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[Cites 13, Cited by 1]

Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur

Ram Rakh Chacha vs Mohd. Yusuf on 6 March, 1997

Equivalent citations: 1997(2)WLC516, 1997(1)WLN293

Author: R.R. Yadav

Bench: R.R. Yadav

JUDGMENT
 

R.R. Yadav, J.
 

1. The instant contempt petition under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 has been filed by petitioner against contemner, for committing wilful and deliberate breach of undertaking given in my court on 21.08.95 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 140/95.

2. The proceeding for contempt stems from the facts alleged in the contempt petition to the effect that late Smt. Narbada Devi who was the land lady of the suit shop filed a suit for arrears of rent and eviction of the tenant-contemner in the trial court on 20.3.80 inter alia on the ground of default in payment of rent which was decreed by trial court on 20.02.95.

3. Aggrieved against the decree dated 20.02.95 passed by trial court, the tenant-contemner filed an appeal before District Judge, Jodhpur which was dismissed on 22.7.95.

4. The contemner preferred a Second Appeal against the judgment and decree 'dated 22.07.95 which was posted before me for admission on 21.08.95. After hearing the arguments advanced by learned Counsel Shri R.M. Bhansali, appearing on behalf of tenant-defendant-contemner, no infirmity was found in the judgments and decree of courts below. At the end of his argument, the learned Counsel for the contemner prayed for granting some reasonable time to vacate the suit-shop. Before granting the aforesaid prayer is was inquired by the court from him as to whether his client was present in the court? The learned Counsel Shri Bhansali affirmed the presence of the contemner in court and identified him. The court inquired from the contemner whether he was willing to give an undertaking in the court to the effect that he will hand-over vacant possession of the suit shop on or before 6 months from that day i.e. 21.8.95 and will pay entire decretal amount and will continue to pay monthly rent month by month to his land lady. The contemner answered in affirmative. The court also inquired from the petitioner who was present in court, whether he had any objection in granting the aforesaid time to the contemner. The petitioner submitted that he had no objection. Thereupon the contemner gave an undertaking to the above effect in the court. After accepting his undertaking the contemner was allowed to remain in possession for six months and thereafter to hand-over vacant possession of the suit-shop to his land-lady on the abovementioned conditions on or before six months from the date of dismissal of his appeal.

5. It is shocking to note that the poor land lady after obtaining decree from this Court could not be able to enjoy the fruits of her decree during her life time and she expired. After her death now her legal representative the present petitioner, is running from pillar to post to enjoy the fruits of decree which is being obstructed by the contemner on some pretext or the other.

6. Irrespective of the undertaking given by contemner, he did not hand-over the possession shop to the petitioner even after expiry of six months from 21.08.95 and also did not pay monthly or any rent or arrears of rent in terms of his undertaking. It is alleged in Paragraph 5 of the contempt petition that a registered notice AD was sent to contemner or 20.7.96 requesting him to comply with his undertaking given in the court on 21.8.95. But the request through registered letter dated 20.7.96 to comply with his undertaking given to court on 21.8.95 resulted in fiasco. The receipt obtained from the post office, in proof of sending a registered letter along with acknowledgment receipt dated 6.8.96 are filed along with contempt petition.

7. On the aforesaid contempt petition notice was issued to the contemner on 25.9.96 and was made returnable within 6 weeks.

8. After receipt of contempt notice the contemner filed an imprudent reply, stating therein that he was not present in court on 21.8.95 and as such making inquiry from him by court about giving undertaking did not arise. It is also stated that contemner was not at all prepared to give undertaking about handing-over vacant possession to the decree-holder on or before six months from the date of order and to pay entire decretal amount together with payment of monthly rent month by month. It is further stated that he was not aware of the undertaking as averred in the contempt petition.

9. Apart from the aforesaid facts the contemner audaciously alleged in his reply that he along with his wife Smt. Shama, Ajar Hussain and Khurshid Beg met with the petitioner on 28.2.96 and he handed-over the key of the disputed shop and requested that without electricity the, petitioner cannot afford to continue in possession with the shop in question. It is also alleged that the petitioner handed-over the key of the shop to his wife in presence of Ajar Hussain and Khurshid Beg on 28.2.96 on the undertaking that when Jugalkishore will hand-over possession the wife of contemner-Shama will also hand-over possession of the disputed shop to him.

10. After receipt of a copy of the aforesaid reply, the petitioner filed a rejoinder, denying the averments made in the reply. It is stated in rejoinder that the contemner has made false allegations in Paragraph 4 of his reply. Petitioner did not take any step to get the electricity disconnected in the suit shop. In the suit shop electric meter is in the petitioner's name. Its current ledger No. is 56/11/42/0513 (old ledger No. 303, 302) meter number is 0496960, service No. is disclosed to be 26590., He filed a true copy of letter obtained from the Assistant Engineer, RSEB, Jodhpur which clearly indicates that an order was passed to disconnect his electric connection for non-payment of electric dues but when the electric dues were paid on 24.2.96 the electric connection was not disconnected. The petitioner further categorically denied in the rejoinder that he agreed to accept rent of suit-shop from Smt. Shama wife of contemner. It is also averred by the petitioner In his rejoinder that he has never met Smt. Shama and has not even seen her or has ever talked to her. It is further stated that disputed shop is still continuing in possession of the contemner.

11. After perusal of contempt petition supported with an affidavit and reply which was not supported with affidavit including the rejoinder supported with an affidavit, this Court took lenient view on 6.1.97 and directed the counsel Mr. U.R. Tatia, appearing on behalf of contemner to inform contemner to remain present in court on 9.1.97 and to report compliance of his undertaking given to the court on 21.8.95. The contempt petition was directed to be posted on 9.1.97.

12. When the contempt petition was taken up for hearing on 9.1.97 contemner started to reiterate the averments made in his reply and expressed his desire to enter in his defence to the charge of contempt levelled against him.

13. Looking into the contumacious conduct of contemner in court on 9.1.97 the court has no alternative except to summon Shri R.M. Bhansali, Advocate who had argued the Second Appeal on his behalf to give his statement on oath about the happenings in court on 21.8.95. The court instead of importing its personal knowledge intends to verify the fact from the counsel of the contemner to the effect whether contemner was present in court and was identified by him on 21.8.95. The court further wanted to be fully satisfied as to whether it was contemner who gave undertaking before the court recorded so in the judgment dated 21.8.95.

14. Shri R.M. Bhansali, Advocate appeared before the court on 9.1.97 and gave his categorical statement on oath to the effect that the contemner was present in court on 21.8.95 who was identified by him. It is he who gave undertaking before this Court to hand-over vacant possession of the suit-shop to the decree-holder on or before six months after making payment of entire decretal amount and also promised to continue to pay monthly rent month by month.

15. In the light of the aforesaid categorical statement on oath given by Shri R.M. Bhansali, Advocate, this Court was prima facie satisfied about grossest contempt of court committed by contemner, who expressed his desire to enter in his defence.

16. Looking into the contumacious conduct of the contemner, a detailed order was passed on 9.1.97, converting the present proceeding initiated under Contempt of Courts Act 1971 in a proceeding under Article 215 of Constitution of India in exercise of suo motu power as it was found that in the present set of circumstances punishment under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would be inadequate. In order to ensure attendance of the contemner he was sent to jail and jail authorities were directed to produce him on 10.1.97 to record his defence in the interest of justice and fair play.

17. The contemner was produced on 10.1.97 by jail authorities. He moved a bail application, making a request that for facilitating handing-over vacant possession of the disputed shop to the decree-holder, his release on bail would be required. He was released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of Dy. Registrar (Judicial) to remain present before this Court on each and every date of hearing fixed during pendency of the present contempt petition.

18. After dictation of order on bail application, the contemner moved an application under Section 14 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, making a prayer that after framing of charges the matter may be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for such direction as His Lordships thinks fit. The aforesaid application was rejected as proceedings were already converted under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in exercise of suo motu power and secondly the application was found to be not maintainable in view of the decision rendered by the Apex Court reported in AIR 1982, SC 1249.

19. Before deciding the present contempt petition on merits I would like to observe that it must be imbibed by all that welfare of the people can be achieved by courts of law in real sense if justice is administered dispassionately, lawfully, judiciously, even-handed, without fear and favour. Those who are responsible for administration of justice, those who are at the doors of justice and those who help in the administration of justice deserve to be protected from insult and annoyance and no court of law in democratic polity can afford to allow a mischievous man to attack the pure fountain of justice with impunity. Administration of justice cannot be made effective unless respect for it is fostered in the mind of people and maintained with pragmatic vision with a message to the public at large that now a days it would not be conducive to discipline of law to compromise with regard to Inflicting punishment in contempt matters by adopting an attitude of unmerited leniency.

20. This court takes judicial notice of the fact that now a days flood-gate of contempt petitions are opened and the contemnors have started to think that unconditional apology is complete answer to the violation of judicial orders passed by courts of law. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I consider it just and proper to erase the aforesaid impression gaining grounds In the mind of contemnors and propose to decide the present contempt petition threadbare where the contemner has also tendered unconditional apology at a belated stage to evade the punishment. To my mind law relating to quantum of punishment in contempt matters deserves to be remoulded and reshaped to meet the needs and opinions of today.

21. With the aforesaid introspection, in the present contempt petition, the court is called upon to decide the following questions of law and fact before inflicting punishment upon the contemner.

1. Whether if any party gives an undertaking to the court to vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted under a decree of court and it is found that he wilfully and deliberately committed breach of such undertaking it amounts to contempt of court?

2. Whether contempt proceeding initiated Under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 can be converted in a proceeding for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution, if so, what procedure should be followed before inflicting punishment on the contemner?

3. Whether unconditional apology tendered by contemner in the present case absolves him from grossest contempt of court or it is only a relevant consideration on question of punishment?

QuestionsNo. 1 and 2.:

22. I am of the view that questions No. 1 and 2 are inter-linked therefore these two questions can be dealt with together-The expression "Contempt of Court" has not been defined under Article 215 of the Constitution which reads thus:
High Courts to be Courts of record-Every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
23. It is true that expression "contempt of court" has been defined under Clause (a)(b) and (c) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 which is reproduced below for ready reference:
(a) Contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
(b) Civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which:
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other planner;

24. A conjoined reading of the Article 215 of the Constitution of India and Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 reveal that under Article 215 of Constitution, there is no classification of contempt of court whereas Under Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, the contempt of court has been classified in two classes i.e. civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil contempts are acts, omissions or commissions', involving a private injury by disobedience of the judgment, order direction or undertaking given before a court. Infact such acts omissions and commissions of a court or a person which undermine the authority of any judgment, decree, direction, order or other process would fall within the definition of civil contempt. Even any attempt to circumbent a lawful order. Judgment or decree would amount civil contempt. Criminal contempt is not required to be defined in the present case and left open to be defined In an appropriate case.

25. In my humble opinion both civil and criminal contempts are within the fold of Article 215 of the Constitution therefore since in the present case the contemner has wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the undertaking given by him, involving a private injury to the petitioner therefore it falls within the category of civil contempt which is punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution. It is to be noticed further that under Article 215 of the Constitution of India no procedure has been prescribed which is required to be followed for punishing a contemner whereas under Contempt of Courts Act 1971 detail procedures have been prescribed u/ss 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20. It is also to be noticed that Under Section 20 no court can initiate any proceeding for contempt either on Its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed whereas there is no such limitation prescribed under Article 215 of the Constitution. It is true that u-/s 14 of Contempt of Courts Act a detail procedure is prescribed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Similarly Section 15 provides the procedure for cognizance of criminal contempt. Section 17 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 prescribes procedure after cognizance whereas Section 18 prescribes the mode of hearing of cases of criminal contempt by a Bench not less than two judges. Section 19 of the aforesaid Act provides procedures for an appeal which shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The aforesaid Section further provides to the effect that where the order or Judgment is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court and where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court. Rest of the procedures are not relevant for decision of the present contempt proceeding, therefore, they are not required to be discussed in detail.

26. Basic question this Court is called upon to decide in the present case would be whether if the present contempt proceeding which was initially initiated under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act 1971 can be converted in a proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution if so what procedure should be followed? Suffice is to say in this regard that the contempt jurisdiction conferred upon this Court does not originate from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 but it a necessary adjunct to all Courts of record. The aforesaid view has been consistently held by judicial precedents and finally recognized by the constitutional provisions enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution. Power to punish a contemner under Article 215 is over and above the statutory provisions postulated under contempt of Courts Act 1971. Power of the court to punish a contemner as Court of record under Article 215 is not liable to be curbed or controlled by contempt of Courts Act 1971. For punishing a contemner this Court being court of record is at liberty to evolve its own procedure akin to the principle of natural justice and fair play.

27. It is true that under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 a contemner can be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with a fine which may extend to 2,000/ or with both but there is no such rider under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. I am of the view that under Article 215 of the Constitution a contemner can be sentenced more than six months not only with simple imprisonment but court in its discretion can inflict upon the Contemner rigorous imprisonment as well. The principle of apology envisaged under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 is also not applicable to the contempt proceeding converted under Article 215 of the constitution. It is pertinent to observe that under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 it is nowhere mentioned as to whether the offence punishable under Contempt of Courts Act amounts violation of moral turpitude but it is held that if a person is held guilty of contempt of court under Article 215 of constitution it would amount violation of moral turpitude and the same Consequences would ensue which are followed in punishment under those offences which involve moral turpitude. Reason is not far to seek in this regard after insertion of Part IV-A in the constitution imposing fundamental duty on every citizen of this country to abide by the Constitution. He who fails to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions or commits contempt of court punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution he must be held guilty of an act involving moral turpitude. Now blameworthy behaviour of any one whosoever he may be towards any institution of the country must be taken to be an athema to the constitutional philosophy as envisaged under Article 51A of the Constitution.

28. Thus from the above discussion it is evident that the proceeding of contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution is independent proceeding in the sense that it arises on account of failure on the part of the person concerned to comply with the order passed by the High Court. Expression used under Article 215 "contempt of itself' supports the aforesaid conclusion. This Court being Court of record can punish a contemner for civil contempt as well as for criminal contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution. When the High Courts being Courts of record are vested with the jurisdiction to punish contemner under Article 215 of the Constitution, it is a matter lying entirely at the sole discretion of the High Courts either to proceed under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 or to proceed under Article 215 of the Constitution as it thinks fit with a rider that if the High Court decides to proceed in its discretion under Contempt of Courts Act 1971 then it is required to follow the procedure prescribed under the said Act before Inflicting punishment on a contemner but if the High Court proceed to decide under Article 215 of the Constitution then it can deal with the contempt proceeding summarily and Is at liberty to adopt its own procedure. However, for all fairness it is necessary that while proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution, the High Court is expected to follow the procedure which can be said to be just, fair and reasonable, making the contemner aware of the charges against him and giving proper opportunity to defend.

29. In the present case when the contemner after full knowledge of the charges levelled against him started to deny it then in all fairness the counsel engaged by him in Second Appeal Shri R.M. Bhansali was summoned and his statement on oath was recorded which has been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. The statement on oath of Shri Bhansali, counsel engaged by contemner to argue the Second Appeal leads me to believe that the case on hand is a case of wilful and deliberate disobedience of undertaking given by the contemner to the court on 21.8.95. It is evident from the statement of Shri Bhansali and also from averments made in the reply filed by the contemner that he had no intention to obey his undertaking given on 21.8.95. The undertaking given by him to the court on 21.8.95 appears to me to have been given very lightly as a mere cloak for obtaining an order to remain in possession over the shop in question which would not have been passed but for his solemn undertaking. Thus it is proved beyond the pale of doubt from the statement on oath of Shri Bhansali that the defence taken by the contemner by way of filing reply is absolutely false.

30. In the present case the contemner has broken the undertaking given to this Court with impunity. Even after recording the statement on oath of his counsel who appeared on his behalf in the Second Appeal on 21.8.95 an opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend him by giving his statement and adducing any other evidence in support of his innocence. The case was posted on 10.1.97 at 2.00 pm. for the said purpose.

31. On 10.1.97 instead of giving his statement in his defence or adducing any evidence in support of his defence the contemner moved an oral application making a request that for facilitating handing over vacant possession of the disputed shop his release would be required. This court considered it just and proper in order to facilitate handing over the vacant possession of the suit shop to the legal representative of deceased Smt. Narbada Devi so he was released on bail as stated in the preceding paragraphs.

32. The contempt, proceeding was again posted on 14.1.97 on which date learned Counsel Shri U.R. Tatia appearing on behalf of contemner stated that entire decretal amount has been deposited along with month to month rent uptil date in the learned trial court. It was also stated by the learned Counsel for contemner that the disputed shop has been vacated by the contemner and key of the shop has been handed over to Shri R.R. Chacha, legal representative of Smt. Narbada Devi. The learned Counsel for contemner also stated on 14.1.97 that the contemner is repenting for his conduct in not complying with his undertaking given before this Court on 21.8.95. Looking into the previous contumacious conduct of the contemner, the oral statement of the learned Counsel for contemner was not found to be sufficient and the contemner was directed to tender his unconditional apology in writing or any other evidence to prove his innocence. The learned Counsel for contemner prayed for and was granted one week time to file unconditional apology in writing or any other evidence in support of his innocence.

33. On the next date of hearing i.e. on 28.1.97 contemner tendered unconditional apology in writing to the effect that he regrets and repents for his acts, omissions and commissions of the offence charged therefore he may be pardoned for the above offence.

34. From the above discussion, I am of the view that if any party gives an undertaking to the court to vacate the premises from which he/she is liable to be evicted under the orders of the court and there is a clear wilful and deliberate breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt which is proved in the present case against the contemner beyond pale of doubt and as such he is held guilty for wilful and deliberate disobedience of undertaking given by him before this Court on 21.8.95. It is further held that if the proceeding Under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act has been converted in a proceeding under Article 215 of the Constitution, then in such cases, the High Court being Court of record is not obliged to follow the procedure prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 but it can deal with the contempt proceeding summarily and is also at liberty to adopt its own procedure for inflicting punishment under Article 215 of the Constitution. In the present case the contemner has been given full and reasonable opportunity to defend himself and his written unconditional apology is a clinching proof of his deliberate and wilful disobedience of his undertaking given to this Court on 21.8.95 and as such he is found guilty for contempt. The aforesaid two questions are answered accordingly.

Question No. 3:

35. It is reiterated at the risk of repetition that unconditional apology itself is not an answer to violation and breach of the order of the High Court. To my mind unconditional apology must be indicative of remorse and it should be tendered at the earliest opportunity. Here in the present case the contemner after service of contempt notice started to justify his wilful and deliberate disobedience of undertaking given to this Court on 21.8.95 by filing a reply which is found to be palpably false. The unconditional apology tendered by the contemner at belated stage to evade the punishment is not found to be satisfactory.

36. An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in case of Sukh Raj. v. Hemraj and Ors. , wherein it was ruled thus:

An unconditional or unreserved apology in a case of a minor or technical contempt may be accepted to have the effect of purging the same. But the same could not be legitimately predicated of serious or grossest contempts. An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty under all circumstances. Nor can it be allowed to operate as a universal panacea. Whether an apology should be accepted or not as purging the contempt in any particular case must depend on the circumstances of each case and the chief of these factors must inevitably be the nature or character of the contempt made. Therefore, where the contempt is of a particularly gross character, any apology offered by the contemner should not be accepted as having purged the same.

37. The aforesaid question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in case of Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s Madhya pradesh Khair Industries and Anr., where their lordships quoted the observation made by Frank further, J. In Offutt v. V.S. (1954) 348 US 11 with approval which is reproduced below:

It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage.

38. Their Lordships have also quoted with approval the observations made by Curtis-Raleigh, J. in case of Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 ALL ER 977 P. 1006 in case of Advocate General Bihar (supra) which is also reproduced below:

The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seeks its protection lost hope.

39. In case of Advocate General Bihar (supra) the contemners had tendered unconditional apology to the Patna High Court which was accepted but the unconditional apology was not accepted by their Lordships on the ground that the conduct of the respondents was so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by imposing of sentence. In that case the judgment rendered by Patna High Court was not approved by their Lordships and the contemners were found to be guilty of obstructing the dignity of the judicial proceedings and the administration of justice and as such were punished.

40. In the present case, I am of the view that the conduct of the contemner is reprehensible and warrant condemnation by imposing of sentence on him and this Court cannot afford to be a silent spectator of violation of the undertaking given to this Court on 21.8.95 and allow the contemner who defy it with impunity to go free and the petitioner who seeks the protection of the court from the contemner lose hope from this Court.

41. I have heard the learned Counsel for contemner Shri U.R. Tatia on the question of sentence. He vehemently argued that since contemner has tendered unconditional apology before this Court, therefore, he is entitled to be exonerated from the charges of contempt of court. For the reasons what have been discussed above since conduct of the contemner is reprehensible therefore it deserves condemnation by imposition of sentence. As the conduct of the contemner during contempt proceeding remained contumacious therefore he is liable to be punished to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months and a fine of Rs. 500/- to uphold the majesty of law and dignity of the court. The contemner has no justification to challenge the facts recorded in the judgment of the court while dismissing his Second Appeal on 21.8.95 by making a false allegation in his reply. I am not satisfied that the contemner is repenting for his acts, omissions and commissions in true sense.

42. Looking into the facts of the case I found some mitigating circumstances in favour of the contemner. Apart from unconditional apology he has now complied with the undertaking given to the court on 21.8.95. In view of these facts his sentence is liable to be reduced from six months RI to three months RI provided he refrains from obstructing the enjoyment of the fruits of the decree to the petitioner for a period of one year and keeps peace and be of good behaviour for the aforesaid period failing which he shall be called upon to serve out the remaining sentence.

43. As a result of the aforementioned discussion the contemner is held guilty of contempt of court for his wilful and deliberate disobedience of undertaking given by him on 21.8.95 to this Court and he is sentenced to undergo six months RI together with fine of Rs. 500/- but after serving out 3 months RI his remaining sentence shall be kept in abeyance for a period of one year. In event of his failure to deposit fine he will further undergo imprisonment for 15 days. If he commits any breach of the conditions enumerated above within a period of one year from today he shall be called upon to serve out the remaining sentence of three months. His bail bond and two sureties bonds are hereby cancelled and he is to be taken into custody.