Kerala High Court
Chacko P.C. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 19 June, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1998)IILLJ587KER
Author: A.C. Lakshmanan
Bench: Ar. Lakshmanan
JUDGMENT A.C. Lakshmanan, J.
1. Though a Division Bench of this Court, in the decision reported in 1997 (1) KLT 788 expressed their displeasure and sorrow by the unseemly controversy between the Advocate General (hereinafter referred to as 'the A.G.' and the Director General of Prosecution hereinafter referred to as "the DGP") and disposed of the said case with a fond hope that the unhappy episode will be forgotten and not allowed to recur to sully the image of the two offices, the controversy, which appears to have been simmering, has come to the surface again.
2. The root cause for the current controversy is the office direction issued by the Director General of Prosecution under Ext.P-1 dated February 5, 1998 informing the Kerala High Court Advocates' Association and the High Court Advocates Clerks' Association that copies of all criminal cases may be directly forwarded to his office with memo (after the cases are numbered in the registry section of the High Court and before sent to the Bench for admission) and such copies will be entered in the register kept in his office and acknowledgment of the same will be noted in the memo with the seal of his office and under his signature or of any person duly authorised by him. Ext.P2 is the directions issued by the office of the Advocate General dated February 7, 1998, which is also sought to be quashed in these proceedings. Exts. P1 and P2 are reproduced hereunder :
Ext. P1 KALLADA SUKUMARAN Director General of Prosecution, Kerala.
No.251/98/DGP Ernakulam, Kochi-14 Pin Code 682014 February 5, 1998.
The President, Kerala High Court Advocates' Association, Ernakulam.
Sub :- Criminal cases filed in the High Court in which State of Kerala is a respondent -Furnishing of copies to the Director General of Prosecution - Regarding.
Ref. :- 1. G.O.(Ms) 249/96/Law dated June 25 19%,
2. G.O.(Ms) 117/97/Home dated June 29, 1996, Copies of criminal cases filed in the High Court in which State of Kerala is respondent are now being served to the Public Prosecutor, High Court (Re-designated by Government as Director General of Prosecution) through the office of the Advocate General. Delay or omissions caused in transmitting/receiving of copies of such criminal cases in my office in time has very often caused dislocations and difficulties in arranging timely defence of the criminal cases representing the State, particularly when the cases are posted for admission in the Court.
It was because of the lack of sufficient staff facilities in the office of the Director General of Prosecution, the arrangement for directly receiving copies of Criminal cases could not be made. On my request, Government have sanctioned additional staff in my office to facilitate the normal work in my office including the handling of files relating to conduct of criminal cases in the High Court.
In the circumstances, I have made the arrangements to receive copies of criminal cases in my office with effect from February 5, 1998 during office hours on all working days. I have informed the President and Secretary of the High Court Advocates' Clerks' Association, that copies of all criminal cases may be directly forwarded to my office with a memo (after the cases are numbered in the registry section of the High Court and before sent to the Bench for admission) and such copies will be entered in the register kept in my office and acknowledgement of the same will be noted in the memo with the seal of my office and under my signature or of any person duly authorised by me. I would request your assistance and co-operation in the matter, representing the High Court Advocates' Association.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Kallada Sukumaran Director General of Prosecution.
Ext.P-2 February 7, 1998.
From The Secretary, Advocate General's Office, Ernakulam.
To
1. The President, Kerala High Court Advocates' Association, Ernakulam.
2. The President, Kerala High Court Advocates' Clerks' Association, Ernakulam.
3. The Secretary, Kerala High Court, Advocates' Association, Ernakulam.
Sir, Sub : Criminal cases filed in the High Court in which the State of Kerala or Government Officers is a respondent - Furnishing of copies of such cases.
It has come to my notice that the Director General of Prosecution has sent a letter dated February 5, 1998 to the President of the Kerala High Court Advocates' Association, Ernakulam stating that the practice hitherto being followed for serving copies of criminal cases filed in the High Court in which State of Kerala is a respondent, on the office of the Advocate General should be discontinued and that the Director General of Prosecution has made arrangements to receive copies of criminal cases in his office with effect from February 5, 1998 and that hereafter copies of all criminal cases may be directly forwarded to the office of the Director General of Prosecution with a memo to be dealt with in the manner indicated in that letter.
This is to inform you that as per the provisions contained in Rule 2(v) of the Rules regulating conditions of Service, Duties, Remuneration etc., of the Advocate General (issued by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 165(2) and (3) of the Constitution of India) only the Advocate General is competent and authorised to arrange to represent the Government in the High Court in all proceedings, civil or criminal, original or appellate, in which the Government is a party. It may also be noted that G.O.Ms.249/96/Law dated May 26, 1996 and G.O. Ms. 117/96/ Home dated June 29, 1996 referred to in letter No. 251/98/DGP dated February 5, 1998 of the Director General of Prosecution addressed to you, do not contain any provision authorising the Director General of Prosecution to arrange to represent Government in the High Court in criminal matters.
I am writing this letter to bring to your notice that service of copies of criminal case in the High Court on the office of the Director General of Prosecution will not amount to proper service of copies of such cases where the Government or Government Officers are respondent.
Yours faithfully Sd/-
C.J. Baby, Secretary.
3. A public interest litigation was filed by a practising lawyer of this Court stating mat because of the controversy and difference of opinion between the A.G. andD.G.P. the petitioner and persons similarly placed are put to utter confusion regarding compliance with the directions given in Exts.P-1 and P-2, which are contradicting each other. The writ petitioner made a representation to the Registrar of this Court, Ext.P-4, to which he was not favoured with any reply. The petitioner also made a reference to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1997 (1) KLT 788 (supra). As the issues raised by him are connected with filing procedures of criminal proceedings in this Court, the petitioner filed this writ petition with the following prayers;
(i) issue a writ of mandamus or appropriate writ order or direction calling for the records leading to the case;
(ii) issue a writ of certiorari or appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing Exhibit-P-1 and Exhibit-P2 directions;
(iii) issue a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the 2nd and 3rd respondents from publishing contradictory orders causing confusion in the minds of the people;
(iv) issue any appropriate writ, order or direction declaring the competent authority to accept the copies of criminal proceedings in which Government is a party;
And
(v) issue any such writ order or directions as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case.
It is seen from the above prayers that the substantial prayer is to declare as to who is the competent authority to accept copies of criminal proceedings in which the Government is a party. It is to be noticed that the petitioner has not called in question any rules or legal provisions. The only question to be decided is as to which is the proper office to receive copies of criminal proceedings.
4. The Secretary to Government, Law Department, the first respondent herein has filed a detailed counter affidavit together with Exts.R-1(a) to R-1(h). Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Senior Advocate, appeared on behalf of the State of Kerala. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent A.G. through his Secretary along with Exts.R-2(a) to (e). Mr. T.P. Kelu Nambiar, Senior counsel, appeared on behalf of the A.G. Mr. P.K. Kurien, Senior Counsel, appeared and advanced arguments on behalf of the D.G.P. The third respondent D.G.P. also has filed counter affidavit along with Ext.R-3(a) series. An additional counter affidavit was also filed by the D.G.P. on March 17, 1998. None has entered appearance on behalf of the Registrar of this Court. The present President of the Kerala High Court Advocates' Association also argued the case and expressed the difficulties experienced by the lawyer community and requested this Court to intervene and declare as to which is the proper office to receive copies of criminal proceedings.
5. Though arguments were advanced by Mr. P.K. Kurien, Senior Advocate questioning the validity of certain provisions in the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978, (hereinafter referred to as "the Law Officers' Rules") which were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (19 of 1968), we do not propose to go into the correctness of the arguments in this writ petition since, as already noticed, the substantial prayer in this writ petition is to declare as to which is the proper/competent authority to receive copies of criminal proceedings. Our attention was drawn to Sections 24, 321, 378, 407(5) and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") and Rule 173 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 which is complementary to Section 407(5) of the Code
6. We have been taken through the exhibits, R-1 series, R-2 series and R-3 series by the learned senior counsel appearing for the A.G. Mr. K.K. Venugopal drew our attention to the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent and also to Rules 19 and 21 of the Law Officers' Rules and to Articles 165 and 177 of the Constitution of India. Learned senior counsel cited the decision reported in Joginder Singh Wasu v. State of Punjab 1994 (1) SCC 184. Referring to Rule 19 of the Law Officers' Rules Mr. K.K. Venugopal argued that a Public Prosecutor or Government Pleader in the High Court can represent the Government in all cases entrusted to him by the Advocate General and conduct them properly. The Advocate General has a right to be assisted by the Government Pleader or by the Public Prosecutor. Sub-rule (6) provides that the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader or Government Pleader shall instruct the Advocate General in proceedings in which the Advocate General or the Additional Advocate General is required to appear on behalf of the Government. In difficult cases, especially in cases where a question relating to the policy of the Government is involved, the Public Prosecutor or the Government Pleader concerned has to obtain the opinion of the Advocate General before deciding the strategy for the defence or prosecution of such cases. Sub-rule (10) of Rule 19 is very important, which provides that the Public Prosecutor or the Government Pleader in the High Court shall attend to case work and other duties in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the Advocate General and the Government from time to time. Sub-rule (11) provides that the Public Prosecutor or the Government Pleader shall attend to such other works as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Advocate General or the Government. The note to Sub-rule (11) of Rule 19 is to the effect that the Public Prosecutor shall be responsible for the conduct of all criminal cases and that the Senior Government Pleaders and Government Pleaders appearing in criminal cases shall act under and in accordance with the directions of the Public Prosecutor. As already noticed, Rule 19 deals with the duties of Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader and Government Pleader in the High Court and Sub-rules (1) to (11) gives the authority to the Advocate General to entrust cases to the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader or Government Pleader and obliges the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader and Government Pleader to assist the Advocate General whenever such assistance is required by him. Therefore, the term 'Public Prosecutor' in the note to Sub-rule (11) of Rule 19 has to be read as plural. Sub-rules (10) and (11) clearly say that the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader or Government Pleader shall attend to case work and other duties in accordance with the directions as may be given by the Advocate General or the Government from time to time and also to attend such other work as may from time to time be assigned to the officer concerned by the Advocate General. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Kurien that the Public Prosecutor shall alone be responsible for the conduct of all criminal cases and that others are not responsible for the conduct of criminal cases cannot be accepted since Rule 19(1) specifically provides that the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader and the Government Pleader shall represent the Government in all cases entrusted to him by the Advocate General and conduct them properly. Therefore, we are of the view that the Public Prosecutor cannot claim any privilege or authority for the conduct of all the criminal cases. The above view of ours is also strengthened by Rule 21 which says that all Government Law Officers in the High Court shall abide by all orders and instructions that may be issued by the Advocate General from time to time in the matter of conduct of cases and shall also follow such procedure in relation thereto as may be laid down in that behalf. We are of the view that the instruction issued by the Advocate General to all Government Law Officers in the matter of conduct of cases is mandatory in nature. All Government Law Officers shall abide by all orders/instructions that may be issued by the A.G. from time to time. We shall now refer to the corresponding rules regulating the conditions of services, duties, remuneration etc. of the Advocate General, Kerala. The Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 165 of the Constitution of India, made the above rules regulating the conditions of service, duties, remuneration, etc. of the Advocate General and Additional Advocate General, Kerala. Rule 2 deals with the duties and functions of Advocate General and Sub-clause (v) enables the Advocate General to arrange to represent Government in the High Court in all proceedings, civil or criminal, original or appellate, in which Government is a party. Sub-clause (xi) of Rule 2 enables the Advocate General to give advice to the law officers attached to the High Court in all difficult cases handled by them and on which they may consult him and conversely to call upon them when necessary to assist him in cases in which he appears and also to supervise and control their work. In paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary to Government, Law Department, on behalf of the State of Kerala it is specifically stated that Ext.R-1(c) order assigning the duties and functions of the D.G.P. does not make any reference at all to any of the functions regarding the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court. It is also stated that the office of the D.G.P. is housed in a separate building away from the High Court building complex and the said office is under the administrative and supervisory control of the Home Department. Article 165 authorises the Governor of each State to appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court to be the Advocate General for the State. Article 165(2) says that it shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him by the Governor, and to discharge the functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution of India or any other law for the time being in force. Sub-clause (3) provides that the Advocate General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, and shall receive such remuneration as the Governor may determine. Our attention was drawn to Article 177 of the Constitution to point out the right of the Advocate General to address the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council and to speak in and otherwise take part in the proceedings of any committee of the Legislature of which he may be named a member, but shall not, by virtue of this Article, be entitled to vote.
7. Mr. Kelu Nambiar, Senior Advocate appearing for the Advocate General took us to Ext.R-2 series. We have gone through the same. He also invited our attention to the relevant rules, particularly Rules 4, 19 and 21 of the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978. Rule 4 provides the method of appointment of Government Law Officers in the High Court. The rule specifically states that the appointment of Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleader, and Liaison Officer shall be made by the Government from a panel of names of advocates furnished by the Advocate General and that the appointment as Public Prosecutor shall be made in consultation with the High Court. Rule 5 of the said rules prescribes qualification for appointment as Government Law Officers in the High Court and states that no person shall be included in the panel furnished by the Advocate General for appointment as a Government Law Officer in the High Court unless such person, in the case of Public Prosecutor or Senior Government Pleader or Liaison Officers, has for at least ten years (as per the Code of Criminal Procedure seven years) been an Advocate of a High Court and has actually practised in the High Court for at least five years; and in the case of Government Pleader, has for at least seven years been an Advocate of a High Court and has actually practised in the High Court for at least three years. Mr. Kelu Nambiar cited the decisions in Abdurahiman's case (supra and State of Kerala v. Krishnan 1981 KLT 839. In Abdurahiman's case a Division Bench of this Court held that the Advocate General has a duty to represent the Government in the High Court in proceedings of importance, civil or criminal, original or appellate, in which the Government is a party and he has been specifically directed to appear. In that case, the matter was referred to the Bench in view of the unresolved question about the competence of the Advocate General to appear for the State in a criminal appeal where the Government had specifically authorised him even though there is a Public Prosecutor appointed in terms of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After distinguishing the decision in State of Kerala v. Krishnan (supra) and following the decision in Thadi Narayanan v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1960 AP 1 the Bench held as follows:
"10. Keeping in view the pre-eminence of the Advocate General in the hierarchy of law officers and respective functions and duties assigned to them under the rules referred to above, it seems to us to admit of no doubt that in a case where the Advocate General appears for the State and in a criminal appeal where he has been specifically empowered by the Government to appear, other law officers including the Public Prosecutor have no right to be heard except through him and under his instructions. No doubt, the functions of the Advocate General and the Public Prosecutor are distinct. Occasions, where the Advocate General appears in criminal cases in the High Court will be few and far between. Only in rare and important cases that he should be expected to appear. In the generality of cases, the Public Prosecutor the Director General of Prosecutions and Addl. Director General of Prosecutions, who is not his subordinate - will have freedom of action though as law officers of the State they will have to abide by such instructions and directions as the Advocate General might give them and such occasions would be rare. But where the Advocate General appears in a case as directed by the Government, he alone and not the Public Prosecutor will have a right to be heard. This is keeping with the supremacy of the office of the Advocate General and his constitutional position as the Supreme Law Officer of the State, who gives advice to the State on legal matters and perform such other duties of a legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him and discharge the functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law for the time being in force."
The decision in State of Kerala v. Krishnan 1981 KLT 839 (supra) was rendered by a Division Bench of this Court before which the scope of Section 378(1) and Section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure came up for consideration. The above was a case of a State appeal against acquittal, presented by the Additional Advocate General, at a time when there was admittedly no Public Prosecutor appointed. The matter came up for grant of leave under Section 378(3) of the Code. The question posed for consideration was whether the State Government can direct the Advocate General or the Additional Advocate General to present an appeal under Section 378(1) of the Code without appointing them as Public Prosecutors under Section 24(1) of the Code in view of Article 165 of the Constitution of India and the rules framed by the Government under Clauses (2) and (3) of Article 165 as per the notification dated November 1, 1956. The Bench, after an elaborate consideration, held as follows:
"As per Section 378(1) of the Code if the State has to file an appeal before the High Court against an order of acquittal the State has to direct the Public Prosecutor to present the same. Public Prosecutor of a High Court is one who is appointed by the State Government or the Central Government under Section 24(1) of the Code for conducting in that High Court any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of that Government. In view of the definition contained in Section 2(u) of the Code a person acting under the direction of Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24 will also be a Public Prosecutor. The combined effect of all the above provisions of the Code is that if the State wants to file an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal, that has to be done only by a Public Prosecutor or a person acting under his direction presenting the appeal to the Court. In other words nobody else can present the appeal even if the State direct. Section 378(1) being a provision which affects the liberty of the citizen it has to be constructed strictly. Nothing short of its full compliance has also to be insisted. The procedure prescribed by the Code has to be complied with by all who invoke the criminal jurisdiction of a Court. It has to be followed by all who appear in such cases. The Advocate General of the Additional Advocate General of a State has no exemption. As per Article 165(2) of the Constitution it shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Government of the State upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character as may from time to time be referred or assigned to him. There is no indication in Article 165 that when an Advocate General appears before a civil or criminal Court in the discharge of his duties as Advocate General he will not be bound by the procedure followed by that Court. Simply because the rules framed by the State Government under Article 165(2) and (3) and issued as per notification dated November 1, 1956 insist that the Advocate General shall represent the Government in the High Court in important civil and criminal proceedings, it will not give him the status and clothe him with the powers of a Public Prosecutor of the High Court appointed under Section 24(1) of the Code. As long as the Advocate General is not appointed as a Public Prosecutor under Section 24(1) of the Code he will not become a Public Prosecutor of the High Court. As far as the Advocate General is concerned, no question of acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor arises as he is a constitutional appointee and it will be awkward for him. If the Advocate General is appointed as a Public Prosecutor under Section 24(1) of the Code acting under his directions the Additional Advocate General can function as a Public Prosecutor. So long as the Advocate General or the Additional Advocate General is not a Public Prosecutor or the High Court neither of them can present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal even if the State Government Directs. Hence it goes, without saying that these appeals presented by the Additional Advocate General cannot be treated as appeals filed in accordance with Section 378(1) of the Code."
8. According to Mr. P.K. Kurien, the question is whether the A.G. can interfere with reference to the statutory functions of the D.G.P. Mr. Kurien, after referring to Sections 24, 321, 378, 407 and 439 of the Code and also referring to the Law Officers Rules, submitted that there is inconsistency between the laws made by the Parliament and the laws made by the State legislature . He invited our attention to Article 254 of the Constitution of India which reads thus:
"254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.-- (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one or the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State."
Mr. Kurien submitted that the Code of Criminal Procedure comes under the concurrent list (List III) and that the provisions of the Code shall have priority above the laws made by the State Legislature. He submitted that Section 24(1) of the Code as it exists at present was incorporated by an amendment in December, 1978 which provides for appointment of a Public Prosecutor for every High Court and that the Additional Public Prosecutor is not invested with all the powers of the Public Prosecutor under the Scheme laid down by the Code. It is further submitted that as per Ext.R-1(a). The Additional Public Prosecutor is given only the status of the Additional Advocate General and not of the Advocate General. Mr. Kurien submitted that Section 24(1) of the Code does not empower the Government to frame any separate rules in regard to the procedure to be followed in the matter of appointment of Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor for the High Court. The Law Officers' Rules, according to him, is not applicable to the Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor for the High Court appointed under Section 24(1) of the Code. It is submitted that these appointments are not to a 'post' but to an 'office' and Section 2(1) of the Public Services Act, 1968 is also not applicable to them. His further submission is that the A.G. cannot encroach upon the powers and functions allotted to the D.G.P. under Section 24(1) of the Code by invoking any provision contained in the Rules regulating the conditions of service, duties, remuneration, etc. of the A.G.. It is his case that the powers vested in the D.G.P. in the matter of conducting prosecution, filing of appeal etc. are absolute and independent subject only to any order issued by the Government and the A.G. is not competent to give any instruction or direction to the D.G.P. in regard to any matter touching the conduct of prosecution, appeal or any other criminal proceedings representing the State. He also submitted that the Public Prosecutor for the High Court is not subordinate to the A.G. and that the A.G. can junction only in the sphere ear marked for him by the law. The authority of the A.G. vis-a-vis the Public Prosecutor for the High Court has to be decided in terms of provisions of the Code. While denying the allegations raised in paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the A.G. that the 3rd respondent has given instruction to the Section Officer of the A.G. 's Office to send to him every day evening only 2-3 petitions, it is submitted that the D.G.P. always insisted that copies of all new cases received are to be sent to him, but the A.G. interfered in the distribution of the criminal work and Court wise allotment of Government Pleaders attending criminal cases with the result that the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court under the direction and control of the 3rd respondent has become difficult and impossible which caused dislocation in the normal and proper conduct of criminal cases representing the State. According to the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent has purposely created a situation with the aid of his office-staff whereby all the notices of criminal proceedings in the High Court could not be regularly seen by the D.G.P. It is also stated that because of the interference in the allotment of criminal work by the A.G. has virtually dislocated the normal functioning of D.G.P's Office in regard to the discharge of his statutory function as a Public Prosecutor for the High Court. Referring to Ext.R-1(e) it is submitted that the issuance of that proceeding is patently beyond the functions and powers of the A.G. It is also submitted that the D.G.P. was not aware of the issuance of Ext.R-1 (e) order. According to the 3rd respondent he has seen Ext.R-1(e) when the same was served on his counsel along with the counter affidavit on behalf of the A.G. in C.M.P. No. 6708/1998. It is submitted that proceedings Ext.R-1(a) was issued to enable the D.G.P. to have better facilities for the office work, including the handling of criminal cases files and receipt and scrutiny of copies of criminal cases, notices, etc. The 3rd respondent has denied the contra statement of Law Secretary as not correct. According to the D.G.P. there is no bifurcation of such work in the office of 3rd respondent and the statement of the Law Secretary that the staff of the 3rd respondent has no authority to deal with the files relating to criminal matters is incorrect and against facts and procedure being followed in the office of the 3rd respondent. According to him the Law Secretary is introducing new interpretations for the first time in regard to the nature of work of the staff of the 3rd respondent's office, for which he has no authority or power conferred by the Government. The 3rd respondent works under the administrative control of the Home Department, and the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department alone is the proper and competent authority representing Government to assess the performance of work of the 3rd respondent or the nature of work carried on by the staff of his office. The 3rd respondent contended that he is justified in issuing Ext.P-1 and he has the authority to issue Ext.P-1. According to him he alone is to represent the State in all Criminal proceedings in the High Court in which the State is a party and that the Public Prosecutor appointed for the High Court is an independent officer for the High Court, and does not become part of establishment of the 2nd respondent. It is submitted that the A.G. has no authority to issue Ext.P-2. Mr. Kurien cited the decisions reported in Aboobaker v. M. Ratna Singh 1992 (1) KLT 41 and State of Kerala v. Krishnan (supra). He also cited an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Crl.M.P. No. 1115 of 1983 in Crl. Appeal No.391 of 1983 and the decision reported in Subash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn.) AIR 1980 SC 423.
9. The decision in Aboobaker's case (supra) was rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court. In that case the petitioner sought to quash the appointment of the Director General of Prosecution. By an amendment to the writ petition, a writ of quo warranto was sought for to call upon the third respondent to show his title to hold the office of the Director General of Public Prosecutions. The learned Single Judge, after referring to the scope of Section 24 of the Code, and the provisions of the Kerala Public Services Act which regulated the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Public Services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala, held that the appointment of the Public Prosecutor under the Code is not an appointment to a post in a service. Therefore, it was held that the Kerala Public Services Act or the Rules framed thereunder can regulate, if at all, only "conditions of service". The learned Judge rejected the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner relating to the invalidity of the appointment. We are of the view that the above judgment will have no application on the question raised for determination in the present case. In this case, no dispute has been raised either by the petitioner or by the Advocate General or the Director General of Prosecution or any third party in regard to the validity of the appointment or either the second respondent or the 3rd respondent. As already noticed, the substantial prayer in this case is to declare as to who is the proper and competent authority or office to receive the copies of the criminal proceedings. The question raised by Mr. Kurien as to whether the A.G. can interfere with the discharge of the statutory functions of the D.G.P. does not arise at all. In this case the A.G. has been issuing directions and instructions to the Public Prosecutor, Senior Government Pleaders and Government Pleaders in this Court with reference to the conduct of all cases entrusted to them by the A.G. and also issued instructions to the 3rd respondent to at-tend to the case work and other duties in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the A.G. and the Government from time to time. As pointed out by the learned senior Advocate appearing for the A.G., the controversy in this case is not related to the status of the A.G.. We are not concerned in this case as to the procedure prescribed under Sections 321, 278, 407 and 439 etc. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said Sections deal with withdrawal from prosecution (Section 321), filing of appeals in cases of acquittal (Section 378) and filing of appeals against sentence (Section 377) as directed by the Government, power of the High Court to transfer cases and appeals (Section 407) and special powers of the High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. Likewise, we are not concerned in this writ petition as to the procedure prescribed under Rules 173 and 175 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala. As pointed out by the learned senior counsel, Ext.P2 letter does not stand in the way of notice being given to the Public Prosecutor either under the provisions of the Code referred to above or under Rules 173 and 175 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala. It is also submitted by the Learned senior counsel appearing for the A.G. that the A.G. is not trying to interfere with the powers and duties of the Public Prosecutor with regard to the filing of appeals, or with the power of the High Court to order notice to the Public Prosecutor. We are only concerned with regard to the nature, process and manner or service of notice in criminal proceedings as per the rules and regulations as they stand today. The procedures are covered by statutory rules framed by the Government of Kerala in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1958. Learned senior Advocate appearing for the A.G. has also submitted that the A.G's Office prepares counter affidavits, maintains registers, prepares special leave petitions, and this apart everything relating to the process of filing of cases is being done in the office of the Advocate General. Therefore, the D.G.P. cannot do these things. He asserts that in the history of the High Court all the filing works of anything connected with criminal matters are done only by the A.G. and that till Ext.Pl letter was issued, everything was done only by the A.G. He is also right in his submission that the D.G.P. should have addressed Ext.P1 to the A.G. and not to the President of the Advocates' Association or the President of the Advocates' Clerks' Association. Under Ext.P1, the D.G.P., after referring to the present procedure prevailing in the office of the A. G., has only requested a change of procedure since he has made arrangements to receive copies of criminal cases in his office. It is also stated that the practice of the papers connected with criminal matters being served to the public Prosecutor (redesignated as Director General of Prosecution) through the office of the A. G. may be changed since, at his request the Government have sanctioned additional staff in his office to facilitate the normal work in his office including handling of files relating to conduct of criminal cases in the High Court. We are also of the view that we need not advert to the arguments advanced by Mr. Kurien, learned counsel appearing for the D.G.P. since in this petition what the petitioner seeks is to quash Exts. P1 and P2 and to declare as to which is the proper office/competent authority to receive copies of criminal proceedings.
10. Mr. Kurien contended that criminal matters are to be dealt with only by the D.G.P. and not by the A.G. or his office, since according to him the Code does not contemplate intervention of the A.G. in matters relating to criminal cases including receipt of copies or notice of criminal cases, conduct of prosecution and other criminal proceedings in the High Court and matters incidental thereto. In the additional counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent it is submitted that the A.G. cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of the D.G.P. under Section 24(1) of the Code by invoking any provision of the Rules regulating the conditions of service, duties, remuneration, etc. of the Advocate General, (in short the 1956 Rules). It is further submitted that the 1956 Rules are made and issued not in exercise of any power conferred by Article 165 of the Constitution and that the powers vested in the 3rd respondent in the matter of conducting prosecution, filing of appeal, etc. are absolute and independent subject only to any order issued by the Government. The Further submission is that the 2nd respondent is not competent to give any instruction or direction to the 3rd respondent; in regard to any matter touching the conduct of prosecution, appeal or any other criminal proceedings representing the State. We are unable to countenance such a contention. As already pointed out by us, the scope of the writ petition is very narrow and we are called upon only to decide and declare the procedure to be followed by the parties concerned in regard to service of copies/ notices of criminal proceedings. The Law Officers Rules are not under challenge before us in any manner. As on date we are left with the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978, the constitutional validity of which has not so far been questioned by anyone till date. It is the case of the learned senior Advocate that the procedure contemplated under the above rules has been followed all these years. We are, therefore, of the view that the same procedure provided under the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 alone has to be followed in the matter of filing of criminal proceedings in the High Court, receipt of notice, etc, till the constitutional validity of the said Rules are challenged and decided in a properly framed writ petition and in the manner known to law.
11. Mr. Kurien drew our attention to the decision of U.L. Bhat, J. (as he then was) in Crl. M.P. 115 of 1983 in Crl. Appeal No. 391 of 1983. In that case the Court entertained a doubt regarding the powers of the Advocate General to issue orders to the Public Prosecutor directing appeal to be filed. The learned Judge in the said order referred to the provisions of the Code relevant for the purpose of the case and also a few other judgments. Similar question does not arise in this case. In that case the Public Prosecutor in the High Court took a decision that there was no scope for appeal, but subsequently the Advocate General passed an order directing appeal to be filed and in the process there has been delay. In other words, the appeal was filed overruling the view of the Public Prosecutor and under the orders of the A.G.. The learned single Judge, after referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, held that the appeal was incompetent. We are told that the above order was also confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P (Crl.) No. 2661 of 1984. We are of the view that the question of filing of an appeal with a petition to condone the delay bypassing the Public Prosecutor or ignoring his opinion does not arise in this case. The facts are entirely different. Therefore, the above decision has no application to the case on hand and the question at issue.
12. The decision in Subaah Chander v. State (supra) cited by Mr. Kurien deals with the exclusive power of the public Prosecutor for withdrawal of a prosecution under Section 321 of the Code. The decision it was held, must be independent and not in obedience with the directions from the District Magistrate or higher authorities and should be on germane grounds. Such a dispute with regard to the power of the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of the Code with reference to withdrawal of prosecution does not arise in this case.
13. At the concluding part of his argument Mr. Kelu Nambiar produced two letters dated November 23, 1996 and November 12, 1997 written by the Director General of Prosecution to the Advocate General. It is better to reproduce both the letters.
KALLADA SUKUMARAN Director General of Prosecution, Kerala.
No. 1435/96/DGP ERNAKULAM, Kochi-14, Pin Code 682014 November 23, 1996.
To The Advocate General, Kerala Ernakulam.
Sir, Sub: Allotment of Government Pleaders to the office of the D.G.P.-Conduct of Prosecution in the High Court of Kerala-Work Arrangement-Regarding.
Ref : This Office Letter No. 1410/96/DGP dated November 19, 19% addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala.
The work arrangement of Government Pleaders chosen by me for conduct of prosecu-tion work in the High Court of Kerala can be fixed as stated below:
1) Sri Gracious Kuriakose Senior Government Pleader.
2) Sri Suresh Babu, Senior Government Pleader.
Court No. II Criminal Appeals and other criminal matters 3 ) Sri Syed Mohammed, Senior Government Pleader Court No. XVI Criminal-Hearing.
4) Sri V.K. Mohanan, Senior Government Pleader Court No. II Admission & Petition
5) Sri S.U. Nazar Government Pleader These arrangements can be had with effect from November 25,1996 and will be subject to changes if and when found necessary.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Kallada Sukumaran, Director General of Prosecution KALLADA SUKUMARAN Director General of Prosecution, Kerala.
No. 1661/97/DGP ERNAKULAM, Kochi-14, Pin Code 682014 September 9, 1996.
To The Advocate General, Ernakulam.
Ref :- G.O. Ms. 226/97/Home dated September 8,1997.
Sir, Please allot the Government Pleader named below to assist me in the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court under my control and directions as per the allotment and distribution of criminal work to be arranged by me with effect from August 22, 1997 and kindly ultimate fact by reply to me with copies to the said Government Pleaders concerned.
Name of Government Pleaders
1. Sri Gracious Kuriakose, Senior Government Pleader.
2. Sri Suresh Babu, Senior Government Pleader.
3. Sri Syed Mohammed, Senior Government Pleader.
4. Sri S.U. Nazzar, Government Pleader.
5. Sri V. V. Nandagopal, Government Pleader.
6. Sri P.N. Sukumaran, Government Pleader.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Kallada Sukumaran Director General of Prosecution."
The production of these two letters was strongly objected to by Mr. Kurien. It is true that there is no reference to these two letters in the pleadings. But that cannot be the reason for doubting the genuineness of these two letters. The author of these two letters is the 3rd respondent himself. In the letter dated November 23, 1996 he informed the Advocate General in regard to the work arrangement of the Government Pleaders chosen by him for the conduct of prosecution work in the High Court. The letter of September 12, 1997 was sent by the 3rd respondent requesting the A.G. to allot the Government Pleaders named in the said letter to assist him in the conduct of Criminal cases in the High Court under his control and directions as per the allotment and distribution of criminal work to be arranged by him. He also requested the A.G. to intimate the fact by reply with copies to the Government Pleaders concerned. It is not the case of the 3rd respondent that he has not authored these two letters. The letter only shows that the D.G.P. has been and is acting on the instructions given by the A.G. from time to time as per the provisions of the Kerala Government Law Officers Rules.
14. The Foregoing discussion would clearly show that under Section 24 of the Code for every High Court the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more additional Public Prosecutors for conducting in such Court any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on behalf of the State. Therefore, Additional Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 24 of the Code is also a Public Prosecutor for the conduct in the High Court of any prosecution, appeal, etc. The procedure to be followed in the matter of appointment to the post of Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor is contained in the (relevant provisions of the Law Officers Rules. The Government, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 24(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, issued Government Order G.O. (Ms.) No. 249/96/Law dated June 25,1996 appointing the 3rd respondent as Public Prosecutor and also an Additional Public Prosecutor for conducting any prosecution appeal, etc. on behalf of the Government of Kerala. The post of Public Prosecutor was redesignated as Director General of Prosecution and the post of Additional Public Prosecutor was redesignated as Additional Director General Prosecution. The new names do not affect the appointment as Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutor under Section 24 of the Code. Under Ext.R1 (b) the Government has assigned certain duties and functions to the 3rd respondent which includes supervision over the Assistant Public Prosecutors attached to the various Magistrate Courts, Deputy Directors of Prosecution at the District level and Public Prosecutors attached to the Sessions Court. In fact, to a letter dated August 3, 1996 sent by the 3rd respondent to the Government stating that he has not been provided with independent set up to manage the clerical and office work relating to the handling of criminal case files in this Court and requesting for the creation of an independent working establishment for the Public Prosecutor with sufficient number of Advocates to be suggested by the Director General of Prosecution for giving him assistance in the conduct of cases in this Court and further stating that this will streamline the system for securing better results in the handling of Criminal cases, the Government in their letter dated December 11, 1996 informed the D.G.P. that as far as the office of the A.G. is concerned, A.G. is the Head of the Office and all the staff including the Law Officers are under the administrative control of the A.G. and that the appointment of Public Prosecutors and Government Pleaders in the High Court is made by the Government from the panel furnished by the Advocate General and the Law Officers so appointed are functioning under the direction of the A.G.. It was further pointed out that the allotment of a particular work to a particular Government Pleader is the absolute discretion of the A.G. and the Government cannot interfere in it. The D.G.P. was requested to take up the matter with the A.G. and get those Government Pleaders suggested by him posted to assist him in the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court. We have already noticed Article 165 of the Constitution of India. In pursuance of the said Article the Governor of Kerala has made rules regarding the duties, remuneration, etc. of the Advocate General and Additional Advocate General, Kerala. Rule 2(v) provides that the A.G. should arrange to represent the Government in the High Court in all proceedings, civil or criminal, original or appellate in which the Government is a party. Rule 2(vi) also provides that the A.G. should represent the Government in the High Court in proceedings of importance, civil or criminal, in which the Government is party. We have already considered the Law Officers' Rules issued by the Government and the relevant rules viz. Rules 3,4 19(1), 19(5), 19(6), 19(9), 19(10), 19(11), 21, 61, 69 etc. It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that the Advocate General is the Chief Law Officer of the State and he is in overall charge of all criminal and civil proceedings pertaining to Government in the High Court. The Public Prosecutor, merely because he has been redesignated as Director General of Prosecution, cannot claim superiority or equality with the Advocate General in the discharge of his official functions pertaining to the conduct of cases in the High Court. The A.G., as already noticed, is a constitutional functionary of the State whereas the Public Prosecutor is only a statutory Law Officer. The rules above referred would show that the Public Prosecutor is a member of the establishment of the A.G. and he is bound by the Law Officers' Rules. The provisions in Chapters III and VIII of the Law Officers' Rules are express and explicit.
15. It is submitted on behalf of the A.G. that criminal matters pertaining to the High Court are being dealt with in two sections in the A.G's office namely 'J' Section with a Section Officer and four Assistants dealing with criminal appeals and criminal revisions, and 'V' Section with a Section Officer and two Assistants dealing with Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions. Criminal cases in this Court are being posted for admission and hearing before the Division Bench and one or two single Judges. It is submitted that these cases are to be conducted by the Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor, three Senior Government Pleaders and three Government Pleaders allotted by the Advocate General. The practice and procedure followed in the A.G's Office regarding the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court has been clearly spelt out in paragraph 12 of the Counter affidavit filed by the Secretary to Government, Law Department. The Advocate General, in exercise of his powers under the rules regarding the duties, remuneration etc. of the Advocate General, framed under Article 165(2) and (3) of the Constitution of India, issued an order No. M3-17/97 regrading allocation/distribution of work between the Public Prosecutor (re-designated as Director General of Prosecution) and the Additional Public Prosecutor (re-designated as Additional Director General of Prosecution) for the purpose of administrative convenience. The said proceedings is produced as Ext.R1(e). It is stated that took effect from December 15, 1997. Copies of the said order have been served on the D.G.P. and the Law Officers and also to the concerned sections of the A.G's Office. It is also seen from the counter affidavit that the proposal sent by the 3rd respondent to the Government requesting orders for creating an independent working establishment attached to his office with sufficient categories and number of posts by detaching equal number of posts from the office of the A.G. and attaching such posts to the office of the D.G.P. for being filled up by him to work under his direct administrative control on deputation basis was opposed by the A.G. pointing out various-aspects mentioned in the counter affidavit, by his letter dated January 24,1997, produced as Ext.R1(f). The Government, thereupon, issued, orders G.O (Ms.) No. 226/97/Home dated September 8, 1997 according sanction for the creation of the following posts.
1. Section Officer 1 (one)
2. Assistant Grade II 3 (three)
3. Confidential Assistants Grade II 2 (Two)
4. Typist Grade II 2 (Two)
5. Peon 2 (Two) In the said order it was also mentioned that the above posts would be filled up by appointment on deputation from the A.G s Office and that if adequate number of persons willing to be deputed from the A.G's Office are not available, the posts will be filled up by appointment on deputation from the Government. Copy of the said Government order has been produced and marked as Ext.R1(g). On getting the said order the A.G. addressed a letter to the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (C) Department, stating that a letter had already been sent by the Advocate General to the Law Department pointing out that the Advocate General's office is understaffed and requesting the Government to accord sanction for sufficient number of additional posts for the Advocate General's Office to meet the situation. The Law Department, we are told, is yet to pass orders on his proposal.
16. It is seen from Ext.R1(g) order that the Government had not granted the request made by the Director General of Prosecution in his letter dated August 17, 1996, for the creation of an independent working establishment attached to the office of the Director General of Prosecution. The Government had also not granted the request of the Director General of Prosecution to appoint the Advocates by him as Senior Government Pleaders or Government Pleaders under his control for the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court. It is stated in the counter affidavit tiled by the Law Secretary that under the existing rules and regulations the request of the D.G.P. cannot be acceded to and appointment of Government Law Officers in the High Court without reference to the A.G. is impermissible in law. It is also stated in paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit as follows:
"21. It is submitted that sanction for the creation of the additional posts referred to in Ext. R1(g) order for the office of the Director General of Prosecution was accorded by the Government not for the purpose of enabling the Director General of Prosecution to conduct criminal cases in the High Court or to deal with copies or criminal proceedings in the High Court in which Government or the officers of the Departments are party and copies of which intended for the Public Prosecutor are served on the Advocate General's office as wrongly assumed by the Director General of Prosecution. By the Issuance of Ext.R1 (g) order, Government had not intended to discontinue the existing practice and procedure that is being followed for serving copies of criminal cases filed in the High Court in which State of Kerala or its Officers are respondents on the office of the Advocate General and processing the same in Advocate-General's Office. As already submitted, the Public Prosecutor for the High Court is only a Government Law Officer under the Advocate General and as such copies of criminal proceedings which are required to be served on the Public Prosecutor are to be received and processed in the office of the Advocate General. Merely because the post of Public Prosecutor for the High Court held by Sri Kallada Sukumaran is re-designated as Director General of Prosecution, the 3rd respondent Director General of Prosecution is not justified in insisting that all copies of criminal proceedings in which Government or officers of department are parties should be in the office of the Director General of Prosecution by the Advocates or parties in person. Having regard to the fact that by issuance of Ext.R1(c) order Government have specified the functions and duties to be discharged by the Director General of Prosecution, namely the exercise of supervisory control by the Director General of Prosecution over the Assistant Public Prosecutors attached to the various Magistrate Courts, Deputy Directors of Prosecution at district levels and Public Prosecutors attached to the Sessions Courts. The office of the Director General of Prosecution is expected to deal only with those types of duties and functions which are discharged and exercised by the 3rd respondent as the Director General of Prosecution. The members of the staff attached to the Director General of Prosecution have no authority or competence to deal with papers concerning the conduct of criminal cases in the High Court. The said duties are to be attended to by the members of the staff of the Advocate General's Office alone."
We are of the view that Ext.P1 letter dated February 5, 1998 issued by the D.G.P., having recognised the A.G. and acted on his instructions, has, for the first time, by the above said letter, sought for change of procedure which is in vogue for all these years, under the guise of availability of adequate staff sanctioned by the Government. He could have taken up the matter with the A.G. and sorted out the procedural formalities instead of issuing Ext.P1 letter to the President of the Kerala High Court Advocates' Association with copy marked to the Advocates' Clerks' Association. However, the D.G.P. has failed in his duty in adopting the proper procedure. We are of the view that as per the rule as it stands today the 3rd respondent has no authority or power to issue any proceedings of the nature, bypassing the 2nd respondent when he is under legal obligation to act on the instructions/orders that may be issued by the A. G. from time to time in the matter of conduct of cases as per the rules in force as on today. He has also to attend to such other work as may, from time to time, be assigned to him by the Advocate General or the Government. Hence, in our view, sending of Ext.Pl is beyond the jurisdiction and power of the 3rd respondent. We only reiterate the opinion expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Abdurahiman's case (supra) and fervently appeal to the officers concerned, via. respondents 2 and 3, to draw the curtain and put an end to an unwarranted litigation like the present one, which compels the Government in the luxury of engaging senior lawyers to protect the interest of the Government. This litigation cold have been avoided if the Director General of Prosecution had approached the Advocate General and sorted out the issue.
17. We saw that the office of the Advocate General is a very important one and he is discharging constitutional functions. Likewise, the post of Public Prosecutor is also very important one with regard to criminal proceedings. He has to discharge his statutory functions under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, The said post also carries distinction of a covetable position It is to be noticed that the post of Public Prosecutor has been redesignated by the Government as Director General of Prosecution, which will have the same status, facilities, emoluments, rate of monetary benefits etc. as those of the Advocate General. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that the Advocate General is appointed by the Governor of the State under Article 165 of the Constitution of India and he is a constitutional functionary whose words are binding on the Government. The Government is also well aware of the primacy of the Advocate General vis-a-vis the Public Prosecutor (D.G.P.) in criminal matters. The only manner in which paragraph 3 of Ext.R1(b) giving the D.G.P. the same status as of A.G. is to be construed is that it is for the purpose of exercising his supervisory powers over the Public Prosecutors, Assistant Public Prosecutors, etc. in the district level. This cannot, in our opinion authorise the Director General of Prosecution to assume the status of the Advocate General, who is a constitutional functionary and the only Law Officer recognised by the Constitution of India.
18. The Supreme Court in Joginder Singh Wasu's case (supra) held that the office of the A.G. is an exalted one and that he is the Supreme Law Officer of the State. The Supreme Court adverted to the fact that the A.G. is conferred the right to audience before the Legislature of a State both in the Assembly and the Council under Article 177 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held as follows:
"Any concession made by the Government pleader in the trial Court cannot bind the Government as it is obviously always unsafe to rely on the wrong or erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the State unless it is in writing on instruction from the responsible officer. Otherwise it would place undue and needless heavy burden on the public exchequer. But the same yardstick cannot be applied when the Advocate General has made a statement across the bar since the Advocate General makes the statement with all the responsibility."
19. For the foregoing reasons, Ext.Pl issued by the 3rd respondent Director General of Prosecution is quashed and consequently, we declare that the office of the Advocate General is the only competent authority to accept copies is the only competent authority to accept copies of criminal proceedings in the High Court in which the Government is a party, and forward the same to the Public Prosecutor's office for further prosecution and conduct of the cases.
The Original Petition is disposed of as above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties to the proceedings will bear their own costs.