Patna High Court
State Of Bihar vs Ramgarh Farms And Industries Ltd. And ... on 18 November, 1960
Equivalent citations: AIR1961PAT302, AIR 1961 PATNA 302
Author: V. Ramaswami
Bench: V. Ramaswami
JUDGMENT Kanhaiya Singh, J.
1. Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh, the proprietor of the Ramgarh estate, commonly known as the Ramgarh Raj, first executed agreements of lease in 1945 and 1947 in favour of the respondents, Ramgarh Farms and Industries limited, whom I shall call the Company, and in furtherance of those agreements subsequently executed a registered lease on 12th February, 1948, granting permanent raiyati interest in respect of vast lands belonging to the Ramgarh Raj on payment of salami. In 1953 the State of Bihar served upon the respondents a notice dated 14th December, 11953, issued under Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to enquire into the validity or otherwise of the alleged settlements of land by the proprietor of the Ramgarh Raj in favour of the Company.
Thereupon, on 19th February, 1954, the Company instituted Title Suit 12 of 1954 against the State of Bihar, substantially on the ground that by virtue of the lease the lands were demised to the Company for cultivation and reclamation of waste land, that thereby it acquired permanent raiyati interest, that raiyati interest had been specifically excepted by Section 4 (a) of the Act and did not vest in the State, and that Section 4 (h) of the Act is unconstitutional and invalid and, therefore, the notice issued thereunder is ultra vires, illegal, void and inoperative in law; and claimed the following reliefs :
"(a) For a declaration that Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is illegal, ultra vires and void.
(b) For a declaration that Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is meaningless and unenforceable unless and until it is suitably amended.
(c) For a declaration that Raiyati interest cannot vest or cannot be deemed to have vested under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act if they were created by the landlord before the date of vesting as provided in the Act.
(d) For a declaration that the Agreement for the creation of the Raiyati interest completed before 1st January, 1946 and comprising any Raiyati interest cannot be within the mischief of Section 4 (h) of the Act
(e) For a declaration that the expression 'settlement' or 'lease' of Section 4 (h) of the Act cannot include Raiyati interest land inasmuch as the interest of Raiyati and under-raiyats are expressly saved from vesting by Section 4 (a) of the Act.
(f) For costs.
(g) For other reliefs."
Subsequently, Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh and the other members of his family were also added as defendants in the suit. They filed written statements supporting the plaintiffs case.
2. On 30th November, 1954, the State of Bihar filed a written statement controverting all the allegations of the plaintiff. The defence of the State of Bihar, which is the virtual contestant, is that Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh, being a member of the Bihar Legislature since long, had full knowledge of the impending legislations for the acquisition of zamindaries in the State of Bihar, and for the purpose of delaying and obstructing the acquisition of his properties by the State and defeating the legislative enactments he floated a number of bogus companies and entered into farzi transactions with them, that the Company is one of such companies and for circumventing the provisions of law and obtaining increased compensation, he forged and executed bogus, colourable and sham agreements of lease and also registered leases in respect of his properties in favour of the Company, that they were not acted upon and despite the said leases, he continued in possession of the suit properties as a proprietor, that his properties have validly vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Act, that the provisions of the Act, more particularly Section 4 (h) of the same Act, are and have been held to be perfectly constitutional and a valid piece of legislation and that accordingly the suit is entirely misconceived and liable to be dismissed.
3. On 30th April, 1958, the Company filed a petition for amendment of the plaint by adding Sant Vinoba Bhave and seven others, being members of the Bhoodan Yagna Committee constituted under the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, as defendants on the ground that out of the areas settled with it by the Ramgarh Raj, the plaintiff, had donated 200,000 acres of land to Sant Vinoba Bhave and others under the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act! prior to the institution of the suit. The plaintiff filed another petition On 6th August, 1956, for fur-
ther amendment of the plaint by adding one paragraph, viz., paragraph 16a, and consequential relief, to be substituted for relief No. (f). The new paragraph to be inserted in the plaint reads as follows :
"Paragraph 16a : That Ramgarh Raj did not vest in the State of Bihar at any time prior to 26th January, 1955 and that it was illegal, ultra vires and beyond the competence of the State of Bihar and its officers to take any action under Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and the action so taken by them is void and of no effect."
And the said new relief No. (f) is in the following terms :
"That Ramgarh Raj not having vested in the State of Bihar notices purporting to have been issued under Section 4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and other action alleged to have been taken in exercise of the power and other section is ultra vires, illegal, unconstitutional and void".
Both these amendments were allowed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge by his order dated 21st September, 1956. For revision of this order the State of Bihar has filed Civil Revision 1077 of 1956. By the same order the learned Subordinate Judge also granted an injunction restraining the State of Bihar from passing final orders on the findings submitted by the Collector in the proceedings under Section 4 (h) of the Act until the disposal of the suit. Against that order the State has filed Miscellaneous Appeal 373 of 1956. Both the Civil Revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal have been heard analogously and will be disposed of by this judgment.
4. To take the Civil Revision first, as regards the amendment of the plaint by adding Sri Sant Vinoba Bhave and others on the allegation that the Company had donated about 200,000 acres of land to the Bhoodan Yagna Committee, there is no evidence of donation at all. In order to legalise and facilitate such donations, the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1954, has been passed, which dispenses with the requirements under the existing law regulating transfer of property. Section 13 of the said Act provides that the right, title and interest of the donor in any land donated to Shri Acharya Vinoba Bhave or to the Bhoodan Yagna Committee shall, on confirmation of the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra in respect of that land, stand transferred to, and vest in, the Committee for the purposes of the Bhoodan Yagna with effect from the date of the donation.
It is apparent, therefore, that the donation to be valid does not require registration, but at the same time the donated lands do not vest in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee unless and until Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra has been so confirmed. Sections 10 and 11 lay down the procedure for donation, publication and investigation into Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra and also for confirmation or supersession of the Bhoodan Yagna Danpatra. There is no averment, much less proof, that a Danpatra was executed and it has been confirmed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 10 and 11 of the Bihar Bhoodan Yagna Act and that the donated lands have vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee. Although the lands are alleged to have been donated in 1953, long before the institution of the present suit, no steps have been taken so far for confirmation of the Danpatra, if any.
There is thus no legal donation, and accordingly the members of the Bhoodan Yagna Committee have no interest therein and are not necessary, or even proper, parties) to the suit. Mr. S. K. Jha appsaring for the plaintiff did not, for this reason, press this amendment, and, I think, rightly. The first amendment, therefore, is insupportable in law and must be set aside.
5. As to the second amendment, it is well to remember that by the instance suit the plaintiff, challenged the validity of the action taken by the-learned Additional Collector of Hazaribagh under Section 4 (h) of the Act on the sole ground that Section 4 (h) was unconstitutional and ultra vires. This-ground is no longer tenable. The constitutionality of Section 4 (h) has been set at rest by a decision of this Court as well, as the Supreme Court. In-Prem Manjari Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954-Pat 550, a Bench of this Court, to which my Lord the Chief Justice was a member, has held that Section 4 (h) of the Act is perfectly constitutional and is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. Subsequent to this decision, Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh also challenged the validity of Section 4 (h) of the Act by a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the view expressed by my Lord the Chief Justice in the aforesaid case, vide Kamakshya Narain v. Collector and D. C. Hazaribagh, (S) AIR 1956 SC 63. In view of these judicial pronouncements the plaintiff cannot be permitted to agitate that Section 4 (h) is illegal and ultra vires.
It must be taken, therefore, that Section 4(h) is constitutional. That being so, the plaintiff has no prima facie case. Realising this lacuna, the plaintiff sought the second amendment by his petition dated 5th August, 1956, which was filed in Court on 6th August, 1956. By this amendment the plaintiff seeks to raise the question whether or not the Ramgarh Raj vested in the State of Bihar at any time prior to 26th January, 1955. He also sought the consequential relief that the Ramgarh Raj not having vested in the State of Bihar notices purporting to have been issued under Section 4 (h) of the Act were ultra vires, illegal and void. It is entirely a new ground and a new relief. In the plaint there is no averment, direct or indirect, that the Ramgarh Raj did not vest in the State of Bihar at all.
On the contrary, the entire plaint proceeds on the assumption that the Ramgarh Raj had vested in the State of Bihar. It may be observed that the plaint was filed on 9th February, 1954. On 60th November, 1954, the State of Bihar filed written statement. In paragraph 12 of the written statement it has been specifically stated that the properties in suit have validly vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Act Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh filed written statement in that case on 11th October, 1955, that is after the State filed written statement. Still, he did not controvert the allegation of the State of Bihar that the estate had vested in the State under the Act.
All that he pleaded was that the raiyati inter ests have been excluded from the operation of the Act and have been expressly saved by Section 4(a) of the Act. Subsequently, on 7th. August, 1956, the company filed a petition for amendment of the plaint and stated therein that the Ramgarh Raj did not vest in the State of Bihar at any time prior to 26th January, 1955. It is manifest that the amendment sought changes the entire complexion of the suit and the court is called upon to decide not the constitutionality of Section 4 (h) of the Act, as in the original plaint, but the factum of the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar.
It "is a new assertion, and a fresh cause of action and is entirely foreign to the scope of the instant suit. Learned counsel for the opposite party contended that this amendment has been sought in consequence of the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in Title Suit No. 24 of 1953 brought by Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh against the State of Bihar disposed of on 18th July, 1956, that the Ramgarh Raj vested in the State on 26th January, 1955, and not On any previous date. I may state here that an appeal has been preferred against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in that case and it is pending.
The finding of a Court in a pending litigation cannot afford a legitimate ground for the amendment of the plaint in another suit, and the course of litigation in a subsequent action cannot be conditioned by findings in other suit, though, between the same parties. If that were so, amendment will be allowed and again disallowed according as the finding is maintained or upset in appeal. Apart from this, I cannot understand how the finding in a separate suit will afford legitimate ground for amendment of a plaint, if the amendment is entirely foreign to the scope of the suit. What the plaintiff seeks to add to the plaint is that the Ramgarh Raj did not vest in the State before 26th January, 1955. Finding or no finding, this averment cannot be inserted in the plaint if the original plaint was not rested at all on that ground, and the question of vesting was irrelevant, having regard to the grounds alleged and reliefs claimed.
AS observed above, the statements made in the plaint and the relief claimed do not warrant the raising of a new question as regards the factum of the vesting of the estate, which changes the entire scope of the suit. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, misdirected himself in allowing this amendment also and the order of amendment cannot be sustained.
6. Coming to the Miscellaneous Appeal, the Court has granted injunction restraining the State of Bihar from passing final orders under Section 4 (h) of the Act. This order is equally vitiated by an error of jurisdiction. There is absolutely no ground for injunction. The only prayer sought in the suit is that Section 4 (h) is ultra vires and constitutional, the other prayers being only ancillary. Now, as observed above, the constitutionality of Section 4(h) has been set of rest finally. Therefore, the very foundation of the suit disappears and the plaintiff , as not prima facie entitled to the reliefs sought for.
There is thus no valid ground to restrain the State of Bihar from passing final orders under Section 4 (h). Learned counsel for the plaintiff contended that on the amendment of the plaint as allowed by the Court below, the plaintiff was entitled to injunction. But, as held above, the amendment itself is illegal and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge has to be set aside. Learned counsel frankly conceded that on the amendment being disallowed, there was no ground for injunction. In my judgment, on the pleadings as they stand now, the plaintiff is not entitled to injunction, and the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is bad in law.
7. It is manifest that in amending the plaint and granting injunction the Court below has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material irregularity, and the order must be set aside by the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers.
8. In the result both the Civil Revision and the Miscellaneous Appeal are allowed with costs and the order of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge dated 21st September, 1956, is set aside. There will be one consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 250/-.
Ramaswami, C.J.
9. I agree.