Allahabad High Court
Sandeep Singh vs State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. ... on 3 July, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 ALL 2550
Author: Rajnish Kumar
Bench: Satyendra Singh Chauhan, Rajnish Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
A.F.R.
Reserved
Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1501 of 2014
Petitioner :- Sandeep Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal,Naveen Kumar Sinha
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
CONNECTED WITH:
(1) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1502 of 2014
Petitioner :- Sudhir Misha
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru Prin.Secy.Appointment Deptt.Lucknow & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Naveen Kumar Sinha,Mudit Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N. Misra
AND
(2) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1503 of 2014
Petitioner :- Ravi Kumar Sagar
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal,Naveen Kumar Sinha
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(3) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1519 of 2014
Petitioner :- Vineet Kumar
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal,Naveen Kumar Sinha
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(4) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1653 of 2014
Petitioner :- Rahul Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar,Romit Seth
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(5) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1654 of 2014
Petitioner :- Bhanu Pratap Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar,Romit Seth
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(6) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1655 of 2014
Petitioner :- Ashwani Panwar
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(7) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1635 of 2014
Petitioner :- Kshitish Pandey
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(8) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1775 of 2014
Petitioner :- Asha Ram Pandey
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy.Appointment Deptt.Lko. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Amar Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N. Misra
AND
(9) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1776 of 2014
Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kumar Sharma
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Amar Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(10) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1811 of 2014
Petitioner :- Ashtosh Tripathi
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Surya Mani Royekwar,Dr. Deepti Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
AND
(11) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1356 of 2015
Petitioner :- Mukesh Kumar & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy. Appointment,Lucknow & 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sandeep Dixit
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gaurav Mehrotra,U.N. Mishra
AND
(12) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1357 of 2015
Petitioner :- Hirdesh Kumar & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy. Appointment,Lucknow & 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kalra,Avinash Chandra Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gaurav Mehrotra
***
Hon'ble Satyendra Singh Chauhan,J.
Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar,J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.) Since common questions of law and fact are involved in all the aforesaid connected writ petitions, therefore, they are being clubbed and decided together by a common judgment and order.
Heard Sri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Mudit Agarwal, Sri Ashwani Kumar, Sri Akhilesh Kalra and Sri Sandip Dixit, learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners and Sri S.K.Kalia, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri U.N.Mishra and Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the High Court as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the State.
These writ petitions have been filed by total fifteen petitioners, namely, S/Shri Sandeep Singh, Sudhir Mishra, Ravi Kumar Sagar, Vineet Kumar, Rahul Singh, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Ashwani Panwar, Kshitish Pandey, Asha Ram Pandey, Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, Ashtosh Tripathi, Mukesh Kumar, Shobhit Sourav, Hridesh Kumar and Himanshu Misra challenging the order of discharge simpliciter from service dated 22.09.2014 and 15.06.2015 from the post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.)/Judicial Magistrate under Rule 24(4) of the U.P.Judicial Service Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred as "the Rules"). In some of the writ petitions order dated 19.09.2014 and inquiry report dated 12.09.2014 as well as proceedings of the Full Court of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 15.9.2014 have also been challenged.
The necessary facts, as culled out from the pleadings in the writ petitions, for adjudication of the present case are that after qualifying the PCS (J) Examination in pursuance of the Advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission, Uttar Pradesh the petitioners were appointed and joined on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) in pursuance of the U.P. Government Notification/appointment dated 10.05.2013. The petitioners joined on different dates and were posted in various districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners were on probation for a period of two years. During tenure of their service and period of probation an induction training programme was conducted as a consequence of appointment on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), for the batch of the petitioners i.e. Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), Phase-II at Judicial Training and Research Institute, Lucknow (hereinafter referred as JTRI, Lucknow) during the period 09.06.2014 to 08.09.2014. On the eve of last day of Training Programme i.e. on 07.09.2014 the petitioners, total 15 in number, went for dinner at Charan Club and Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow. The petitioners consumed liquor and took dinner there. Admittedly the aforesaid fifteen Judicial Officers were present in the Charan Club and Resort (Supra) at the said place and time. It appears that while the petitioners were taking liquor and dinner some heated arguments took place between some of them, which resulted in a scuffle between them. It has been alleged that the heated arguments were exchanged between Shri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, Shri Asha Ram Pandey, Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri Bhanu Pratap Singh and Shri Rahul Singh, resulting in beating (marpeet) to the extent that an officer fell unconscious and was brought to JTRI in the same condition. After coming to the premises of the JTRI, Lucknow again there was marpeet between some of them before the officers of the Institute. It has also been admitted by the petitioners that the incident had started because of lewd remarks made in respect of a fellow lady trainee judicial officer. However, next day the said officers apologized to each other and the matter ended in an amicable manner. It has further been submitted that it was a friendly argument initially, which resulted in a scuffle and marpeet, however, later the issue was settled amicably, so it cannot be termed and treated as either a law and order problem or misconduct. This incident does not invite any cognizance by third parties as the matter was between five friends and was also settled amicably between them. It has been stated on behalf of some of the petitioners in their writ petitions that they were not involved in any misbehaviour or any scuffle and some of them have stated that they had tried to pacify the scuffle. Some of them have stated that they have not consumed the liquor at all. From the pleadings it is apparent that one of the Judicial Officers was mercilessly beaten by fellow trainee officers to the extent that he became unconscious and was brought to JTRI in an unconscious condition. But none of the petitioners appointed on such a responsible post or the officers posted at JTRI even cared to inform the incident to the senior officers or the High Court.
The incident was brought to the notice of the Registrar General of this Court on 8th of September 2014 through a telephonic call. After receiving the information the Registrar General put up a note before Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Hon'ble the Chief Justice directed on 09.09.2014 to the Senior Registrar (Judicial) to visit the place of incident for the purpose of ascertaining as to what had actually happened on 7th of September 2014 at Charan Club and Resort and then at the premises of JTRI, Lucknow and submit a report. The Senior Registrar (Judicial) visited the place of incident and after collecting the necessary information submitted a report before Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 12th of September 2014. The report of the Senior Registrar was placed before the Administrative Committee of the High Court in its meeting held on 15th of September 2014, in which the Administrative Committee resolved that the report be accepted and the matter be referred to the Full Court for discussion. The minutes of meeting of Administrative Committee are extracted as under:-
Sl. No. AGENDA RESOLUTION 1 Consideration of report dated 12 September 2014 submitted by Smt.Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget) (Recruitment Cell), High Court, Allahabad Considered the report dated 12 September 2014 submitted by Smt. Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell), High Court. Allahabad.
Resolved that the report dated 12 September 2014 submitted by Smt.Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell), High Court. Allahabad be accepted.
Let the matter be referred to the Full Court for discussion.
In terms of the resolution of the Administrative Committee the matter was placed before the Full Court on 15th of September 2014 and after deliberations the Full Court resolved that the 11 probationers be discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction as stipulated under Rule 24(4) of the U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001 and that a recommendation to that effect be submitted to the appointing authority. The minutes of meeting of Full Court dated 15.09.2014 are extracted as under:-
AGENDA RESOLUTION 1 Suitability of the probationary Judicial Officers, namely, Sri Ashwani Panwar, Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Lakhimpur Kheri, Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh, Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bahraich, Sri Asha Ram Pandey, Judicial Magistrate, Maharajganj, Sri Rahul Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Auraiya and Sri Ashutosh Tripathi, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Azamgarh.
2. Any other matter with the permission of the Chair.
Consideration of report dated 12 September 2014 submitted by Smt. Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell), High Court, Allahabad Considered the report dated 12.9.2014 submitted by Smt.Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell), High Court. Allahabad.
The meeting of the Full Court commenced at 4.30 p.m. A live video link between the Hon'ble Judges at Allahabad and Lucknow was established.
The Chief Justice opened the discussion by elaborating upon the nature of the power conferred by Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001, which provides as follows:
"24.Probation-(1) ...........................
4. If, it appears, to the Court at any time during or at the end of period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, that a probationer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, it may, make recommendation to the appointing authority whereupon the probationers shall be discharged from the service by the appointing authority."
The letters of appointment issued to the probationers stipulate that their appointments are temporary in nature and that until they are permanently appointed, their conditions of service would be governed by the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, notified on 11 June 1975. The Chief Justice while elaborating on the power conferred upon the HIgh court to asses the suitability of a probationer for continuance in service drew attenton to sub-rule (4) of Rle 24, under which the High Court may make a recommendaton to the appointing autority for the discharge of a probationer from service, where the probationer has "otherwise failed to give satisfacton" during the term of the probationary appointment. The position of a probationer has been laid down by the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad (AIR 1960 SC 689) and in a judgment of Seven Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192) which have been followed since. The present meeting, the Chief Justice noted, was only confined to determining the suitability of the probationers.
The report submitted by the Senior Registrar (Judicial), dated 12 September 2014 had been circulated to all the judges for the purposes of determining the suitability of the probationary judicial officers for their continuance in service.
The Chief Justice invited participation by the Hon'ble Judges, both at Allahabad and Lucknow. The Hon'ble Judges who wished to place their views before the Full Court both at Allahabad and Lucknow placed their views before the Full Court. The discussions which commenced at 4.30 pm continued until 6.00 pm. during the course of the discussion, the suitability for continuance in service of the following probationary judicial officers was considered;
1. Sri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma
2. Sri Asharam Pandey,
3. Shri Ashutosh Tripathi
4. Sri Ashwani Panwar
5. Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh
6. Sri Kshitish Pandey
7. Sri Rahul Singh
8. Sri Ravi Kumar Sagar
9. Sri Sandeep Singh
10.Sri Sudheer Mishra
11.Shri Vineet Kumar The Full Court resolved that the aforesaid 11 probationers be discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rle 24(4) and that a recommendation to that effect be submitted to the appointing authority. All the probationers, who are to be discharged from service, should be paid one month's pay plus allowances in lieu of notice.
Accordingly, orders for the discharge simpliciter of the aforesaid probationary judicial officers be recommended to be issued by the appointing authority under Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001.
In pursuance of Full Court recommendation, 11 petitioners/Judicial Officers, namely, S/Shri Akhikesh Kumar Sharma, Asha Ram Pandey, Ashutosh Triapthi, Ashwani Panwar, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Kshitish Pandey, Rahul Singh, Ravi Kumar Sagar, Sandip Singh, Sudhir Mishra and Vineet Kumar were discharged under Rule 24(4) of the U.P.Judicial Service Rules, 2001 giving one month's salary plus allowance in lieu of notice with immediate effect by an order of simpliciter discharge passed by the Government.
Subsequently one Hon'ble Judge of this Court wrote a letter and in pursuance thereof Senior Registrar of the High Court put up a proposal dated 28.10.2014 before Hon'ble the Chief Justice indicating therein that report of Senior Registrar (Judicial) is silent about the role of Senior Officers of the JTRI, Lucknow. He further stated that though the three Senior Officers had been transferred from the Institute on 19.9.2014, but their role in the incident is yet to be inquired into for preventing happening of such incident in future. He further submitted that it would be in the fitness of the things that the points indicated by his Lordship may be inquired into by a Senior Judicial officer so that corrective measures may be taken. Hon'ble the Chief Justice ordered for Vigilance Inquiry to be conducted by the OSD (Enquiries) in respect of the role of senior officers of JTRI on 29.10.2014. In pursuance thereof the inquiry report was submitted on 27.01.2015 by the OSD (Enquiries) after conducting the Vigilance Inquiry in the matter.
In paragraph 136 of this inquiry report it has been mentioned that after seeing the CCTV footage of Charan Club & Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow, fifteen induction trainee officers were identified, namely, S/Shri Vineet Kumar, Kshitiz Pandey, Sandeep Singh, Ravi Kumar Sagar, Ashutosh Tripathi, Sudhir Mishra, Ashwani Panwar, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Asha Ram Pandey, Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, Rahul Singh, Mukesh Kumar, Hridesh Kumar, Shobit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra who were present at Charan Club& Resort on 07.09.2014. It has also been mentioned that there were three incidents of fighting between the officers on the same night, two at Charan Club and Resort and one at JTRI, Lucknow In view of the aforesaid report the names of four additional judicial officers namely S/Shri Mukesh Kumar, Hridesh Kumar, Shobhit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra emerged. The report of the OSD (Enquiries) was placed before the Administrative Committee, which after considering the same directed to place it before the Full Court vide resolution dated 05.02.2015. Accordingly the matter was placed before the Full Court on 23.05.2015 in terms of resolution dated 05.02.2015, which after considering the matter resolved that the four probationers/petitioners, namely, S/Shri Mukesh Kumar, Hridesh Kumar, Shobhit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra be discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction as stipulated under Rule 24(4) of the Judicial Service Rules 2001, and a recommendation was made that let orders for discharge simpliciter of the aforesaid probationary judicial officers be issued by the appointing authority. The minutes of Full Court meeting dated 23.05.2015 are extracted as under:-
AGENDA RESOLUTION
2.
Sri Mukesh Kumar, Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Pratapgarh, Sri Hirdesh Kumar, Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai, Sri Shobhit Sourav, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Shravasti at Bhinga and Sri Himanshu Mishra, Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Basti.
Consideration of the vigilance report dated 27.1.2015 submitted by Sri Sanjay Kumar Pachori, O.S.D.(Enquiry), High Court, Allahabad pursuant to the Administrative Committee's Resolution dated 5.2.2015.
Resolved that the following four probationers:
1. Sri Mukesh Kumar
2. Sri Hridesh Kumar
3. Sri Shobhit Sourav and
4. Sri Himanshu Mishra be discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 and that a recommendation to that effect be submitted to the appointing authority. The probationers, who are to be discharged from service, should be paid one month's pay plus allowances in lieu of notice.
Let orders for discharge simpliciter of the aforesaid probationary judicial officers be recommended to be issued by the appointing authority.
In furtherance thereof the aforesaid four judicial officers were discharged by a simpliciter discharge order vide office memorandum dated 15th of June 2015, passed by State Government.
Being aggrieved with the order of discharge simpliciter the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petitions before this court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of simpliciter discharge has been passed in purported exercise of Rule 24(4) of the Rules without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners at any stage. Submission is that the impugned order dated 19.09.2014 corrected/amended vide order dated 22.09.2014 is a camouflage as discharge simpliciter, but in fact the same is stigmatic order founded on the alleged misconduct based on a solitary incident which occurred at Charan Club and Resort on 07.09.2014, in which it has been alleged that certain scuffle took place between the petitioners while they had gone there for liquor and dinner. In respect of the said incident an inquiry was conducted by Senior Registrar (Judicial) and a report dated 12.09.2014 was submitted. On the basis of the aforesaid report the incident was termed as misconduct and the services of the petitioners have been terminated. It has further been submitted that the petitioners after appointment as Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) completed their three months training successfully at JTRI on 8th of September 2014 and nothing adverse was reported by the Director of the Institute as such there was nothing against the petitioners with regard to their conduct or performance during training. Otherwise the Director should have sent a report to the Court about the conduct and performance of the petitioners during the training under Rule 22(3) of the Rules, rather the training completion certificate has been issued by the Director with a note that ''However it is learnt that due to an incident which took place in the night of 7th of September 2014, services of the trainee officer has been dispensed with'. Further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there was nothing against the petitioners either in regard to their conduct or performance or during their training, as such the petitioners could not have been discharged in purported exercise of power under Rule 24(4) of the Rules on the ground that the petitioners have not made sufficient use of their opportunity or have failed to give satisfaction. Accordingly, the submission is that the petitioners had been performing their duties successfully and without any complaint and their working was always appreciated but for the incident, which had taken place, in respect of which the inquiry was got conducted and a report was submitted on 12.09.2014. Further submission is that the aforesaid report goes to indicate that the allegation of misconduct has been made against the petitioners and the petitioners have been alleged to have taken liquor and entered into brawl in public place which is a Club and Resort and on the basis of the said incident, order of simpliciter discharge has been passed without holding any inquiry in pursuance of the said fact finding inquiry. However, since nobody else was there in the Club and Resort at the time of incident, it can not be said that it had happened in public place and seen by anybody. Further submission is that no inquiry was made by the opposite parties in respect of suitability of the petitioners in the office of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), rather the inquiry was conducted into the incident and once the incident was inquired into and the complaint was to the effect that liquor has been taken in public place and the petitioners have entered into a brawl then a full fledged inquiry should have been held and the petitioners should have been afforded opportunity of hearing and the principles of natural justice should not have been violated. Thus, the petitioners' orders of simpliciter discharge are not sustainable in the eyes of law. It has also been submitted that it is not a motive on the basis of which the petitioners have been terminated, but it is a foundation on the basis of alleged incident and the misconduct which is followed by the termination order. Further it has been submitted that the Full Court Agenda was circulated in respect of five officers on the same date for consideration of the report submitted by the Senior Registrar (Judicial), but the Full Court has taken a decision to discharge the services of 11 Judicial Officers/petitioners without ascertaining their involvement in the incident and therefore on this count, the resolution of the Full court is defective, illegal and without application of mind. The order of simpliciter discharge in pursuance thereof is therefore said to be not sustainable in law.
On behalf of the petitioners of writ petition No.1356 (SB) of 2015 and Writ petition No.1357 (SB) of 2015, namely, S/Shri Mukesh Kumar, Shobit Sourav, Hridesh Kumar and Himanshu Misra, it has been submitted that their names did not appear initially in the inquiry report, which was conducted by the Senior Registrar (Judicial), but upon a letter written by an Hon'ble Judge of this Court an enquiry was held with a pre-determined mind to cover up the lacuna in the earlier report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial). It has further been submitted that in the said report names of these four officers came to light on the basis of CCTV footage, but there is no incriminating remarks against them. Even then on the basis of the said report these four petitioners have been discharged vide order dated 15.06.2015 by an order of simpliciter discharge without there being any evidence against them. It has further been submitted that the order dated 15.06.2015 has been passed referring the inquiry report of the OSD (Enquiries), in which no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners so the same is not sustainable on the face of it as it has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the opposite parties in respect of conduct of the judicial officers and also that the stand on a different footing is of no substance and liable to be repelled as the law applies equally to all. It has further been submitted that if an officer can be dismissed after holding an inquiry, then it cannot be said that a judicial officer can be dismissed without holding any inquiry as the protection of law in respect of discharge/termination based on misconduct will be available to the petitioners also and they cannot be thrown out without following the due procedure of law.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, it has been submitted that once the inquiry has been made and the incident has been alleged, then the order becomes punitive and stigmatic and the same cannot survive without any opportunity of hearing in the eyes of law as it has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing in violation of principles of natural justice.
As regards the petitioner Sri Asha Ram Pandey, it has been submitted that not only his lien has been terminated from the post of Assistant Prosecution Officer but the Govt. has also recommended for cancellation of his selection on the said post in view of the termination of his services by the High Court.
It has also been pointed out that the petitioners stand debarred from appointment in judicial service of other States as is evident from an advertisement of the State of Karnataka which deprives/disqualifies the persons for appointment for Higher Judicial Service who have even been discharged simpliciter. Accordingly it has been submitted that the order of simpliciter discharge is in fact a punitive and stigmatic order and it is not sustainable. However during course of arguments it was informed that some of the petitioners have been selected and appointed again at other places even in judicial service in other States.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the services of the petitioners have been discharged in wholly arbitrary, illegal and biased manner without application of mind and without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in gross violation of principles of natural justice as such the same are not sustainable in the eyes of law and liable to be quashed by this Court and the writ petitions are liable to be allowed with costs.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of their submissions, have placed reliance on Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab; 1974 (2) SCC 831, Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India, 1984 (2) SCC 369, Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P.; 2000 (5) SCC 152, Register General High Court of Gujarat Vs. Jayshree Chaman Lal Buddhibhatti; 2013 SCC Online 952, State Bank of India Vs. Palak Modi; 2013 (3) SCC 607, Dr.Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India and others; (1989) 3 SCC 311, Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar and others; (2015) 15 SCC 151, Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36, K. H. Phadnis Vs. State of Maharashtra; 1971 (1) SCC 790, Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U. P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another; (1999) 2 SCC 21, Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others; (1999) 3 SCC 60, Mathew P.Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. and others; (2003) 3 SCC 263.
Per contra, learned counsel for the High Court submitted that the petitioners, after appointment on the post of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), were on probation, as such their services were on trial as per law. But during period of probation they failed to maintain the high standards of conduct and behaviour expected from a judicial officer. It has further been submitted that the general principles of service jurisprudence applicable to any other service may not be strictly applicable in the case of judicial officers as the judicial service is a different category of employment. The standards expected from the judicial officers both in performance of judicial duties as well as behaviour in private life have to be of a higher probity and propriety vis-a-vis any other Government service. Further highest standards of probity, morality and propriety, both in discharge of judicial functions as well as in public life are expected from persons who are to be appointed as judicial officers or working as judicial officers after appointment.
Learned counsel for the High Court further submitted that the petitioners, who are 15 in number, went for a dinner and liquor at Charan Club and Resorts, which is a public place and after taking liquor involved in scuffle and marpeet to the extent that one of the judicial officer was beaten so mercilessly that he fell unconscious and in that stage he was brought to the JTRI where also the marpeet took place. Even thereafter the petitioners, who were appointed on the most responsible post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) to discharge the pious work of dispensation of justice, did not inform the higher officers or High Court about the incident. The worst part is that the incident was informed telephonically by somebody else on the next day and on coming to know with the facts, they were got verified by the Senior Registrar (Judicial) of this Court by the order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It was found that the petitioners have failed to give satisfaction during probation as stipulated under Rule 24(4) of the Rules. Accordingly they have been discharged from service by a simpliciter order of discharge after due consideration by the Administrative Committee and the Full Court in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the power has been exercised as contemplated in the Rules and there is no illegality in the order passed by the High Court. He further submitted that the decision has been taken in accordance with law as the petitioners had tried to diminish the image of the Institution in public. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have been discharged by an order of simpliciter discharge in which Rules of principles of natural justice are not applicable. Accordingly the order cannot be termed to be stigmatic and the services of the petitioners have not been discharged on account of any misconduct, but because they have failed to give satisfaction that they are fit for the service.
It has further been submitted that the challenge to the impugned orders on the ground that in some of the orders a mention has been made of the Inquiry report so it is stigmatic and not sustainable, is totally misconceived and not sustainable because once a decision was taken by the Full Court to discharge the services of the judicial officers by an order of simpliciter discharge, then, mention, if any, made by the Government, does not make the order punitive, stigmatic or against law. Even otherwise the report mentioned in the said order was not in respect of any misconduct of the petitioners, rather it was in respect of the conduct of the judicial officers posted at JTRI. During inquiry, on the basis of the CCTV footage, it transpired that in fact 15 officers had gone to Charan Club and Resort on 07.09.2014, when the incident had taken place. In fact in the earlier report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial) also presence of 13-14 judicial officers is mentioned. Accordingly the services of the remaining 4 judicial officers were dispensed with by order of simpliciter discharge.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the petitioners were not liable to be retained in service.
In regard to the report it has been submitted that no fact finding inquiry was held and in fact only a report was called by Hon'ble the Chief Justice from Senior Registrar (Judicial) to know the facts as to actually what had happened. Once the incident was verified and it was found that these judicial officers/petitioners have gone at a public place to have dinner and liquor where they made lewd remarks in respect of a fellow lady trainee Judicial Officer and entered into a brawl and marpeet to the extent that a judicial officer fell unconscious, the court concluded that their conduct and behaviour is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and they have failed to give satisfaction to retain them in service. Further it has been submitted that the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners that services of one of the petitioners have been dispensed with from the post of Assistant Prosecution Officer in view of the order of discharge passed by this Court and they are not liable for selection in judicial service of other States, is also misconceived and not sustainable because it is the view of the department concerned. Further if the rules of any service permit not to appoint such officers, it cannot be said that the order is punitive or stigmatic particularly in view of the fact that some of the judicial officers have been appointed again at other places including in the judicial service.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the writ petitions are highly misconceived and devoid of any merit and are liable to be dismissed with costs.
Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of their submissions, have placed reliance on Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36, Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir; (2010) 12 SCC 783, Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. S.G.P.G.I. & Another; (2002) 1 SCC 520, Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Another Vs. L.A.Balakrishna; (2001) 9 SCC 319, The Manager Govt. Branch Press & Another Vs. D. B. Belliappa; (1979) 1 SCC 477, Daya Shanker Vs. H.C. of Allahabad and others; (1987) 3 SCC 1, Ram Gopal Ghaturvedi Vs. State of M.P.; (1969) 2 SCC 240, C. Ravichandra Iyer Vs. Justice A. M. Bhattacharjee & Others; (1995) 5 SCC 457, Nawal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and another; (2003) 8 SCC 117, Ashok Kumar Yadav Vs. State of Haryana; (1985) 4 SCC 417, Pawan Kumar Nigam (5571 (SS) 1981); Special Appeal No. 633 of 2014, Dr. T. C. Pillai Vs. I.I.T. Guindy, Madras; (1971) 2 SCC 251, State of U.P. Vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla; (1991) 1 SCC 691, Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others; (2007) 4 SCC 54, Punjab National Bank & others Vs. Manjeet Singh and Another; (2006) 8 SCC 647, P. D. Agarwal Vs. State Bank of India and others; (2006) 8 SCC 776, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Others Vs. S. G. Kotturappa & Another; (2005) 3 SCC 409, R. C. Chandel Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another; (2012) 8 SCC 58, High Court of Judicature, Patna Vs. Shiveshwar Narayn & Another; (2011) 15 SCC 317, Rajendra Singh Verma Vs. Lt. Governor and others; (2011) 10 SCC 1, High Court of Judicature of Bombay Vs. Udai Singh and others; (1977) 5 SCC 129, Municipal Committee, Sirsa Vs. Munshi Ram; (2005) 2 SCC 382, H. F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka; (2001) 3 SCC 117, Paras Nath Pandey Vs. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre, Allahabad; (2008) 10 ADJ 283 (DB), Judgment and order dated 23.09.2016 passed in Writ Petition No.2733 of 2013:Gurunath Dinkar Mane Vs. State of Maharahtra (Challenged through Special Leave to Appeal No.18148 of 2017 - Dismissed on 18.09,2017).
Considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
A judicial officer is required to maintain high standards of probity, morality and propriety in their judicial duties as well as in personal life. Once a person has been appointed as a Judge, he must accept restrictions on his/ her conduct and behaviour which would be viewed as burdensome and onerous by an ordinary citizen. He is required to maintain high standards of conduct. A judge has to act at all times in a manner which upholds and promotes the good name, dignity and esteem of the office of a judicial officer and administration of justice. It is an established fact that the conduct of a judicial officer does not end at the door of the court room, it goes beyond it. Increased media attention, public awareness and public scrutiny allows very little privacy and the behaviour of judges even in their private capacity can have serious effects on the public perception of their impartiality and on the judicial system. A judge should respect and comply with the law and act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the institution. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper bahaviour of Judges in public places, which leads to a situation where public and Government officers do not care to have deference to the judgements and court proceedings. That is why a Judge carries a great responsibility to maintain high standards of probity and behaviour, both personally and in public life, adherence to which brings public confidence in the impartiality of judiciary, while conversely, violation of laws and loose behaviour that too in public places diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and injures the judicial system. There is one more aspect. Punishment has been provided for contempt or scandalizing Judges. Therefore, the Judges have more responsibility to maintain high standards and not to give chance to public to abuse or even raise a finger against a judicial officer or the system. Consequently a judicial officer stands on a different pedestal than any other Government servant.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Daya Shankar versus High Court of Allahabad and others; (1987) 3 SCC 1 has held that the judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office, they occupy.
In the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer versus Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and others; (1995) 5 SCC 457, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is therefore entitled to expect that a judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences and after dealing the issue has held that it is expected of him to maintain high standard of conduct. The relevant paragraph 21 of the judgment is reproduced as under:-
"21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would generate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judge's official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a layman and also higher than that expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society."
In the case of R.C.Chandel versus High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another; (2012) 8 SCC 58, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. They hold the public office. Their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Kohli versus High Court of Jammu & Kashmir; (2010) 12 SCC 783 while considering the case of a judicial officer has held as under:
31. The High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service. The district judiciary is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned at the primary level of entry to the doors of justice. In providing the opportunity of access to justice to the people of the country, the judicial officers who are entrusted with the task of adjudication must officiate in a manner that is becoming of their position and responsibility towards the society.
32. Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only to bolster the image of the judiciary in the eye of the litigants, but alst to sustain the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among Judges. The public's perception of the judiciary matters just as much as its role in dispute resolution. The credibility of the entire judiciary is often undermined by isolated acts of transgression by a few members of the Bench, and therefore it is imperative to maintain a high benchmark of honesty, accountability and good conduct.
In the said judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held that services rendered by a judicial officer during probation are assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance, but also on the probity as to how one has conducted himself.
Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Udai Singh; (1997) 5 SCC 129.
The Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma versus Lieutenant Governor and others; (2011) 10 SCC 1, held that judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment as is commonly understood. Judges discharge their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of State.
Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Patna versus Shiveshwar Narayan and another; (2011) 15 SCC 317.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawal Singh versus State of U.P. and another; (2003) 8 SCC 117, has held that judicial service is not a service in sense of an employment as is commonly understood. Judges discharge their functions while exercising the sovereign judicial power of State. It should be reflected in their overall reputation. Further the nature of judicial service is such that it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of doubtful integrity or persons who have lost their utility. Though the said case is of compulsory retirement but regarding the probity and propriety in behaviour of a judicial officer, the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments it is well settled that the judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment and it is on different footing in which the judicial officer is required to maintain high standards of probity, morality and propriety in their judicial duties as well as in personal life and public appearances. But it does not mean that they are not amenable to law or protection of law is not available to them. The only thing is that it has to be applied in the facts, circumstances and the law.
Now coming to the question of right of a probationer to continue in service, it is a settled principle of law that the service of an employee placed on probation are taken on trial during the period of probation and if he fails during the period of trial to give satisfaction to continue in service, his services are liable to be dispensed with in terms of the conditions of appointment and the service Rules.
The Apex Court has dealt with this issue in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra versus Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36. The relevant portion of paragraph 26 and paragraph 28 of the said judgment are extracted as under:
26.) .................................................Thus where a person is appointed to a permanent post in a government service on probation, the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment, for the government servant, so appointed, has no right to continue to hold such a post any more than the servant employed on probation by a private employer is entitled to do. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture of any right of the servant to hold the post, for he has no such right and obviously cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment.................................................
28.) The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a con'. tractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra). Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art.; 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (I). In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under r. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India (supra), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 3 1 1 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Art. 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing.' If the Government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a Punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or, the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government bad purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression " terminate " or " discharge " is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to ? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Art.311, which give protection to Government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.
In the aforesaid it has been specifically held that if termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. Further it has been held that the use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind referred in the judgment and if the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished. Meaning thereby if either of the two tests are not satisfied the order of simplicter would not amount to stigmatic or punitive. In the present case the petitioners were on probation and it is well settled law that the probationer has no right to post.
The case of K.H.Phadnis Vs. State of Maharashtra; 1971 (1) SCC 790 is regarding reversion, so it is not applicable on the present case. However, in the said case the Apex Court has held that the order of reversion simpliciter will not amount to reduction in rank or the punishment but if there is evidence that the order of reversion is not 'a pure accident of service' but an order in the nature of punishment, Article 311 of the Constitution would be attracted.
The case of Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India and Another; (1984) 2 SCC 369 was a case of an officer of Indian Police Service, in which on a particular day, all the trainees reached about 22 minutes late at the place where P. T./ Unarmed Combat Practice was to be conducted after change of venue on account of rains, So it is not applicable on the facts of the present case.
In the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P.State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.and another; (1999) 2 SCC 21, the Apex Court held in paragraphs 33 and 34 as under:-
"33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Ram Narayan Das case [AIR 1961 SC 177 : (1961) 1 SCR 606 : (1961) 1 LLJ 552] . It is done only with a view to decide whether he is to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even if a preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary enquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to initiate a regular departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in Champaklal case [AIR 1964 SC 1854 : (1964) 1 LLJ 752] . The purpose of the preliminary enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of the officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry officer is appointed -- if at that point of time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur case [AIR 1968 SC 1089 : (1968) 3 SCR 234 : (1970) 1 LLJ 373] and in Benjamin case[(1967) 1 LLJ 718 (SC)] . In the latter case, the departmental enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing the guilt of the employee. In all these cases, the allegations against the employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case [(1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] the employer was entitled to say that he would not continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the employer by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth has not been found, and were merely the motive.
34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee -- even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases."
The case of Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar and others; (2015) 15 SCC 151 is a case of dismissal as after issuance of the show cause notice and obtaining reply from the delinquent employee, the documents were not supplied and no regular inquiry was held and the punishment of dismissal was passed, so the same is not applicable on the facts of the present case.
In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others; (1999) 3 SCC 60, the Apex Court has held, in paragraph 21, as under:-
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as "founded" on the allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
Further the Apex Court has held in the said case that the order of termination passed therein was not a simple order of termination but a lengthy order.
In the case of Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. and others; (2003) 3 SCC 263, the Apex Court dealing with the case of a probationer has held that whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case The case of Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India and others; (1989) 3 SCC 311, is a case where the order of appointment was on ad hoc basis for a period of six months or till availability of a regular candidate. The case is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand.
The case of Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P.; 2000 (5) SCC 152 is a case of a Constable, who had successfully completed his training and also completed two years of probation period without any blemish. Thereafter on account of an incident some inquiry was held, in which his involvement was found established on the basis of which the termination order was passed. In this case the Apex Court held in paragraph 30 that the termination was founded on the report of the preliminary inquiry as the employer had not held the preliminary inquiry to find out whether the appellant was suitable for further retention in service or for confirmation as he had already completed the period of probation quite a few years ago but was held to find out his involvement. In this situation particularly when it is admitted by the respondent that the performance of the appellant throughout was unblemished, the order was definitely punitive in character as it was founded on the allegations of misconduct. Accordingly the said case is not applicable on the facts of the present case. However, the Apex Court while dealing with the question pertaining to motive and foundation in paragraphs 28 and 29 has categorically held that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question, which are reproduced as under:-
28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of "motive" and "foundation", concerning a probationer, are that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of "motive".
29. "Motive" is the moving power which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently, "motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry."
In the case of Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.A. Balakrishna; (2001) 9 SCC 319 the Apex Court while considering the issue of discharge of an officer on probation and on being challenged before the court, the consequence of the reply of the employer, were dealt with, in paragraphs 5 and 6, as under:-
"5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason thereof. If the termination during probationary period is without any reason, perhaps such an order would be sought to be challenged on the ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, naturally services of an employee on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. If the order on the face of it states that his services are being terminated because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. We do not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the services are being terminated.
6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the challenge the employer states that the services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services of the probationer were being terminated by way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate the services."
Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Sirsa Vs. Munshi Ram; 2005 2 SCC 382 and The Manager, Govt. Branch Press Vs. D. B. Belliappa; (1979) 1 SCC 477.
The Apex Court while dealing with a case of discharge of a Munsif on probation, discharged on the ground that he was unsuitable to hold the post of Munsif as stated in the impugned order, after considering the case of Constitution Bench decision in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India and Seven Judges decision of Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and other cases, Hon'ble Apex Court in H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka; (2001) 3 SCC 117 held that the High Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during the period of probation and it was not necessary that there should have been a charge and an inquiry on his conduct since the petitioner was only on probation.
In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another; (2002) 1 SCC 520, the Apex Court had held that tests to determine whether an order of termination is punitive it is to see whether prior to the termination there was a full scale formal enquiry into the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which culminated in a finding of guilt and if all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order, but if any one of three is missing the termination would be upheld. However, the observations made in paragraph 29 of the judgment have been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs. Palak Modi and another; 2013 (3) SCC 607 and held in paragraph 45 that the said proposition must be read as confined to the facts of that case and cannot be relied upon for taking the view that a simple order of termination of service can never be declared as punitive even though it may be founded on serious allegation of misconduct or misdemeanour on the part of the employees. However, after considering the right of the probationer the Apex Court held, in paragraph 25 of the judgment after considering several judgments, as under:-
25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice."
In the case of Dr. T. C. Pillai Vs. The Indian Institute of Technology; 1971 (2) SCC 251, the Apex Court, while considering the termination of a probationer, held in paragraph 7, as under:
7. It is well settled that a probationer or a temporary servant can be discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he is holding. This can be done without complying with the provisions of Article 311(2) unless the services are terminated by way of punishment. Suitability does not depend merely on the excellence or proficiency in work. There are many factors which enter into consideration for confirming a person who is on probation. A particular attitude or tendency displayed by an employee can well influence the decision of the confirming authority while judging his suitability or fitness for confirmation.
It has been followed by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Pawan Kumar Nigam Vs. The Central Ware Housing Corporation; Special Appeal No. 633 of 2014 and held that the probationer has no right to post and upheld the order of discharge.
A Division Bench of this court in the case of Paras Nath Pandey Vs. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre, Allahabad; (2008) 10 ADJ 283 (DB), after considering several judgments, laid down the principals, broadly, in paragraph 57 and also held in paragraph 58 that each case has to be tested on the facts and circumstances of the each case. Paras 57 and 58 are reproduced as under:
57. From the above discussions, the principles discernible to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not, broadly, may be stated as under :
(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences.
(c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order.
(d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct.
(e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary.
(f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, when his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation.
(g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not.
(h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive.
(i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed.
(j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating a probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive.
(k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive.
(l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee.
(m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive.
(n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct.
(o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive.
(i) "want of application",
(ii) "lack of potential",
(iii) "found not dependable",
(iv) "under suspension",
(v) "work is unsatisfactory",
(vi) "unlikely to prove an efficient officer".
(p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic.
(q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service", have been held stigmatic.
(r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.
58. The aforesaid are not exhaustive, but lay down some of the principles to find out whether termination of an employee is simplicitor or punitive. Each and every case has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, but broadly the aforesaid are the factors to find out whether termination of an employee is punitive or not.
Coming to the question of adherence to the principle of natural justice, the Apex Court has held in several cases that if there is any alleged violation, it is for the employee to show the prejudice caused to him.
In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others; (2007) 4 SCC 54, the Apex Court has held in paragraph 26 and 27 that it is also well settled that it cannot put any straitjacket formula and it may not be applied in a given case unless a prejudice is shown.
Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and others versus Manjeet Singh and another; (2006) 8 SCC 647.
Similarly in the case of P.D.Agarwal Vs. State Bank of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 776 the Apex court has held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.
Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. S.G.Kotturappa and another; (2005) 3 SCC 409.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, considered in the light of the aforesaid law.
The petitioners were appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) in pursuance of selection made by the Public Service Commission and their services were placed on probation as per Rules, as such in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court the services of the petitioners were taken on trial. During course of their probationary period the petitioners participated in an induction training programme at JTRI, Lucknow along with their batch mates during the period from 09.06.2014 to 08.09.2014. On the eve of last day of training the petitioners, total fifteen in number, went for dinner at Charan Club and Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow and there liquor was also taken.
Admittedly all the fifteen petitioners were present in the Charan Club and Resorts and none of the petitioners has denied his presence at the said time and place. On account of some lewd remarks made in respect of a fellow lady trainee judicial officer, some heated arguments had taken place, resulting into a scuffle and marpeet to the extent that one of the judicial officers fell unconscious and was brought to the Institute in the same condition. The petitioners did not inform to the higher officers or the High Court about the incident. The incident was brought to the notice of Registrar General through a telephonic call on 08.09.2014. The Registrar General put up a note before the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts in respect of the incident at Charan Club and Resort and within the premises of JTRI, Lucknow, directed the Senior Registrar (Judicial) to visit the place of incident for the purpose of ascertaining as to what had actually happened. The Senior Registrar (Judicial) after collecting information submitted a report on 12th of September 2014, which was considered by the Administrative Committee and on being directed to place the same before the Full Court, the matter was placed before the Full Court for consideration of suitability of the five probationary judicial officers mentioned in the Agenda and any other matter with the permission of the Chair. While considering the matter, the Full Court considered the report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial) and after deliberations recommended for discharge of the 11 officers named by the Senior Registrar (Judicial) in report. According to report of Senior Registrar (Judicial) there were about 13-14 officers although names of only 11 officers were given. It seems that names of others could not be ascertained by Senior Registrar (Judicial) at that time. In the Agenda besides the names of five judicial officers any other matter with the permission of the Chair could have also been considered. Accordingly the report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial) mentioning the names of 11 officers was considered and decision taken.
In view of the above, it is totally misconceived to say that the names of only five persons/judicial officers could have been considered by the Full Court and the consideration and recommendation of other persons is illegal. Once there was an Agenda that any other matter could be considered with the permission of Chair and the report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial), in which 11 persons were named including the 5 persons mentioned in the agenda was considered, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in the decision taken by the Full Court and it is in accordance with the agenda and the law.
The Full Court has made recommendation under Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules 2001 as the petitioners have otherwise failed to give satisfaction. The Rule 24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules 2001, on reproduction, reads as under:-
24. Probation -(1) .....................
(2) ...........................
(3) ....................
(4) If, it appears, to the Court at any time during or at the end of period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case may be, that a probationer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, it may, make recommendation to the appointing authority whereupon the probationers shall be discharged from the service by the appointing authority."
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that since the petitioners have completed their training successfully and a certificate to that effect has been issued on 30th of September 2014, so the order of discharge of the petitioners is arbitrary and illegal. It was also submitted that the petitioners continued to discharge their duties to the full satisfaction of the Superior Officers in the district also. He also argued that the Director, JTRI did not send report to the Court about the conduct and performance of the petitioners during the training for consideration of Hon'ble Court under Rule 22 (3) and (4) of the Rules 2001. Rather the Director, JTRI issued a certificate on 30th of September 2014 towards successful completion of the Training, with a note ''It is learnt that due to an incident which took place in the night of 7th of September 2014 services of the Trainee officers have been dispensed with'. Certificate dated 30th of September 2014 issued by the Director of the Institute states that ''This is to certify that Mr......., Designation............., District.........., participated in the induction training programme organized by the Institute from ............. to ................'. It is not mentioned on the said certificate that the trainees have completed the training successfully, rather a note as aforesaid has been put up at the foot of the certificate, therefore, the contention of the petitioners that they have completed their training successfully, on the basis of the said certificate is misconceived. There is no such certificate by the Director. He issued certificate regarding participation in training.
The behavior and conduct of the petitioners in the Club, which was a public place, was unbecoming of Judicial Officers as lewd remarks were made in respect of a fellow lady judicial officer, consequently they indulged into scuffle and marpeet to the extent that a judicial officer fell unconscious and liquor was consumed, which is against the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules 1956 and Circular No.CL No.71 dated 12th of May 1971 issued by the High Court in pursuance thereof.
The Circular No.CL No.71 dated 12th of May 1971 issued by the High Court, on reproduction, reads as under:
"(i) As required by rule 3 of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, Judicial Officers are expected to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. They should avoid mixing freely with the members of the public and the Bar, dining or drinking with them or going with them on picnics and outings, nor should they attend too many social functions. They should also avoid sitting in clubs till late in the night and playing bridge, etc. with high stakes. Rule 4-A of the aforesaid rules prohibits habitual use of intoxicating drinks and drugs and appearance in public places in a state of intoxication. Conveyance belonging to private persons or subordinate officers or legal practitioners must also not be used too often."
It is totally misconceived to allege that since nobody was present at the time when the petitioners assembled at Charan Club and Resorts for dinner and liquor and nobody had seen the incident, so it cannot be said that it was in a public place. Club and Resort, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be said that it is not a public place. It may be the coincidence that nobody from public was present in the Club and Resort at that time, but the employees of club and staff must have been present. Even otherwise a public place will remain a public place.
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1356 (S/B) of 2015 and 1357 (S/B) of 2015 to the effect that petitioners' names had not come in the earlier enquiry report submitted by the Senior Registrar(Judicial) and no other enquiry was conducted in respect of the petitioners and the enquiry in which the names of the petitioners have appeared was in respect of the conduct of the judicial officers of the J.T.R.I. and no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners, so the names of the petitioners have wrongly been mentioned in the report of OSD (Enquiries) and the discharge of the petitioners on the basis of the said report mentioned in the order of simpliciter discharge makes the order punitive and stigmatic, which is not sustainable and is also mis-conceived. The enquiry was conducted, on a letter written by one Hon'ble Judge of the High Court about role of the senior judicial officers at J.T.R.I. and also their role in the incident,which was got conducted by the O.S.D. (Enquiries). While conducting the enquiry, the O.S.D. (Enquiries) found, on the basis of CCTV footage, that 15 persons/petitioners were present at the time of incident and their names have been mentioned in paragraph 138 of the report. It is to be noted that the said enquiry was not conducted in regard to the conduct of the petitioners rather it was in respect of the conduct of the officers of the J.T.R.I. but during course of the enquiry on the basis of the CCTV footage the petitioners were recognized by the employees of the J.T.R.I. among the persons assembled for dinner and liquor at Charan Club and Resort, so the order of discharge simpliciter of the petitioners has rightly been passed and it cannot be said that it is punitive and stagmatic.
The relevant paragraph 136 of the said report dated 27th of January 2015 is reproduced as under:-
136. That after seeing the CCTV footage of Charan Club & Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow, the witnesses EW-24, 37 and 39 indentified 15 induction trainee namely Shri Vineet Kumr, Shri Kshitiz Pandey, Shri Sandeep Singh, Shri Ravi Kumar Sagar, Shri Ashutosh Tripathi, Shri Sudhir Mishra, Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri Bhanu Pratap Singh, Shri Asha Ram Pandey, Shri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, Shri Rahul Singh, Shri Mukesh Kumar, Shri Hirdesh Kumar, Shri Shobhit Sourav and Shri Himuanshu Mishra. In the first incident of fighting occurred at 11.33.06 pm. in Restaurant, II incident of fighting occurred at 11.35.28 pm. at lobby of said Restaurant and III incident of fighting occurred in fromt of officer's hostel and in this incident Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri Bhanu Pratap Singh and Shri Rahul Singh had done marpeet with Shri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, and Shri Asha Ram Pandey."
Moreover these five petitioners have not denied their presence alongwith others in the Club where incident took place.
The alleged conduct and behavior of the petitioners was not a misconduct in discharge of official work and duties and it is also not the case of the opposite parties. So no regular departmental enquiry was required. However, in view of the law as discussed above, the petitioners have failed to maintain the high standards of probity, morality and propriety as expected from a judicial officer. Accordingly, their cases have rightly been considered by the Full Court and recommended for discharge simpliciter, in pursuance of which the State Government, being the appointing authority, has passed the order of simpliciter discharge.
In case there is some discrepancy in the order passed by the appointing authority in pursuance of the recommendation of the Full Court, that does not make the order stigmatic, punitive or illegal because once the matter has been considered by the Full Court and recommended for discharge by a simpliciter order of discharge then any mentioning by the government does not vitiate the order. In this regard against an order of challenge to the order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the government being the appointing authority has passed the order with non-application of mind the Apex Court in the case of R.C.Chandel versus High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another(2012) SCC 58 has held that on the recommendation of the High Court after full consideration the consequent action by the Government on such recommendation are beyond any doubt. Similar view had been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi Vs. State of M. P.; (1969) 2 SCC 240. Accordingly, if any mention has inadvertently been made by the government, that does not vitiate the order.
Applying the case of Rajesh Kohli versus High Court of Jammu Kashmir(2010) 12 SCC 783 in which the Apex Court held that services rendered by the judicial officers during probation are assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance but also on the probity and propriety as to how one has conducted himself. It has been found that the petitioners have failed to conduct with probity and propriety, therefore, the discharge of their services by the order of simpliciter discharge has rightly been passed in accordance with law.
Admittedly the petitioners were on probation and the petitioners have no right to post and in view of the law as discussed above It is well settled that a probationer or a temporary servant can be discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he is holding. It is also settled that regular departmental enquiry is not required in each and every case. Further if any discreet enquiry is held to verify the facts, it will not vitiate the order on the ground that no opportunity was afforded or regular enquiry was not held.
As held by the Apex Court in various decisions discussed above that merely by conducting an enquiry for verifying the facts does not vitiate the order. No regular enquiry was held in regard to the any misconduct of the petitioners so the question of affording any opportunity does not arise.
The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order is stigmatic and punitive in nature as they have been debarred from services in future is a mis-conceived argument because the rule has already been amended and the provision of debarring from future employment has been abolished. Further it has been informed that some of the petitioners have joined at other places, even in judicial service, also indicates that the order is not punitive or stigmatic. In fact the High Court has taken a lenient view of discharging the services of the petitioners by an order of simpliciter discharge. Thus, there is no stigma also as dealt with by Hon'ble the Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (Supra). Paragraph 25 of the judgment, on reproduction, reads as under:-
25. In the matter of "stigma", this Court has held that the effect which an order of termination may have on a person's future prospects of employment is a matter of relevant consideration. In the seven-Judge Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [(1974) 2 SCC 831 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 550] Ray, C.J. observed that if a simple order of termination was passed, that would enable the officer to "make good in other walks of life without a stigma". It was also stated in Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana [(1978) 1 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 55] that if the order contained a stigma, the termination would be bad for "the individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of reputation which may affect his future prospects.
The relevant unamended sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 is reproduced as under:-
"(5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to compensation and shall also not be eligible for re-appointment to the service."
The relevant amended sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 is reproduced as under:-
"(5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to any compensation."
The case of the petitioners is squarely covered by a Division Bench Judgment of Bombay High Court rendered in the case of Gurunath Dinkar Mave Vs. State of Maharashtra and another; Writ Petition No. 2733 of 2013 dated 23.09.2016. On being challenged before the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal, the S. L. P. No. 18148 of 2017 has been dismissed vide order dated 18.09.2017. In the said case the petitioner was appointed on the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate First Class and was placed on probation. During period of probation he underwent a training programme at the Judicial Academy and Training Institute and completed successfully and joined back at the place of posting. After some time he received an order of discharge. In fact in a discreet enquiry, the petitioner was found under the influence of the alchohal twice while he was residing as a trainee Judge at the Academy. So a complaint or report was submitted by the Joint Director of Academy to the Registrar General of The Bombay High Court. Considering the same the High Court decided to discharge the petitioner from service. On being challenged, the Division Bench, after considering the nature of judicial service and expected conduct and behavior of a Judicial Officer, held that merely because some preliminary or discreet enquiry is held while judging for assessing the performance and take note of it or called for a report about the same from the superior of the persons like the petitioner, does not mean that they desired to hold a full fledged enquiry or there is a decision to terminate the services on account of some misconduct.
Considering the cases of the petitioners in view of the law as discussed above, the writ petitions are mis-conceived and devoid of merit so the petitioners are not entitled for any relief and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Order Dated:03.07.2018 Banswar (Rajnish Kumar,J.)