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7. The assessee is aggrieved at these dismissals of its appeals by the ld. CIT(A) and has accordingly come in appeal before us. Sh. Rakesh Garg, Advocate (hereinafter referred to as the ld. AR) offering arguments in favour of the assessee's claims, submitted that the entire order was invalid in the eyes of law as the name of the assessee, the PAN, the assessment year, the date of assessment and the section in which the order was passed were left blank. Furthermore, it was argued that the demand notice that was issued, bore no relation to the assessment order, because it was not computed on the basis of the income determined in that order. Therefore, it was deserving of being quashed. The ld. AR ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 pointed out that the ld. CIT(A) had glossed over these fundamental issues and applied the provisions of section 292B to cover up the mistakes, which in fact could not cover such mistakes. She had not even held the demand notice to be unlawful, even though she was clear that it did not arise out of assessment order. Therefore, the ld. AR prayed that the entire demand may be quashed on account of the invalid assessment order. Without prejudice to the above, the Ld AR argued that additions to the income of the assessee had only been made because the ld. Pr. CIT, Central had cancelled the registration of the assessee trust. It was submitted that once the registration of the assessee trust had been restored by the ITAT and had not been reversed by any order of any superior court, the additions that had been made in the hands of the assessee could not be made, because once the objects of the trust had been considered as charitable, then the assessee trust had to be assessed according to the scheme laid down under sections 11 to 13 of the Act and the disallowances made were not sustainable. Thereafter, the ld. Authorized Representative assailed the orders of the ld. CIT(A) and invited our attention to para 10.5.3 of the order of the ld. CIT(A). It was submitted that in the said para, the ld. CIT(A) had made an erroneous observation that the provisions of section 11(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act should be for a specific purpose and that since there was no specific direction as to what purpose the said donation was to be applied to, these could not be regarded as having been made towards the corpus. It was also submitted that the ld. CIT(Exemption) had affirmed the view of the ld. AO that since the assessee had asked for the donation, the donations made towards the corpus were not voluntary. It was submitted that the fact that the assessee requested for the donation did not in any way make the donation involuntary, because the donors had confirmed that they had made the donation voluntarily. Furthermore, it was submitted that the only condition that was laid down in section 11(1)(d), was that there should be a specific direction that the donation should be towards the corpus. There was no requirement that the purpose of the donation should also be stated and the ld. CIT(A) was incorrect in her assumption that this was so. The ld. AR, thereafter, invited our attention to ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 pages 191 to pages 214 of his paper book which contained the letters of the various donors. He pointed out that in almost all the cases, the donors had indicated that they were making the contributions voluntarily and that the donations were being made by them towards the corpus of the trust. In the circumstances, since the conditions of section 11(1)(d) stood complied, there was no occasion for the ld. CIT(A) to sustain the addition made on account of donations to corpus, which had not been and were not required to be taken to the income and expenditure account. The ld. AR, thereafter invited our attention to para 10.6.81 of the order of the ld. CIT(A), in which the ld. CIT(A) had refused to allow the accumulation of Rs.22,00,00,000/- on account of the fact that in its application under in Form 10, the assessee had only mentioned that the accumulation was being done for the purposes of the trust. It was submitted that the assessee had filed Form 10 on 28.10.2017, i.e. before the due date of filing of the return for that assessment year and had mentioned the purpose for which the excess of 15% amount was accumulated or set aparti.e. for the charitable objects of the trust. Our attention was invited to section 11(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, which required the assessee to state the purpose for which the income was being accumulated and set apart and the period for which the income was being accumulated and set apart in a prescribed format. It was submitted that the assessee had complied with these conditions. It was a public charitable trust running a hospital and providing medical education. These objects had been pursued by it since the inception of the trust and this had been accepted by the ld. AO also. Thus, the purpose for which accumulation was done was clearly indicated and the requirement of law had been duly complied with, in terms of section 11(2)(a). There was no dispute on compliance of section 11(2)(b) and 11(2)(c) that the income should be deposited in specified modes and Form 10 should be filed within the prescribed time. Therefore, there was no justification to hold that the said accumulation was not in accordance with section 11(2). Accordingly, he prayed that the addition made in this regard should be deleted. With regard to the addition of Rs.18,18,45,925/-, being 15% of the income derived from the property ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 held in trust that was set apart as per section 11(1)(a), it was argued that the same was not included in the total income of the assessee as per the scheme of assessment of charitable trusts. The disallowance had only been made because the registration of the assessee had been cancelled but once the registration had been granted by the Tribunal, thus the same was automatically allowable. It was submitted that the ld. CIT(A) was misdirected in saying that the details of the accumulation had to be provided in Form 9A as Form 9A was for cases where 85% of the income could not be applied towards charitable purposes, on account of either non-receipt of the income or for any other cause, which was not there in the assessee's case and the assessee trust had furnished the details of accumulation under section 11(1)(a) in the ITR filed by it. Therefore, the sustenance of addition on such grounds was unjustified. On the issue of addition to fixed assets, the ld. AR invited our attention to para 10.7.01 of the order of the ld. CIT(A), in which the ld. CIT(A) had disallowed the investment in fixed asset on the grounds that the assessee was earning huge profits and has utilized the same to purchase fixed assets, for the purposes of earning further profits. The ld. AR submitted, that capital expenditure also allowed as application of income for charitable purposes during the year under consideration. It was pointed out that in the remand report, the ld. AO had pointed out, that the assessee had incurred the capital expenditure on fixed assets relating to the hospital run by it and also pointed out, that assets had not been acquired for the other objects of the trust. It was submitted that while the ld. AO had tried to guide the assessee in the manner in which it should spend its funds, he had confirmed that the fixed assets were created for the trust purposes and that the capital expenditure had been incurred for the objects, as per the object clause of the trust. Under these circumstances, the ld. CIT(A) was not justified in holding that the expenditure on capital assets was not allowable, because they were only made with a view of earning further income. It was submitted that the assessee was a public charitable trust and any income earned by the trust, would only subsequently be applied towards the objects of the trust i.e. charitable purposes. Therefore, it was prayed that the addition may be deleted.

9. Shri. H.S. Usmani, CIT DR (hereinafter referred to as the ld. CIT DR), arguing on behalf of the Revenue, pointed out that the ld. CIT(A) had passed speaking orders in which she had pointed out the reasons for rejecting the assessee's claims. Referring to her order for the Assessment year 2017-18, he submitted that in para 7.2 of her order, the ld. CIT(A) has pointed out that the case was selected for scrutiny under CASS and a notice under section 143(2) was duly served upon the assessee. Furthermore, in response to notices under section 142(1) of the Act, the assessee had furnished submissions and attended hearings. On perusal of the notice of demand issued under section 156, it was noted that the PAN number, date, assessment order etc., had all been specifically mentioned alongwith the DIN and notice number. On perusal of the assessment order, it had been noted that DIN and order number had been mentioned. Both the assessment order as well as the notice of demand had been digitally signed by the Assessing Officer on 31.12.2019 at 10:35 pm. The ld. CIT(A) has also pointed out how the assessee was well aware that an assessment order for the instant assessment year was awaited in its case. Furthermore, the ld. CIT(A) had pointed out that there was no confusion in the mind of the assessee while filing Form 35, as the assessee had mentioned all the details which it stated was missing in the order such as the section under which the order was passed, the date of the order, the assessment year, the amount of income assessed, the total addition to income and the amount of disputed demand. Thus, in the instant case, when the order that was issued was in conformity with and according to the intent and purpose of the Act, the same could not be held to be invalid only because there were certain omissions in the said order due to technical mistakes while uploading. The ld. CIT DR submitted that in view of this judicious finding in the order of the ld. CIT(A), no interference was called for and the order could not be invalidated on this account. On the issue ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 of erroneous computation of tax as reflecting in the demand notice, the ld. CIT DR pointed out that the same would not invalidate the tax notice, but the assessee was entitled to seek rectification of the same and the ld. CIT(A) had accordingly advised him so. Thus, there could be no challenge to either the assessment order or the demand notice. On the issue of disallowance of corpus donation, the ld. CIT DR submitted that the Assessing Officer and the ld. CIT(A) had clearly brought out that the donations were not made voluntarily, but had been actively sought by the assessee and therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the benefits as laid down under section 11(1)(d). On the issue of accumulation under section 11(2), the ld. CIT DR invited our attention to paragraph 10.6.3 of the order of the ld. CIT(A) in which he pointed out that the ld. CIT(A)had elaborately discussed why specification of purpose was a requirement of section 11(2) of the Act and generality of the objects of the trust could not take the place of specificity. He submitted that no section could be read in a manner that rendered its provisions otiose. When sub section (2) of section 11 requires specification of purpose, then the purpose was required to be indicated. It could not be argued that by accumulating for the generality of the objects of the trust, the purpose was being indicated, because in any case a charitable trust could not apply its income for any purpose other than the objects. Thus, the very fact that the statute requires the purpose for accumulation to be specified, implied that such a purpose should be a concrete one and one must be stated. The ld. CIT(A) had clearly brought this out in her order and therefore, the addition of Rs.22,00,00,000/- made on this account deserved to be sustained. With regard to the amount of Rs.18,18,45,925/-, being 15% accumulated under section 11(1)(a) and the addition of Rs. 13,41,75,589/- on account of investments in capital assets, the ld. CIT DR relied upon the orders of the ld. CIT(A). With regard to the addition of Rs.5,59,55,800/- under section 68 and addition of Rs. 6,77,19,543/- by way of adhoc disallowances, the ld. CIT(DR) submitted that the additions had been made primarily because the assessee had failed to furnish supporting evidences and therefore, he would not have objection ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 to the matter being remanded back to the Assessing Officer for re-examination, after considering those evidences which the assessee claimed to possess.

Subsequently, the ld. Commissioner revised the case under section 263. According to him, section 11(2) contemplated only specific or concrete purposes and since those were not specified by the assessee, the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. Accordingly, the assessment was set aside. On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal held, that on an examination of the scheme of the Act, since a plurality of charitable purpose was not ruled out, no objection could possibly be taken to the assessee listing out all its objects in Form No.10. It held that it had complied with the provisions of the Act and disagreed with the findings of the Commissioner. Before the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that one purpose of accumulation was interlinked with the other and therefore, the mention of all the purposes did not make any difference and satisfied the requirements of section 11(2). However, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court observed that the Tribunal's decision overlooked the scheme relating to accumulation of income for particular future use. It held that while accumulation under section 11(1) could be taken for the broad purposes of the trust as a whole, which is why the statute did not require an assessee to state to specify the purpose, long term accumulation was only permissible under sub section (2) and that could only be for a definite and concrete purpose or purposes. The Hon'ble High Court held that the assessee had sought permission to accumulate for the objects as enshrined in the trust deed in a blanket or global manner which, in its view, was definitely not in the contemplation of section 11(2), when it was construed in its setting. The Hon'ble High Court held that accepting the assessee's contention that saving and accumulation of income for future application was for the purposes of the trust under widest terms so as to embrace the entirety of the objects clause of the trust deed, would render the requirement of specification for the purposes of acquisition in that sub section, redundant. The Hon'ble High Court further observed that when section 11(2) required the specification of the purpose, it did so with the objective of calling an assessee to state some specific purpose, out of the multiple purposes for which the trust stood; had it not been so, there would not have been any mandate for such specification since, in any case, a charitable trust could, in no circumstances, apply its income, whether current or accumulated, for any purpose other than the objects for which it stood. The very fact that the statute required the purpose of accumulation to be stated, implied that such a purpose be a concrete one, an itemized purpose for a purpose instrumental or ancillary for the implementation of its object or objects. The very requirement or purpose predicated that the purpose must have an individuality. The Hon'ble High Court further observed that it was not necessary that the assessee had to mention only one specific object; there could be setting apart and accumulation of income for more objects than ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 one, but whatever the objects or purposes might be, the assessee must specify in the notice, the concrete nature of the purposes for which the application was being made. Plurality of purposes of accumulation may not be precluded, but it must depend on the exact and precise purposes for which the accumulation was intended; generality of the objects of the trust could not take the place of the specificity of the need for accumulation. According to the Hon'ble High Court, the provision of section 11(2) was a concession provision to enable a charitable trust to meet the contingency, where the fulfilment of any project within its object or objects, needed heavy outlay calling for accumulation to amass sufficient money to implement it and, therefore, specification of purpose, as required by section 11(2), admitted of no amount of vagueness about such purposes. The facts of the assessee's case are exactly similar to the facts in the case of DIT(Exemption) vs. Trustees of Singhania and Charitable Trust (supra). In this case also, the assessee has filed the Form 10, in which it has given notice of accumulation for the generality of the objects of the functions of the parishad as enshrined in section 15 of the U.P.A.E.V.P.A. 1965. The ld. AR has submitted that the functions (which are 21 in number) are all inter-related and because the assessee parishad cannot spend any money outside of its objects, it is fully compliant with the requirements of section 11(2) of the Act.

25.1Thus it has been clearly brought out in the judgments of Trustees of Singhania Charitable Trust and Sir Sobha Singh Public Charitable Trust that the language of section 11(2)(a) as it stood at the time, mandates that the notice under section 10 be specific about the purpose for which the income was being accumulated and a reference to the objects of the trust as the purpose for accumulation, would not meet the requirements of the said section. It is however true, that the Courts are divided on this issue. While the views of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of DIT(Exemption) vs. Trustees of Singhania Charitable Trust(supra) have been followed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. M.CT MutthaiahChettiar Family Trust 245 ITR 400, some other Hon'ble High Courts like the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hotel and Restaurants Association 261 ITR 190 have held , while refusing to admit Revenue's appeal, that plurality of purpose of accumulation was not precluded, the purpose or purposes to be specified could not have been beyond the objects of the trust and Revenue had not come to a finding that any of the objects of the assessee-company were not for charitable purposes. The concurrent findings by the lower authorities were findings of fact and they gave no rise to questions of law. Both these judgments had been followed by various other courts and ITA Nos.181 & 182/LKW/2024 Rohilkhand Educational Charitable Trust A.Ys. 2017-18 & 2018-19 Tribunals. The decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has been followed in subsequent decisions of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Bharat Kalyan Pratisthan vs. DIT(Exemption) 299 ITR 406 (Del),DIT vs. Mitsui and Co. Environmental Trust 303 ITR 111 (Del) and Bharat Krishak Samaj vs. DDIT(Exemption) 306 ITR 153 (Del). The ld. Special Counsel has pointed out that the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hotel and Restaurant Association cannot constitute a valid precedent because it related to the question of an admission of a case, which was rejected on the basis of concurrent findings of lower authorities and therefore, could not be read as an exposition of law on the issue of section 11(2). Be that as it may, the fact remains that the said decision has been followed by subsequent orders of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, as narrated above. However, as the Ld CIT(DR) has pointed out, the Constitution Bench Of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs (Import) Mumbai vs. Dilip Kumar & Company (2018) 95 taxman.com 327 (SC)has held, that exemption provisions have to be strictly applied and whenever there was an ambiguity in the exemption clause or notification, which was subject to strict interpretation, the benefit of such ambiguity could not be claimed by the assessee, it must be interpreted in favour of the Revenue and the burden of proving the applicability would be on the assessee to show that his case comes within the parameters of the exemption clause or exemption notification. Section 11(2) is not a charging section. Rather it is a section which confers an exemption from tax on the fulfilment of certain conditions. Hence it is to be strictly applied. Therefore considering the decision in CC(I)Mumbai vs Dilip Kumar & others (Supra), where in section 11(2)(a), it is written that the person is required to specify the purpose for which the income is being accumulated or set apart, the views in support of such interpretation, as expressed in Singhania Charitable Trust and Sir Sobha Singh Public Charitable trust regarding the requirement of specificity in the notice in Form 10, must be upheld.