Jammu & Kashmir High Court - Srinagar Bench
Mohammad Yousuf Kumar vs State Of J&K; And Others on 25 April, 2018
Author: M. K. Hanjura
Bench: M. K. Hanjura
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT SRINAGAR
OWP no. 293/2018
MP no. 01/2018
Date of order: 25/04/2018
Mohammad Yousuf Kumar
Vs.
State of J&K and others
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. K. Hanjura, Judge
Appearing Counsel:
For Petitioner(s): Mr. M. Sultan, Adv.
For Respondent(s): Mr. M. A. Wani, Sr.AAG & Mr. Sheikh Hilal, Adv.
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals, etc.
ii) Whether approved for publication Yes/No
In press.
01/ By the medium of this writ petition, the petitioner has questioned the
order dated 24-05-2017, passed by the learned Financial Commissioner, (Rev) J&K, Srinagar, and the order dated 21-10-2015, passed in the Revision Petition, by the learned Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir, besides the Notice and the proceedings initiated by the Tehsildar, Chadoora.
02/ The brief facts, vital for arriving at a just conclusion in this petition, are that the petitioner's father - Noor Mohamad Kumar, who owned approximately 12 kanals of land in the revenue estate Wathora, Chadoora, alienated and transferred, in his lifetime, almost 09 kanals and 11 marlas of the said land leaving behind approximately 03 kanals for his legal heirs. It is stated that a mutation bearing No. 2018 dated 23-04-1993 came to be effected in favour of the two surviving legal heirs of the deceased, viz. the petitioner and OWP no. 293/2018 Page 1 of 15 his sister - namely Mst. Fazi, respondent No.5 herein. It is further stated that after a long period of more than 20 years, the said mutation came to be challenged in a Revision Petition by the respondent No.5 before the Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir, who referred the same to the Financial Commissioner (Rev), J&K, Srinagar, in gross violation of the position of law. The petitioner has further stated that while the reference was pending before the Financial Commissioner, (Revenue), J&K, Srinagar, the respondent No. 5 filed a motion before the Tehsildar, Chadoora, seeking attestation of a fresh mutation and the Tehsildar, Chadoora, issued notice to the petitioner for causing his appearance before the Court.
02/ The petitioner has proceeded to state in the writ petition that the notice of the Tehsildar, Chadoora, was assailed by him in another writ petition (OWP 2235/2015), filed earlier in point of time, in which an order of status quo was passed. However, during the pendency of the said writ petition, the Financial Commissioner, accepted the reference of the Divisional Commissioner, vide order dated 24-05-2017. It is further stated that the petitioner sought the withdrawal of the writ petition (OWP 2235/2015) to assail the order of the Financial Commissioner. The request was accepted by the Hon'ble Court and liberty was granted to the petitioner to question the order of the Financial Commissioner as also the order of the Divisional Commissioner by filing a fresh writ petition. The writ petitioner seeks the quashment of both the orders along OWP no. 293/2018 Page 2 of 15 with the notice issued by the Tehsildar, Chadoora, on the grounds, inter alia, that the earlier order passed in mutation No. 2018 dated 23.04.1993 still holds the field and has not been quashed by the competent authority, therefore the Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to issue the notice on a motion seeking denovo enquiry as well as attest a fresh mutation. It is further pleaded that the revision petition before the learned Divisional Commissioner was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. It is also stated that in terms of section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, the Financial Commissioner as well as the Divisional Commissioner have been invested with the powers to hear and decide a revision petition. However, in terms of section 15(4) of the Land Revenue Act, the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner is subject to the orders passed by the Financial Commissioner (Rev), and therefore, in view of this legal position, the order of the Divisional Commissioner has yet to attain finality. 03/ The petitioner has further stated that during the pendency of the reference, the State of J&K, issued an SRO 307 of 2017, conferring upon Shri Anil Kumar Gupta (KAS) - Joint Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms, J&K, the powers of the Financial Commissioner to hear and dispose of the appeals and revisions under the Land Revenue Act & the Agrarian Reforms Act. It is further stated that after the date of the promulgation of the SRO, the respondent Financial Commissioner (Rev), J&K became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, and therefore, the impugned order dated 24-05- OWP no. 293/2018 Page 3 of 15 2017, passed by him, is illegal & unlawful. The petitioner has further stated that the orders passed by the authority/s, which lack competence and power in the revisional capacity and are contrary to the statutory provisions, are liable to be quashed. The petitioner has finally prayed that in view of the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition be allowed and the reliefs sought therein be granted.
05/ Heard and considered.
06/ Leaving apart as to whether the learned Financial Commissioner who dealt with the reference, was empowered to accept the reference on the face of the notification: Jammu, the 13th December, 2016 issued vide SRO 393, and the notification: Srinagar, the 26th July, 017 issued vide SRO no. 307, which conferred powers of the Financial Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms (Revenue) upon Sh. Arun Kumar Sharma and Shri Anil Kumar Gupta to be exercised by them respectively for the purpose of hearing and disposing of the appeals and the revisions under the J&K Land Revenue Act, Samvat 1996 (1939 AD), the first question that strikes one's mind is whether the Law of Limitation does or does not apply to a revision filed before the Divisional Commissioner. What can be said in answer to this question is that there are conflicting judicial dictums on the subject. Some judicial pronouncements lay down that Section 12 of the Land Revenue Act which includes within its ambit, scope and purview, a revision also, OWP no. 293/2018 Page 4 of 15 prescribes a period within which a revision can be filed by a party aggrieved of an order passed in a mutation by an officer subordinate to the Divisional Commissioner. On the contrary, there are judgments of law which hold that the powers of the Divisional Commissioner in revision petitions are unfettered and a revision can be entertained by the Divisional Commissioner at any point of time under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act.
7. Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act envisages and encompasses a situation where the Divisional Commissioner can exercise suo moto powers in a revision and in this behalf the judicial opinion in some of decided cases is that it is only where the Divisional Commissioner exercises the suo moto powers that the law of Limitation does not apply but where a party knocks at the door of the competent authority, i.e., Divisional Commissioner by filing a revision, the law of limitation has its application both in vigor and rigor in view of what is postulated and provided under Section 12 of the land Revenue Act.
8. Be that as it may, and assuming, but not admitting that the law of limitation does not apply to a revision petition filed before the Divisional Commissioner, the question simpliciter is whether the Divisional Commissioner can exercise such a power after a great deal of 20 years approximately from the date of the attestation of the mutation in a case like the present one and the answer to it should be a big "No" in view of the detailed and legal interpretation OWP no. 293/2018 Page 5 of 15 of this aspect of the case by the Supreme Court of India in the law laid down in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District & Anr. Vs. D. Narsing Rao & others, (2015) 3 SCC 695, wherein it has been held as under:
"12.1 In the decision in State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha, this Court while adverting to Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too late.
12.2 In the decision in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, this Court while dealing with Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 held that though the said Section does not prescribe for any time limit for initiation of proceeding such power should be exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said Section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time.
12.3 In the decision in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale, this Court while dealing with the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows (SCC pp. 356-57, paras 11-12).
"11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.
12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub- Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30-3- 1976 is flawed and legally not correct."
12.4 In the decision in State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., this Court while dealing with the revisional power under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 held thus : (SCC p 367, paras 17-19)/ OWP no. 293/2018 Page 6 of 15 "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years................" 12.5 In the decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham vs. K. Suresh Reddy, this Court while dealing with suo motu power of revision under Section 50-B(4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950 held as follows :
(SCC pp. 676-77, para 9).
"9. ...............In the absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court were right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed by the non-official respondents. Use of the words "at any time"
in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub- section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the OWP no. 293/2018 Page 7 of 15 orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation."
17. In the light of what is stated above we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law.
25. The legal position is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power.
26. In one of the earlier decisions of this Court in S. B. Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, this Court held that exercise of suo motu power of revision must also be within a reasonable time and that any unreasonable delay in the exercise may affect the validity. But what would constitute reasonable time would depend upon the facts of each case.
27. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud the revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable period and that several factors need to be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should be denied only on the ground of delay. The Court said: (SCC p. 677, para9).
"9.... In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act)."
28. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal transport, wherein this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrary and interminably. This Court observed: (SCC p. 476, para 28).
"28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix, a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words 'at any time' in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to OWP no. 293/2018 Page 8 of 15 variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the little over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute."
29. In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Sing, this Court held that in the absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15 years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was impermissible as the delay was unduly long and unexplained. This Court observed:
(SCC pp. 588-89, para6).
"6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that sub section (3) provides that such a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20."OWP no. 293/2018 Page 9 of 15
30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, wherein the Court explained the legal position as under:
(SCC pp. 602-03, para 13).
"13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and state claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and the other lapse of time is not attributable to any latches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed."
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercised of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statue that vests such power in an authority.
9. The judicial precedent cited above does not support or reiterate the view that a person who is slack, callous and remiss in rolling the law in his favour at the opportune time can do so after a great deal of time subject to his whims and OWP no. 293/2018 Page 10 of 15 caprice. If such a situation is allowed to prevail, it will open a floodgate for uncalled litigations which cannot be controlled by the authorities while hearing and determining the revisions. Such a view, that a person filing a revision can do so at his will at any moment of time without spelling out reasons as to why he waited for pursuing the action for such a long time which did not meet the test of reasonability will lead to disastrous consequences. Taking the instant case, as an example it is repeated and reiterated here that, the respondent No. 5 filed a revision petition challenging the mutation which was attested more than twenty years back, before the Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir, who referred the same to the Financial Commissioner (Rev), J&K, Srinagar, in gross violation of the position of law. While the reference was pending before the Financial Commissioner, (Revenue), J&K, Srinagar, the respondent No. 5 filed a motion before the Tehsildar, Chadoora, seeking attestation of a fresh mutation. The respondent no. 5 did not delineate any reason for this delay of more than 20 years caused in challenging the said mutation. In case any fraud was played with her, the respondent no. 5 could have filed the revision without waiting for this long period of twenty years.
10. If a statute does not prescribe the time limit for the exercise of revisional power, that will not give the authority determining the matter, the power to unsettle an order after a long time of 20 years. The power has to be exercised within a reasonable time as per the law laid down in (2007) 11 SCC 363 and OWP no. 293/2018 Page 11 of 15 ordinarily it can be exercised within a period of three years and in no case beyond a period of five years even where fraud is alleged. The passage of considerable time, from the date of the attestation of the mutation had to be taken into consideration and had to be given due weight while exercising the revisional powers.
11. Looking at the petition of the petitioner from another perspective that is the application of Shariat Act of 2007 in light of the law laid down by this Court in LPA No.07/2010 titled "Ahad Sheikh v. Murad Ahmad Shah & others, on which the the explicit reliance has been put in carving out a case for the respondent no. 5, it needs must be said that the Shariat Act came into force in the year 2007 and it reads as under:
An Act to make provisions for the application of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) to Muslims of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Be it enacted by the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature in the Fifty-
eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:-
1. Short title and commencement :-(1) This Act may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007.
2. It shall come into force from the date of its publication in the Government Gazette.
3. Application of Personal Law to Muslims:- Notwithstanding any customs or usages to the contrary, in all questions regarding intestate succession, OWP no. 293/2018 Page 12 of 15 special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lain, khula and mubaraat, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
4. Repeal:- The provisions of the Shri Partap Jammu and Kashmir Laws Consolidation Act, Samvat 1977 (1920 A. D.) shall be repealed in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
12. The question whether this Act is prospective or retrospective in nature is no longer res. Integra. The fact that cannot be lost sight of it is that it applies to the suits and the proceedings which were pending as on the date when the Act came into force and it also applies to the suits and the proceedings filed after that. What is to be understood is that the mutation proceedings are summary in nature and a Mutating Officer and the Financial Commissioner are the Quasi Judicial Authorities. The mutation is a fiscal entry. It does not confer any title on any person and it is made for the upgradation of the records. The question of title is open to be decided by the civil courts and the logic behind the judgment of law cited above in incorporating the words "Suits and Proceedings"
pending on the date of the operation of the Act or filed thereafter seems to be to give the parties the right to agitate and settle their grievance in the civil Courts.OWP no. 293/2018 Page 13 of 15
13. The import of the application of Shariat Act, 2007, makes it abundantly clear that from the date of its promulgation that is the year 2007, all questions detailed in Section 3 have to be decided and determined under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), where the parties are Muslims. The mutations here in this case have been attested a long back, that is, on 23.04.1993. The judicial precedent cited above lays in unequivocal terms that the Act will apply to all the suits and proceedings which were pending on the date when the Act came into force as also to the suits and proceedings filed after its enforcement. The suits and proceedings which have been finally decided would not be affected by the enactment of the Shariat Act, but if such a suit and proceedings will be pending even in appeal on the date when the Act was brought into operation, the application of law to such a case will be the Muslim Personal Law, if the other conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled.
14. There is no doubt in saying that the Shariat Act, 2007, will apply to all the mutations that are attested after the enactment of the Shariat Act 2007, but on the plain phraseology of the Act, it will not apply to a mutation which has been attested a long before it came into operation. Suits and proceedings as stated in the judgment encompass within its operation and scope the suits filed before the Civil Courts and the proceedings emanating there from like the execution petitions, appeals or the proceedings initiated in the suit itself. The word "Suit" as defined in the West's Encyclopedia of American law edition 2 is a generic OWP no. 293/2018 Page 14 of 15 term, of comprehensive significance, referring to any proceedings by one person or persons against another or others in a Court of law in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the law affords for the redress of any injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in Equity. A mutation is a fiscal entry and may be a prima facie proof of the possession of the estate by the person in whose favour it is attested. It does not as is repeated here decide the title which has to be decided by the Civil Court.
15. In view of the proceeding analysis, the petition is allowed, as a corollary to which, the impugned order of the learned Financial Commissioner passed in file No. 790/FC-AP dated 24.05.2017, and impugned order of learned Divisional Commissioner, Kashmir passed in file no. 408/Rev dated 21.10.2015, as also the notice dated 30.11.2015 issued by the Tehsildar are set aside.
16. Disposed of accordingly along with the connected MP(s).
(M. K. Hanjura) Judge Srinagar 25/04.2018 N Ahmad OWP no. 293/2018 Page 15 of 15