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Showing contexts for: proximate cause in Sm. Sumitra Debi Jalan vs Satya Narayan Prahladka And Ors. on 26 March, 1964Matching Fragments
(b) Negligence in the act itself; and lastly;
(c) Negligency must be the proximate cause.
See .
53. Estoppel by negligence as laid down in in my, opinion applies to the facts of the present case.
54. Under the Companies Act Sections 28 and 34 the buyer of shares with blank transfer deeds has a statutory duty to have the shares registered in his name in order to become the full owner thereof. Delivery of shares along with blank transfer deeds passes not the property of the shares, but a title legal and equitable which enables the holder to vest himself with the shares without risk of his right being repudiated by any other person deriving title from the registered owner. Re. In the matter of Mahaluxmi Cotton Mills Ltd. 57 Cal WN 102.
55. Such buyer has a further duty to the transferee or the public at large, not to leave or allow the shares to remain with blank transfer deeds duly executed by the registered holder, with a person thereby enabling him to deal with them; and such duty is broken by leaving the property in such condition.
56. In this case it appears to me that there has been breach of both these duties.
57. I further find in this case that negligence is in the very act itself, namely, leaving the shares with blank transfer deeds or allowing them to remain in possession of the defendant No. 1. This very act or leaving the shares or allowing them to remain in possession of the defendant No. 1 with blank transfer deeds enables the defendant No. 1 to deal with them and that act of negligence was the proximate cause.
62. It would indeed be regrettable if these principles were to be departed from and/or a contrary principle established because that would in my judgment knock the very bottom out of the principle upon which the ground of mercantile convenience is based and thereby endanger the security of commercial transactions and destroy that confidence upon which what is called the usual course of trade materially rests.
63. This principle was also expressed by Blackburn J. in Swan v. North British Australasian Co. (1863) 2 H. & C. 175 at p. 182 also reported in 159 E. R. 73 and also in Farquharson Bros. & Co. v. C. King & Co. 1902 A. C. 324 at p. 342 that the rule is qualified; that neglect must be in the transaction itself and must be the proximate cause of leading the party into that mistake; that it must be neglect of some duty that is owing to the person led into that belief or what comes to the same thing, to the general public of whom the person is one.