Karnataka High Court
Suresh B Shetty vs The State Of Karnataka on 26 September, 2018
Bench: Raghvendra S.Chauhan, B M Shyam Prasad
1 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2018
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. M. SHYAM PRASAD
W. P. H. C. NO. 73 OF 2018
BETWEEN:
SURESH B. SHETTY
S/O. BOJA SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
OCC: HOTEL BUSINESS,
R/O. RADHA NIVAS, NEAR MANASA GATE,
MARPALLI, KORANGRAPADY, UDUPI TALUKA,
UDUPI DISTRICT-574 118.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI DINESHKUMAR K. RAO, ADV. FOR
SRI R. B. DESHPANDE, ADV.)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOME,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
UDUPI DISTRICT,
UDUPI-576 101.
2
3. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
UDUPI DISTRICT,
UDUPI-576 101.
4. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF JAIL
CENTRAL PRISON, BELLARY DISTRICT,
BELLARY-583 101.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, AAG A/W
SRI S. V. GIRIKUMAR, AGA FOR R-1 TO R-4)
THIS WPHC IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO (A) A WRIT IN THE
NATURE OF HABEAS CORPUS BY QUASHING OF THE ORDER
OF DETENTION DATED 03.05.2018 PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.2 IN NO.MAG (2) CR/82/2018/33571 PRODUCED AT
ANNEXURE-A AND B; (B) A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF HABEAS
CORPUS BY QUASHING OF THE FINAL OF ORDER OF
DETENTION DATED 08.06.2018 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1
IN NO.HD 281 SST 2018 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-E; AND (C)
A WRIT OF DIRECTION DIRECTING THE RESPONDENT NO.4 TO
RELEASE THE DETENU VISHWANATH SHETTY S/O BHOJA
SHETTY, RESIDENT OF RADHA NIVAS, NEAR MANASA GATE,
MARPALLU, KORANGRAPADY, UDUPI TALUKA, UDUPI DISTRICT,
FORTHWITH.
THIS WPHC COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Mr. Suresh B. Shetty, the petitioner, has challenged the detention of his brother, Mr. Vishwanath Shetty, by order dated 03.05.2018, before this Court. 3
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 03.05.2018, the District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner, Udupi District, passed a detention order under the provisions of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1985 ('the Act', for short) against Mr. Shetty. Consequently, on 03.05.2018, Mr. Vishwanath Shetty was taken into custody. On 04.05.2018, a copy of the detention order was communicated to the detenu. On 10.05.2018, the said detention order was approved by the Government under Section 3(3) of the Act. On 12.05.2018, the detenu was informed that his detention order has been approved by the State Government. Subsequently, on 17.05.2018, the detenu filed a representation before the Advisory Board. On 22.05.2018, his case was referred to the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board met on 02.06.2018. The detenu appeared before the Advisory 4 Board on the said date. On 02.06.2018, after hearing the detenu, the Advisory Board submitted its report to the Government. Relying on the report of the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention order on 08.06.2018. On 13.06.2018, the Government's decision confirming the detention order was communicated to the detenu. Hence this petition before this Court.
3. Mr. R. B. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court:-
Firstly, the Act prescribes an elaborate procedure for passing of a detention order, for confirmation of the said order, for its revocation, or modification of the said order. It also bestows substantial right on the detenu for submitting a representation against the detention order. Since preventive detention violates the fundamental right of personal liberty, the elaborate 5 procedure established by the Act necessarily has to be followed by the State. According to the learned counsel, if there is any lapse in following the procedure, the omission on the part of the State would vitiate not only the detention order, but also the detention itself.
Secondly, Section 3(2) of the Act permits the State Government to delegate its power to pass a detention order upon a District Magistrate, or a Commissioner of Police. Section 3(3) of the Act bestows a power upon the State to approve the detention order passed by the delegated authority within a period of twelve days. For the purpose of seeking the approval of the State Government, the delegated authority is required to furnish a copy of the detention order, and such other particulars having a bearing on the matter, to the State Government.
Section 8 of the Act bestows a substantial right upon the detenu to be informed of the ground of 6 detention, within a period of five days, and to be given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention order to the State Government.
Section 14 of the Act bestows the power upon the State to either revoke, or to modify the detention order passed by the delegated authority. According to the learned counsel, the right to file a representation in the scheme of the Act, is a vital right. Moreover, while appreciating this right to file a representation, and while considering the act of the State, these three provisions, namely Section 3(3), Section 8(1) and Section 14, have to be read co-jointly.
Most importantly, according to the learned counsel, the right to submit a representation would include the right to have access to all the documents relied upon by the detaining authority before taking its decision to detain the detenu. Therefore it was imperative for the detaining authority to provide all the 7 documents to the detenu while furnishing a copy of the detention order to the detenu. However, in the present case, the detaining authority, in fact, never provided any documents to the detenu while serving him with a copy of the detention order. According to the learned counsel, it is much later, i.e., after the detention order was confirmed by the State, by order dated 13.06.2018, that the documents were supplied to the detenu. Therefore, the detenu's right to file a substantive representation was violated. Hence the detention order stands vitiated. In order to buttress this plea, the learned counsel has relied on the case of M. AHAMEDKUTTY -VS- UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER [(1990) 2 SCC 1].
Thirdly, the detenu was not even informed in the detention order that he has the right to file a representation against the detention order. Thus the detenu was kept in the dark that he does have a right to 8 file a representation before the State Government under Section 8(1) of the Act.
Fourthly, the detention order has been passed ostensibly on the ground that the detenu was involved in criminal activities from 2011 to 2018. According to the detention order, he was charged of having committed an offence under Section 399 of IPC on 20.05.2011, and having committed an offence under Section 307 r/w other provisions of IPC on 21.01.2012. However the detenu was already acquitted in these two cases. Thus, the very basis for forming an opinion that the detenu is indulging in dangerous activities, is highly misplaced. Moreover, in other criminal cases in which the detenu is allegedly involved in, the detenu has already had the benefit of bail granted by Court of law. Yet, there is no indication in the detention order that the detaining authority is even aware that the detenu is on bail in the other criminal cases which have been 9 lodged against him. According to the learned counsel, this clearly indicates non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority.
Lastly, the detention order does not reveal under which category the detenu's actions fall. For, there is no indication whether the detaining authority considers him to be a bootlegger, or a drug-offender, or a gambler, or "a goonda", or an immoral traffic offender, or a slum- grabber. Therefore, the detention order suffers from vagueness. The vagueness of the order also reveals the non-application of mind. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the detention order should be set aside by this Court, and the detenu should be set at liberty.
4. On the other hand Mr. Sandesh J. Chouta, the learned AAG, has raised the following counter- contentions:-
10
Firstly, the detention order is passed on the basis of a subjective satisfaction on the facts and circumstances of the case. According to the detention order, eleven grounds were spelt out: ten criminal cases in which the detenu was involved, and the eleventh ground that he had been acquitted in the two criminal cases as he had threatened the witness who were to be produced by the prosecution in those cases. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is sufficient information for reaching a subjective decision to detain the detenu.
Secondly, considering the large number of criminal offences committed by the detenu, obviously, he poses a danger to the peace and tranquility of the society at large.
Thirdly, under Section 3(3) of the Act, there is no requirement that the representation submitted by the detenu under Section 8(1) of the Act needs to be placed 11 before the Government, prior to Government taking a decision to approve the detention order under Section 3(3) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, merely "the earliest opportunity of making a representation" needs to be given to the detenu without specifying that the representation needs to be submitted prior to the State Government taking a decision for approving the detention order. Therefore, the requirement that the detenu has a right to file the representation before the State approves the detention order cannot be read in Section 3(3) of the Act.
Fourthly, in the detention order it was clearly mentioned that the petitioner does have the right to make his representation against the detention order to the Government of Karnataka. He was further informed that he can send the representation either through the District Magistrate, or through the Senior Superintendent of the Central Prison. He was further 12 informed that he could also make a representation to the Advisory Board against the detention order. Such a representation should be sent to the Chairman of the Advisory Board. Therefore, ample information was given to the detenu for making his representation. According to the learned counsel, the detenu did not make any representation to the State Government. Instead, he filed a representation before the Advisory Board. Moreover, on 02.06.2018, the detenu appeared before the Advisory Board. According to the learned counsel, the detenu did not raise an objection before the Advisory Board that he has not been supplied with the relevant documents by the State. Furthermore, it is only after the Government had confirmed the detention order on 08.06.2018, that, as an afterthought, the detenu sent a letter to the Under-Secretary on 19.07.2018, asking for the documents. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is unjustified in 13 claiming that the right of filing a representation has been violated, which would vitiate the detention order.
Fifthly, Section 6A of the Act incorporates the doctrine of severability. It clearly prescribes that even if a ground of detention is found to be vague, non- existent, not-relevant, not connected, or not proximately connected with the detenu, or invalid for any other reason, even then the detention order cannot be declared to be an illegal one. Thus, even if the detaining authority has relied upon the two criminal cases of 2011 and 2012, in which the detenu has been acquitted, even then the detention order should not be declared to be an illegal one.
5. In rejoinder, Mr. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has pleaded that according to Section 8(1) of the Act, the earliest opportunity of making representation has to be given. The detention order was communicated to the detenu on 04.05.2018. 14 But even before a representation could be filed by the detenu, by order dated 10.05.2018, the State Government approved the detention order. Hence sufficient time was not given to the detenu to make a representation. Therefore, the right to submit a representation has been reduced to a mere illusion.
Secondly, according to Section 8(1), the representation can be filed only before the State Government. There is no provision under the Act permitting the detenu to file a representation before the Advisory Board. Hence, the detenu has been mislead by the detaining authority. Moreover, since the second option of filing a representation before the Advisory Board could not be given under the Act, the giving of such an opportunity clearly reveals that the detaining authority is unaware of the requirement of the Act. Hence, non-application of mind is writ large in the detention order.
15
6. This Court has asked a pointed query to the learned AAG, whether any documents were furnished to the detenu prior to his making a representation before the Advisory Board? To this pointed query, the learned AAG has frankly conceded that no documents were furnished to the detenu prior to his making the representation on 17.05.2018.
7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order, and the records.
8. Section 3 of the Act is as under:
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons -
(1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug-offender or gambler or goonda or immoral traffic offender or slum-grabber that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such persons be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within 16 the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-
section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the sub-section :
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government.
Section 8 of the Act is as under:
8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order -
(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the 17 order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
Section 14 of the Act is as under:
14. Revocation of detention orders -
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899, a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the State Government, notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3.
(2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order (hereinafter in this sub-section referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not, whether such earlier detention order has been made before or after the commencement of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-leggers, Drug-offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers (Amendment) Act, 1987, bar the making of another detention order (hereinafter in this sub- section referred to as the subsequent detention order) under section 3 against the same person :18
Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the revocation or expiry of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall in no case, extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months, from the date of detention under the earlier detention order.
9. A bare perusal of Section 3 of the Act clearly reveals that the section deals with two different circumstances: while Section 3(1) of the Act deals with a situation where the State Government itself passes the detention order, Section 3(2) of the Act bestows power of passing a detention order upon a District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police. In case a detention order is passed by the delegated authority, Section 3(3) imposes a duty upon the delegated authority to report the fact of detention of a person to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the detention order has been passed, and "such other particulars which have a bearing on the matter". Section 3(3) further states that 19 the detention order shall remain in force only for twelve days, unless, in the meantime, the detention order is approved by the State Government. Thus, the State Government is required to give its approval within a period of twelve days. Within the short period, the State Government is required to examine the detention order, and "such other particulars having a bearing on the matter", and the report submitted by the detaining authority.
10. A bare perusal of Section 8 of the Act clearly reveals that the detenu has the right to be informed of the grounds of detention, within a period of five days. The detenu also has the right to be given an opportunity to make a representation to the State Government "at the earliest".
11. Section 14 bestows the power upon the State to either modify, or to revoke the detention order. 20
12. A co-joint reading of these provisions clearly reveals that the State has the powers to approve, to modify, or revoke the detention order. While applying its mind, the State Government is required to consider the detention order, and other particulars having a bearing on the matter. Obviously, a representation filed by the detenu would have a great bearing on the legality or illegality of the detention order. Thus, even if Section 3(3) does not prescribe that a copy of the detenu's representation should be furnished to the State Government, in the absence of the representation, naturally, the State Government would not have all the relevant particulars for it to apply its mind. Therefore, it is imperative that before the Government is expected to approve the detention order, it must have a copy of the representation submitted by the detenu, if any. Therefore the learned AAG is unjustified in claiming that there is no requirement that a representation of the 21 detenu has to be placed before the State Government, before it approves the detention order.
13. The contention raised by the learned AAG is also unsustainable on the ground that a statute has to be read as a whole, and not in a piecemeal manner. Therefore, in order to see whether a copy of the representation has to be furnished to the State Government or not, Section 3, Section 8 and Section 14 of the Act, necessarily have to be read co-jointly. As stated above, Section 8 bestows a substantial right upon the detenu to make a representation against the detention order, "at the earliest". The right to make a representation is not a mere rite to be performed. The right to make a representation is a right to challenge the very foundation of the detention order, and to claim the right to be set at liberty. Moreover, the submission of a representation serves a significant purpose. For, the representation permits the State Government to apply 22 its mind, and to decide the issue whether the detention order should be approved, or modified, or revoked. The power to decide the said issue cannot be weakened by denying the State, the right to have access to the representation. Therefore it is essential that the detenu is directed to file the representation prior to the government applying its mind to the validity of the detention order. In case a representation is filed, the same should be placed before the State Government before it approves of the detention order.
14. Interestingly, Section 8(1) uses the words "the earliest opportunity of making a representation". According to the learned AAG, no time-frame has been prescribed for giving an opportunity of making a representation, except to prescribe that the opportunity must be "at the earliest". However, even this interpretation is unacceptable. According to Section 3(3), the State Government has merely twelve days time 23 to approve, or to disapprove the detention order. As opined hereinabove, in case a representation is filed, the said representation has to be considered by the State Government. Thus, obviously, the opportunity to file a representation, not only has to be at the earliest, but also has to be within a reasonable time. Even if no time limit is prescribed, considering the fact that the State has only twelve days to approve the detention order, a reasonable time of one week has to be given to the detenu to file his representation to the State Government under Section 8(1) of the Act. By giving a period of seven days to the detenu to file the representation, a period which has to be specified in the detention order, the conflicting interest of the detenu, and the State are balanced. For, the detenu has ample time to submit his representation, and the State Government, equally has substantial time to consider the representation, and to pass its order either 24 approving, or revoking, or modifying the detention order.
15. A bare perusal of the detention order clearly reveals that the detenu was informed that he has the right to file a representation before the State Government. However, the period in which the representation needs to be filed was not even specified. By not specifying the period, the right to file a representation has been made illusionary by the detaining authority. Thus, it was imperative for the detaining authority to clearly state the time-frame in which the representation should have been filed.
16. In the case of DR. RAHAMATULLAH -VS- STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. [(1981) 4 SCC 559], the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with detention under National Security Act. Section 8 of the National Security Act, and Section 8 of the Act are similarly worded. Thus, both the provisions are pari material. Hence, the 25 interpretation of the former can be read while interpreting the latter provision. In the said case, the Apex Court opined as under:
"5. The normal rule of law is that when a person commits an offence or a number of offences, he should be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the normal appropriate criminal law; but if he is sought to be detained under any of the preventive detention laws as may often be necessary to prevent further commission of such offences, then the provisions of Article 22(5) must be complied with. Sub- Article (5) of Article 22 reads:
When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order."26
6. This sub-article provides, inter alia, that the detaining authority shall as soon as may be communicate the grounds of detention and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The opportunity of making a representation is not for nothing. The representation, if any, submitted by the detenu is meant for consideration by the Appropriate Authority without any unreasonable delay, as it involves the liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution. The non-consideration or an unreasonably belated consideration of the representation tantamounts to non- compliance of Sub-Article (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution.
7. The law is well-settled that in case of preventive detention of a citizen, the obligation of the appropriate government is two-fold: (i) to afford the detenu the opportunity to make a representation and to consider the representation which may result in the release of the detenu, and (ii) to constitute a Board and to communicate the representation of the detenu along with other materials to the Board to enable 27 it to form its opinion and to obtain such opinion. The former is distinct from the latter. As there is a two-fold obligation of the appropriate government, so there is a two-fold right in favour of the detenu to have his representation considered by the appropriate government and to have the representation once again considered by the Government in the light of the circumstances of the case considered by the Board for the purpose of giving its opinion.
8. In the instant case, the State Government did not discharge the first of the two-fold obligation and waited till the receipt of the Advisory Board's opinion. There was, as pointed out above, an unexplained period of twenty-four days of non-consideration of the representation.
This shows there was no independent consideration of the representation by the State Government; on the contrary they deferred its consideration till they received the report of the Advisory Board. This is clear non-compliance of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court. The order of detention is, therefore liable to be quashed on this ground alone".
28
17. According to Section 8(1) of the Act, the representation can be filed only before the State Government. There is no provision which permits the detenu to file a representation before the Advisory Board. According to Section 11 of the Act, the detenu can be presented before the Advisory Board in case the detenu desires to be heard by the Board. But, curiously, in the detention order, two options have been given to the detenu, by the detaining authority, to file his representation either before the State Government, or before the Advisory Board. Obviously, the second option of filing a representation before the Advisory Board has no legal backing. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner is justified in claiming that by giving two options to the detenu, the detenu has been mislead by the detaining authority. Hence his right to file a representation has been violated by the detaining authority.
29
18. The right to file a representation is not merely a formality to be performed by the detenu. It is a right which protects the detenu from violation of his personal liberty by the State. Therefore, the right can be exercised, if and only if, the relevant documents have been supplied by the detaining authority to the detenu. In the present case, the learned AAG has frankly conceded, and in the opinion of this Court, rightly so, that no documents were supplied to the detenu along with the detention order. They were supplied to him only after he had filed an application on 19.07.2018. Thus, in the period between his detention, and the consideration of his case by the Advisory Board, the detenu was clearly deprived of the relevant documents. Therefore, the representation made by him cannot be said to be a substantive representation.
19. In the case of M. AHAMEDKUTTY (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that "it is a 30 constitutional imperative for the detaining authority to give the documents relied on, and referred to in the order of detention. Such documents should be furnished at the earliest so that the detenu could make an effective representation. Hence the question of demanding the documents, is wholly irrelevant. Any infirmity in supplying the documents would be violative of the constitutional safeguards enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India".
20. The said principle is certainly applicable to the present case, as admittedly the detenu was not supplied with the copy of the documents before he made his representation to the Advisory Board.
21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, of course, pleaded that one of the grounds for detaining the detenu was his alleged involvement in two criminal cases in 2011, and 2012. However, as he was acquitted in those cases, the existence of these two cases could 31 not have been formed the basis for his detention. Therefore, the detention order stands vitiated.
22. Section 6A of the Act is as under:
"6A. Grounds of detention severable -
Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 3, which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds, and accordingly, -
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are, -
(i) vague;
(ii) non-existent;
(iii) not-relevant;
(iv) not connected or not proximately
Connected with such person; or
(v) invalid for any other reason
whatsoever;
and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or the officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-
section (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;
32
(b) the Government or the officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), after being satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) with reference to the remaining ground or grounds."
A bare perusal of the said provision clearly reveals that it creates certain legal fictions: firstly, the detention order is deemed to have been made separately on each of the grounds mentioned therein; secondly, that even if one or some of the grounds are found to be vague, non- existent, not-relevant, not connected, or not proximately connected with the detenu, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever, even then, it is not possible for the Court to opine that the Government, or the Officer making such order would not have been satisfied on the basis of remaining grounds for passing the detention order. Sub-clause (b) further makes it abundantly clear that it shall be deemed that the Government, or the Officer was satisfied on the basis of the remaining ground or grounds that the detention was a necessary 33 one. Therefore, even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted, even then, the detention order does not stand vitiated, inter alia, on the ground that in two of the criminal cases, the detenu was acquitted by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the said contention is clearly unacceptable.
23. However, for the reasons stated above, this petition is hereby allowed. The order dated 03.05.2018, passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the District Magistrate, Udupi, and the order dated 08.06.2018, issued by the Under Secretary, Department of Home (Law and Order), are hereby set aside. The respondent No.4 - Superintendent of Jail, Central Prison, Bellary District, is directed to set the detenu at liberty, forthwith.
24. However, it is made abundantly clear that merely because the detenu is being released by this Court, it does not prevent the State Government from 34 taking any further action for preventively detaining the detenu, provided that the detaining authority detains the detenu, strictly in accordance with law.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE RD/NV