintiff. The learned senior counsel further contended that the transaction is void in so far as the 4th defendant is concerned, since the mother cannot represent the minor. It is further submitted that even assuming the defendants 1 & 2 have got the power under Section 307 of Hindu Succession Act, 1925, the same cannot bind the rights of the minors and therefore the provisions contained in Section 8 of Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act, 1956 will have the preference over the Hindu Succession Act, 1925.
15. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that in order to appreciate the intention of data, the will as a whole has to be read. It is further submitted that a reading of the will would clearly show that the power has been given to the Executors/Trustees to do any act in so far as the suit property is concerned and the said action cannot be questioned. It is further submitted that the defendants being a beneficiaries under a document cannot question the terms of the said document. In other words, the rights of the defendants are subject to the provisions of the will. The learned counsel submitted that it is not even necessary to make the defendants 3 to 10 as parties and the defendants have derived the power under the will. It is also submitted that under Section 307 of Indian Succession Act, no application is necessary seeking the permission from the Court.
16. The learned senior counsel also submitted that Section 8 of Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act would not apply to the present case, since the rights have be accrued under the will subject to the condition stipulated therein. Further it is also submitted that the defendants have received their share and it is not proper for them to contend otherwise. In so far as the readiness and willingness is concerned, there is no clause for fixing the time and the delay is because of the pending proceedings in O.P. No.122 of 1985. The financial capacity of the plaintiff to pay has not be disputed in the written statement and also in the evidence. The plaintiff has deposited the entire amount in pursuant to the judgment and decree of the Court below. Hence it is prayed by the learned senior counsel that the judgment and decree of the Court below has to be confirmed and the appeal will have to be dismissed.
17. In the present case, the execution of the will dated 15.01.1977 is not in dispute. The said will has been executed by the late VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi making her husband Vairavan Chettiar as the Executor/Trustee of the will. The contents of the will is extracted here under:
I HEREBY APPOINT MY HUSBAND Sri VE.A.Vairavan Chettiar TO BE THE EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE UNDER THIS WILL. He shall immediately after my death, take possession of my Estate and obtain such probate letters of Administration or Succession Certificate in respect of any part of the Estate as may be necessary or expedient as he deems necessary and shall pay all debts payable by me, taxes, funeral and testamentar expenses and Estate duty out of the said Estate and shall thereafter carry out the directions obtained hereunder. He shall also have power to dispose of any of my property immovable or movable, if he deems fit and any such action by him shall not be liable to be questioned by any person claiming under this Will. Nor shall the Executor and Trustee be under any obligation to render any accounts to anybody. If my husband unfortunately passes away before completely carrying out the directions contained in my Will the Trustee and Executors appointed by him under his WILL, in respect of his properties shall "IPSO FACTO" become the Trustees and Executors of my WILL who shall carry out my directions.
18. Hence a perusal of the said will would show that the deceased VE.A.VE.Meyyammai Achi appointed her husband Ve.A.Vairavan Chettiar as Executor and Trustee under the will. The power is given to the said person to probate and administer the will. The power is also given to the said person to carry out the directions contained in the will. He has also been given the power to dispose of any property whether immovable or movable if he deems fit and any such action by him shall not be questioned by anyone claiming under the Will. He shall also be not liable to render any accounts to anybody.
19. Similarly, the above said will also speaks about the situation in which the Executor dies before carrying out the directions mentioned in the will. In such a case the Trustees and Executors appointed by him under his will shall "IPSO FACTO" become the Trustees and Executors of her will and they shall carry out the directions mentioned in her will.
20. Therefore, a reading of the said will would clearly show that absolute power has been given to the original Executor to dispose of the property under the will and while exercising the said power, no beneficiary can question the same and he is not liable to give any account for his action. The later portion of the will also visualizes the situation when the Executor dies and in such an event, all his powers will have to be exercised by the Executors and Trustees named in his will.
21. The word IPSO FACTO has been defined in the BLACK'S DICTIONARY as "the very nature of situation". Similarly in the AIYAR'S LAW LEXICON, it has been defined as "automatically". Applying the said meaning it is very clear that the will clearly stipulates that the defendants 1 & 2 being the Executors shall exercise the powers of the original Executor.
22. It is a well settled principle of law that a will should construed as a whole and the actual meaning will have to be imported. Section 74 of the Indian Succession Act reads as follows:
Wording of Will: "It is not necessary that any technical words or terms of art be used in a Will, but only that the wording be such that the intentions of the testator can be known therefrom".
Section 82 Meaning of Clause to be collected from entire Will:
"The meaning of any clause in a Will is to be collected from the entire instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other"
23. On a reading of the above said provisions, it is clearly seen that a will has to be read as a whole and the surrounding circumstances are to be given effect to. The only conclusion that can be arrived in the present case is that the defendants 1 & 2 have been given absolute power to deal with the properties mentioned in the will in the same way as that of the original Executor. It has been held in Paragraph 33 of the judgment reported in 2009 (3) LW 5 as follows:
How a Will has to be interpreted is no longer res integra. Intention of the testator must be ascertained from the words used and the surrounding circumstances. The Court will put itself in the armchair of the testator. In Navneet Lal v. Gokul [(1976) 1 SCC 630]it has been held:
8. From the earlier decisions of this Court the following principles, inter alia, are well established:
(1) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed. (Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal) (2) In construing the language of the will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator's armchair (Venkata Narasimha v. Parthasarathy) and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than merely the words used. It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense...
But all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document. (Venkata Narasimha case and Gnanambal Ammal v. T. Raju Ayyar) (3) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory. (Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer) (4) The court must accept, if possible, such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expressions inoperative. The court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the state of his property, of his family and the like. Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator. Further, where one of the two reasonable constructions would lead to intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which does not create any such hiatus. (Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das) (5) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will. (Ramachandra Shenoy v. Hilda Brite Mrs)'.
{See also Arunkumar and Anr. v. Shriniwas and Ors.[(2003) 6 SCC 98 = 2003-4- LW.713]} This aspect of the matter has recently been considered in Bajrang Factory Ltd. v. University of Calucutta [(2007) 7 SCC 183 = 2008 - 1-L.W.201]wherein it was held:
39. With a view to ascertain the intention of the maker of the will, not only the terms thereof are required to be taken into consideration but also all circumstances attending thereto. The will as a whole must, thus, be considered for the said purpose and not merely the particular part thereof. As the will if read in its entirety, can be given effect to, it is imperative that nothing should be read therein to invalidate the same.
40. In construing a will, no doubt, all possible contingencies are required to be taken into consideration, but it is also a well-settled principle of law that only because a part of a document is invalid, the entire document need not be invalidated, if the former forms a severable part. The legatee admittedly did not have any issue, nor did he adopt or appoint any person. In a situation of this nature, effect can be given to Clause 12 of the will, if it is read as occurring immediately after Clause 5 of the original will. As the said clause stands on its own footing, its effect must be considered vis-`a-vis Clause 6, but the court may not start with construction of Clauses 6 and 7, which may lead to a conclusion that Clause 5 is also invalid. The contingencies contemplated by Clause 6 may not have any effect on Clause 7, if it does not take place at all.
The property which should have been purchased with the sale proceeds could have been the subject-matter of the bequest and in terms thereof the University of Calcutta became the beneficiary on the death of the original legatee. We do not find any reason as to why the same cannot be given effect to. We have indicated hereinbefore that it is possible to construe Clause 7 of the will and in fact a plain reading thereof would, thus, lead to the conclusion that it merely provides for an option given to the legatee to take recourse thereto. We have also indicated hereinbefore that the term "devise" in the context of Clause 7 does not carry any meaning and, therefore, the same for all intent and purport should be substituted by the word "desire". As a matter of fact, the appellant in the copy of the will supplied to us had also used the word "desire" in place of the word "devise", which would also go to show that even the appellant understood Clause 7 in that fashion. Clause 7, if so read, will have no application to the properties which were to be substituted in place of the immovable properties belonging to the testator. The benefit of the sale proceeds, thus, in absence of any action on the part of the legatee in terms of Clause 7 shall also vest in the University. Moreover, the questions as to whether the deed of sale purported to have been executed by the legatee in favour of Chamong Tea Co. Ltd. or other instruments executed by him in favour of the appellants herein are pending for consideration before the High Court which may have to be determined on its own merit. In the event the said transactions are held to be void, the question of giving any other or further effect to Clause 6 of the will may not arise.
In Anil Kak v. Kumari Sharda Raje and Ors. [2008 (6) SCALE 597 = 2008-3-L.W.723] it is stated:
The testator's intention is collected from a consideration of the whole Will and not from a part of it. If two parts of the same Will are wholly irreconcilable, the court of law would not be in a position to come to a finding that the Will dated 4.11.1992 could be given effect to irrespective of the appendices. In construing a Will, no doubt all possible contingencies are required to be taken into consideration. Even if a part is invalid, the entire document need not be invalidated, only if it forms a severable part. [See Bajrang Factory Ltd. and Anr. v. University of Calcutta and Ors. [(2007) 7 SCC 183 = 2008-1- LW.201]} In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth edition, Volume 50, page 332-33, it is stated:
462. Leading principle of construction: The leading principle of construction which is applicable to all wills without qualification and overrides every other rule of construction is that the testator's intention is collected from a consideration of the whole will taken in connection with any evidence properly admissible, and the meaning of the will and of every part of it is determined according to that intention'.
In Shyamal Kanti Guha (D) Through LRs. and Ors. v. Meena Bose 2008 (9) SCALE 363 = 2009-1-L.W.201, it is stated:
Keeping in mind the aforementioned backdrop, the Will should be construed. It should be done by a Court indisputably placing itself on the arm- chair of the testator. The endeavour of the Court should be to give effect to his intention. The intention of the testator can be culled out not only upon reading the Will in its entirety, but also the background facts and circumstances of the case. Following the said principles, we have no hesitation to hold that the title to the said property vested in the appellant.
24. Therefore, on a consideration of the said legal position this Court is of the opinion that the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. In the judgment reported in 2009 2 MLJ 104 (Shyamal Kanth Guha (D) Through Lrs. and others Vs. Meena Bose), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while interpreting a will the intention of the testator has to be taken into account and in order to ascertain the said intention the will has to be read in entirety and the background and facts and circumstances have also to be take note of.
25. In so far as the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act, 1956, the same also does not merit acceptance. In the present case, the legatees get the benefit under the will. There is no difference between a minor and a major in so far as the legatees are concerned. There is no dispute that the power has been given to the Executors to take a decision in the interest of beneficiaries. Therefore, when a person gets his right under a document which in this case "a will" he cannot question the terms of the said document. In other words, the defendants cannot "approbate" or "reprobate". Section 8 of the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act would not be applicable in a case of this nature. The learned senior counsel for the appellants relied upon Section 7 of the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act to contend that the said Act will have preference over the other enactments. However in the present case, the issue involved is not with respect to the application of Indian Succession Act, 1925 over and above the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act, 1956, but the question of implementation of the directions given under will. Therefore, the only question to be decided is about the intention of the testator.
26. The learned senior counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1987 Punjab 215 (Darbara Singh Vs. Karminder singh and others), AIR 1982 Orissa 194 (Laxman Hota Vs. Rama Chandra Hota and others), AIR 1968 MadhyaPradesh 150 (Ramchandra Vs. Manikchand and another), AIR 1974 SC 1892 (Kugu Collieries Ltd. Vs. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. and others), AIR 1932 Bombay 604 (Mahommed Hussein Vs. Bai Aishabai and others), in support of his contention to show that the agreement is unenforceable, since the permission as required under the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act has not been obtained in so far as the minors are concerned. The learned senior counsel for the appellants has also relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1971 Kerala 239 (Ayissa and anothers Vs. Prabhakaran), 1991 Madhyapradesh 340 (Johri and others Vs. Mahila Draupati alias Dropadi and others), 1980 1 MLJ 486 (Sundaramoorthy and another Vs. Shanmugha Nadar and others), in support of her case to contend that the agreement entered into by an incompetent person not being the natural guardian cannot be enforced. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the suit will have to be dismissed.
27. There is no difficulty in appreciating the principle of law that a minor's individual property cannot be sold without obtaining the permission as required under the Hindu Minorities and Guardianship act. Similarly an incompetent person cannot enter into agreement either for sale or purchase on behalf of the minor. However in the present case on hand, the above said rulings have no application in view of the fact that the defendants 1 & 2 being the Executors have got the powers to deal with the property which they administer under the will. Therefore this Court is of the opinion that the said judgment's relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants are not applicable to the present case for the simple reason that the rights of the defendants accrue and emerge under the will and therefore they cannot question the same.
28. The next contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants is that the very fact that the defendants 1 & 2 have not obtained the permission under Hindu Minorities and Guardianship Act from the Court as well as under
Indian Succession Act, 1925 would itself show that the plaintiff is aware of the legal hurdles and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. The said contention is also in the opinion of the Court cannot be accepted. A reading of Sections 307(1) and 307(2)(1) of Indian Succession Act, 1925 would clearly show that no application is warranted when the Executor sells the property covered by a will when such a power is given to the Executor. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants does not merit acceptance.
29. In so far as the readiness and willingness is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the plaintiff has not proved the same. According to the learned senior counsel the suit has been filed belately after waiting for a long time. The learned senior counsel has also relied upon the judgment reported in 1998 (1) CTC 181 (Vasantha and others Vs. M.Senguttuvan) and 1997 (1) CTC 160 (Seeni Ammal Vs. Veerayee Ammal), to contend that a duty is cast upon the agreement holder to prove the readiness and willingness as contended by the learned senior counsel for the respondents in the present case the plaintiff is a Doctor. The financial capacity of the plaintiff has not been questioned by the defendants. It is further seen that the plaintiff is having a dispensary running his hospital. The said averments regarding readiness and willingness was also not disputed in the written statement as well as the evidence. It is further seen that the plaintiff has deposited the entire amount in pursuant to the orders of the Court. When the Court has asked the plaintiff about the time required under Order 20 Rule 12(a) of C.P.C., the plaintiff sought for time and paid the amount within the said time. Therefore, the said contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff has not proved the readiness and willingness to execute the sale deed, is also rejected. It is also to be noted that the plaintiff could not come to the Court in view of the pending proceedings and only after the withdrawal of the petition before the Court, the plaintiff has come before the Court. Therefore, there is every justification for the delay in approaching the Court.
30. This Court also will have to see the conduct of the parties. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the defendants have received the money. The guardians of the defendants have received the money on behalf of the minors. The reason stated that the rent that would fetch by letting the building would be less was also found acceptance by the Court below. Moreover, the defendants have been living in different places and therefore the defendants 1 & 2 being the Executors have thought fit in the interest of the defendants to sell the suit property. Hence in view of the findings given above and on a reading of the will, the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent is to be accepted that it is not even necessary to include the other defendants in the agreement in view of the power conferred upon the defendants 1 & 2 under the will. Therefore, looking from the said angle also this Court is of the opinion that the appeal deserves to be rejected.
31. For the reasons stated above and on a consideration of the materials available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the appeal filed by the appellants is liable to be rejected and accordingly the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. and miscellaneous petition are closed.
cs To The Principal Sub Court, Trichy.