State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Chief Exe.(Works), The Hooghly Mills ... vs Sri Sachin Kundu on 6 December, 2010
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission West Bengal BHABANI BHAVAN (GROUND FLOOR) 31, BELVEDERE ROAD, ALIPORE KOLKATA 700 027 S.C. CASE NO. FA/231/10 DATE OF FILING:03.5.2010 DATE OF FINAL ORDER: 06.12.2010 APPELLANT Chief Executive (Works) The Hooghly Mills Company Ltd. Unit Gondalpara Jute Mill P.O. Gondalpara, P.S. Chandannagar Dist. Hooghly at present Murlidhar Ratanlal Exports Ltd. RESPONDENT Sri Sachin Kundu S/o Late Upendra Nath Kundu Residing at T.N. Bhattacharya Bye Lane P.O. & P.S. Chandernagore Dist. Hooghly BEFORE : HONBLE JUSTICE MR. PRABIR KUMAR SAMANTA, PRESIDENT MEMBER : MRS. S. MAJUMDER MEMBER : MR. S. COARI FOR THE APPELLANT : Mrs. K. Mukhopadhyay, Advocate FOR THE RESPONDENT : None appeared. : O R D E R :
HONBLE JUSTICE MR. PRABIR KUMAR SAMANTA, PRESIDENT This appeal is by the Chief Executive (Works), The Hooghly Mills Co. Ltd., the employer of the complainant against the judgment and order of the Forum below thereby directing payment of the gratuity amount as claimed by the complainant to him with interest as also a sum of Rs.10,000/- by way of compensation and Rs.1,000/- as costs.
The short but most important question involved in this appeal is whether under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act a Consumer Redressal Forum has the jurisdiction to decide the question as to the entitlement and/or payment of the gratuity amount by the employer to the employee.
The sole Respondent herein as being an Ex-employee of the appellant, who retired on 27.11.07 filed a complaint case before the Forum below by contending that he joined in the service on 15.6.1970 as a casual/bodli labourer and was made permanent subsequently and worked as a permanent employee till the date of his resignation on 27.11.07. As per provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and the Rules framed thereunder it is the duty of the employer to pay gratuity to his employees and non-payment of the same would attract a simple interest @ 10% per annum on the amount of gratuity payable. He accordingly claimed in a complaint case before the Forum below that he is entitled to the gratuity amount of Rs.1,09,626/- but the appellant/employer has not provided him a single farthing on such account inspite of several requests.
The appellant/employer contested the case by filing written objection by contending that the complaint case as above is not maintainable in the Forum constituted under the Consumer Protection Act. In other words since the complainant is an Ex-employee under the appellant/employer there is no relationship of consumer and/or service provider amongst them and as such the complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act is not at all maintainable. The District Forum below has allowed the complaint case by directing payment as above by the appellant/employer to the complainant.
On the question of maintainability it has only been held that it is a well settled principle of law that the special law overrides the general law and the complainant is a consumer under the appellant/employer as per provisions of Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1980 and it is the obligation of the appellant/employer to make payment of the gratuity amount to the employee and, therefore, the appellant/employer is a service provider to the complainant in terms of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act. The said judgment however does not reflect any reason and/or the logic whatsoever for holding as such. It is, therefore, very much necessary to decide in a case of this nature whether a relationship of consumer as per the provisions of Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1980 exists in between an employee and the employer or the appellant/employer is a service provider to its employee for the purpose of payment of gratuity in terms of Section 2(1) (o) of the aforesaid Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Consumer has been defined in the said Act under Section 2(1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act which reads as under:
(d) consumer means any person who
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose;
Section 2(1)(o) defines service as under:
(o) service means of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news of other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;
Upon careful reading of the definition of consumer it does not appear that in a relationship of employer and employee there is any element of buying or selling of any goods for a consideration either by the employer or by the employee from the other.
Certainly employer hires the services of an employee for a consideration. Again if such service by the employee to the employer for a consideration is not by way of a contract of personal service in between the employer and the employee but evidently such service has been availed of by the employer from the employee for its commercial purposes in which the employer is engaged. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that in a public and/or private relationship in between the employer and the employee there is any ingredient of a consumer as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act.
Again the definition of service as given in Section 2(1)(o) of the said Act is an inclusive definition and includes any kind of service which is made available to potential users excepting services rendered free of charge or under a contract of personal service. It is no doubt true that where service of the employee is hired by the employer, there the employer is the potential user of the service which is made available to the employer by its employee. It is not that employer is rendering any service to the employee by hiring him for a consideration, although in a broader sense he may be doing some service to the nation and the unemployed mass by providing employment.
Thus, in a relationship of employer and employee it cannot be said in any manner whatsoever that an employee is a potential user of the services rendered by his employer during the period of his employment.
Again deficiency has been defined in Section 2(1)(g) which reads as under:
(g) deficiency means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner or performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.
Alternatively if we go by the definition of deficiency as defined in Section 2(1)(g) it would appear that it means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service. This definition of deficiency comes into play in favour of a person who is a consumer as per Section 2(1)(d)(i) or a potential user of the services which has been hired or availed of for a consideration by him falling within the provision of 2(1)(d)(ii). This definition of deficiency will certainly not apply in all cases whenever there is any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force, unless there is element of consumer in favour of a person who has alleged deficiency or is a potential user of service hired or availed by him for consideration. For instance police authorities are lawfully obliged to register a F.I.R. if lodged in writing by a person stating clearly the offences committed by the culprit. If such F.I.R. is not registered will give rise to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Court to entertain complaint against the police authorities. Instances will galore in the field of both public and private services where there are lawful obligations to be performed under the particular statutes without any element of consumer or potential user of services hired or availed of for a consideration being involved in performances of such lawful obligations. There is no scope for holding that such deficiency in relation to service would apply in favour of a person who has neither hired nor availed of any service from his employer rather he is providing service to his employer who is availing the same at a consideration. It cannot also be said that in all and sundry relationships the deficiency if any in the performance of duties and/or lawful obligations would attract Consumer Protection Act even if there is no element of consumer or potential user of services hired or availed of for a consideration in such relationship. It is, therefore, difficult to hold upon reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Consumer Protection Act that in a relationship between employer and employee non-payment of gratuity by the employer to its employee would come within the four corner of deficiency of service by the employers to its employee for the purpose of invocation of the jurisdiction of the Consumer Protection Act for compelling the employer to make payment of the same.
In this regard the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.4965 of 2000 (Kishore Lal-Vs-Chairman, Employees State Insurance Corporation) has to be read in a proper perspective.
In the case before the Supreme Court the appellant was insured with the Respondent/Employees State Insurance Corporation. The appellants wife was admitted in the ESI dispensary for her treatment for diabetes.
The condition of his wife continued to deteriorate. It was alleged by the appellant that there were instances when the doctors were not available even during emergencies. Later, the appellant got his wife medically examined in a private hospital. The test done revealed that his wife had been diagnosed incorrectly in the ESI dispensary; and that the deterioration in the condition of the appellants wife was a direct result of the wrong diagnosis. The appellant filed a complain under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which the Corporation contested by raising preliminary objection that the complainant was not a consumer within the definition of consumer and he was not entitled to file a complaint against the ESI dispensary. It was also contended that the facilities of medical treatment in government hospital cannot be regarded as a service hired for consideration. In such context it has been held in paragraph 14:
(14). THE service rendered by the medical practitioners of hospitals/nursing homes run by the ESI Corporation cannot be regarded as a service rendered free of charge. The person availing of such service under an insurance scheme of medical care, whereunder the charges for consultation, diagnosis and medical treatment are borne by the insurer, such service would fall within the ambit of service as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the CP Act. We are of the opinion that the service provided by the ESI hospital/dispensary falls within the ambit of service as defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the CP Act. ESI scheme is an insurance scheme and it contributes for the service rendered by the ESI hospitals/dispensaries, of medical care in its hospitals/dispensaries, and as such service given in the ESI hospitals/dispensaries to a member of the Scheme or his family cannot be treated as gratuitous.
In respect of the contention made on behalf of the Corporation that the claim made by the appellant would exclusively fall for decision within the jurisdiction of the Employees Insurance Code and that being the position the Consumer Forum has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue, it was held in paragraphs 16,17,19,20,21 as under:
(16) RELEVANT portions of Sections 74 and 75 of the ESI Act are reproduced below:
74.
Constitution of Employees Insurance Court. (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute an Employees Insurance Court of such local area as may be specified in the notification. 75. Matters to be decided by Employees Insurance Court.
(1) If any question or dispute arises as to (a) whether any person is an employee within the meaning of this Act or whether he is liable to pay the employees contribution, or (b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of an employee for the purpose of this Act, or (c) the rate of contribution payable by the principal employer in respect of any employee, or (d) the person who is or was the principal employer in respect of any employee, or (e) the right of any person to any benefit and as to the amount and duration thereof, or (ee) any direction issued by the Corporation under Section 55a on a review of any payment of dependants benefits, or, (f) [omitted], or (g) any other matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation, or between a principal employer and an immediate employer, or between a person and the Corporation or between an employee and a principal or immediate employer, in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Act, or any other matter required to be or which may be decided by the Employees Insurance Court under this Act, such question or dispute subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2-A) shall be decided by the Employees Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of this Act.(2)
Subject to the provisions of Sub-Section (2-A), the following claims shall be decided by the Employees Insurance Court, namely, - (a) claim for the recovery of contributions from the principal employer; (b) claim by a principal employer to recover contributions from any immediate employer; (c) (Omitted);
(d) claim against a principal employer under Section 68; (e) claim under Section 70 for the recovery of the value or amount of the benefits received by a person when he is not lawfully entitled thereto; and (f) any claim for the recovery of any benefit admissible under this Act.
(3)No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question or dispute as aforesaid or to adjudicate on any liability which by or under this Act is to be decided by a medical board, or by a medical appeal tribunal or by the Employees Insurance Court.
(17) IT has been held in numerous cases of this Court that the jurisdiction of a consumer forum has to be construed liberally so as to bring many cases under it for their speedy disposal. In the case of Spring Meadows Hospital and Anr. V. Harjol Ahluwalia and Anr., it was held that the CP Act creates a framework for speedy disposal of consumer disputes and an attempt has been made to remove the existing evils of the ordinary court system.
The Act being a beneficial legislation should receive a liberal construction. In State of Karnataka v.
Vishwabarathi House Building Co-op. Society and Ors., the Court speaking on the jurisdiction of the consumer fora held that the provisions of the said Act are required to be interpreted as broadly as possible and the fora under the CP Act have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the fact that other fora/courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. These judgments have been cited with approval in paras 16 and 17 of the judgment in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha and Ors.. The trend of the decisions of this Court is that the jurisdiction of the consumer forum should not and would not be curtailed unless there is an express provision prohibiting the consumer forum to take up the matter which falls within the jurisdiction of civil court or any other forum as established under some enactment. The Court had gone to the extent of saying that if two different fora have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in regard to the same subject, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum would not be barred and the power of the consumer forum to adjudicate upon the dispute could not be negated.
(19) A bare perusal of the provisions of Clauses
(a) to (g) of Section 75 (1) clearly shows that it does not include claim for damages for medical negligence, like the present case which we are dealing with. Although the question does not directly arise before us, we shall consider what in the ordinary course shall constitute negligence.
(20) THIS Court has considered the principles of the law on negligence in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Anr. The jurisprudential concept of negligence defies any precise definition. Eminent jurists and leading judgments have assigned various meanings to negligence. The concept as has been acceptable to Indian jurisprudential thought is well-stated in the Law of Torts, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal (24th Ed. 2002, edited by Justice G.P. Singh). It is stated (at pp. 441-442): negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person or property the definition involves three constituents or negligence: (1) A legal duty to exercise due care on the part of the party complained of towards the party complaining the formers conduct within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of the said duty; and (3) consequential damage. Cause of action for negligence arises only when damage occurs; for, damage is a necessary ingredient of this tort. Cause of action for negligence arises only when damage occurs and thus the claimant has to satisfy the court on the evidence that three ingredients of negligence, namely, (a) existence of duty to take care; (b) failure to attain that standard of care; and (c) damage suffered on account of breach of duty, are present for the defendant to be held liable for negligence. Therefore, the claimant has to satisfy these ingredients before he can claim damages for medical negligence of the doctors and that could not be a question which could be adjudicated upon by the Employees Insurance Courts which have been given specific powers of the issues, which they can adjudicate and decide. Claim for damages for negligence of the doctors or the ESI hospital/dispensary is clearly beyond the jurisdictional power of the Employees Insurance Court. An Employees Insurance Court has jurisdiction to decide certain claims which fall under Sub-section (2) of Section 75 of the ESI Act. A bare reading of Section 75(2) also does not indicate, in any manner, that the claim for damages for negligence would fall within the purview of the decisions being made by the Employees Insurance Court.
Further, it can be seen that any claim arising out of and within the purview of the Employees Insurance Court is expressly barred by virtue of Sub-section (3) to be adjudicated upon by a civil court, but there is no such express bar for the consumer forum to exercise the jurisdiction even if the subject matter of the claim or dispute falls within Clauses (a) to (g) of Sub-section (a) of Section 75 or where the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim is vested with the Employees Insurance Court under Clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 75 if it is a consumers dispute falling under the CP Act.
(21) HAVING considered all these aspects, we are of the view that the appellant is a consumer within the ambit of Section 2(1)
(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the medical service rendered in the ESI hospital/dispensary by the respondent Corporation falls within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act and, therefore, the consumer forum has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the case of the appellant. We further hold that the jurisdiction of the consumer forum is not ousted by virtue of Sub-Section (1) or (2) or (3) of Section 75 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948.
The said case before the Supreme Court is therefore distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Because the services rendered to an employee and his family members by a medical practitioner or in a hospital/nursing home under the insurance scheme framed under ESI Act are part of the conditions of service of the employee. In the case in hand the payment of gratuity to an employee by the employer is not a condition of service and not by way of rendering service to the employee by the employer. It is lawful entitlement of the employees because of the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 in the organization in which the employee is engaged. Thus, the entitlement to the payment of gratuity is purely statutory and in view of the applicability of the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to the organization of the employer and not by way of conditions service under which the employee has been hired by the employer. We are, therefore, of the view that the above Supreme Court decision would not be applicable in a case of payment of gratuity by the employer to the employee.
This State Commission in its decision rendered on 16.11.09 in S.C. Case No. FA/266/2009 has held that a proceeding under Consumer Protection Act for a claim for gratuity is maintainable. It has been held as such merely by relying on the decision of the Honble National Commission in the Case of Venkatesh-vs-Vishwanath reported in 2006(1) CPR 473. In that case the complaint for non-payment of gratuity was allowed by the Consumer Fora upto State Commission. On revision the Honble National Commission has held as under:
4.
As far as the first point is concerned, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner wishes to rely upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur & Ors., CA No.8 of 1977 dated 16.10.79. We have very carefully gone through this judgment which relates to the period 1979 whereas Consumer Protection Act, 1979 came into existence from 1987. Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 reads as follows:
3.
Act not in derogation of any other law the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
5. Admittedly, as per law now laid down by this Commission and the Honble Supreme Court this is an additional remedy available to the consumer. The fact that the complainant shall fall within the definition of the consumer has been well settled by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shiv Kumar Joshi, III (1999) CPJ 36(SC)=X (1999) SLT 395, CA No. 411 of 1997 dated 30.1.1996. In the cited judgment the Honble Supreme Court relying upon its own earlier judgment in the case of Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, I(1998) CPJ 1 (SC)=III (1998) SLT 684=I(1998) 4 SCC 39, held as follows:
In the present case, we are concerned with Clause (ii) of Section 2(1) (d). In the said clause a consumer would mean a person who hires or avails of any services and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services. When a young child is taken to a hospital by his parents and the child is treated by the doctor, the parents would come within the definition of consumer having hired the services and the young child would also become a consumer under the inclusive definition being a beneficiary of such services. The definition clause being wide enough to include not only the person who hires the services but also the beneficiary of such services which beneficiary is other than the person who hires the services, the conclusion is irresistible that both the parents of the child as well as the child would be consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and as such can claim compensation under the Act.
6. In the above circumstances we are left in no doubt that the respondent shall be consumer and in view of the Section 3 of the CPA, 1986, the Consumer Fora will have jurisdiction to entertain such a case.
Regard being had to the decision as above it is abundantly clear that the ratio decidendi has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.
The Supreme Court in a latest decision reported in 2010(3) CHN (SC)1 (Bihar School Examination Board-Vs-Suresh Prasad Sinha) has held as under:
8.
The question that arises for our consideration is whether a statutory School Examination Board comes within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. There is some confusion and divergence in the decisions of the National Commission on this issue. In some cases, it has been held that Examination Boards do not come within the purview of the Act. In some other cases, the Commission has held that though holding of examinations is a statutory function, issue of mark-sheets and certificates etc., is an administrative function, and therefore, the Examination Boards are amenable to the jurisdiction of Consumer Fora if there is negligence amounting to deficiency in service, in such consequential administrative functions.
9. The definitions of the terms service and deficiency in clauses (o) and (g) of Section 2 of the Act which are relevant are extracted below:
Section 2(o): Service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provisions of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service;
Section 2(g): Deficiency means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.
According to the definition of consumer in Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who hires or avails of any services for a consideration, is a consumer. The following category of service availors will not be consumers: (i) persons who avail any service for any commercial purpose; (ii) persons who avail any free service; and (iii) persons who avail any service under any contract of service. A consumer is entitled to file a complaint under the Act if there is any deficiency in service provided or rendered by the service-provider.
10. The Board is a statutory authority established under the Bihar School Examination Board Act, 1952. The function of the Board is to conduct school examinations. This statutory function involves holding periodical examinations, evaluating the answer scripts, declaring the results and issuing certificates. The process of holding examinations, evaluating answer scripts, declaring results and issuing certificates are different stages of a single statutory non-commercial function. It is not possible to divide this function as partly statutory and partly administrative.
When the Examination Board conducts an examination in discharge of its statutory function, it does not offer its services to any candidate. Nor does a student who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, hires or avails of any service from the Board for a consideration. On the other hand, a candidate who participates in the examination conducted by the Board, is a person who has undergone a course of study and who requests the Board to test him as to whether he has imbibed sufficient knowledge to be fit to be declared as having successfully completed the said course of education; and if so, determine his position or rank or competence vis--vis other examinees. The process is not therefore availment of a service by a student; but participation in a general examination conducted by the Board to ascertain whether he is eligible and fit to be considered as having successfully completed the secondary education course. The examination fee paid by the student is not the consideration for availment of any service, but the charge paid for the privilege of participation in the examination.
11. The object of the Act is to cover in its net, services offered or rendered for a consideration. Any service rendered for a consideration is presumed to be a commercial activity in its broadest sense (including professional activity or quasi-commercial activity). But the Act does not intended to cover discharge of a statutory function of examining whether a candidate is fit to be declared as having successfully completed a course by passing the examination. The fact that in the course of conduct of the examination, or evaluation of answer scripts, or furnishing or mark-sheets or certificates, there may be some negligence, omission or deficiency, does not convert the Board into a service-provider for a consideration, nor convert the examinee into a consumer who can make a complaint under the Act. We are clearly of the view that the Board is not a service provider and a student who takes an examination is not a consumer and consequently, complaint under the Act will not be maintainable against the Board.
Upon reading of the aforesaid decisions we are inclined to follow the line as has been decided by the Honble Supreme Court in its latest decision in the case of Bihar School Examination Board (Supra). For the reasons aforesaid we are of the view that there is no relationship of consumer between the employer/appellant and the complainant/respondent and consequently there cannot be any deficiency of service by the employer for the purpose of payment of gratuity to the employee by the employer. In that view of the matter we hold that the complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in this regard is not maintainable in the Fora constituted under the said Act. The impugned order of the Forum below is accordingly set aside. The complaint case is, thus, dismissed. However, the complainant/respondent would be at liberty to approach the authority concerned prescribed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 for redressal of his grievances as to non-payment of gratuity by the employer to him. If for the purpose of approaching the concerned authority under the said Act if there be any delay because of the pendency of the proceeding before this consumer Fora it would be necessary to condone such delay for the interest of justice.
With this observation this appeal shall stand allowed.
(S. Majumder) (S. Coari) (Justice P.K. Samanta) MEMBER(L) MEMBER PRESIDENT