Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Penugonda Rajeswari vs Jaladi Anasuyamma on 20 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(3)ALD273, 1998(3)ALT1
Author: Ramesh Madhav Bapat
Bench: Ramesh Madhav Bapat
ORDER P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
1. This Civil Revision Petition has come up before us on a reference made by our learned brother T.N.C. Rangarajan J., who felt that there is conflict between two decisions rendered by Justice Ramachandra Raju in Nagappa v. Krishnasa, 1971 (2) An.WR 141 and the decision rendered by Justice Venkatrama Sastry in Shankar Rao v. Ramakrishna Rao Hulsulkar, 1974 (1) APLJ (SN) 22; regarding interpretation of Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act 1960 hereinafter called 'the Act'. Interpreting this provision, Ramachandra Raju J, observed the word 'instead' occurring in clause (b) should be read as "in addition to"; while Justice Venkatrama Sastry felt the word means 'instead'. Justice Venkatrama Sastry doubted the interpretation placed by Justice Ramachandra Raju and Justice Rangarajan shared the said doubt. Hence he made the reference.
2. Before answering the reference, it is necessary to briefly narrate relevant facts which gave rise to this reference. The respondent-landlady filed an application for eviction of appellant on three grounds viz that the appellant has committed wilful default in payment of rent (ii) the appellant has used the building for the purpose other than for which it was let out viz. carrying on manufacture of candles and tailoring business in the premises when the premises was let out for residential purpose contrary to the agreement; (iii) and that the respondent seeks eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement. Of course, both the Courts found that the first two grounds are not established by the respondent-landlady and ordered eviction on the third ground viz. respondent requires the premises for her personal requirement.
3. Here again a few facts which are relevant for this ground have to be narrated. Respondent-landlady sought for recovery of premises for residential purpose of her fourth son. According to her, her fourth son was transferred to Repalle from Chimakurthi about four years back and he is living at Tenali along with his wife and attending his office by going to Repalle from Tenali daily. According to the respondent the house in which they are staying is not sufficient after her daughter-in-law started living with her fourth son in that house. Added to this apart from her fourth son and his wife, her fifth son who is recently married is also living with his wife. The house consists of only two rooms in the first floor and in the ground floor the respondent carried out some repairs and constructed two small rooms and in one tiled room, her fifth son is carrying on business in fancy goods and in the other one, they are dumping damaged articles.
4. The admitted case of both the parties is that the respondent owns four houses at Tenali town and she is living in one of those houses; while her third son is residing in one house with his family which consists of three rooms and he is with his three children and the third house is let out to the appellant; while in the fourth house a Marwadi gentleman is residing as a tenant for running his business in the ground floor and using the first floor for his residence.
5. The respondent examined herself as P.W.I. Her fourth son was examined as P.W.2 and P.W.3 is her fifth son. The appellant examined himself as R.W.1. No documentary evidence was produced by both parties. ExA1 is the Pass Book of Syndicate Bank belonging to P.W.I. On the basis of the evidence, the Rent Controller as well as appellate Authority concurrently found that the requirement of the respondent is bona fide. Hence this revision.
6. The Revision Petition itself is posted before us without framing a point for reference. We deem it appropriate that the revision itself should be disposed of by this order.
7. The main question that arises for consideration in this revision is whether a landlord who has more buildings than one in the City/Town/or Village and is in occupation of one such building, can require another building for his own occupation without surrendering the building in his occupation. Before we answer this proposition, a look at sub-section (3) of Section 10 to the extent it is relevant, is necessary which is extracted hereunder.
"(3) (a) A Landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building-
(i) in case it is a residential building-(a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation;
(b) if the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city, town or village concerned is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead, for his own occupation;
(ii) .... ... ... ... ...
(c) a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may notwithstanding anything in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.
8. On a cursory reading of clause (b) we may get the idea that the landlord who has more buildings than one in his occupation cannot require another building for his own occupation except by surrendering the one in his possession. In other words he may ask for another building instead the building in his possession. For the word 'instead' the dictionary meaning is 'as a substitute, or altemate, in place of etc.' In Nagappa v. Krishnasa, (supra), the learned single Judge observed thus:
"A reading of the above provisions would show that a landlord can bona fide require his residential building for his own occupation if he is not occupying (1) a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation; (2) the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city and is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead, for his own occupation (3) where the landlord of the building is only occupying a part of the building requires also the remaining portion of the building as additional accommodation.''
9. However, Justice Venkatrama Sastry, in the case Shanker Rao vs. Ramakrishna Rao Hulsulkar, (supra) (C.R.P. No. 1181 of 1973 dated 31-12-1993) observed thus:
"The meaning of the word given in Concise Oxford Dictionary at page 619 is as follows :--
"Instead = (ed). Adv. As a substitute or alternative; in place of.
The word can only mean that the building is required as a substitute or an alternative for the one, which is already occupied by the landlord. The provision would have given the meaning attributed to it viz., 'in addition to', if the word 'instead' had not been used there. It is the cardinal principle of interpretation of Statutes that every word has to be given its true and natural meaning, hi contrast we may look into clause 10(3) (a) (iii), relating to non-residential buildings, which is as follows :
"In case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise."
The Legislature therefore had purposely used the word 'instead' in the case of residential buildings and not in the case of non-residential buildings. Applying the provision as it is, I do not think that the landlord can ask for additional accommodation under this clause in respect of a residential building".
10. It is no doubt true that a legislative interpretation should accord with the scope and objects of the Act. In order to arrive at true scope of a particular provision one must have regard to the objectives in ascertaining true intention of the Legislature such as history of the Legislation, benefits the Act wanted to confer and the mischief which it intends to suppress. Intention of the Legislature can be gathered from the plain language of the statutory provision only. In other words, where the language of the Statute is plain, intelligible and unambiguous the same must be given effect to despite the inconvenience it may result in. Courts are not expected to re-write or amend a section since there is casus omissus, and it should be left to the Legislature to remedy the defect rather than taking on itself to rectify the same. In the absence of absolute necessity, it is impermissible for the Court to read something into an enactment. Of course words can some times be supplied in order to give the language sense and meaning to its content.
11. The main objects of the Act are prevention of unreasonable eviction at the hands of unscrupulous landlords, fixation of fair rent by giving relief from the clutches of landlord demanding exorbitant rent, permission to deposit rents and restoration of amenities. It is therefore a beneficial Legislation for tenants, but at the same time there are certain safeguards for the landlords also. A landlord is entitled to recover possession for effecting repairs, is entitled to evict the tenant if the tenant commits wilful default in payment of rent, uses the premises for purposes other than for which it is let out, or causes damage or brings down the utility of the premises, or when there is bona fide requirement. Therefore any provision has to be interpreted to give effect to these objects in a harmonious way of safeguarding the rights of both the tenant as well as landlord, and at the same time compel him to discharge his obligations that are imposed under the Act.
12. The scheme under Section 10(3) of the Act is regarding eviction of a tenant of residential and non-residential premises. Under Section 10(3)(i)(a) if a landlord is not occupying a residential building in the village/ town/city, and if he requires it for his own occupation; under Section 10(3)(b) if the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city and one such building is in his occupation and if he requires another building for his own occupation; under Section 10(3)(c) if the landlord is occupying only a part of the building whether residential or non-residential, he may apply for additional accommodation in respect of the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building in possession of the tenant, and can seek for recovery of possession. Clause (b) is placed between clauses (a) and (c) and all the tenants arc grouped together under Section 10(3) and the purpose is to enable the landlords in different situations to recover possession. In one case landlord is not having a residential premises; in the other case landlord is having a residential premises, but it is short of accommodation; and in the third case, he is in occupation of part of the building, but requires the other part also for his accommodation. So, the intention of the Legislature in enacting 10(3)(b) in between clauses (a) and (c) clearly shows that the intention is to enable the landlord to recover possession of the building for his residential purpose.
13. Still, the question is whether it is a right created in the landlord to recover possession unconditionally or on surrender of the premises in his possession. It cannot be said that the Legislature intended by introducing clause (b) that a landlord can be in possession of only one building at a time irrespective of size of his family even though he has more than one building, cannot be accepted. It cannot be the intention of the Legislature to lay embargo or curb the right of the landlord to have more than one building in in his possession even though the family consists of large number of members and one building is not sufficient to accommodate all of them. We cannot therefore attribute to the Legislature such a narrow intention. Interpretation should be to advance the aims and objects of the enactment, but not to thwart or throttle such an object.
14. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. V. Asher, 1949 (2) All.E.R. 155 Lord Denning said:
"When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament.....and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the Legislature.....
A Judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this nick in the exture of it, they would have straightened it out. He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not after the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases."
15. This view of Lord Denning has approval of the Supreme Court in M. Pentaiah v. Veeramallappa, . Again the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, reiterated the same view. In Magor & St. Mellons v. New Port Corpn., 1951 (2) All. E.R. 839, it is pointed out:
"We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analyses."
In Tinkham vs. Perry, 1951 IKB 547 the Court observed:
"Words plainly should not be added by implication into a statute unless it is necessary to do so to give the language sense and meaning in its context''.
In R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, , the Supreme Court observed thus :
"In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to take into account the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it."
16. A Full Bench of our High Court in N. Sarada Mani v. G. Alexander, 1997 (2) L.S. 662 observed as follows:
"It is well settled law that when the language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequences. The words of the statutes speak the intention of the Legislature. The inconvenience and hardship are not relevant considerations. It is the function of the Court to interpret the law and not to legislate it. If the Court finds any deficiency in the statute, it is the duty of the Legislature to fill-up and it is no part of the duty of the Court to supply the deficiency. However, a careless omission made by the Legislature may be supplied in order to give the Legislation an effective meaning and to prevent it from becoming devoid of effect. The construction which would lead to an anomalous result should not be accepted. But, however, it is the duty of the Court to give coherence to the statutory provisions set within the bounds imposed by a fair reading ofa legislation."
17. In Padmanabha Setty v. Papiah Setty, , the Supreme Court observed thus:
"The object of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenant. Can it be said that the Legislature is considering it to be unreasonable for a landlord to shift his own premises while he is in occupation of tenanted premises over which he has not an absolute right of possession but only a right to remain in possession till one of the conditions in Section 8(2) is satisfied and over one of which he has no control? In our view, in the context, the words ' entitled to possession' have a mere positive content and arc more to akin to the right of possession which an owner has in respect of the building owned and occupied by him."
18. The Supreme Court interpreting the words 'right to possession of which he is entitled to under this Act, or otherwise' pointed out that the right of the statutory tenant to remain in possession is a right to stay in possession and as such, the same cannot be equated with right to possession. Thus, even though the landlord is in possession of a non-residential building as a tenant, he is still entitled to recover possession of a non-residential building since he is not entitled to possession of the building in which he is carrying on business as a tenant. This interpretation was given in order to advance the aims and objects of the Act. After all Section 10 curtails the landlord's right to terminate the tenancy which is available to him under Transfer of Property Act. The right is restricted on certain specified grounds upon which alone eviction can be granted by the Rent Controller. Therefore, Court cannot "adopt a narrow or pedantic approach and further restrict the right of the landlord to recover possession when the landlord is not in a position to accommodate all the members of his family in one building, and to say even then he has no right to recover another building can never be the intention of the Legislature as it would not be the intention of the Legislature to encroach upon the liberty of the landlord to take possession of his own building for his requirement or need. Legislature may not and would not impose restrictions on anybody in securing sufficient accommodation for residential purpose muchless the landlord. To have sufficient accommodation for his family is a matter of public interest, otherwise it would be creating unhealthy atmosphere if people are compelled to reside in insufficient accommodation. Therefore, the Legislature would not have intended this.
19. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Padmanabha Setty v. Papiah Setty, (supra), a Full Bench of our Court in Vijayalakshmi Printing Press v. N. Shanker, 1991 (1) An.W.R. 198 observed thus:
"The possession of a statutory tenant is treated as a mere right to remain in possession till one or more of the conditions for eviction prescribed by the Act are satisfied. The decision in Padmanabha Setty was rendered as far back as 1966. The Mysore, Madras, and Andhra Acts employ identical language in this behalf. Yet, the A.P. Legislature has not thought it fit to clarify that the said word mean something different than what the Supreme Court has said though the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court practically makes both the expressions occurring in the said sub-clause mean the same thing thus doing away the distinction between residential and non-residential buildings, made by the Act in this behalf."
20. So, the Full Bench has also noticed the liberal interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on Section 10(3). Therefore, the Legislature would not have intended that when the landlord who has more than one building and if he is in occupation of one of them, he shall not be allowed to occupy another building, unless he vacates the premises in his possession, even though the requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation is bona fide.
21. From the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the word used 'instead' in Section 10(3)(a)(i)(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is to be interpreted as 'in addition to'. Thus, we answer the reference accordingly.
22. From the facts seen above, it is absolutely clear that the requirement of the respondent is bona fide and in fact, both the Courts have concurrently found that the respondent's fourth son along with his wife started living with her and her fifth son also started living with his wife, and therefore, the premises which contains only two rooms is insufficient for accommodating all of them, and as such, they are entitled to ask for additional accommodation. The finding that the claim of the respondent for additional accommodation is bona fide is on the basis of evidence. We do not find any material to disturb the findings of both the Courts that the requirement of the respondent for additional accommodation is bona fide.
23. For all the above reasons, the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Time for eviction 3 months.